http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/8/lawler.htmA few weeks ago, reporting on the Foundations of Freedom conference at the University of Portland, I expressed some doubts about the very interesting paper, "President Bush, the Ownership Society, and the Catholic Understanding of the Common Good,” presented by Dr. William Hudson. Also relevant to the "Ownership Society" debat is this new essay, "The Caregiving Society," by Peter Augustine Lawler and available at The New Atlantis. Here is a taste:
In his stirring second inaugural on “America
’s ideal of freedom,” President Bush called upon us to build “an ownership society.” “By making every citizen an agent of his or her destiny,” he declared, we “will give our fellow Americans greater freedom from want and fear.” With that vision in mind, he proposed to reform Social Security by bringing it under the control of each individual agent. Certainly, some reform is needed as individuals live longer, children become scarcer, and the baby boomers retire. And surely there is a large potential upside to making today’s workers active investors in their own retirements and deploying today’s assets in the entrepreneurial economy.
But there is also something deeply inadequate about viewing old age in terms of individual “ownership” of one’s own destiny. The aging society, after all, will confront us with the realities of human neediness. Freedom from “want and fear,” to the extent such freedom is humanly attainable, will require the old accepting the inevitability of their growing dependence on others, and it will require others who willingly accept the burden of caring for their elders, even at the expense of their own independence. The ownership society only makes sense if it prepares us to be care-givers and care-receivers, and if it does not encourage us to see ourselves as unencumbered individuals. . . .
Self-reliance, of course, is a great American virtue. America is a middle-class nation, and it continues to become more middle-class all the time. This does not mean that we are all equal economically, or that we are all equal when it comes to intelligence and virtue. It means that we all work because we have to work, and that we are all free. We believe that all human beings have an equal right to work and no right to expect the fruits of other people’s labors. And we believe that freedom means not being dependent on others or constrained by others. We are against all forms of servitude and dependence, and we often see no real difference between paternalism and despotism. Even the rights and responsibilities of parents are quite limited and temporary; our children are raised to be free and independent, to achieve on their own, to go their own way.
More than ever, we experience ourselves simply as individuals, distinguished by our freedom from what nature has given us. We are freer to escape the constraints of bodily limitation, of gender, senescence, and decline—or at least to live for an extended period of time as if we could do so. The world exists, the individual thinks, for me. In the beginning, there I was, and after me there is nothing.
But this view of ourselves as individuals remains far from complete. Despite our pretensions, we remain in many ways dependent beings.
Rick
Thanks to MOJ contributors who have called attention to Justice O'Connor's resignation. Her stepping down from the Supreme Court will trigger a great deal of discussion about the qualities of her successor. Here is a short essay Download moral_issues_and_the_virtuous_judgenomination_of_supreme_court_justices.mdi I wrote on a related topic, the role of virtues, back in the mid 1990s. It may still offer some thoughts relevant to the judicial selection process in 2005. I read the Solum commentary linked to Rick's earlier posting on Justice O'Connor's resignation. I saw Solum's question about whether advocating for a virtuous judicial candidate is naive. I hope I was able to present some points why considering the virtuous character of candidates is not naive but essential. RJA sj
A few days ago, I posted an essay by Notre Dame's Dan Philpott on forgiveness. For some interesting reactions to the Philpott essay, by a law professor who has written often and thoughtfully about issues of mercy and justice, see this post at Prawfsblawg, by Dan Markel.
Rick
Larry Solum has a must-read post up on Justice O'Connor, formalism, and the judicial virtues. Check it out.
Friday, July 1, 2005
As we salute Justice O'Connor as an individual and honor her for the boost she gave to the participation of women in the legal profession, we also turn to the consequences of her retirement for a whole range of legal, especially constitutional, issues. The Supreme Court Nomination Blog posts a long list of the 5-4 decisions in which Justice O'Connor cast the deciding vote and a more conservative replacement might vote differently. They include church-state cases but also, obviously, lots of others that might be grist for our mill of discussing the future of the law as it relates to Catholic thought. I'd be interested in hearing about some of them -- especially some of the less well known holdings -- from fellow MOJers knowledgable in the respective fields.
Tom B.
THE TABLET
02/07/2005
The gift of married priests
John Crowley
After
40 years as a priest, the Bishop of Middlesbrough hopes for a mixed,
celibate and non-celibate clergy. Access to Mass, rather than marital
status, matters
RECENTLY
it has been my happiness to celebrate 40 years of priesthood. On the
actual anniversary date itself I was able to offer a Jubilee Mass of
Thanksgiving in our cathedral, together with many of my brother
priests, deacons and lay faithful. It was an intensely joyful
experience which touched me more deeply than I had anticipated. On the
eve of that celebration I was interviewed on local radio on a whole
range of issues which included a question about my view on married
priests. I expressed the personal hope that within my lifetime the
Church might more generally allow married priests. Subsequently that
remark has produced some lively debate, not least in some parts of the
Catholic press. That is all to the good, but it might be helpful to put
my remarks into their wider context, and The Tablet has kindly allowed me the space to do so.
[To read the piece, click here.]
______________
mp
As MOJ readers certainly know, Justice Sandra O'Connor has announced her retirement from the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice O'Connor concludes -- for now, anyway -- a long career of public service as a legislator, judge, and justice. In my view, she was -- among other things -- a consistent and important defender of religious freedom, and of the constitutional principle that our First Amendment does not require discrimination against religious believers or the exclusion of religion from the public square. Her life story is fascinating and inspiring. I gather from news reports that her husband is not well, and so I wish her, and him, all the best.
Rick
I follow the Mirror of Justice blog with interest, and saw your
recent post concerning religious and governmental institutions, and their spheres of operation. May I suggest the following historical and legal sources? I encountered them during my education at Catholic University School of Law, and in personal reading.
- Kenneth Pennington, Law and Norms Without a State - Here
- Jacques Maritain - Man and the State
- Any St. Thomas Aquinas on State Government
May I also suggest that a more precise definition of "allegiance" might be required? For instance, it might be said that it is required that secular government both draw basic norms from natural law; secular government because this forms the baseline for varied people, and religious where the tenants of natural law are confirmed (or at the very least, uncontradicted) by revealed or divine law. Another way of defining allegiance would be to indicate, as did the Centurion did, that the secular government has power over a people only because it is given that power from above. It is worthwhile to note that until the 18th century, custom and natural law (here, meaning transnational norms of the ius commune) had a higher place on the heirarchy than promulgated law.
Sincerely,
Jonathan Watson
Thank you Jonathan for responding.
