[I suspect some MOJ-readers will be interested in this.]
New York Times November 18, 2005
Vatican Official Refutes Intelligent Design
VATICAN CITY (AP) -- The Vatican's chief astronomer said Friday that
''intelligent design'' isn't science and doesn't belong in science
classrooms, the latest high-ranking Roman Catholic official to enter
the evolution debate in the United States.
The Rev. George Coyne, the Jesuit director of the Vatican
Observatory, said placing intelligent design theory alongside that of
evolution in school programs was ''wrong'' and was akin to mixing
apples with oranges.
''Intelligent design isn't science even though it pretends to be,''
the ANSA news agency quoted Coyne as saying on the sidelines of a
conference in Florence. ''If you want to teach it in schools,
intelligent design should be taught when religion or cultural history
is taught, not science.''
His comments were in line with his previous statements on
''intelligent design'' -- whose supporters hold that the universe is so
complex that it must have been created by a higher power.
Proponents of intelligent design are seeking to get public schools
in the United States to teach it as part of the science curriculum.
Critics say intelligent design is merely creationism -- a literal
reading of the Bible's story of creation -- camouflaged in scientific
language, and they say it does not belong in science curriculum.
In a June article in the British Catholic magazine The Tablet, Coyne
reaffirmed God's role in creation, but said science explains the
history of the universe.
''If they respect the results of modern science, and indeed the best
of modern biblical research, religious believers must move away from
the notion of a dictator God or a designer God, a Newtonian God who
made the universe as a watch that ticks along regularly.''
Rather, he argued, God should be seen more as an encouraging parent. ''God in his infinite freedom continuously creates a world that
reflects that freedom at all levels of the evolutionary process to
greater and greater complexity,'' he wrote. ''He is not continually
intervening, but rather allows, participates, loves.''
The Vatican Observatory, which Coyne heads, is one of the oldest
astronomical research institutions in the world. It is based in the
papal summer residence at Castel Gandolfo south of Rome.
Last week, Pope Benedict XVI waded indirectly into the evolution
debate by saying the universe was made by an ''intelligent project''
and criticizing those who in the name of science say its creation was
without direction or order.
Questions about the Vatican's position on evolution were raised in July by Austrian Cardinal Christoph Schoenborn. In a New York Times column, Schoenborn seemed to back intelligent design and dismissed a 1996 statement by Pope John Paul II
that evolution was ''more than just a hypothesis.'' Schoenborn said the
late pope's statement was ''rather vague and unimportant.''
I blogged a few weeks ago about a legislative proposal in Massachusetts, sponsored by Sen. Marian Walsh, that would (according to the Boston Globe) "requir[e] religious organizations to disclose their finances." In fact, the proposal purports to authorize intrusive and entangling review by state officials not simply of "finances", but of a wide range of religious and pastoral decisions about ministry and resource-allocation. Boston College's John Garvey has explained, succinctly, why the bill is an affront to religious liberty and unconstitutional. In a nutshell, some Catholics -- frustrated (reasonably) with the Church -- have enlisted legislators to employ the state in order to promote what these Catholics regard as much-needed reform and openness in the Church. But, as Garvey points out:
[I]t is not the government's business to take sides in internal church disputes. You can imagine a legal system where it does. British courts supervise the way churches use their members' money. But the Church of England is controlled by the government. Our First Amendment forbids any such arrangement. When we talk about separation of church and state, this is what we mean -- that it is none of the state's business to say how churches are run. . .
. . . The Constitution favors an arrangement that leaves churches financially independent: The government does not support them; it should not inhibit their efforts to support themselves, and it should not get involved in reviewing how they spend their money. That is a matter for churches and their members to resolve among themselves.
Apparently -- thanks to some help from the Massachusetts Council of Churches -- a dispositive vote on the church-disclosure bill has been put off. That the Senate approved the bill 33-4, though, is deeply troubling. Stay tuned . . .
In addition to a book review (by me) of three new law-and-religion books, the current issue of Commonweal has this reasonable, sober editorial, "Alito & Armageddon" about Judge Alito's nomination and the state of things on the Supreme Court. (I admit, though, that I could do without the scare-quotes around the word "originalist.") One minor slip -- the editors ask:
Will he be a radical in the mode of Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, both of whom can be described as “activist” justices eager to overturn much of the Court’s recent jurisprudence?
The claim is no more true for being often repeated -- It is simply false that Justices Thomas and Scalia are "eager to overturn much of the Court's recent jurisprudence." They are (Thomas more than Scalia) willing to consider overruling (a few) wrongly decided cases, but there is nothing particularly "radical" about that. The editors make a good point, I think, when they state that "[e]xcept in the most exceptional circumstances, the Supreme Court best serves the nation and justice by moving the law by degrees rather than turning established practice upside down." Still, it is simply not the case that a decision like Lopez (often cited as "activist" by critics) comes even close to "turning established practice upside down." What's more, when it comes to cases that badly misinterpreted the Constitution (e.g., Roe), as opposed to statutory-interpretation cases, it would seem that stare decisis concerns should not foreclose reconsideration and correction.
Tom Berg has posted his (very interesting) contribution, "John Courtney Murray and Reinhold Niebuhr: Natural Law and Christian Realism," to the Journal of Catholic Social Thought's forthcoming symposium issue on John Courtney Murray's work and its influence. Here is the abstract (thanks to Larry Solum):
During the two decades after World War II, two Christian theologians of public life appeared on the cover of Time magazine: Reinhold Niebuhr in 1948 and John Courtney Murray in 1960. As their appearances suggest, during this time Murray the Catholic and Niebuhr the Protestant were America's most prominent Christian theologians concerning the relationship between religion, morality, and politics. Niebuhr inspired not only two generations of Christian clergy and activists, but also numerous secular statesmen and thinkers who admired his hard-nosed policy and cultural analyses, and some of whom dubbed themselves Atheists for Niebuhr. Murray, of course, set forth the most prominent account of how faithful Catholics could affirm the American political system and laid the intellectual groundwork for the Church to embrace equal religious freedom as a moral ideal at Vatican II.
Murray and Niebuhr each engaged in polemics directed at the other's writings or school of thought. Niebuhr criticized the Catholic natural-law tradition for rigidity and for elevating contingent features of pre-modern societies into the supposedly universal standards of human reason. Murray, in defending the universal propositions of natural law, blasted Niebuhr's Christian realism as a theory that sees things as so complicated that moral judgment bcomes practically impossible.
The thesis of this paper, though, is that Murray and Niebuhr, natural law and Christian realism, are not as far apart as they seemed, for the reasons following. (Indeed, the philosophically deepest aspects of the American founding reflect elements both of natural-law reasoning (as Murray emphasized) and realist concerns to structure institutions so as to counter the inevitable tendencies to self-aggrandizement (as Niebuhr emphasized).)
First, Niebuhr was more of a natural-law theorist than he admitted. Although Christian realism emphasizes how moral-political assertions are typically tainted by partiality and self-aggrandizement, Niebuhr himself set forth a universal theory about the perennial dynamics of human nature, and he affirmed the universal validity of certain moral-political concepts sich as equality. Second, although Niebuhr criticized natural-law theory for elevating historically contingent propositions to universal status, recent natural-law approaches have given much greater attention to historical contingencies and differences in the application of general principles. I show how Murray exhibited this historical consciousness and often relied on arguments of prudence and pragmatics that a Christian realist should appreciate. Third, although Niebuhr's appreciation for ambiguity and tension made him reluctant to rely on absolute rules in political matters, later Christian realists affirmed the need for rules precisely to limit the human propensities for self-aggrandizement.
Natural law and Christian realism both assert that moral-political principles and institutions should rest on assessments of human nature and what will promote human flourishing in the light of that nature. Both recognize real, objectively valid moral-political principles - grounded ultimately in God the creator - but both can recognize also that these universal principles tend to be general in nature and that applying them to concrete contexts will produce varying specific rules. There remain many differences between natural-law and Christian-realist approaches, but often the differences complement each other, so that a full vision of Christian political ethics can benefit from both approaches. A combination of natural law and Christian realism suggests that a moral-political principle or institution is most solid when its justification rests on both the possibilities of human nature and on its negative tendencies. For example, the most powerful case for democracy, in Niebuhr's words, is that man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, and man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.
I close the paper with a brief discussion of why the common project that Murray and Niebuhr shared remains of value in America today. Among other things, both Murray and Niebuhr articulated their arguments in terms that others could access and evaluate without having already adopted the premises of the Christian faith. Although I do not believe there is any general legal or moral obligation to present political arguments in such terms, nevertheless in a society characterized by religious disagreement, such arguments are more likely to be effective in political debate and lead to productive deliberation about political choices.
In response to my post on Fields v. Palmdale School Dist., a couple of readers have pointed out that, as of 2003, federal law forbids local schools from requiring any student, "as part of any applicable program, to submit to a survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information concerning . . . sex behavior or attitudes" without parental consent. 20 USC 1232(h). (Parental consent was obtained in this case, but the parents were not informed of the nature of the survey's questions.) This statute wasn't enacted in time to help the Palmdale parents, but does this take care of the problem? Should the courts stay out of it? As Eugene Volokh argues,
Whether or not the school district's decision may have been wrong, foolish, or harmful, it wasn't unconstitutional. The proper remedy for the district's failure is through the elected branches of government, not through the federal courts setting educational policy.
On one hand, depending on the elected branches of government to validate rights that should be recognized as part of the natural order of society provides little comfort to those concerned with state encroachments on the family. On the other hand, expecting extralegal normative claims to be embraced by courts is a high-wire act in today's environment of bitterly contested normative claims offered from a variety of anthropological perspectives. This raises a familiar concern for Catholic legal theorists: should we advocate for robust conceptions of the unenumerated constitutional rights we favor, like parental rights, or should we resist "rights talk" across the board for fear of where that path may lead (and has already led)?
The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has stumbled again on the path to bring the faithful the Mass in English that is faithful to the tradition, but the Conference, thank God, has pushed through other mighty barriers to speak against death's being used as a criminal sentence.
From the Catholic News Service, 15 Nov. 2005:
. . . A statement approved today by the U.S. Catholic bishops by a vote of 237 - 4 declares the United States cannot “teach that killing is wrong by killing those who kill.” The use of the death penalty contributes to a cycle of violence in our society that must be broken, according to A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death. “The sanction of death violates respect for human life and dignity.”
The statement describes the death penalty as a continuing sign of a “culture of death” in U.S. society. “It is time for our nation to abandon the illusion that we can protect life by taking life,” the bishops’ document asserts. “When the state, in our names and with our taxes, ends a human life despite having non-lethal alternatives, it suggests that society can overcome violence with violence. The use of the death penalty ought to be abandoned not only for what it does to those who are executed, but what it does to all of society.
The statement echoes the powerful words and courageous action of Pope John Paul II who taught clearly and forcefully against the use of the death penalty. In his encyclical, The Gospel of Life, Pope John Paul II insisted that punishment “ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today, however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.”
In a visit to St. Louis in 1999, Pope John Paul II said, “The new evangelization calls for followers of Christ who are unconditionally pro-life: who will proclaim, celebrate and serve the Gospel of life in every situation. A sign of hope is the increasing recognition that the dignity of human life must never be taken away, even in the case of someone who has done great evil…I renew the appeal I made…for a consensus to end the death penalty, which is both cruel and unnecessary.”
The new statement from the bishops of the United States also acknowledges that more must be done to assist victims of violence and loss. “They deserve our compassion, solidarity and support—spiritual, pastoral and personal. However, standing with families of victims does not compel us to support the use of the death penalty … No act, even an execution, can bring back a loved one or heal terrible wounds. The pain and loss of one death cannot be wiped away by another death.”
The statement includes brief statements and stories from the families of victims of deadly crimes as well as from a former death row inmate who was exonerated. While the statement acknowledges that people of goodwill can disagree on this issue, the bishops encourage engagement and dialogue, not judgment and condemnation, in the hope of leading others to a reexamination and conversion.
This statement is part of a wider Catholic Campaign to End the Use of the Death Penalty including a new web site (www.ccedp.org). Many people, especially Catholics, are reexamining their past support for the death penalty. A survey conducted by Zogby International, Inc. in November 2004 and March 2005 of 1700 Catholics suggested that support for the death penalty among Catholics had dropped from 70 percent in the 1970’s to under 50 percent in 2005. It also reported that those who attend Church often are more likely to oppose the use of the death penalty, with respect for life cited most frequently as the reason.
The Catholic Campaign to End the Use of the Death Penalty urges Catholics to pray for victims of crime and their families as well as those on death row and the prison officials who watch over them; to reach out to families who have lost loved ones through violence; to learn more about the Church’s teaching on the death penalty; to educate others, especially through the Church’s parishes, schools and other programs; to advocate for the end of the use of the death penalty in states that have capital punishment; and to change the debate by emphasizing life over death.
“We don’t really expect the use of the death penalty to end in one piece of sweeping legislation or a stunning court decision, although we’re making significant progress in both legislatures and the courts,” explained Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio, chair of the bishops’ Domestic Policy Committee. “Rather, it will wither away in the daily and individual choices of prosecutors and legislators, judges and jurors and ordinary Catholics and others. We believe this day will not come easily, but with hard work and prayer it will come sooner rather than later.”
The statement, which was developed by the USCCB Domestic Policy Committee with the support of the Committee on Pro-Life Activities and the Committee on Doctrine, is the first comprehensive statement focused on the death penalty by the Catholic bishops of the United States in twenty-five years.
The statement and the campaign call on Catholics to defend all human life and unite together to be “people of life for life.” This issue, says the statement, “is more than public policy; it involves our faith…[it] is more than how to respond to violent crime; it is about justice and what kind of society we want to be…this initiative is not about ideology, but life and death.”
Today's Washington Post has a confession from a journalist who aborted her baby after learning that he had Down's Syndrome. An excerpt:
While I have no doubt there can be joys and victories in raising a mentally handicapped child, for me and for Mike, it's a painful journey that we believe is better not taken. To know now that our son would be retarded, perhaps profoundly, gives us the choice of not continuing the pregnancy. We don't want a life like that for our child, and the added worry that we wouldn't be around long enough to care for him throughout his life.
Why is the journey better not taken? Because it is painful? Whose pain is motivating the decision -- the pain of the child or the pain of the parents? If the latter, the writer's angst is a thin disguise for selfishness. If the former, who is she to presume that the child would decide that no life at all is preferable to a life with pain? Andrea Yates, after all, saved her children from the pain of growing up in a fallen world by drowning them in a bathtub. Does the degree of pain accompanying Down's Syndrome make this a qualitatively different decision?
Another gem:
I'm sure pro-lifers don't give you the right to grieve for the baby you chose not to bring into the world (another euphemism, although avoiding the word "abortion'' doesn't take any sting out of the decision to have one). Only now do I understand how entirely personal the decision to terminate a pregnancy is and how wrong it feels to bring someone else's morality into the discussion.
I think most pro-lifers would encourage the writer to grieve the baby's absence; but they would also point out that the grief should encompass the reason for the baby's absence.
Earlier this month--on November 6--the Birmingham [Alabama] News editorial page began a six-day exploration of the death penalty in Alabama. To quote: What we have done is look at capital punishment in the context of
some of our strongly held views on other life-and-death issues. In the course
of that inquiry, we found it increasingly hard to reconcile our traditional
support for the death penalty with our reverence of life, as expressed in our consistent
opposition to abortion on demand, embryonic stem-cell research and euthanasia. Eventually, the editors concluded:
Put simply, supporting the death penalty is inconsistent with our
convictions about the value of life, convictions that are evident in our
editorial positions opposing abortion, embryonic stem-cell research and
euthanasia. We believe all life is sacred. And in embracing a culture of life,
we cannot make distinctions between those we deem 'innocents' and those
flawed humans who populate Death Row.
Faith tells us we all are imperfect, but we're not beyond
redemption. We believe it's up to God to say when a life has no more purpose on
this Earth.
This six-part series, which relies in part on the teaching of John Paul II (Catholics have come a long way in Alabama!), is must reading for anyone interested in the morality of capital punishment.
To read the whole series, click here. _______________
In response to my earlier post on Palmdale and parental authority, Oglethorpe Univ. politics prof Joseph Knippenberg sent me his essay on the case; here's his conclusion:
[I]n allowing school officials to sometimes get away with insensitive and offensive behavior, the courts are reminding us that they are not our primary protector of rights. Rather, our rights are primarily protected by individual responsibility and vigilance. The Palmdale parents shouldn’t have sued; they should have burned up the phone, FAX, and Internet lines to the school board; they should have held school officials accountable for rectifying their shoddy research oversight in the next school board elections; and, if all else failed, they should have pulled their children out of the public schools, sending them to private schools or educating them at home.
The lesson here, then, is not that we parents have no right to choose how and what our children will learn, but that we parents are responsible for exercising that right through the choices we make regarding the education of our children. At the very least, we should actively demand school choice, and not just between various public options. And at most, we should bring our children back home, where strangers are much less likely to inquire into whether they “can’t stop thinking about sex.”
This case can, in other words, be a victory for parental control, if only we act like parents, and not like wards and clients of the state.
I agree that courts should be the refuge of last resort in a pluralist democracy. But in an educational system that does not meaningfully acknowledge our pluralism, the last resort may be the only resort. Grass-roots action means little where there is no viable exit option. Unless the school's practices offend enough parents to pose a realistic threat to school board members at the next election, administrators have little incentive to take the perspective of dissenting parents seriously. In this regard, Knippenberg is correct to call for school choice. I've always been a bit uncomfortable with the home schooling option, as it seems akin to responding to the surrounding culture by waving the white flag. But if I encountered school officials with the same degree of sensitivity displayed by those in Palmdale, I might reconsider.
I'm flying this evening to Rome with SWBO this evening; will be there about a week. My primary "business" purpose will be to speak at a fascinating conference that Amy helped organize on the topic of "Relazionalita nel diritto; quale spazio per la fraternita?" (accents missing). or "Relationships in law: is there a space for fraternity?" The sponsore are the organizations Commune e Diritto and Movimento dei Focolari. I'll be spoking mainly on my usual theme of the tension between corporate law norms and CST concepts of community and fraternity. If you're going to be around Castel Gandalfo this Friday and Saturday, you might want to stop by (well, maybe Father Araujo may be in the neighborhood!). For more info send an email to dirittoATfocolare.org. I've got some other Villanova business in Rome, but will try to spend some time revisiting the haunts of my student days and seeing the sights. I'm also looking forward to visiting our Augustinian's HQ, St Monica's, which is right behind the colonnades at St Peters. Speaking of conferences in Rome, St. Tom's excellent John Ryan Institute for CST (et al.) is sponsoring an excellent confab on Oct 5-7, 2006 at the Angelicum on the topic of "The Good Company: CST and Corporate Social Responsibility in Dialogue." The Call for Papers just came out; for more info see www.stthomas.edu/thegoodcompany . The principal organizers are Mike Naughton and Helen Alford OP, two of the major voices in this field. At this time tomorrow I'll be eating the famous Tuscan white beans at Nino's on the Via Borgogna. I'll resist the temptation to post a description of every meal, lest I be charged with the sin of gluttony or inciting others to the sin of envy.
