Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, November 3, 2006

Miller on Penalver on abortion and the election

My colleague Robert Miller takes on Eduardo on abortion and the upcoming election over at

http://www.beliefnet.com/story/202/story_20265_1.html

More on elections and voting

Last week I received my absentee ballot for the mid-term elections. As I perused the ballot, which contained elections for about thirty offices, I noticed something that I did not expect. Only three of the races had candidates from the two major parties. The overwhelming percentage of offices only had candidates from one of the major parties, the Democratic Party to be specific. I came to realize that our discussion of a few weeks back on Catholics, voting, and voting guides did not address very much, if at all, this circumstance that I have just encountered. How does any voter, including the Catholic voter, deal with an election in which there is no opposition. I suppose this is what happens in totalitarian regimes where voters have no choice. But, the United States is a democracy, is it not? I then began to wonder if the time has come to consider the possibility of reevaluating the current “two party” system. In particular, I have started to think about the likelihood of members of the laity forming an American version of the Christian Democratic Party. Would there be Constitutional prohibitions against such an institution or not? I am curious what other MOJ participants and readers might think about such a proposal. In the meantime, I continue to reflect on the meaning of my voice in American politics that was dramatically affected by the ballot I received.   RJA sj

Thursday, November 2, 2006

Arguments for Amnesty

Dear Fellow Amnesty Members and Activists:

As some of you may know, Amnesty International’s 2005 International Council Meeting called for a process to “enable AI to take an informed decision as to the organization’s position” regarding abortion. AI is presently neutral on abortion. The decision now being contemplated would endorse various rights to abortion.

   

I think an AI endorsement of abortion rights would be a mistake, for three reasons: Endorsing abortion rights would cause further harm to already oppressed women, particularly in the developing world. Endorsing abortion rights would hurt AI’s important work for human rights in general. And the consultation process being used by AI is woefully inadequate to generate a thoughtful and democratic result. Let me explain these three assertions.

If a woman is dominated by others, certain rights she is given will be exercised against her by those who dominate her :

The “Draft Amnesty International Policy Statement on Abortion” begins with words of great wisdom: “In practice, many women are simply unable to effectively negotiate the terms and conditions of their sexual interactions and reproductive choices due to pervasive discrimination, coercion and violence against them.” [#1] Unfortunately, the  Draft Policy contents itself with saying that AI “believes” women should not be so coerced [#6] and then goes on to suggest providing the coercers with another weapon that they can use against the women they dominate, i.e. “decriminalization [of abortion] in all cases” [#8]. (Note that I am purposely ignoring the fetus here.)

In other words, the AI Draft Policy is idealistic but misguided. It genuinely seeks to help oppressed women, but it would end up hurting them. Here’s an analogy: Suppose a certain nation has a law limiting women to ten hours of work a day, but no law at all limiting men’s work. Clearly such a law is sexist and harms women who would be powerful enough to control they own lives. For example, such a law would stop Westernized and educated young women from working the 14 hour days that it takes to crawl to the top of a modern business, thus preserving an all-male leadership. But should the law be abolished? What if the vast majority of the women in that nation are not their own masters? What if the elimination of the sexist law would cause untold misery, as women would be forced to spend all their waking hours in a sweatshop? Isn’t abolishing the law putting the cart before the horse? Shouldn’t women first be empowered and then given the right to work as many hours as they wish?

Abortion rights are the same. They may truly be liberating for powerful women whose careers cannot easily accommodate children, for women who are truly free to choose without outside pressures and for whom the opportunity costs of children are very great. Polls indeed show that such women overwhelmingly support a right to abortion. By contrast, poorer women, even in the USA, are the group most hostile to abortion. Why would they want abortion available if it’s only going to result in a boyfriend, a parent, a husband, or an employer coercing them (even by violence) to forego one of the few satisfactions they have in their oppressed lives, the love of a child? Or just think how the availability of abortion can facilitate raw sexual exploitation: A college student told me once: “I’m really pro-choice, but you can bet I tell my boyfriend I’m 100% pro-life.” She knew that the option of abortion could easily make him less careful. But not all young women are so clever. (Consult the great feminist thinker Catherine MacKinnon for more on the effect of making abortion a “privacy” right. She points out that it is precisely in women’s private lives that male dominance is most extreme.)

The developing world is much, much worse for most women, as the first section of the Draft Policy so well stated (see above). Except for a tiny elite segment of women (which unfortunately may be the only non-male presence at international conferences set up to propose new laws) abortion hurts women because it empowers husbands, sweatshop owners, and pimps to use them with impunity. The rule is very simple: Those who make real life choices for women are the real rights holders, regardless of who may have the formal legal right to make decisions.

Even seemingly obvious rights to abortion, such as abortion after rape or incest, may backfire against women where they are weak. After all, in most societies rape and incest are viewed very negatively, if they are discovered. Male predators ordinarily want their victims to have abortions so they won’t be exposed and punished, and so that they can continue their sexual exploitation. Only in a modern nation, with a good police force, could predators regularly be caught and punished, so that the abortion decision could be truly that of the woman. This is a tough call I admit, if we put aside any fetal interests, but the uncertainty of the real life impact of laws permitting abortion after rape should give one second thoughts about making even abortion after rape into an international right, applicable in all countries.

In summary, to proclaim rights to abortion around the world is to adopt a first-world, or an upper elite, view of the beneficiaries of such rights. A down-to-earth look at poor and oppressed women’s actual lives will lead one to conclude that women would first need to be empowered before they could truly benefit from any rights to abortion.

Amnesty will no longer be able to proclaim complete support for Human Rights if it endorses abortion :

As a teacher of comparative law, I can tell you the right to life of the fetus is explicitly protected by a number of international treaties and national constitutions. Fundamental rights to abortion are recognized far less extensively.

I’m not saying that only a few nations permit abortion. Many do. But very few treat it as a basic human right.  Abortion is permitted simply because the legislature of the nation has decided to pass such a law, but that law could be repealed tomorrow without violating any treaty or constitution. Nowhere in Europe

(with the possible exception of abortion for severe health reasons in Italy) is there a clear constitutional right to abortion, to my knowledge. But various countries’ constitutions or constitutional court decisions contain a right to life. Germany is one. The unborn child has a constitutional right to life throughout pregnancy there, recognized twice by the high court in lengthy decisions in 1975 and in 1993. Do not rely on the over-simplified report that Germanydoes not punish abortion in the first 12 weeks, as long as the pregnant woman has undergone solidly pro-life counseling and has waited three more days to think it over. That is true, but the Court’s reasoning is that the counseling will save more unborn lives than threats of punishment. Strange as it may seem to us, abortion goes unpunished in Germanyi n recognition of a fetal right to life, not of a maternal right to abortion. And why does Germany care about unborn life? The answer given by the Court is that to permit abortion is to head once again down the path to devaluation of individual human life followed by the Nazis. If Amnesty were to proclaim a right to abortion, according to German human rights doctrine, it would be attacking life, the most basic human right of all, and following again that dreaded path.

The regional human rights treaty for the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, 1969) explicitly proclaims “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception.” [Art. 4(1)]. It also emphasizes that “’person’ means every human being.” [Art. 1(2)] Thus we see that the unborn child is recognized as a person with a right to life from the moment of conception. When it comes to legal protection of that right, it is true, the signatory states have a little flexibility (presumably to deal with any clash with the mother’s equal right to life) because of the words “in general.” But this is not phrased as a limit on the right itself, but only as a permitted (but not required) minor exception to the enforcement of that right. Does Amnesty really want to proclaim a right to violate the core of a major human rights treaty? Does it want to have to say from now on: “We’re for many recognized human rights, but we’re opposed to others”?

It is true that the recent Protocol to the African Charter endorses a very limited right to abortion—the first such treaty right in the world. This is quite ironic, however, since black Africa may be the most pro-life part of the globe. A recent Pew poll, for example, found that 64% of Nigerians and a whopping 81% of Kenyans said women should be stopped from having abortions (USA: only 32%, according to Pew). How much does that Protocol represent the African peoples as opposed to representing NGOs and other elites? Does AI want to be part of what may well be a shoving of elite westernized interests down the throats of Africans? Why not stay out of the whole uncertain mess, by staying neutral on abortion?

Lastly, and most simply: Amnesty International has long had one clear message: Human Dignity. AI has proclaimed that rights are not just for the strong, or just for citizens, or just for non-criminals, or just for adults. AI has always said that just being human is all one needs to have human dignity and human rights. But no one seriously doubts that the unborn offspring of two humans is also human. So if AI endorses a right to abortion, it is saying that merely being human and alive is no longer enough for dignity and rights. Amnesty will either have to make a deep change in its self understanding and abandon its foundation in the dignity of simply being human, or else constantly face the charge of hypocrisy from many opponents and erstwhile supporters.

The current consultation process is deeply flawed. It is not designed to produce thoughtful or democratic reflection from long time AI supporters :

First of all, non-members have no voice at all in the consultation. This is unfair and unwise because many of AI’s strongest supporters are thus left out of the conversation simply because they forgot or couldn’t afford their dues, even though they may regularly join in letters, petitions, rallies and other AI causes.

Perhaps It could be argued that any final voting should be done by members, but why not at least get the opinions and views of non-member AI activists? This is not being done at all. The Draft Policy and accompanying documents are available only to those who type in someone’s membership data. (Here are mine, for any AI supporters who want to take a look at the documents:  Username: rstith  Password: 1a9iwyq Scroll down to the lower right.) Moreover, when various members of Consistent Life called AI headquarters in New York, they were told curtly that AI is staying neutral on abortion rather than thinking of changing it. And no record of the callers’ views or names seemed to be kept. (Consistent Life is a group to which I belong that is opposed to all violence: no war, no death penalty, no abortion, no euthanasia, no poverty and no racism. We have all traditionally supported AI, though only some of us have been actual members at any given time.)

However, in fact voting on the policy will not be democratic even among the AI paid members; it will be done by certain leaders—supposedly after receiving input from members. But the questions asked (if one can find them; they’re not prominent even in the members-only pages of the AI website) cannot possibly generate people’s true or deep opinions on a subject like abortion. Please take a personal look at all of them, but here are the first four questions:  (1) “Is the scope of this policy consistent with 2005 ICM decision 3, especially paragraph D?” (2) “Is the level of detail in this policy and the supporting notes appropriate?” (3) “Which of the options in paragraph 6 do you prefer?” [What if you don’t like either?] (4) “Which of the options presented in paragraph 8 do you prefer?” [The only choice here is between complete decriminalization throughout pregnancy and complete decriminalization except in some unspecified late part of pregnancy. A small paragraph in the 14-page “Explanatory Notes” shows that either option will be taken to endorse a right to abort for sex selection or for the “potential disability status of the fetus.”]

The Explanatory Notes accompanying the questions are dense and confusing. They seem almost designed to obfuscate (or even to manipulate) rather than to clarify. For example, the only option in question 3 (regarding paragraph 6) is whether to append (to a general statement supporting freedom in termination decisions) the following sentence: “Such decisions are a matter of private conscience to be decided by the woman in consultation with her health service provider.” I would read the sentence in question to be a kind of encouragement to be reflective and to get medical advice before exercising one’s freedom. But the Explanatory Notes say “Opponents of this sentence argue that … use of this terminology could give the impression that AI is staking out a broad ‘pro-abortion’ position here.”

For the three reasons I have explained above, I believe it would be highly unwise for Amnesty International to adopt its Draft Policy endorsing rights to abortion. Such a right might benefit powerful elites, but it would harm many of our most vulnerable sisters in the developing world. It would clash head-on with the internationally recognized human right to life of the fetus, and even with Amnesty’s own foundation in universal human rights. And many AI supporters may be alienated not only by the substance of the proposed policy but also by the un-open fashion in which the new policy is being “debated.”

If you agree with some of these arguments, please do whatever you can to make your views known to the leadership of Amnesty International.

                                                                           Sincerely,

                                                                           

                                                                           

                                                                           Richard Stith

                                                                           

                                                                           Member, Amnesty International

                                                                           Member, Consistent Life

                                                                           Email: [email protected]

                                                                           Website: www.consistent-life.org

Is Acting on the Embryo Morally Dispositive?

Here is the Finnis, Grisez & Boyle article referenced by Karen Stohr (thanks to Antonio Manetti for the link).  And here is a helpful excerpt from their discussion of the moral distinction between a hysterectomy and craniotomy:

[T]he hysterectomy is performed "upon the woman," the craniotomy "upon the fetus." We reply: this difference does not show that craniotomy is direct killing. A counter-example makes this clear. All those acts of self-defense of the kind that Aquinas shows need involve no intent to kill and no direct killing are nonetheless performed "upon" the person killed.  And in general, the fact that an act is done to (or "upon") X for the sake of Y, or to Y for the sake of Y, provides no criterion for distinguishing between what is intended and what is accepted as a side effect.

This underscores my own (much less educated) skepticism toward the lines drawn on the issue of ectopic pregnancy.  If we're going to invoke Kevorkian, the remove the tube / remove the embryo distinction seems akin to attaching moral significance to the difference between Kevorkian assisting a suicide by lethal injection and assisting a suicide by bulldozing the victim's house while she is inside.  The death is certain to result in both cases and the actor's intent is, as far as I can tell, identical.  So why does it matter if I bring about the death by acting upon the person or by acting upon the container in which the person is located? 

Rob

Wednesday, November 1, 2006

More from Karen Stohr

Thanks again to Karen Stohr for her contributions (here and here).  Here is another:

I must say, I have always found the terms of this particular debate [ecgtopic pregnancy] quite troubling.  As a Catholic philosopher (and mother) who subscribes to the basic tenets of double effect, I am very skeptical of attempts to apply it definitively in such situations.  If anyone is going to insist that a woman suffering from an ectopic pregnancy must undergo the removal of her fallopian tube, on the grounds that nothing else is a morally licit option, one had better have a *very* good justification for that view.  After all, her health, hopes, and dreams may rest on it (what if it is her only remaining fallopian tube?).   And the justification for the view depends on philosophical concepts that are undeniably murky.

In order to use double effect in a philosophically responsible way, one must have reasonably defensible views about intention and related issues in action theory.   The distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' killing  requires, among other things, an account of what it is to intend something (including whether actions can be intentional only under descriptions and if so, which descriptions of one's actions one must accept) and an theory of action individuation (including how we can distinguish actions from their consequences).   Many discussions of double effect just slide past these issues.  I have not seen a comprehensive and persuasive action theory that supports May's contention that while salpingectomy does not count as intentional killing, salpingostomy and methotrexate do.  It's not that there couldn't be such a theory, but I do not see it in the articles Professor Myers cites, nor have I seen it elsewhere.

On the other hand, the line on intention taken by Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle in the article I mention[ed] in the email to Rob [here] undermines the distinction as May draws it.   And in her seminal book, /Intention, /the great Catholic philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe argues for a theory of intention that also cannot support the salpingectomy/salpingostomy distinction.   The accounts of these four thinkers are far from decisive, but their combined philosophical skill and sophistication ought to carry considerable weight, and hence, give pause to anyone who wants to insist that women suffering from ectopic pregnancy choose evil if they choose salpingostomy or methotrextate.

Society of Catholic Social Scientists annual meeting

Before too much time goes by, I wanted to mention the most recent annual meeting of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists. The meeting/conference was at the University of Dallas. The plenary talks were by Ron Rychlak (Mississippi Law) and by J. Budziszewski (Texas Philosophy). The latter talk featured insightful comments by my colleague Kevin Lee and by Frank Beckwith. The banquet address was by Gerry Wegemer (Dallas, English) who spoke with great eloquence about the witness of St. Thomas More.

The SCSS is a good group, and I encourage people to take a look at its activities. Most of the members are not law professors, and so the conferences are usually quite diverse (some law, but more history, political theory, sociology, etc.). I don't mean to slight the law professors--there was a very good session featuring 3 professors from Mississippi Law--Ron Rychlak, John Czarnetzky, and Kyle Duncan. 

One important SCSS project is a forthcoming encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought. See this link for information.

Richard M.

Evolution and Imago Dei/Original Sin

Regarding evolution's implications for our belief that humans are created in God's image, Matt Donovan writes:

When I was a grad student at BC and studying under some of Bernard Lonergan's students, we were often referred to Lonergan's notion of "naive realism" -- the prevailing modern bias of equating the real with the material. There seems to be a lot of naive realism going around these days, perhaps inspired by the recent publications from Richard Dawkins and E.O. Wilson, among others.

To be sure, that we are made in God’s image is an important teaching in the Judeo-Christian tradition, but it is perhaps not as anthropomorphic as one might suspect. The most obvious scriptural source for the teaching, of course, comes from the two creation stories in Genesis. The first story uses the language of "God creat[ing] man in God’s image." But the second story gives us more detail about the process of that creation. And according to Gen. 2:7, that process is two-fold.

First, "God formed man out of the clay of the earth"; that is, one could say that he created our physical, chemical, and biological make-up out of the earthly matter he had already created. (By the way, for a fascinating evolutionary account of creation in the Genesis stories, see Leo Strauss's "On the Interpretation of Genesis" and "Jerusalem and Athens" in part VI of Kenneth Hart Green's collection, "Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity"). But second, and perhaps more importantly, God "blew into his nostrils the breath of life" such that "man became a living being"; that is, one could say that man becomes distinctly human only after being directly enlightened with the immaterial spirit of the divine.

This accounts, in part, for the traditional Judeo-Christian anthropological construction of man as mind or spirit embodied. And as Aristotle noted, it is intelligence or rationality that distinguishes human beings from other biological beings. In other words, being "created in God’s image," seems to be intimately connected to being endowed with his spirit; that is, being endowed with intelligence -- the pure immaterial intelligence that God is. Put another way, unlike the reductionist (or naive realist) anthropology of, say, modern scientific materialism, the Judeo-Christian doctrine regarding the "Imago Dei" puts forth a more transcendent anthropology that takes into account -- perhaps emphasizes -- the immaterial, spiritual, or rational element of man’s make-up.

Today's conversation around these latter realities of the human condition seems to me rather inadequate for the most part.

On my related question regarding evolution and original sin, Matt Festa recommends Edward Oakes' article, Original Sin: A Disputation, along with helpful follow-up questions and comments from First Things readers.

And another (anonymous) reader recommends Peter van Inwagen's work on evolution and the Fall.  The reader believes that, in van Ingwagen's view, "God caused an ape or some other sort of non-human animal to be distinctively human, and that was Adam."  In the reader's view, "for my money, just give up on evolution." 

Rob

"Checks, Balances, and Bishops"

Here is a post, from the First Things blog, about the work of the called the National Leadership Roundtable on Church Management.  Fr. Neuhaus writes: 

The initiative has produced a book, Governance, Accountability, and the Future of the Catholic Church, and a report, “The Church in America: The Way Forward in the 21st Century.” (Information is available on the website of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Life, which is directed by Alan Wolfe.) In its initial and subsequent meetings, the Roundtable has continued to advance its goal, which, according to Mr. Boisi, is to provide a “check and balance” on the role of the bishops and, according to Mr. Butler of Foundations and Donors, to “allow lay people to speak in the name of the Church.”

Undoubtedly, some who have been recruited by the Roundtable only want to assist the bishops in their leadership of the Church. And nobody would dispute that the bishops need all the help they can get in improving management and financial practices, and, to that end, should draw more fully on the talents of lay people. Yet it seems evident that the Roundtable has much bigger things in mind. The apparent goal is to create an institutional structure that will propose itself as representing the lay people in speaking for the Catholic Church, whether in tandem with or as an alternative to the voice of the bishops. The further apparent goal is to gain control of—or at least to exercise major influence in—a large measure of Church governance, employing the immense wealth to which the Roundtable has access.

These are goals long espoused by the academics, editors, and Church activists associated with this project. In its more modest statement of purpose, the project is to be a “clearinghouse” for the bishops, providing them with “best practices” in business management. But there is also the plan to establish a permanent national “Leadership Roundtable” of up to 225 members. Such an institution seems disproportionate to the task of giving the bishops business advice. Not surprisingly, some think they detect an effort to “democratize” the Church by establishing—somewhat along the lines of the Episcopal Church—a “house of delegates” composed of laity to balance the “house of bishops.” If that is the long-term goal, it would indeed be a radical change in the way the Catholic Church understands her constitution. . . .

The introduction to Governance, Accountability, and the Future of the Catholic Church notes that the book’s essays “focus on the urgent and far-reaching changes in ecclesial governance, administrative style, and financial accountability called for if the congregation of the faithful in the future is to fulfill its hallowed aspiration to be the salt of the earth and the light of the nations.” In his own essay, Francis Butler writes, “Many, if not most, bishops have proven themselves unable to measure up to the demands of running the multimillion-dollar organizations which U.S. dioceses have become.”

Again, nobody should deny that the bishops need all the help they can get. But talk about “far-reaching changes in ecclesial governance” would be less problematic were it more obvious that those pressing for such changes have a firm understanding of and commitment to the ecclesiology by which the Catholic Church is constituted.

I have not read the initiative's book, but it does seem to me worth being concerned about an uncritical importing of "checks and balances" language -- which is great in the constitutional law context! -- into our ecclesiology. 

Salpinegectomy v. Salpingostomy

Prof. Karen Stohr offers the following additional comment on our ectopic pregnancy discussion:

I'm watching the continuation of this discussion of ectopic pregnancy with considerable interest. Let me just point out, though, that the sources that Professor Myers cites on the management of ectopic pregnancy are far from uncontroversial. There is considerable dispute over whether it is possible to draw a philosophically sound distinction between salpinegectomy on the one hand, and salpingostomy and methotrexate on the other hand. How one draws the distinction depends greatly on what one takes an intention to be, and how intentions relate to action descriptions. One can accept the basic framework of double effect and yet disagree with May et al on the management of ectopic pregnancy, on the grounds that the particular account of intention upon which he relies is philosophically problematic.

For a quite different take on the moral structure of procedures such as salpingostomy, see this article by that mighy triumverate, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle: "'Direct and Indirect': A Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory" _The Thomist_ 65 (2001): pp. 1-44.

Rob

The Muslim reponse to the Pope

Here is an interesting essay, by John F. Cullinan, on the "Open Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI" which was written a few weeks ago by a group of Muslim clerics and scholars.  Here is the Open Letter.  (It is amazing to me that this response has not received more news coverage.  The press is -- surprise, surprise -- really dropping the ball.)