Here is a response, by Ramesh Ponnuru, to some of the critiques of his book, "The Party of Death." (Seetheseposts.) With respect to the charge that Ponnuru fails to see or embrace the implications of his pro-life views for the criminalization and punishment of abortion, Ponnuru writes:
It is true that I don’t lay out a detailed version of an ideal legal code concerning abortion. I had three important reasons for this “omission.” The first is that legislatures and voting publics are not yet in a position to be enacting ideal legal codes, and the case for allowing them to do so — which can include a case for the general reasonableness of the anti-abortion position — has to be made before it makes much sense to proceed to the next steps.
The second, related one is that my view of politics is not utopian. A slow process of persuasion, of asymptotic approaches to justice, is not a compromise; it is the very best that we can hope for. I have no illusions, and indulge none in the book, about the likelihood that a democratic resolution of the abortion debate would involve the triumph of my views on, say, the permissibility of aborting fetuses because of their disabilities. If we reach a point where unborn children are generally protected, I may write a book attempting more persuasion. But it would be a very different book.
My third reason is that there is considerable room for prudential judgment in the drawing up of laws. In one state, penalties might have to be tougher to deter a crime. I don’t have an ideal legal code in mind for prohibiting homicide in general, and I think that homicide laws may rightly vary according to the circumstances of time and jurisdiction. That doesn’t nullify my view that all places ought to prohibit homicide.
Yet I say enough to refute the charge that Rauch makes. I don’t sidestep the issues he addresses. See page 262, where I offer a reason for considering abortion “less culpable than, say, the murder of a business rival out of greed,” and for thinking it “just to impose less severe punishments.” I also explicitly say that if a legal regime of delicensure and fines for abortionists “deterred abortion and communicated the state’s and the public’s hostility to abortion. . . there would, in my view, be no need to go further” (p. 246).
In other words, I outlined the principles that ought to govern these laws in as much detail as the matter allows. I explained the sense in which abortion is analogous to other kinds of homicide (its deliberate ending of a peaceable human being’s life) and the sense in which it is not (the subjective moral intent likely to be behind the act). To put it a different way: While I cannot assent to the common pro-choice argument that we should allow the killing of unborn human beings since our society includes people who take many different good-faith moral views about the issue, I can see this pluralism as a legitimate reason for lenity in enforcing the prohibition.
Michael links, through Brian Leiter's blog and Daily Kos, to a "depressing map showing income drop under Bush." Here is a New York Times story on the same issue.
A quick thought: Clearly, Governor Jennifer Granholm -- a Democrat -- of Michigan, where the "income drop" is most pronounced, has to go! Go De Vos! Beat Granholm!
A more serious question: What, exactly, does the map mean?? No doubt, and this is particularly true for those of us -- that is, for all of us -- who don't really understand the ins and outs of labor economics, the news that wages are dropping should cause us to be concerned, sit up, and try to figure out what is going on. After all, "under Bush," the economy has grown, notwithstanding the bursting of the Clinton-era tech-bubble, the September 11 attacks, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If it were the case that, despite this growth (which was not inevitable, was it?), Americans in the middle-, working, and lower classes were worse off, it would indeed be upsetting, and "depressing".
This map does not show, though, that Americans' standard of living is declining. It isn't. This Bureau of Labor Statistics report, "100 Years of U.S. Consumer Spending," might be of interest here. See also this recent Washington Post op-ed on why statistics like those in the map o which Michael links provide an incomplete picture of poverty and well-being.
Nor does the map accurate depict developments regarding Americans' real, total compensation (including benefits, insurance, pension contributions, etc.) According to this BLS chart, real hourly compensation in the non-farm sector has increased consistently since the 2001 recession. See also this post, by our fellow MOJ-er Steve Bainbridge, on whether statistics like those depicted on the map ignore the realities of the "ownership society."
Clearly, a map showing declining median wages in the face of growth and productivity increases is politically useful in September of an election year. And, we might conclude that, even the full picture of the economy (i.e., one that factors in real compensation and the considerations outlined in the Post op-ed) is troubling, perhaps because of the disparity between those at the top and the bottom. (See theseold MOJ posts on income inequality.) We might think that even real, total compensation is too low, and failing to keep pace with American workers' increased productivity. And so on. But, if it turns out to be the case that, while median wages are not growing, real compensation and consumer spending are, is this something that is "depressing"? Morally objectionable?
William Thro, state solicitor general for Virginia, recently published an essay with the provocative title "A Pelagian Vision for Our Augustinian Constitution: A Review of Justice Breyer's Active Liberty," 32 Journal of College and University Law 491 (2006). (HT: Bob Anthony).
He writes: "While the Christian Church resolved the theological issue in the fifth century, humanity continues to grapple with the broader question. For a nation, the collective answer to that question inevitably will determine how it organizes its government." The author suggests that Breyer's pelagian tendencies cause him to devalue such structural safeguards as state sovereignty (rejecting by implication the Catholic concept of subsidiarity and the Calvinist concept of sphere sovereignty) in his interpretative method.
[This may be of interest to MOJ-readers. Lifted from Brian Leiter's blog. Posted by guest-blogger Benj Hellie.]
Depressing map showing income drop under Bush
That's median income,
folks. Despite the fact that the economy has been growing at a slow but
consistent rate, median income has been dropping in nearly every state,
in some cases, quite dramatically -- in excess of 10% (!) in five
states. Obviously, there has been a tremendous looting of the great
majority of Americans by the ultra rich, who not only have absorbed all
that economic growth for themselves, but are actually *taking away* the
small gains made since the early seventies. Indeed, we have heard for
years that incomes have barely risen since then, but now it seems quite
likely that under Bush, we have seen an absolute income drop, returning
to the levels of the 1960s.
I suspect that many readers of this blog are professionals, who
regard steadily increasing income as a given. Can you imagine if you
had to take a 10% income cut? This is stark, terribly bad economic
news: most of America is effectively living through an economic
depression.
Marie Failinger just brought to my attention the Journal of Lutheran Ethic's exploration of Deus Caritas Est. The editorial synopsis of the September issue follows:
This month five more authors join the four from the August issue to offer their reflections on the pope’s letter. Three of the authors focus on theoretical themes arising from the letter and two draw out the practical meaning of love.
[2] In a wide-ranging article, William Buckley, a Roman Catholic, introduces Pope Benedict and his encyclical and places them in historical perspective. He interprets the encyclical in terms of its eucharistic liturgical catechesis and points to a history shared by Benedict and Luther.
[3] Mary Gaebler takes up Benedict’s claim that eros and agape cannot be separated and turns to Luther texts to investigate whether or not Luther affirmed eros or self-love as part of the Christian life.
[4] Michael Rothaar writes on why and how the pope’s letter on love is helpful to him in his pastoral ministry.
[5] Mark Peterson, viewing Deus Caritas Est from the perspective of Lutheran social ministry, praises the centrality of love of neighbor in the letter and notes areas for further elaboration.
[6] Michael Trice argues that an in-depth reading of the encyclical shows that Benedict missed the opportunity to develop two important themes about love and community.
This new paper, "The Moral Subject of Property," by Carol Rose, looks really interesting. Here is the abstract:
What kind of person is presupposed by property law? This paper, written for a symposium on the morality of law, investigates the morality that is expected of participants in property regimes, and it argues that property presupposes a "second-best" morality. The presumptive property subject is a self-interested being, but also one who has a modicum of cooperativeness. But is such a second-best morality good enough to command respect? Critics complain that it is not, and that property concedes too much to human self-interest. This paper explores three areas where this critique arises: the claims that initial acquisitions are based on wrongful behavior, thus tainting subsequent ownership; that property results in unequal distributions of wealth; and that commercial property's alienability corrupts the human understanding of love, generosity and good civic behavior. The usual property-based answer to these critiques is that property nevertheless makes us all better off. Thus claims and responses do not meet, with one side speaking of personal morality and the other referring to the public welfare. Nevertheless there are several ways in which property's more forgiving second-best standard may also call into question the personal moral character of a more demanding first-best standard.
I appreciate Eduardo's response to my post about Rauch's review of Ponnuru's book. (That sentence is a parody of blogging, isn't it?)
That said, the force of Eduardo's and Rauch's critique continues to elude me. That is, I do not see why those who believe -- as I do, and as Ponnuru does, and as Eduardo does -- that abortion generally involves wrongful homicide, and that our Nation's tolerance (let alone constitutionalization and celebration) of private violence against unborn children is shameful, are therefore required, for consistency's sake, to believe that women who have abortions, or doctors who perform them, should be punished in the same way and with the same severity as are persons who "murder" adults. Nor do I see why those who believe that abortion generally involves wrongful homicide are therefore required, for consistency's sake, to "fire-bomb[] . . . abortion clinics" or take to the streets.
Eduardo writes:
But if abortion is murder, then the scale of the injustice being perpetrated on a daily basis in our country alone (not to mention the world) is truly staggering. Over six million innocent human lives have been intentionally taken in the United States under the Bush presidency alone. Why does President Bush get a pass for this? No doubt some will point towards his rhetoric of life and the limited actions he has taken, which admittedly would not have been taken under a different administration. But if abortion is mass murder on the scale of a Holocaust every eight years, shouldn't he be doing more? Where is the sense of urgency? If abortion is mass murder, the President should be filibustering, refusing to talk about anything else, shutting the federal government down until he gets his way, not taking his eye of the ball and fighting wars in Iraq, negotiating trade agreements, cutting taxes, or making speeches about the problems with social security.
Well, I suppose one reason why "Bush [might] get a pass" on this is because he is, in fact, doing what can be done, within the constraints of horribly misguided constitutional law, to change people's minds about abortion, and thereby hastening the day when the wrong of abortion will be as clear to most people as it is to Eduardo and me. Eduardo knows as well as I do that "filibustering," etc. would be, given the givens, utterly useless. I do not see why those who believe that abortion is wrongful homicide are required to indulge in useless (indeed, counterproductive) dramatics, even when the wrong being combatted is as great as this one, when smaller steps hold out the promise of actually changing people's minds.
I am inclined to agree with Eduardo that there is a difference -- one that is relevant to the perpetrator's culpability and deserved punishment -- between procuring or performing an abortion and maliciously causing the death of an adult. True, both involve the deaths of human beings, and both are wrong. But, it seems to me, the state-of-mind, or mens rea is almost certainly different (if only because the humanity of the victim, and therefore the wrongfulness of the conduct, is impossible to avoid in the latter situation), and so it does not seem to me odd, or hypocritical, to concede (as Ponnuru does) that the law may treat them differently.
We have just gone through that time of liturgical year when the daily Gospel readings from St. Matthew are replete with Jesus's critique of the scribes and Pharisees--"Woe to you Scribes and Pharisees...!" Yesterday's Gospel for the twenty-second Sunday of Ordinary Time from St. Mark was a climax for this series of admonition to the lawyers of his time. Jesus calls them hypocrites and accuses them of disregarding and defiling God's commandment. The source of this defilement, he says, is not from outside the person but from within. He strongly rebukes the legal profession of his time. But for those of us who might wonder if there is hope for lawyers, regardless of the era in which they live, the first reading from the Book of Deuteronomy provides some valuable insight into what God asks of us through His commandments. If we allow ourselves to be open to God's intelligence and wisdom, human governance and the law that is made and applied under it can make the human family and its nations great. Moreover, if we lawyers are free for God's intelligence and wisdom, think of the benefits that can be derived for those whom we encounter. Some of them may be skeptical and others may be quite critical of such a project. But, there may well be those who see that there is something beyond the present moment and the political caprice of the day. As we begin a new academic year, we might consider how the lessons from these passages of sacred scripture might make us not only better teachers but more effective ministers of God's justice in this world. RJA sj
It's good to be back in the U.S. after two excellent weeks in Europe (including in Siena, Italy teaching at a European summer school on church-state relations on which I'll blog a little).
On SSRN, Allan Samansky (Ohio State) posts an article arguing that the Internal Revenue restrictions on tax-exempts intervening in political campaigns in favor of particular candidates should not be applied to churches, at least as to "core" religious activities such as sermons:
There are convincing arguments for treating churches differentlyfrom other section 501(c)(3) organizations when interpreting andapplying the prohibition against intervening in politicalcampaigns. The article recommends that pastors and other churchleaders be able to communicate with members about the merits ofpolitical candidates without risking loss of favorable taxstatus. Such leniency for churches is consistent with thelegislative history of the prohibition and would not violate theEstablishment Clause of the First Amendment. Furthermore, strictenforcement of the ban against participation in politicalcampaigns by churches risks violating the Free Exercise Clause ofthe First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of1993.
