Sightings 2/27/06
Doubting Dennett
-- Martin E. Marty
Last
year it was Sam Harris's The End of Faith; this year it is Daniel C.
Dennett's Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon that
sets out to rally the anti-religious, and serves to fire up some
defenders of religion. Neither lacks notice. Reviewers and
editorialists savor conflict, some academics critical of religion
sharpen their knives, and many preachers enjoy having sermon topics
hand delivered to their pulpits. Next year we will repeat the cycle
with someone else's book, as Americans have done since the middle of
the eighteenth century.
Exactly fifty years ago I was writing my
dissertation on the subject of how "infidels," "freethinkers,"
"atheists," etc. made use of religion, and how religionists of several
sorts made use of them and their tracts and blasts. I have kept on
tracking the partisans, noting along the way that the Harrises and the
Dennetts do the faithful a favor. Instead of being indifferent, as most
self-described non-religious scholars tend to be, they find faith
important enough to oppose it. One can make the case that their
opposition is helpful. It is easier to sneer back at a sneer than to
effectively shrug off a shrug. A-theistic thought, Feuerbach- and
Nietzsche-style, is quickening and, with its vital criticism, can
encourage reform.
Meanwhile, the religious who get suckered into
making emotional responses might take comfort from the knowledge that
few people "lose the faith" because of books like these. Many of the
religious, as they face their own doubts, show awareness of the faults
in religious history and flaws in the communities of faith they
themselves profess, and have thought of and faced up to all of these.
I've never seen a partial percentage point of a blip downward in trends
of support for religion in the face of "outsider" attacks.
Little
of what I have written is fair to Tufts University professor Dennett,
who makes his case for questioning all religion from the viewpoint of
evolutionary biology. It is true that the neurosciences today pose more
profound and disturbing questions than Darwinian evolution ever did.
"God" reduced to something in the genome or "mysticism" to nothing but
neuron firings in the brain produce real challenges, some of which
Professor Dennett, albeit naively, furthers in his argument. I don't
want to be a sneerer (William Paley: "Who can refute a sneer?"). I do
want to tell what I took from a reading and from some reviews. For
example, Leon Wieseltier, who savages the book in the New York Times
Book Review (February 19), shows that Dennett flubs the case for
reason, which he rather strangely defines, and whose backfiring on him
he does not notice.
Dennett -- here's where naivete comes in --
wants religion to be studied just like every other phenomenon can be
studied, namely "objectively." He seems unaware of the ways scholars in
many disciplines question "objectivity," how many students of religion
are aware of "hermeneutics" in ways that he is not, how
"phenomenologists" among them learn to bracket their own commitments
when studying something complex.
Criticism from within religious
communities for two centuries, or maybe twenty, has shaken the
foundations of the faiths that it often purifies. Maybe next year's
critical sensation will show awareness of the kinds of criticisms that
have been going on for a long time -- never "objectively."
For Further Reading:
For
those who would like a succinct summary of Dennett's proposal, M.E.M.
suggests "Common-Sense Religion" by Daniel C. Dennett, in the Chronicle
of Higher Education (January 20).
Martin E. Marty's biography, current projects, upcoming events, publications, and contact information can be found at www.illuminos.com.
----------
Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.
Monday, February 27, 2006
More on the Dennett Controversy ...
Elizabeth Brown (St. Thomas Law School) on Plan B
I received several helpful e-mails providing more information on the distinction between contraception and abortifacients. They generally agreed on the following information, which I received from Elizabeth Brown, and thought I'd post here (thanks also to Denise Hunnell, MD, who sent along very similar information):
While everyone agrees that an abortion is the termination of a pregnancy, the problem is that everyone does not define when pregnancy begins in the same way. The American Medical Association defines pregnancy as beginning when a fertilized egg implants in the uterus. Other groups, like the Catholic Church, define life and pregnancy as beginning when the sperm fertilizes the egg.
Plan B or the morning after pill is like taking two or three regular birth control pills at once. Generally, Plan B is taken in two doses within 12 hours of each other. Like regular birth control pills, it can prevent ovulation, or it can prevent the fertilization of the egg, or it can prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus. Plan B cannot disrupt or end an established pregnancy, i.e., it doesn’t have any effect if the fertilized egg has implanted in the uterus. Plan B only works if it is administered 72 hours after having unprotected sex. If taken within 24 hours, Plan B has a 95% success rate at preventing pregnancy. The later in that period that a woman begins taking it, the less effective it is. If begun within 48-72 hours, it only has a 58% success rate at preventing pregnancy.
As noted above, the American Medical Association defines pregnancy as beginning when a fertilized egg implants in the uterus. As a result, the AMA does not view Plan B as an abortifacient because it is not terminating an established pregnancy (as the AMA defines pregnancy). See AMA House of Delegates resolution opposing the FDA’s decision not to allow Plan B without a prescription.
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/15/res_hod443_a04.doc
Many groups opposing Plan B view any fertilized egg as a human being and thus, any chemical that prevents a fertilized egg from implanting is, in their definition, an abortifacient.
Plan B is different from RU-486, or the abortion pill, which is administered 4-7 weeks into a pregnancy and is designed to terminate the pregnancy. In the case of RU-486, everyone agrees that a viable pregnancy exists and will end if RU-486 is administered.
Not every woman, who has unprotected sex and does not use contraceptives, will become pregnant. In addition, about 40-60% of fertilized eggs naturally fail to implant on their own.
At this point in time, there is no way for anyone to know whether unprotected sex has resulted in a fertilized egg or not because pregnancy tests can only detect an implanted fertilized egg. So neither the woman taking Plan B nor the doctor prescribing Plan B nor the pharmacist dispensing Plan B can know for certain that the medication will, in fact, terminate a fertilized egg, instead of merely preventing ovulation, preventing fertilization, or doing nothing.
For more information on Plan B, see http://www.uspharmacist.com/index.asp?show=article&page=8_1567.htm
In general, Plan B may be viewed as being a bit like Russian Roulette. There is a very small chance that it will, in fact, terminate a fertilized egg compared to the chance that it will prevent ovulation or fertilization or do nothing. If it prevents ovulation or fertilization then it is no different that any other contraceptive.
Religious Liberty Cases and Catholics: Guest Blogging at The Volokh Conspiracy
In recent empirical study of judicial decisionmaking, Michael Heise (Cornell), Andy Morriss (Case Western), and I have been exploring religious liberty cases in the lower federal courts. The enduring legal myth is that members of minority religious groups face a decidedly uphill battle in securing accommodation for unconventional religious practices, expression, or values from the courts. According to the conventional wisdom, traditional Christian believers may anticipate a more hospitable welcome from the judiciary when asserting claims of conscience or religious liberty. However based upon our empirical study of religious liberty decisions in the federal courts, the proposition that minority religions are less successful with their claims was found to be without support, at least in the modern era and in the lower federal courts. In fact, counter to popular belief, adherents to traditionalist Christian faiths, notably Roman Catholics and Baptists, appear to be the ones that today enter the courthouse doors at a disadvantage.
For the next week, I will be guest-blogging once daily on the subject of this study and the nature and meaning of the findings at "The Volokh Conspiracy" (volokh.com), identified just last week in the Wall Street Journal as one of the leading legal blogs in the country (hence my great appreciation for being invited by Eugene Volokh to share some ideas on this topic with his readers). I invite "Mirror of Justice" readers to surf over and, after the week is concluded, I may continue the conversation and respond further to comments back here at home on the "Mirror of Justice."
Greg Sisk
The Pre-Implantation Embryo
In his statement today to the Pontifical Academy for Life (at this conference), Pope Benedict:
reaffirmed Catholic teaching that life begins at the moment of conception, saying embryos are "sacred and inviolable" even before they become implanted in a mother's uterus. . . .
By making such a defense of life, the Pope appeared to be trying to cut short any debate that the period between conception and implantation could be seen as a time for legitimate experimentation or manipulation on embryos.
Rob
Factual Question on Oral Contraception
After re-reading some of these posts on contraception and pharmacists and looking over some of the left-wing blogs' takes on this question, I am a little bit confused about the distinction between abortifacients and oral contraception. My understanding is that oral contraceptives are permissible for therapeutic purposes, even though they can prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum. (Ironically, oral contraceptives are sometimes used as part of fertility treatments (to sort of re-zero the hormonal clock).) Some of the things I've read suggest that Plan B works in the same way. What exactly is meant by an abortifacient? Does the hierarchy consider normal oral contraceptives to be such? (Is the only difference between oral contraceptives and so-called "emergency contraception" the intent of the user?) I would have thought that abortifacient means something that directly kills an embryo. But maybe there's something about the hierarchy's teachings on oral contraceptives that I'm misunderstanding. Can someone point me towards a good (and recent) scholarly analysis of the question?
Carozza on "Secularity or Secularism"
Here is a link to a helpful and thoughtful piece by MOJ-friend Paolo Carozza (Notre Dame), called "Free Church and Limited State," on how "[t]he religious character of American culture and the role of the Church in public debate reveal why a concordat between Church and State is superfluous in the USA." Here is a bit:
Our law respects and protects that central role that religion has played in our collective life. We have a capacious understanding of freedom of religion, which recognizes that an important part of the liberty of religious communities is the capacity to speak and act publicly on questions of common concern. At the same time, the dominant American notions of freedom of speech are substantially more unrestricted than the prevailing European ones. Much of our tolerance for the presence of religiously informed views on controversial social issues is the consequence of the idea that all speech is given space to be heard in the public square, even if it is unpopular or offensive to some others. This is especially important given the great pluralism of religious identity and commitment among Americans. It is not the role of the state to be the arbiter of what is acceptable as public discourse, and so the law protects the liberty of all to express their views–even, or perhaps especially, those whose views are informed by their religious convictions.
Here there is a close connection between American views of the place of religion in public and American views of the state. While the legacy of nineteenth-century constitutional theories in continental Europe emphasizes the monopoly of the state as the embodiment of the public interest, the United States belongs to a constitutional tradition much more inclined to see the state as a limited actor in the social fabric. From this side of the Atlantic, a Concordat appears to be a response to the need to establish certain protections for the Church against the state’s claim of exclusive and ultimate power and authority. But in a context such as ours, where the freedom of the Church is largely guaranteed by the structural limitations of the state to interfere in her affairs, a Concordat seems to be superfluous. To give a specific example: there is no need for a special agreement ensuring the right of the Church to establish its own educational system, because the state does not have a monopoly of power over education to begin with and so cannot prohibit the creation and operation of religiously affiliated schools.
Sunday, February 26, 2006
Catholic Conservative William F. Buckley on Iraq ... Food for Thought
National Review Online
February 24, 2006
It Didn’t Work
William F. Buckley, Jr.
"I can tell you the main reason behind all our woes — it is America." The New York Times
reporter is quoting the complaint of a clothing merchant in a Sunni
stronghold in Iraq. "Everything that is going on between Sunni and
Shiites, the troublemaker in the middle is America."
One
can't doubt that the American objective in Iraq has failed. The same
edition of the paper quotes a fellow of the American Enterprise
Institute. Mr. Reuel Marc Gerecht backed the American intervention. He
now speaks of the bombing of the especially sacred Shiite mosque in
Samara and what that has precipitated in the way of revenge. He
concludes that “The bombing has completely demolished” what was being
attempted — to bring Sunnis into the defense and interior ministries.
Our mission has failed because Iraqi animosities have proved
uncontainable by an invading army of 130,000 Americans. The great human
reserves that call for civil life haven't proved strong enough. No
doubt they are latently there, but they have not been able to contend
against the ice men who move about in the shadows with bombs and
grenades and pistols.
The Iraqis we hear about are first indignant, and then infuriated, that
Americans aren't on the scene to protect them and to punish the
aggressors. And so they join the clothing merchant who says that
everything is the fault of the Americans.
The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, elucidates on the complaint
against Americans. It is not only that the invaders are American, it is
that they are "Zionists." It would not be surprising to learn from an
anonymously cited American soldier that he can understand why Saddam
Hussein was needed to keep the Sunnis and the Shiites from each others'
throats.
A problem for American policymakers — for President Bush, ultimately —
is to cope with the postulates and decide how to proceed.
One of these postulates, from the beginning, was that the Iraqi people,
whatever their tribal differences, would suspend internal divisions in
order to get on with life in a political structure that guaranteed them
religious freedom.
The accompanying postulate was that the invading American army would
succeed in training Iraqi soldiers and policymkers to cope with
insurgents bent on violence.
This last did not happen. And the administration has, now, to cope with
failure. It can defend itself historically, standing by the inherent
reasonableness of the postulates. After all, they govern our policies
in Latin America, in Africa, and in much of Asia. The failure in Iraq
does not force us to generalize that violence and antidemocratic
movements always prevail. It does call on us to adjust to the question,
What do we do when we see that the postulates do not prevail — in the
absence of interventionist measures (we used these against Hirohito and
Hitler) which we simply are not prepared to take? It is healthier for
the disillusioned American to concede that in one theater in the
Mideast, the postulates didn't work. The alternative would be to
abandon the postulates. To do that would be to register a kind of
philosophical despair. The killer insurgents are not entitled to blow
up the shrine of American idealism.
Mr. Bush has a very difficult internal problem here because to make the
kind of concession that is strategically appropriate requires a
mitigation of policies he has several times affirmed in high-flown
pronouncements. His challenge is to persuade himself that he can submit
to a historical reality without forswearing basic commitments in
foreign policy.
He will certainly face the current development as military leaders are
expected to do: They are called upon to acknowledge a tactical setback,
but to insist on the survival of strategic policies.
Yes, but within their own counsels, different plans have to be made. And the kernel here is the acknowledgment of defeat.
_______________
mp
Religion in MMOGs
I once started, but made no progress on, an essay about religion -- or, more precisely, religious freedom -- in MMOGs ("massively multiplayer online games"). I wondered, what would it mean for an "avatar" (i.e., the "digital you" in virtual-world games) to enjoy and exercise religious freedom? I was not thinking so much about any real-world, religious-freedom rights that we might have to participate in MMOGs, or about any constraints that religious-freedom laws might impose on the regulation of gamers or games themselves. Instead, I was trying to imagine what it would really mean to say or wonder if the avatars themselves, in "their" worlds, enjoyed religious freedom. The question seemed worth asking because -- in my view, anyway -- religious-freedom questions (in the real world) are intimately connected to moral-anthropology questions, i.e., what is a human person and what does the answer to this question mean for additional questions about how human persons ought to be regarded and treated?
Well, again, I made no progress. This should have come as no surprise, given that I really do not know much about MMOGs or computer-gaming generally. (Some prawfs -- like Dan Hunter, Michael Froomkin, Timothy Wu, and Jack Balkin -- do, though). In any event, here is an interesting post, on the "Terra Nova" blog, about "religion in MMOGs" (read the comments, too):
[A]ctual religion and theology are pretty much absent or at best non-operative in most MMOs. In fantasy games the priest is typically a "healer" but otherwise the character is a façade. In modern or science fiction games, religion is conspicuously almost entirely absent.
I've been wondering for some time about enabling the presence of both real-world and made-up religions in MMOs as thematically appropriate. Is this a good way to flesh out a world, to create gameplay surrounding a moral code and shared identity, and to bring a significantly missing piece of human community to the game, or would it just be a way to invite controversy -- in effect, to draw aggro from both religious and non-religious players and cause a heap o' customer service trouble?
The companion to this question is a bit more introspective: to what degree does the answer to the question of operative religions in MMOs vary with our own degree of spirituality/religiosity? Is the perceived agnosticism of the game development community keeping religion out of MMOs?
Any thoughts?
Conscience, Catholic hospitals, and contraception
Apparently, lawmakers in Connecticut are putting together a bill "that would require all Connecticut hospitals, including the four Roman Catholic hospitals in the state, to provide emergency contraception to rape victims." The news story, and the proposal's supporters who are quoted, speak simply of "contraception," while those speaking for the Catholic hospitals speak in terms of early abortifacients:
The Rev. John Gatzak, director of communications for the Archdiocese of Hartford, said the archdiocese would oppose any legislation requiring hospitals to administer contraceptives in cases where an egg already has been fertilized or ovulation has begun.
The Catholic Church "does believe and always has that human life begins at conception and that human life" at the point of conception "is entitled to all the respect that other human life is entitled to," Gatzak said.
I assume that the First Amendment would not require an exemption from Connecticut's "emergency contraception" mandate (though, perhaps, state law would). Is there any compromise possible? Or, is the Catholic Church simply going to have to give up on running full-service hospitals? And, if the Church were to do this, would that be good for civil society and for the poor?
Conscience, Human Dignity, and Livelihood
As a past participant to some of the MOJ discussion on conscience and related issues, I would like to offer a few thoughts in response to some of the recent postings. It is clear that a wide variety of individuals today, both in the US and abroad, are facing challenges to their consciences. In this context, I often think of our fellow Catholics in the People’s Republic of China. Some of the recent MOJ debate has concentrated on physicians and pharmacists. In some of this dialogue, a distinction was drawn between members of these two professions. It seems that one view makes a distinction between these two groups in that the sanctions they face can lead to a threat of livelihood for physicians but not for pharmacists. Is that really the case?
Let me suggest that any person has a right to claim the exercise of conscience and that those opposed to this exercise of conscience may take actions that threaten that person’s livelihood and possibly even that individual’s life. Let us take the case of the auto mechanic who is employed by the only place where his specialty and trade are in need. The employer (and only employer) runs a so-called “chop shop” in which stolen cars are broken up into components and sold. Our mechanic of conscience so far has worked only on legal activities, but his employer begins to apply pressure that he must now participate in the shop’s illegal activities. Knowing that there is no other place to go (the mechanic must stay in this community because of his family) for employment, does this fellow not risk loss of his livelihood?
Let us take another case of high school students. Most are good kids; a few get into mischief; some engage in dangerous anti-social behavior. In this case, there is student who minds her business, but she is targeted by a clique from the last group I identified. She is pressured and threatened to engage in dangerous, illegal conduct by members of this last group. There is no escape in that she cannot leave school; if she says anything to her parents or the school authorities, she has good reason to believe that the bullies will initiate reprisals that will lead to serious injury or death. In conscience, she stands her ground and refuses to comply with the demands. Does she not risk loss of her livelihood?
Let us take a third case. Private Jones is a member of an elite military unit in a dangerous foreign assignment where the military are pursuing terrorist suspects. The military unit finds and detains suspects. A superior decides to use interrogation methods that violate applicable international humanitarian law and international law. Private Jones realizes this and finds ways of not participating in these illegal activities for a while. But the day comes when pressure is put on Private Jones to assist in these unlawful methods. In conscience, the private resists, but more pressure is applied—pressure that threatens the private’s status in the elite unit. Does Private Jones not risk loss of livelihood?
Let us take a fourth case. After much difficulty in finding a university teaching post because of national financial constraints in higher education, Professor Davis has recently joined the faculty of Mosquito State University. She weathered the hiring battles and finally got a prized teaching post. What initially seems to be a stroke of good luck is not. The University has authorized the faculty to hire another person in an increasingly difficult job market. Thousands of candidates apply and a few are called on campus to be interviewed. Professor Davis is attracted to one candidate in particular because they both share similar philosophies on life and teaching. However, just before the faculty vote that will determine who will be the successful candidate, a senior member of the faculty who also chairs the rank and tenure committee stops by Professor Davis’s office and “suggests” that Professor Davis not vote for Davis’s favorite candidate. Even though the hiring vote is done by “secret” ballot, Davis knows that how each member of the faculty votes can be determined. Professor Davis, in conscience, is compelled to vote for this candidate, but Davis also knows the consequences for her presently untenured career. Does Professor Davis not risk loss of livelihood because of the exercise of conscience?
I believe that the distinction between physicians and pharmacists about losing or not losing their livelihood is not a helpful one. All persons have human dignity, and all persons of conscience can find themselves in situations where their integrity and their well-formed consciences in which they rely on the objective moral order can be assaulted. These assaults can occur in the daily life of the person wherever he or she works and lives. They can occur to someone who is a member of a learned profession and someone who is not. These pressures know no boundaries that are based on age. They can exist throughout the human condition. They do not visit only members of elite professions; they can threaten virtually anyone including our local pharmacist. RJA sj
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