Thanks to Steve Bainbridge for
raising the authority/conscience issue and to Michael Perry for the citations
(Readings in Moral Theology No. 6 Dissent in the Church, Charles E. Curran and
Richard McCormick, eds. also has excellent essays espousing a variety of positions
on these issues). There is clearly a distinguished tradition within the Church
supporting the statement of Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism 973: “If, however,
after appropriate study, reflection, and prayer, a person is convinced that his
or her conscience is correct, in spite of a conflict with the moral teachings
of the Church, the person not only may but must
follow the dictates of conscience rather than the teachings of the Church.”
At the same time, there is a
counter tradition within the Church which is more in accord with what I
understood Patrick to be saying, i.e, a duty of assent to the teachings of the magisterium.
Moreover then Cardinal Ratzinger took the position in the Curran case that “In
any case, the faithful must accept not only the infallible magisterium. They
are to give the religious submission of intellect and will to the teaching
which the Supreme Pontiff or the college of Bishops [enunciate] on faith and
morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium, even if they do not intend
to proclaim it as a definitive act.” Curran and McCormick, supra at 362. I am confident
he made other similar statements on behalf of the Congregation.
The difference between these views
of conscience are between a conception of subjective conscience (Consider Avery
Dulles, Curran and McCormick, supra at 97, “According to the Catholic ethical
tradition, conscience is the ultimate subjective norm of all human action”) and
a conception which understands conscience as right or objective conscience.
Related to this issue is the
question of what counts as a teaching of the Church. If the Church is the
People of God with the hierarchy playing an important leadership role, what is
the status of hierarchal teachings that are not
accepted by the faithful (recognizing that the question of what counts as
acceptance could be very difficult to ascertain on some issues and easy on
others)? I am unsure. Consider this passage from Lumen Gentium, “The entire body of the faithful, anointed as they are
by the Holy One,(111) cannot err in matters of belief. They manifest this
special property by means of the whole peoples' supernatural discernment in
matters of faith when "from the Bishops down to the last of the lay
faithful" (8*) they show universal agreement in matters of faith and
morals. That discernment in matters of faith is aroused and sustained by the
Spirit of truth. It is exercised under the guidance of the sacred teaching
authority, in faithful and respectful obedience to which the people of God
accepts that which is not just the word of men but truly the word of God.(112).”
I think this passage is ambiguous, but I know some maintain that a proposition
can not count as a Church teaching if it is not accepted by the People of God.
I would be grateful for comments on this issue.
Catholics
like me, and I believe that includes most American Catholics (consider the
evidence accumulated by Andrew Greeley) face the question why remain a Catholic
if you reject the theory of authority put forward by the leaders of the Church.
Greeley himself has asked Catholics why they are still Catholic and has come up
with interesting answers. Hans Kung has spoken eloquently on the subject. In my
opinion, Garry Wills has not. Such answers appear regularly in Commonweal, The Tablet, and
the National Catholic Reporter. They often sustain me in hard times. Apart from such reasons, however, what seems
very important to me is not forever to be absorbed with dissent or anger against
Church leaders, but to recognize that Catholics of all stripes have much in
common, that we work within a rich spiritual and theological tradition, and that most of what
we do in our daily lives has little to do with the conflicts dividing us. Steve
Jonathan Watson joins our ongoing conversation on homosexual priests:
There is one thought on MOJ which has shown itself in bits and pieces, but which is never outrightly discussed, and that is the question of this document being both a warning to seminaries and a reaction-by-confirmation to the scandals involving homosexual priests. This is the elephant in the closet to which MOJ commentators haven't spoken.
Father Richard John Neuhaus writes: "[T]he Church pastorally cares and prays for people who struggle with disordered desires. But she should not jeopardize the mission of the priesthood by ordaining those who are thought likely to succumb to such desires." Nor, I suspect, those who hold that such desires are normal and normative (supporting a "gay" culture). It should also be noted that gay culture in the majority of the world is not supportive of monogamy in any real way, and so supporting that culture would be to promote promoscuity.
Canon 1029 of the Code of Canon Law states on the ordination of priests that: "Only those are to be promoted to orders who, in the prudent judgment of their own bishop or of the competent major superior, all things considered, have integral faith, are moved by the right intention, have the requisite knowledge, possess a good reputation, and are endowed with integral morals and proven virtues and the other physical and psychic qualities in keeping with the order to be received." I suspect that under physical and psychic qualities falls not only homosexuality, but also sexual addictions, and other things which the Church considers to be disorders.
I remember vaguely the journal articles and discussions spurred by selective fertilization by blind and deaf individuals seeking to have a blind or deaf child. The danger with normalizing that which is not normal is that the individuals who do need help will not receive it. The Vatican, clearly in the minority in this world, believes that supporting a gay culture is trying to do precisely that - normalizing something inherently unnatural. Doing so might prevent homosexuals from receiving treatment or assistance otherwise needed.
The Catholic News Service has obtained a 1985 memo from the Congregation of Education (cited in the new document) (Hat Tip: Open Book) addressing the question of homosexual priests:
A church source said the memorandum was issued in the middle of the Vatican's visitation of U.S. seminaries in the mid-1980s and was circulated to many but not all U.S. bishops.
After making it clear that the virtue of chastity and commitment to celibacy are required of all candidates to the Latin-rite priesthood -- including heterosexuals -- the document stated:
"A candidate who is homosexually active or who leads a homosexual lifestyle (whether he is homosexual or not) is not acceptable.
"A high standard of chastity and integration of the personality is required before admission to seminary, such that latent or repressed homosexuality is also a counterindication requiring that the candidate not be accepted -- it would not be fair to the individual nor to the seminary community," it said.
The memorandum said that in the discussion of homosexuality distinctions needed to be made among practice, orientation and temptation. The first two -- practice and orientation -- are "counter-indications of acceptability," when orientation is understood as "commitment to or support of homosexual practices or lifestyles."
It said temptations not directly linked to that kind of orientation would not in themselves disqualify a priesthood candidate.
Although the memo is offered to show that the Vatican's stance hasn't changed, isn't there a difference given the memo's definition of disqualifying orientation as "commitment to or support of homosexual practices or lifestyles?" In other words, if an individual with "deep-rooted homosexual tendencies" commits himself not to support homosexual practices or lifestyles, wouldn't he take himself out of the disqualified category laid out by the 1985 memo?
As we explore ways in which Christianity can engage the culture, we also should take note of the ways in which the culture has engaged Christianity. I'm constantly noticing the extent to which Christians have become a market niche, a trend encouraged by certain pop culturephenomena. This morning I was listening to Christian radio and was intrigued disturbed by an advertisment for Christian cruises, during which we can fellowship with other Christians, be entertained by family-friendly comedians, listen to concerts every night by top Christian artists, and (in the advertisment's words), "spend five full days in total luxury." Here's the website:
With incredible talent and an even more incredible love for God, the artists bring a dimension to this family adventure that makes it closer to a spiritual retreat than simply a fun vacation. Lives are changed. Commitments are renewed. Spiritual batteries are recharged, and relationships are strengthened. Along with nightly concerts in four concert halls, there will be uproarious clean comedy and uplifting Christian speakers to round out the renewal.
This incredible journey will take place on Carnival’s 70,000-ton luxury liner, the Paradise. One of the world-class cruise line’s most spectacular ships, it boasts a Nautica spa, wide variety of restaurants, sparkling pools, and spacious cabins. You’ll enjoy the choice of formal dining at the Captain’s Gala Dinner, casual dining on the Lido Deck, or 24-hour stateroom service. Whether a midnight buffet or lunch by the pool, your dining options are nearly mind-boggling and certainly mouthwatering.
Nothing like a midnight buffet to bring us closer to Christ.
By way of a first answer to the question of Michael Perry, whom I love: If the Church "ruled" that "persons of African ancestry could not be ordained," Patrick would be shocked, awed, and confused. But, mercifully, the same Patrick doesn't and won't have to confront that crisis; the Church won't so "rule[]." And, for the record, I have taken no position here (or elsewhere) on whether gay men (people?) are in fact called by God to the ministerial priesthood; my position is that on this question I (shall) seek to accept the answer given by the Church. For the sake of the discussion, however: Was there a non-discrimination norm seeking to bind Christ when he called the apostles to their priestly ministry? Does Christ's exemplary charity entail or reveal that God cannot or does not, on account of an equality-of-equal-service norm, call some (but not others) to such (holy) office? The Church doesn't (and, to my knowledge, never has) taught that ethnicity is part of what Christ taught about His holy priesthood. That the Church would now -- in a world that more and more denies the essential and consequential difference between homosexuality and heterosexuality which the Church continues to affirm-- speak afresh to sexuality's part in the ministerial priesthood is as it should be. Susan S. is of course right that the documents sounding in terms of "homosexuality" are of compartively recent genesis; whether the Church's teaching on homosexuality as such is a flash in the pan is another question, which I referenced with my observation that new wrongs call forth new declarations of (new) rights. Returning to the question of the ministerial priesthood in particular: "Discrimination is the wrong issue/question, as concerns the life of the Church as we're discussing it here; the sources of officia and munera are the heart of the matter, as I see it." The Church's teaching on homosexuality should not be a cause for our surprise, whatever one may think of the teaching; the recent Instruction as it concerns the necessary conditions for admission to (the seminary leading to) ministerial priesthood is a matter that will be well debated by competent theologians in service of the Church.
I appreciate the humility underlying Michael S.'s conception of his role as "helping the world see through the Church's eyes," but it triggers in my mind a broader question as to what the proper scope and limits of the Catholic legal theory project are. Is the project simply to engage the legal culture with the Church's truth claims? Or are we also to engage the Church with truths discovered -- or at least helpfully articulated -- by the legal culture? Maybe the eligibility requirements for the priesthood are not readily amenable to insights derived from lives in the law (other the lawyer's natural inclination to hold up the current policy to the logic of past teachings), but won't there be other areas where legal theorists will have something to say, not just from the Church, but to the Church? I'm not just talking about prudential judgment regarding the application of theological claims to the legal system. For example, the political theory insights of John Courtney Murray and others produced some dramatic shifts in the Church's stance on religious liberty -- shifts that encompassed the theological claims underlying religious liberty, not just the implementation of fixed theological claims in the political culture. So while Catholic legal theorists are not necessarily equipped to enter into the ongoing theological discourse within the Church, don't claims grounded in legal theory have the potential to shift theological discourse?
To be clear, I don't quibble with the thrust of Michael S.'s reflection, and I don't think the Catholic legal theory project should ever become the let's-make-Catholic-legal-theory-more-like-liberal-legal-theory project, but isn't the bridge we're constructing between the Church and the legal culture open to traffic in both directions?
Abstract:
Conservative Christians are often accused, justifiably, of trying to
impose their moral views on the rest of the population: of trying to
equate God's law with man's law. In this essay, we try to answer the
question whether that equation is consistent with Christianity.
It
isn't. Christian doctrines of creation and the fall imply the basic
protections associated with the rule of law. But the moral law as
defined in the Sermon on the Mount is flatly inconsistent with those
protections. The most plausible inference to draw from those two
conclusions is that the moral law - God's law - is meant to play a
different role than the law of code books and case reports. Good morals
inspire and teach; good law governs. When the roles are confused, law
ceases to rule and discretion rules in its place. That is a lesson that
many of our fellow religious believers would do well to learn:
Christians on the right and on the left are too quick to seek to use
law to advance their particular moral visions, without taking proper
account of the limits of law's capacity to shape the culture it
governs. But the lesson is not only for religious believers. America's
legal system purports to honor the rule of law, but in practice it is
honored mostly in the breach. One reason why is the gap between law's
capacity and the ambitions lawmakers and legal theorists have for it.
Properly defining the bounds of law's empire is the key to ensuring
that law, not discretion, rules.
Steve Bainbridge asks, in his posting below: "To what extent is it proper for a Catholic to dissent from
non-infallible but presumably magisterial teaching? We are not
Protestants, after all."
No, but neither are we mindless. As John Noonan said, "the record is replete with mistakes--the faithful can't just accept everything that comes from Rome as though God had authorized it." What mistakes, you ask? Well, you may want to begin here: Robert McClory, Faithful Dissenters: Stories of Men and Women Who Loved and Changed the Church (2000).
For those who, like Steve, want to think about this issue, Father Bernard Hoose's writings are a good place to begin: Bernard Hoose, "Authority in the Church," 63 Theological Studies 1207 (2002); Bernard Hoose, Authority in Roman Catholicism (2002). See also this collection, edited by Father Hoose: Authority in the Roman Catholic Church (2002). _______________ mp
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have argued
that, if recent empirical studies claiming to find a substantial deterrent
effect from capital punishment are valid, consequentialists and deontologists
alike should conclude that capital punishment is not merely morally
permissible, but actually morally required. While there is ample reason to
reject this argument on the ground that the empirical studies are deeply flawed
(as economists John Donohue and Justin Wolfers elaborate in a separate essay),
this response directly addresses Sunstein and Vermeule's moral argument.
Sunstein and Vermeule contend that recognition of the distinctive moral agency
of the government and acceptance of "threshold" deontology (by which
categorical prohibitions may be overridden to avoid catastrophic harm) should
lead both consequentialists and deontologists to accept the necessity of
capital punishment. This response demonstrates that neither premise leads to
the proposed conclusion. Acknowledging that the government has special moral
duties does not render inadequately deterred private murders the moral
equivalent of government executions. Rather, executions constitute a
distinctive moral wrong (purposeful as opposed to non-purposeful killing), and
a distinctive kind of injustice (unjustified punishment). Moreover, acceptance
of "threshold" deontology in no way requires a commitment to capital
punishment even if substantial deterrence is proven; rather, arguments about
catastrophic "thresholds" face special challenges in the context of
criminal punishment. This response also explains how Sunstein and Vermeule's
argument necessarily commits us to accepting other brutal or disproportionate
punishments, and concludes by suggesting that even consequentialists should not
be convinced by the argument.
Two questions re the Congregation's recent instruction on "persons with homosexual tendencies" and the priesthood:
Is this to be regarded as infallible teaching? Based on my understanding of infallibility, I assume the answer is no.
If this is not infallible teaching, to what extent is it doctrinally licit for a Catholic to dissent? (I'm thinking here especially of Eduardo's comment that he "vigorously" dissents "from many Church teachings on sexuality, and on gay sexuality in particular.") To what extent is it proper for a Catholic to dissent from non-infallible but presumably magisterial teaching? We are not Protestants, after all.
Because this is a highly sensitive issue, combining religion and sexuality, however, the usual requirements that comments be civil and relevant to the topic at hand will be enforced with special ruthlessness. In particular, the topic is not whether the Congregation made the right decision; the question is whether good Catholics can dissent from that decision and, if so, how. Thread hijacking will not be tolerated!
