Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Sunday, August 28, 2005

Another comment on the Compendium

Kevin Lee asked me to post his reaction to Alison Sulentic's reaction to my question about the use of the Compenium as a teaching tool.  (Sorry for the delay in posting - I just returned from picking up my daughter from summer camp.)  Kevin does not share Alison's sense that the Compendium overemphasizes the writings of Pope John Paul II, given the length of his tenure during a time of "radical development" in the Church's social teaching.  He observes:

"It may be that students will have difficulty grasping the accomplishments of this soon-to-be-canonized pope, but I think rather than presenting his thought against other less authoritative voices, it might be more productive to attempt to locate his thought in the fullness of the Catholic intellectual heritage by clearly articulating his reading of that tradition with as much hermeneutical good will as can be brought to the task. This is a very demanding task, indeed, because he was a complex thinker and the text tradition of his work is in a nascent stage. But, I would encourage all of us to read deeply of John Paul II’s thought in order to make a cogent critique of it, rather than to risk allowing the students to dismiss it without fully appreciating what it has to offer.

"I understand all too well the problems involved in trying to come to terms with the complexity of John Paul’s thought. I’ve been working for several years on my doctorial dissertation, which attempts to unfold the meaning of his conception of the human person for the Rule of Law. What I have found is that to understand his thought it is vital to get into the primary sources from his early life as a scholar of philosophical ethics. Here you can find a number of helpful works. In addition to the standard ones, Acting Person, Love and Responsibility, etc., what I have found most important for understanding his assessment of moral philosophy in the Catholic intellectual heritage is his collection of essays known as the “Lublin Lectures.” It is here that he takes up Aquinas, Kant, Scheler and several others in a robust discussion of the nature of the moral good and justice in the context of a magnificent discussion of the phenomenology of moral action. This is heady stuff, but well worth reading. That’s the rub. For all its value, there is no reliable and authoritative English translation of the Lublin Lectures on the market today. If you read German, they are available in Lubliner Vorlesungen, ed. Juliusz Stroynowki (Stuttgart-Degerloch: Seewald Verlag, 1981).  This translation seems very good, but my German is very bad. Kenneth Schmitz relied on this translation in his very useful book, At the Center of the Human Drama (CUA Press).  This text, along with Rocco Buttiglione’s Karol Wojtyla, The Thought of the Man Who Because John Paul II, are excellent background sources on John Paul’s thought and its relation to twentieth century Neo-Scholastic thought and phenomenological ethics. I think, given the relative innocence of most students of the Catholic intellectual tradition in general and Catholic moral philosophy, let alone secular moral philosophy, that picking and choosing among texts is quite difficult. Unfortunately, there is no single work on the market today with a sustained analysis of his Lublin Lectures, although I plan to have one out soon."

I don't disagree with the importance of John Paul II to the development of Catholic Social Thought (and did not read Alison as doing so either).  That does not mean, however, that having students read other sources in addition to his teachings risks the students dismissing his thought without fully appreciating it.  Certainly it can't be said that no other voices are worthwhile and important to the development of the Church's thought.  It is this that leads Alison (and several others whom I have read) to hesitate about overreliance on the Compendium.

More on Roberts and Conflicts

I think that Rick is probably right when he argues that the likelihood of a conflict between Roberts' religious views on abortion and his interpretation of what the Constitution properly requires is not great enough to justify sensitive inquiries into Robert's Catholicism (inquiries that should be at least somewhat disfavored because they are likely to stir up emotions and prejudices concerning other issues, etc.).

I do think, though, that it's a little more complicated than Rick's argument portrays it.  Here's his money quote:

The premise for Governor Cuomo's "I can't impose my personal religious beliefs on the Constitution" is, and has been for two decades, that the Constitution actually requires an near-unlimited abortion license.  But, it doesn't.  If we were talking about a conflict between religious belief and, say, the requirement that Representatives have attained the age of 25 years -- if we wondered whether Roberts's religion would compel him to require the seating of a 16 year old -- then the potential for that conflict might be worth exploring.  But we are not.

I.e., Roberts need not be driven by Catholic faith to reject Roe; he can (and should) reject it merely because it's an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution (unwarranted, as RIck earlier says, by "text. history, or structure").  I certainly agree with this judgment about the wrongness of Roe.  But two complications.

First, the issue of stare decisis.  There is some possibility that in applying his best understanding of the legal considerations concerning overruling of precedents, Roberts might conclude that there is a case for preserving Roe on stare decisis grounds, even if it was originally wrong.  A senator  might plausibly ask, "If you reach that conclusion as a matter of stare decisis principles, but this conflicts with the fundamentals of your faith, what will you do?"  This possibility -- however unlikely  -- fits with my general sense that the extent and contours of Roberts' commitment to stare decisis is the most crucial single issue in the entire upcoming hearings.  (And it's a wild-card issue because theories of stare decisis are way underdeveloped compared with theories of constitutional interpretation on the merits.)  Perhaps the answer in return is, "Roe is so wrong that Roberts is not going to be drawn to upholding it based on stare decisis considerations."  That may be -- again, I certainly don't want to minimize the constitutional wrongness of Roe -- but it nevertheless seems to me that this is more complex than the argument as Rick puts it.

More broadly, the question put to the nominee is not precisely, "If your religious faith conflicts with what the Constitution requires, what will you do?" but rather, "If your religious faith conflicts with your best understanding of what the Constitution requires, what will you do?"  What the senators want (and should want) to know is that the nominee will follow his/her best understanding of constitutional method to its logical conclusion, notwithstanding any distortion or misdirection from extra-constitutional sources.  So the question is not so much whether Roe is right constitutionally (and a nominee's faith might misdirect him or her to the opposite result).  The question is somewhat more subjective:  whether the nominee conscientiously, after engaging in his best attempt to interpret the Constitution, would conclude it's right (but then be so misdirected).  Thus my reaction is that Rick, in simply pointing out the constitutional wrongness of Roe, is not quite asking the right question; you can't smuggle in your own evaluation of the merits of the issue (however correct that evaluation is).  Rather, since the question is whether the (prospective) justice's judgment would be distorted or misdirected, the question is what would Roberts conclude about Roe as a matter of constitutional interpretation.  (Again, the answer may be -- and this seems probably right -- that Roberts would himself think Roe wrong, as an original matter, for the same (good) reasons that Rick offers.  But again, although this may not change the ultimate conclusion, it does make the argument more complicated, it seems to me.)

Am I wrong about this, Rick or others?

Tom B.

 

Saturday, August 27, 2005

Mike Schutt's additions to the booklist

Mike Schutt has these recomendations:

1. Augustine, City of God

2. A.P. D'entreves, Natural Law

3. O'Donovan and O'Donovan, From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook on
Christian Political Thought

I'll also take this opportunity to remind our readers of his fine bibliography, Law and the Biblical Traditon:  Select Bibliography for Christian Law Students, and another bibliography, The Catholic Dimensions of Legal Study:  The Catholic University Law School Annotated Bibliography.

Interesting church-property case

This news story describes a recent ruling by a federal bankruptcy judge that -- contrary to the arguments of the Diocese of Spokane -- the Diocese owns the parishes and schools in the diocese, and that these properties are therefore available to the Diocese's creditors, including sex-abuse victims.  The Diocese had "argued that the properties belong to individual parishes, not to the diocese, and therefore were not subject to liquidation."

In her ruling, [Judge] Williams tackled thorny church-state issues that are being closely watched nationwide. Among the most important: whether civil law would trump church law on the issue of who owns parish property.

Under Catholic Church law, individual parishes own their property. And while the bishop holds legal title to parish property and schools, the church considers such property to be held in trust for the benefit of parishioners. The diocese argued that any decision to the contrary would violate the church's First Amendment rights in that the state essentially would be forcing the bishop to violate church law.

In her ruling, . . . the bankruptcy judge said [Bishop] Skylstad had voluntarily entered into bankruptcy court. She said that though the dispute did involve a church, the case was not an internal church dispute and therefore civil law took precedence.

Further, she said it was not a violation of the First Amendment to apply federal bankruptcy law or state law to determine what property the diocese owns.

I tend to be a church-autonomy hawk.  Still, this ruling -- as described in the article, anyway -- seems right.  I'm not an expert in this area, but I'm inclined to think that, having cast the finances -- and perhaps the future -- of the Diocese before the bankruptcy court, Bishop Skylstad can hardly complain that the bankruptcy court is doing what bankruptcy courts do.  (Thanks to Amy Welborn).

Do others disagree?

Rick

Update:  Professor Friedman reports, at "Religion Clause", on another interesting church-autonomy / no-entanglement case, involving New York's divorce law and Jewish marriage law, and on yet another one, involving judicial resolution of collective-bargaining disputes involving Catholic schools.

Cuomo on Roberts and Religion

Here is Mario Cuomo's L.A. Times op-ed, "Put a little faith in Roberts:  Go ahead, ask him about his religious beliefs.  As long as he puts the Constitution first, there should be no problem." 

Well, not to be too flip, but there actually would be a problem -- wouldn't there be? -- if Roberts "put the Constitution first," ahead of his "religious beliefs".  Cuomo's real point, of course, is this:

The question about Roberts' beliefs in effect asks whether he would impose his own personal test, religious or otherwise, on his reading of the Constitution: Would he say he might ignore his oath to support the Constitution if faced with an overriding personal belief?

Now, as Gov. Cuomo knows full well, there is zero chance that Judge Roberts will say -- or that Judge Roberts believes -- he should "impose his own personal [religious] test . . . on his reading of the Constitution."  Presumably Gov. Cuomo -- as much as he frustrates me, I have no doubt that he is a decent man -- strongly believes that being a public official does not excuse acting wrongly (lying, cheating, stealing, etc.).  So, why does Cuomo think the question should be asked?  Payback, apparently.  Here is Cuomo's opening:

FOR MORE THAN 20 years, some conservative clerics and politicians have bitterly criticized Catholic public officials for refusing to use their office to "correct" the law of the land. They demand that Catholic officials make political decisions reflecting their religious belief that abortion is tantamount to murder and work to overturn Roe vs. Wade and other laws that make abortion legal.

Most of the targeted officials have been Democrats such as Ted Kennedy, Gerry Ferraro and John Kerry. But now that Judge John G. Roberts Jr. — their candidate — has been nominated for the U.S. Supreme Court, the shoe is on the other political foot. Conservatives are outraged that another Catholic public official might be considered deserving of the same criticism. They demand that Roberts not be asked about personal beliefs, including religious ones, because it would amount to a "religious test" prohibited by the Constitution.

So, Cuomo -- like E.J. Dionne, in his own recent editorial piece -- contends that consistency somehow requires "conservative" Catholics not to object to questioning about Roberts's religion, becuase they have (he says) "bitterly criticized Catholic public officials for refusing to use their office to 'correct' the law of the land" and have "demand[ed] that Catholic officials make political decisions reflecting their religious belief that abortion is tantamount to murder[.]"  Cuomo wants Roberts to be asked about religion, because he thinks it unfair that he (and Senator Kerry, and Mayor Rudy G., and Rep. Ferraro, etc.) were challenged by co-religionists.

I imagine it is comforting for Gov. Cuomo to imagine that he and Judge Roberts are similarly situated, and that his own support for abortion rights (and his opposition even to regulations of abortion that might be permissible under Roe and Casey) is not meaningfully distinguishable from, say, Justice Roberts's decision to vote in accord with the fact (and it is a fact) that the Constitution permits the death penalty, notwithstanding its immorality.

But the complaint of "conservatives" about politicians like Cuomo has not been -- at least, in my view, it should not have been -- that these politicians have not "ma[d]e political decisions reflecting their religious belief that abortion is tantamount to murder[.]"  It has been that (a) they are making political decisions that do not provide the protection to unborn children that justice -- not "religious belief[]" -- requires and (b) that they have, for political expediency, embraced a reading of the Constitution that is mistaken.  Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided, not because it conflicts with Catholic teaching, but because it cannot be squared with the Constitution's text, history, and structure.

It is also sad to hear Gov. Cuomo characterizing Catholics' opposition to abortion as reflecting nothing more than their "personal" "religious beliefs."  After all, the Catholic claim is not that abortion's wrong-ness is revealed, or a mystery of the Faith.  The Catholic claim that abortion is wrong -- which Gov. Cuomo refuses to support politically -- is not different from the Catholic claim that race discrimination is wrong.  These are moral claims, yes -- and maybe all moral claims are, in a sense, "religious" -- but I assume Governor Cuomo has no objection to political actors trying to use their office to bring about a more just, moral society (e.g., the Civil Rights Act, the Social Security Act, etc.).  The premise for Governor Cuomo's "I can't impose my personal religious beliefs on the Constitution" is, and has been for two decades, that the Constitution actually requires an near-unlimited abortion license.  But, it doesn't.  If we were talking about a conflict between religious belief and, say, the requirement that Representatives have attained the age of 25 years -- if we wondered whether Roberts's religion would compel him to require the seating of a 16 year old -- then the potential for that conflict might be worth exploring.  But we are not.

Finally, the whole "would Justice Roberts put his oath to the Constitution above his faith?" question is misconceived, in my view.  In an honest world, Roberts would say, "What a strange question.  Of course the Faith comes first.  No, I certainly would not, in exercising my office, culpably cooperate with evil.  But there is nothing about my oath to uphold the Constitution, properly understood, in my capacity as an appellate judge, that is remotely likely to conflict with my moral obligations or religious commitments.  The same cannot be said for you, though, Senator.  After all, you are responsible for many of the laws that I am charged with interpreting."

Am I being unfair to Gov. Cuomo?  Am I letting Roberts off too easy?

Rick

Friday, August 26, 2005

Popular by Contract

Given our ongoing discussion of Pat Robertson's bizarre behavior this week, it bears noting that he appears to be even less of a spokesperson for evangelicals than we might think, as he is no longer dependent on attracting or keeping viewers with his espoused take on the world.  Christianity Today reports that:

Television and televangelism usually work through viewership. A show with few viewers won't stay on the air: On commercial television, no advertisers will buy space. In religious broadcasting, no donations will come in. But Robertson hasn't needed viewers for almost a decade. He has contractual obligations.

Many people have complained about the 700 Club to cable channel ABC Family, which airs it. But ABC Family has no choice. It is obligated under contract to air it. (The FCC may not be able to do anything, either)

In 1988, Robertson sold the Family Network to Fox for $1.9 billion.  Not bad, when you consider the channel was originally launched in 1977 through the donations of viewers who had been promised a Christian alternative to "secular" television, then taken public in 1992. CBN got $136 million from the sale. Robertson's Regent University got another $148 million. Robertson personally received $19 million, and the rest went to the Robertson Charitable Remainder Trust, which will fund CBN after Robertson and his wife die.

But the money wasn't the biggest part of the deal: Fox Family was required to air The 700 Club three times a day—and, if Fox sold the network, the obligation to air The 700 Club had to be part of that deal, too.

Cable World reported in 2001 that Robertson turned down hundreds of millions of dollars to renegotiate. Largely due to frustration that the 700 Club had disrupted its programming, Fox sold the network to the Walt Disney Company in 2001 for $3 billion and $2.3 billion in debt. Now ABC Family is obligated to air the program three times a day.

Hopefully reality will give folks pause before they attribute Robertson's "leadership" to the desires and inclinations of evangelicals (much less Christians more broadly).

Rob

Just War and the Leaderless State

Jonathan Watson offers another consideration to Steve's analysis of just war theory as applied to the assassination of Hugo Chavez:

although the just war analysis on assassination of Chavez looks at him as a confluence of two people (individual and leader), the proportionality idea needs an additional thought. My consideration is of him as a leader in a position of power. Whenever the leader of a country dies while in office, there is naturally a time of confusion while the power vacuum is filled. When the transition is planned for, such as is the case in the United States, where we have ready successors and electors to fill the gap if necessary, that time of confusion is short and tends toward the orderly. However, when the electoral are questionable, the leader holds power either through Machiavellian or other power politics, or succession is unplanned and unexpected, chaos could result.  In my (short) experience, such chaos often results in the deaths of innocents, as well as economic depression. This should be taken into account in any just war discussion on assassination.

Jonathan also has three more entries for our Catholic legal theory book list:

Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics

Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations

Gratian, The Decretum, Treatise on Law

Rob

Congrats to Gerard Bradley

My colleague, Gerard Bradley -- who is, among other things, the director of Notre Dame's Natural Law Institute and co-editor (with John Finnis) of the American Journal of Jurisprudence -- is to be honored at this year's Annual Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars with the Cardinal Wright Award.  Gerry is a great friend, colleague, scholar, and citizen, and the award is richly deserved.

Rick

Puritan Revolution and the Law of Contracts

I just received a copy of Professor Scott Pryor and Glenn Hoshauer's article, Puritan Revolution and the Law of Contracts, published as part of a symposium on the 150th anniversary of Hadley v. Baxendale, 11 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 291 (2005). 

I haven't yet read the article but thought I would share with you part of the abstract:  "Most legal historians have ignored the impact of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of Puritianism on the development of the common law. ... The Authors conclude that Puritan theology was irrelevant to assumpit and consideration ... [T]he Puritan emphasis on discipline - personal, social, and ecclesiastical - [however] represents an independent source of inluence on the development of the common law of contracts.  The disciplined life grew in cultural significance with the Reformation and the subsequent process of confessionalization. ..."

Another book for the list

OU law grad and self-described member of the "Rick Garnett fan club," Jason Reese, suggests reading Joseph de Maistre, especially On Sovereignty.