Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

We'll Choose Choice for You

Thanks to Rob for posting about Alan Wolfe's brief for Boston College-type schools over Wheaton-type schools.  Isn't there a contradiction on the face of the argument?

[B]oth BC and Brandeis recognize that in today's world, religion has gone from being an ascribed status to an achieved one; more and more Americans choose their religious identity rather than having it chosen for them.

In today's world, religious diversity is a fact of life, and the only choice for a college or university grounded in one faith is to open its doors to others.

Let's see.  (1) Students should be able to "choose their religious identity rather than having it chosen for them."  (2) But the "only choice" that should be available as a model for religious engagement and formation at a college is the diversity-of-faiths model, not the communal-faith model.  (3) So (it seems to follow) students should have the diversity-of-faiths model of religious identity formation "chosen for them." 3 contradicts 1.

(To anticipate the counterarguments:  It seems clear to me that the diversity-of-faiths campus and the communal-faith campus are, indeed, themselves competing models of religious identity and formation, with real, differing effects on that formation.  One may be better kind of identity than the other (as Wolfe argues), but that's a different question from whether there is a choice among identities.  And under the communal-faith model, students still make a choice of identities -- to seek the communal one by attending such a college in the first place.  I've made a similar argument here that the relevant categorizations of American religious identity include not only "Catholic vs. Protestant vs. Jew vs. Muslim etc.," but also "assimiliated faiths vs. sectarian faiths.")

Tom

Christianity Today on "What Would Wilberforce Do?"

As Friday's opening approaches for the movie Amazing Grace, on William Wilberforce and the British evangelical movement to abolish the slave trade, Christianity Today editorializes on the lessons of that movement.  Among other things,

we should not worry about "diluting" any political clout we might have by engaging a variety of issues. Wilberforce and his circle did not conceive their political duty narrowly. They eagerly sought to reform society on a number of fronts. They are remembered best for their antislavery work, but they also founded the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the Church Missionary Society, promoted prison reform, and sponsored charity schools, while encouraging George III to step up enforcement of existing laws against vagrancy, blasphemy, drunkenness, and profaning the Sabbath.

Among other things, taking on more than one issue builds up "moral capital" transferable from one issue to another -- as long as one avoids "arrogance and silliness" in embracing positions that dissipate that capital.

How do we apply the lessons today to questions about whether the Church and other Christian bodies take on too many issues, or not enough?

Tom B.

Perry on "What Is Morality?"

This coming Friday, our own Michael Perry will be presenting (and I will be moderating) during a panel called, "What is Morality," at the Federalist Society's annual student symposium in Chicago (at Northwestern).  Here is the web site and program.  Typical (in my view) of Federalist Society events, the line-up of speakers and topics is rich, and far more diverse and broad than is (unfortunately) usually the case in the legal academy.  If you are in or near Chicago, check it out.  Of special interest, I expect, is the debate on religion in the public square between Kevin "Seamus" Hasson, the happy warrior for religious freedom and founder of the Becket Fund, and civil-religion's-bane, Michael Newdow.  Hasson, by the way, has a very good book about religious freedom, which puts -- MOJ-style -- questions of moral anthropology at the heart of the matter.

Viability and Sentience

Back near the anniversary of Roe v. Wade, a number of liberal bloggers posted commentary questioning the widespread view -- accepted even by many supporters of abortion rights -- that abortion is, at a minimum, a morally problematic practice.  Over at Unfogged, in the course of recounting the story of her own abortion, LizardBreath made the following claim:

Morally, I think that a ten week embryo -- in fact, any fetus in at least the first two trimesters -- is not sentient and is not a person or anything else with rights, and that ending a pregnancy does not have moral significance with respect to the rights or interests of the fetus.

I meant to post something at the time questioning the factual claim that a fetus cannot be sentient during the second trimester.  But this USA Today story goes one better, and provides evidence of viability several weeks back into the second trimester: 

A premature baby that doctors say spent less time in the womb than any other surviving infant is to be released from a Florida hospital Tuesday.

Amillia Sonja Taylor was just 9½ inches long and weighed less than 10 ounces when she was born Oct. 24. She was delivered 21 weeks and six days after conception. Full-term births come after 37 to 40 weeks. "We weren't too optimistic," Dr. William Smalling said Monday. "But she proved us all wrong." Neonatologists who cared for Amillia say she is the first baby known to survive after a gestation period of fewer than 23 weeks. A database run by the University of Iowa's Department of Pediatrics lists seven babies born at 23 weeks between 1994 and 2003.

Amillia has experienced respiratory problems, a very mild brain hemorrhage and some digestive problems, but none of the health concerns are expected to pose long-term problems, her doctors said.  "We can deal with lungs and things like that but, of course, the brain is the most important," Dr. Paul Fassbach said Monday. "But her prognosis is excellent."

Viability is not evidence of sentience, but it does lead to an interesting question.  Given the distinct possibility (indeed, I think, likelihood) that some day down the road medical technology might make a fetus viable before it becomes sentient, what is the significance of the concept of viability to those who emphasize sentience in their analysis of the morality of abortion?

Mardi Gras - Fat Tuesday

Happy Mardi Gras!  At our house, we celebrate by eating banana splits for dinner!

From AmericanCatholic.org:

“Mardi Gras, literally "Fat Tuesday," has grown in popularity in recent years as a raucous, sometimes hedonistic event. But its roots lie in the Christian calendar, as the "last hurrah" before Lent begins on Ash Wednesday. That's why the enormous party in New Orleans, for example, ends abruptly at midnight on Tuesday, with battalions of streetsweepers pushing the crowds out of the French Quarter towards home.

What is less known about Mardi Gras is its relation to the Christmas season, through the ordinary-time interlude known in many Catholic cultures as Carnival. (Ordinary time, in the Christian calendar, refers to the normal "ordering" of time outside of the Advent/Christmas or Lent/Easter seasons.)

Carnival comes from the Latin words carne vale, meaning "farewell to the flesh." Like many Catholic holidays and seasonal celebrations, it likely has its roots in pre-Christian traditions based on the seasons. …

The Carnival season kicks off with the Epiphany, also known as Twelfth Night, Three Kings' Day and, in the Eastern churches, Theophany. Epiphany, which falls on January 6, 12 days after Christmas, celebrates the visit of the Wise Men bearing gifts for the infant Jesus. In cultures that celebrate Carnival, Epiphany kicks off a series of parties leading up to Mardi Gras. …

Mardi Gras literally means "Fat Tuesday" in French. The name comes from the tradition of slaughtering and feasting upon a fattened calf on the last day of Carnival. The day is also known as Shrove Tuesday (from "to shrive," or hear confessions), Pancake Tuesday and fetter Dienstag. The custom of making pancakes comes from the need to use up fat, eggs and dairy before the fasting and abstinence of Lent begins.”

The trains are back on track—the same one

Over the past several months a new responsibility has garnered a great deal of my attention and daily efforts. However, I have done my best to remain alert to trends in society and the law that have some bearing on Catholic Legal Theory. Other contributors to MOJ have, needless to say, done well in pointing out various developments in law and society that bear in relevant ways on the core project of Mirror of Justice. I have let several opportunities to comment on some of these trends pass because my attention and energies had to be focused on other matters.

But, the time has come once again to offer some reflections on evolving conflicts between members of society and the state that emerge as a result of different understandings of human nature involving religious liberty and freedom of conscience. While I have offered my own commentary on these issues in past MOJ postings, I took the occasion last May to analogize these conflicts as trains traveling on the same track in opposite directions [HERE]. The trains are back on the same track and once again racing toward one another, this time in Lexington, Massachusetts. Yes, the place in which the shot heard round the world was fired.

The controversy, for the time being, is between the several families of Lexington and the public school system of that town. The families have objected to the school system’s mandate to teach, in a positive manner, about homosexuality and to the school system’s declaration that parents have no right to object and ask that their children be exempt from this instruction. If I recall correctly, back some decades ago when prayer at school events was the issue, the suggestion was previously made that objecting families could simply not attend the particular event. However, this eventually led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee v. Weisman (1992) in which prayer at a school event was a crucial issue. In the case involving the Lexington families, representatives of the school system have stated that the teaching in question is obligatory and that the only option is for the parents to withdraw their children from the public school system. Again, this theme of withdrawal from obligatory events was a theme briefly addressed in Lee v. Weisman. Unlike that case, however, where attendance at the graduation exercise where the non-sectarian prayer was to be offered was not obligatory to receive an education and graduate (daily prayers in school having been abolished earlier), attendance at school to receive an education and to graduate is obligatory.

It appears that much of the Lexington controversy emerged from the mandatory “diversity training” in which first and second graders read and listened to the story “King and King” and “Who’s in a Family”—two publications with very strong same-sex love stories. Representatives of the school system have argued that this diversity training is essential to a “legitimate state interest” that combats discrimination “on the basis of sexual orientation” and eliminates the perpetuation of stereotypes. These officials have also insisted that parents have no right to control the ideas that schools expose to their children once the children enroll in these public institutions.

Through their counsel, the parents involved in this case, Parker, et al. v. Town of Lexington, et al., No. 06-CV-10751-MLV, USDC, District of Massachusetts, have argued that they “have the right to direct the moral upbringing of their children.” Surely their claim can be substantiated on the relevant international legal right of parents to which the United States is obliged to follow since it is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 18.4 of the Covenant specifies that, “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents… to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” The Covenant is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which, in Article 26.3, specifies that parents “have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.” As the travaux prèparatoires of the UDHR indicate, this provision came about to avoid and eliminate the attempt of the National Socialists in Germany to poison children’s minds through the unqualified state control of education. It would appear that the Lexington school system, by the position it has taken, is trying to do that which the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights forbid.

In the context of Catholic Legal Theory, we need to take stock of the fact that Pius XI in two of his encyclicals, Non Abbiamo Bisongno (1931) and Mit Brenneder Sorge (1937), expressed his concern about the totalitarian efforts of the state to control the educational process of children in Italy and Germany. For those of us interested in Catholic Legal Theory, we must be conscious of the concerns raised by Papa Ratti over seventy years ago. We might think that the day of the totalitarian state in which Pius XI lived is over. But, is it? The evidence from the Parker case might suggest otherwise.

In the coming weeks, I will be addressing some of these issues in more detail. On March 15, I shall be delivering a lecture at Boston College Law School entitled Regensburg and Beyond: Pope Benedict and Religious Liberty. I will also be delivering a paper, Conscience, Religious Liberty, and Totalitarian State at the conference on The American Experiment: Religious Freedom convened by the University of Portland from April 12-14.

In the meantime, the Parker case merits close attention as the trains once again head toward collision. And for those of us concerned about Catholic Legal Theory, religious liberty and the protection of conscience and parental rights, the work of our minds and the efforts of our prayers will surely be in order.    RJA sj

Monday, February 19, 2007

"A Crisis of the Truth About Man"

"A Crisis of the Truth About Man"
Interview With Monsignor Mariano Fazio

Zenit.org).- A crisis in anthropology is at the root of the present trend of secularization, says the rector of the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross.

ZENIT interviewed Monsignor Mariano Fazio, who recently wrote "Historia de las ideas contemporáneas. Una lectura del roceso de secularización" (History of Contemporary Ideas: A Reading of the Process of Secularization), published by Rialp.

Monsignor Fazio is a professor of the history of political doctrines at the university and the author of various philosophical and historical works.

Q: Is secularization necessarily a negative process?

Monsignor Fazio: The book's thesis consists in affirming that there are two processes of secularization: a strong one, which is identified with the affirmation of man's absolute autonomy, cutting off any relationship with a transcendent authority.

From a Christian perspective -- though not only from a Christian perspective, but also from an anthropological one -- this is a very negative process, as the human person cannot be understood without his openness to the transcendent.

However, there is another process of secularization, which I have called "de-clericalization," which consists in the awareness of the relative autonomy of the temporal, which I judge to be profoundly Christian.

The distinction -- not the radical separation -- must be established between the natural and the supernatural order, and between political and spiritual powers. In other words, there must be coherence with "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's."

If the first process could be identified with laicism, the second would be the affirmation of secularity.

Q: Your book on contemporary ideas seems to identify the latter with Western culture. Is this so?

Monsignor Fazio: I believe Western culture cannot be understood without Christianity. The two processes mentioned above spell a direct relationship with the presence of the Christian religion in the history of our societies.

It isn't possible to speak of Voltaire, Nietzsche or Marx without their position on Christian revelation. In this connection, secularization is characteristic of a culture of Christian origin, as is the Western. In other cultures there have been different processes, and the elements of secularization taking place in Asia or Africa have a Western origin.

Q: Liberalism, nationalism, Marxism and the scientific spirit are, according to you, "substitute religions." Is it unthinkable that they coexist with religion?

Monsignor Fazio: The ideologies that characterized the 19th and 20th centuries pretended to be complete explanations of man and his destiny.

In this sense they are incompatible with religions, which also attempt to give a total explanation of the world.

However, the ideologies mentioned in the book are not identical to one another, and there are some toned-down versions of them which are not so radically opposed to religion.

In my book I attempt to tone down the presentation of ideologies, though I criticize clearly the reductive anthropologies that are at their base.

Q: The contemporary world continues to be in a state of crisis. Is it basically an anthropological crisis?

Monsignor Fazio: I am convinced that the present crisis is a crisis of the truth about man; hence the insistence of Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI to trust the power of reason, which can arrive at objective and normative truths.

I believe that John Paul II's magisterium can be presented as an attempt to make manifest the beauty of the truth about man. Truth can be known -- "Fides et Ratio"; it can be lived -- "Veritatis Splendor"; and it must be spread -- "Redemptoris Missio."

The present Pope is making a great effort to have us discover the natural law, which sheds light on the main problems of contemporary culture: family, life, peace, intercultural dialogue, etc.

ROME, FEB. 19, 2007 (

Wolfe on Religious Identity

The average Wheaton College student might struggle to recognize Boston College or Brandeis as meaningfully religious institutions.  Nevertheless, Alan Wolfe argues:

[E]vangelical colleges have much to learn from Catholic universities such as Boston College (BC) or the Jewish Brandeis. Each of these schools worries about losing its religious identity, since each has become remarkably successful, and success brings with it faculty and students who at BC have never been to mass and at Brandeis read their e-mail on Yom Kippur. For those who grew up in a world of strong religious attachments, the increasing religious diversity at BC or Brandeis represents a serious loss of community. Yet both BC and Brandeis recognize that in today's world, religion has gone from being an ascribed status to an achieved one; more and more Americans choose their religious identity rather than having it chosen for them.

In today's world, religious diversity is a fact of life, and the only choice for a college or university grounded in one faith is to open its doors to others. No doubt it will, in the process, lose some of the communal understandings that once informed it. But it will gain in return a religious identity made stronger by being exposed to, and having to defend itself against, other claims to truth, wisdom, justice, or the spirit. The community protected by faith statements at evangelical colleges can be a stifling one because it is so closed to challenge and disagreement.

Over at Touchstone, David Mills responds.

A rose by any other name… More on Speech Codes

I just read Rob’s posting on the Scottish National Health Service’s action regarding the elimination of discriminatory language. I should like to see the entire text. I wonder if they will also remove language that discriminates among doctors, nurses, technicians, office staff, patients, vendors, visitors, and chaplains. It strikes me that offering patients different types of treatment based on their medical condition, even though warranted, is discriminatory, too. I don’t know how the National Health Service will handle the person who has no relatives, partners, friends, family, etc.—in other words, someone with absolutely no relations with any other human being. Sounds like more discrimination. Perhaps the National Health Service should concentrate on providing good medical service and rather than engage in attempting to engineer human nature.   RJA sj

Why the Catholic Majority on the Supreme Court May be Unconstitutional

A paper of interest at MOJ:

"Why the Catholic Majority on the Supreme Court May Be
Unconstitutional"
     University of North Carolina Legal Studies Research Paper
     No. 960410
          University of St. Thomas Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2007
   

  Contact:  MICHAEL J. GERHARDT
              University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill -
              School of Law
    Email:  [email protected]
Auth-Page:  http://ssrn.com/author=509049

Full Text:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=960410

ABSTRACT: In this essay, Professor Michael Gerhardt ponders two
possible problems with how presidents may have assembled the
current Catholic majority on the Supreme Court. The first is that
they may have unwittingly demonstrated their agreement with
social scientists who believe that neither the rule of law nor
Supreme Court precedent constrain justices, and the second is
that they may have violated constitutional prohibitions on
religious tests for federal office. After showing how both these
problems may have occurred, Gerhardt demonstrates how they were
avoidable at the time the current majority was assembled and in
future judicial selection.