My new book has just been published by Cambridge University Press. The title: Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts. The table of contents, introduction, and conclusion are available for download at SSRN (here). This is the abstract I posted on SSRN:
Abstract:
Jurgen Habermas has remarked that “notwithstanding their European
origins, . . . in Asia, Africa, and South America, [human rights now]
constitute the only language in which the opponents and victims of
murderous regimes and civil wars can raise their voices against
violence, repression, and persecution, against injuries to their human
dignity.” Nonetheless--and as philosopher John Searle recently wrote--“we [do not] have a clear theory of human rights. On the contrary, . .
. the necessary work is just beginning.” My new book, Toward a Theory
of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press), is an effort to
contribute to that “necessary work”.
I pursue three inquiries in the book:
1. What is the morality of human rights — and can a secular worldview ground (embed, make sense of) that morality?
2.
What is the relationship of the morality of human rights to the law of
human rights? In addressing that question, I focus on three
controversial issues: capital punishment, abortion, and same-sex
unions.
3. What is the proper role of courts in protecting,
and therefore in interpreting, the law of human rights--in particular,
constitutionally entrenched human rights law? I give special attention
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
For a fuller
overview of the questions I address in the book, interested readers can
download (below) the book's table of contents, introduction, and
conclusion.
It looks as if Harvard University students won't have to take a religion course after all.
In October, a university committee called the Task Force on General
Education released a proposal to overhaul Harvard's core curriculum.
The most-talked-about change would require students to take a course in
a category dubbed "Reason and Faith." At the time, Louis Menand, a
co-chair of the committee, said the requirement would help students
understand "rapid change and conflicts between reason and faith."
But in a letter about proposed curriculum changes that the
committee sent to faculty members at Harvard this month, that category
was dropped. The letter, which has not been made public, says the
category is not needed because religion-related classes will be offered
in other areas of the curriculum.
Views like those expressed in an essay by Steven Pinker, a
Harvard professor who opposed the Reason and Faith requirement, may
have played a role in derailing the requirement.
In his essay, published in The Harvard Crimson
and adopted from comments he shared with the committee, Mr. Pinker, a
professor of psychology, wrote that the requirement gave religion "far
too much prominence."
In an e-mail message on Wednesday, Mr. Pinker called dropping Reason and Faith "an excellent change."
The committee has suggested that a new category, called "What It Means to Be a Human Being," replace Reason and Faith.
Neither Mr. Menand nor his co-chair, Alison Simmons, a professor of philosophy, could be reached for comment on Wednesday.
Final recommendations from the committee are expected to be released in January.
This story, from the Telegraph, seems quite revealing:
A cuckolded husband was banned by the High Court yesterday from naming a married public figure who conducted an affair with his wife.
In what is believed to be the first case of its kind, Mr Justice Eady granted the adulterer — who may be identified only as CC — an injunction against the betrayed husband, referred to as AB.
The judge suggested that even an adulterer might have a legitimate expectation of privacy. AB had wanted to expose CC in the media. . . .
In his ruling, the judge said: "There is a powerful argument that the conduct of an intimate or sexual relationship is a matter in respect of which there is 'a reasonable expectation of privacy'."
Is the "expectation of privacy" that an adulterer has -- let's assume that, subjectively, he has one -- really one that the law should regard as "legitimate" or reasonable? Is it an expectation that the law should -- as law does -- help to create and protect?
In a speech that overturned more than three decades of Labour support for the idea, he set out a series of requirements that were now expected from ethnic minority groups if they wished to call themselves British.
These included "equality of respect" - especially better treatment of women by Muslim men - allegiance to the rule of law and a command of English. If outsiders wishing to settle in Britain were not prepared to conform to the virtues of tolerance then they should stay away.
He added: "Conform to it; or don't come here. We don't want the hate-mongers, whatever their race, religion or creed.
"If you come here lawfully, we welcome you. If you are permitted to stay here permanently, you become an equal member of our community and become one of us.
"The right to be different. The duty to integrate. That is what being British means."
Does "being American" mean this, too? What else, besides being "tolerant" and speaking English, is the Prime Minister demanding of those who would be British. Or, more precisely, what does he think it means to be "tolerant"?
Melissa Rogers (Wake Forest) has some thoughts about the Court's grant in the case Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, which could be the Roberts Court's first foray into the Religion Clauses fever swamp. In her view, a decision by the Court to limit "taxpayer standing" in Establishment Clause cases would reflect a decision not to enforce the Clause, and "[i]f we fail to enforce the Establishment Clause adequately, these values will suffer and the quality of religious liberty will be diminished." I am inclined to disagree. That is, while I agree entirely that the Establishment Clause, properly understood, serves religious freedom in important ways, it is not obvious to me why enforcement the Establishment Clause -- unlike, say, the Free Speech Clause, or the Commerce Clause -- requires the Court to confer standing on claimants who have not suffered the injury-in-fact that we require in every other federal context.
“Here's the tension, in my view: Our need for law derives in significant part from our fallen condition. We are selfish and we need rules to rein in our selfishness. But the ideal for sexuality (the lifelong coupling of a man and woman) is not in response to our selfishness, but to our incompleteness. Adam and Eve did not need the criminal law in the Garden of Eden, but they still needed each other. Corporate management does not need to face punishment for self-dealing because they are incomplete, but because they are selfish. An authentic view of sexuality allows us to transcend our selfishness; law accounts for our selfishness. I totally agree that our understanding of the human person must include an articulation of human sexuality. But I'm still not sure how far the articulation of human sexuality gets us toward a comprehensive theory of law.”
I see the tension Rob proposes if the law is a set of “rules to rein in our selfishness.”But, doesn’t the tension depend largely upon one’s conception of “a comprehensive theory of law?”Even if law’s sole function is to provide a set of “rules to rein in our selfishness,” we need a thick enough conception of the human person to understand the category “selfish act.”Further, if our positive law might legitimately serve in some modest way to promote the common good – to encourage private charitable undertakings might be one example – then it seems to me that our comprehensive theory of law must account for and understand more completely the good of the person and the good of community.And, if our positive law reflects our participation (or lack of participation) in the eternal law of God through our understanding of the natural law (and possibly revealed law), then we must grasp an even thicker understanding of the person.Here I suggest that "[r]eflecting on the design of our bodies, our radical incompleteness, our intense desire (especially in males) to ‘use’ another’s body to satisfy our own needs, and a whole host of related topics” might aid in the development of a thick conception of the human person, which, in turn, might aid in the development of a comprehensive theory of law.
For those like me who are interested in reading Margaret Farley's new book, Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics (2006)(at Michael P.’s suggestion), I would encourage a close examination of Karol Wojtyla’s Love and Responsibility and John Paul II’s Theology of the Body.I suspect we will get contrasting visions of human and communal goods from Farley and Wojtyla/JPII. After we read these works, I hope we can have a robust discussion about 1) which author has more complete understanding of the human person and the human community, and 2) whether any of this has currency beyond the narrow (albeit important) arena of sex, sexual ethics, and sexual politics; in other words, whether an understanding of these matters can aid in the development of Catholic Legal Theory.
The insightful folks over at Get Religion dissect the LA Times'coverage of the Christian manliness movement. (If that brings to mind Promise Keepers, think again -- the PKers are angst-ridden schoolgirls by comparison.) And Mary Ruiz offers her own explanation of the eminently mockable phenomenon over at First Things. My only question: When Pope John Paul II stated that "both man and woman make their specific contribution" to the common good, could this be what he had in mind for the fellas?
I thought that Rick Garnett and other MOJ-readers would like to know that last night, on national television, right before the Monday night football game in which the 2007 Super Bowl Champion Chicago Bears extended their season record to an NFL-leading 11-2 [okay, okay, San Diego has an 11-2 record too, but who even knows that San Diego has a football team?], Barack Obama--whose home town is the great city of Chicago, where citizens are urged to "vote early and often"--announced his run for the presidency. Somehow today's newspapers missed the story [I suspect Rick Garnett had something to do with that]. But now, right here on MOJ, you can see the announcement for yourself:
My correspondent replies to Michael P.’s latest post:
“I wonder if Michael would think it reductionist to pay attention to the fact that our efforts at democracy building in the
Middle East
entail a very messy war? I mean, that's so bogged down in detail. Can't we just say we're engaged in nation building and integrating humanity? I supported this war, and now I must check my conscience on that; it requires some "reduction" to the actual acts that support the goals I felt justified them.”
