Rick notes that reallocating ice cream money to immunizations would require the government to obtain the money through taxation. Alternatively, it could simply require citizens to elect officials who will rethink our national spending priorities. The point is not to get me to stop buying ice cream (though maybe I should spend less on it), but to get me to acknowledge that empowering the government to provide immunizations would not pose an onerous tax burden unless I view as onerous a tax burden that is equivalent to the amount I spend on ice cream (or pet food, etc.). I know of one enormous pot of federal money that currently is being spent with dubious justification and with very little to show in return. Susan's statistics are important because they give context to our society's spending decisions. My spending priorities should be reflected in my own lifestyle, but they also should be articulable in terms of political accountability.
Thursday, March 8, 2007
Helping the Have Nots -- How to Get There
Helping the "Have Nots"
Lots of problems are really hard to solve. But, as Susan reports, it is striking how (relatively speaking) little money it would take to alleviate a lot of suffering and disadvantage. Certainly, if one asks "what is more important, ice cream, on which the Europeans spend $11 billion, or immunizing children and providing clean drinking water for all, both of which could be achieved for more or less the same amount," the answer is clear.
That said, it is people, not states, who are spending these billions on perfume, ice cream, and cruise ships. In order for the money they are spending to be re-allocated to immunizations and water-treatment, that money would need to be acquired by states through taxation (or, I suppose, NGOs and charitable organizations through donations). And, what would be the effects, in all kinds of other areas (economic growth, job creation, prices of goods, etc., etc.) of the policies that would be required in order to acquire the money and reallocate it from ice cream to immunizations? I just don't know.
Reflecting on the numbers that Susan posted, do we think that Peter Singer is right, and that it is simply immoral for someone who is aware of these numbers to choose to spend her money on ice cream or a cruise instead of giving it to a water-treatment charity? Or, moving from the private to the public, is it immoral for a state government like California to spend a billion dollars on speculative stem-cell research instead of spending that money to immunize every child?
To be clear -- I don't think I'm disagreeing with Susan, at all, that it would be better if, given a pot of several billion dollars, it went to clean drinking water and immunizations for all, rather than to cruises (even if we take into account all the jobs that would be lost were there no cruise industry.) (I imagine we could go through the federal budget and find hundreds of billion-dollar items that we would want to trade for immunizing all children.) But, how do we get there? Does CST tell us? Does it, again, give us rules, standards, or principles?
Christian, Secular, or Something Else
Any reactions to this essay by Sr. Joan Chittister? In this column, she sees the clash between those who propose a secular foundation for society and those who propose a theistic foundation for society as "may be one of the most important Western questions since the writing of the U.S. Constitution." George Weigel, in his "Cube and the Cathedral" agrees. But, Joan and George differ (or so it seems to me) on which side holds the promise of a better tomorrow.
For Rob Vischer ...
... and others interested in Christians and conscience.
Click here and follow the link to The Colbert Report. (FYI: Stephen Colbert is a Catholic.)
GWB on JPII on Work
In his speech earlier this week on American policy in the Western Hemisphere, President Bush said:
[S]ocial justice requires economies that make it possible for workers to provide for their families and to rise in society. For too long and in too many places, opportunity in Latin America has been determined by the accident of birth rather than by the application of talents and initiative. In his many writings, Pope John Paul II spoke eloquently about creating systems that respect the dignity of work and the right to private initiative. Latin America needs capitalism for the campesino, a true capitalism that allows people who start from nothing to rise as far as their skills and their hard work can take them. So the United States is helping these nations build growing economies that are open to the world, economies that will provide opportunity to their people.
The Haves and the Have-Nots
Here are some sobering statistics provided by my friend John Freund, C.M., during his homily at mass this morning:
The amount of annual investment needed to completely eliminate hunger and malnutrition worldwide: $19 billion. Annual expenditures on pet food in the United States and Europe: $17 billion.
The amount of annual investment needed to immunize every child: $1.3 billion. Annual expenditures on ice cream in Europe: $11 billion.
The amount of annual investment needed to provide clean drinking water for all: $10 billion. Annual expenditures on ocean cruises: $14 billion.
The amount of annual investment needed to attain univeral literacy: $5 billion. Annual expenditures on perfumes: $15 billion.
There may be disagreement among adherents of CST as to how certain goals are to be attained, but whether one believes CST provides rules, principles or standards (see Rick's post), I think we can all agree these statistics are a serious indictment of our priorities as a society.
Wednesday, March 7, 2007
"Rules, Standards, and Principles"
Here's something from a post over at Steve Bainbridge's other blog, about "rules, standards, and principles." Quoting Larry Solum, Steve writes:
- Rules are the most constraining and rigid. Once a rule has been interpreted and the facts have been found, then the application of the rule to the facts decides the issue to which it is relevant.
- Standards provide an intermediate level of constraint. Standards guide decisions but provide a greater range of choice or discretion; for example, a standard may provide a framework for balancing several factors.
- Principles are even less constraining. Principles provide mandatory considerations for judges. Whereas, standards identify an exhaustive set of considerations for adjudication or policy making, a principle identifies a nonexhaustive set, leaving open the possibility that other considerations may be relevant to the decision. ...
So, what is it that Catholic Social Teaching gives us? Rules, standards, or principles?
What's the harm in religious establishments?
Jack Balkin in this post neatly cuts right to what I think is the interesting question at the heart of the Court's pending Establishment Clause case, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation. He writes:
Standing to sue should depend on the nature of the underlying substantive right. In my opinion, the Establishment Clause does not simply protect citizens from certain spending decisions (although it does do that). It protects them from certain dignitary harms caused by the government's endorsement of one religion over another, of religion in general over non-religion, or of atheism over religion. In other words, the Establishment Clause requires the government to give equal respect to its citizens with respect to religious questions, both in its symbolic activities as well as in its expenditures of money. Thus, if the Government were to erect a large sign from general appropriations stating "There is no God," this would violate the Establishment Clause because it imposes a dignitary harm on religious citizens. . . .
If my substantive theory of the Establishment Clause is correct-- and it is more or less the theory that the Court currently holds-- then then any citizen of the U.S. who suffers a dignitary harm by reason of endorsement in violation of the Establishment Clause has standing to sue, and any citizen of a state who suffers dignitary harm by reason of endorsement by a state has standing to sue. A person's status as a taxpayer is irrelevant because it has nothing to do with the underlying nature of the substantive right.
It seems right to me that our discussion about "standing" to bring Establishment Clause claims has to include claims about what, in fact, is the harm in establishments of religion and on the nature of the underlying "substantive right" protected or conferred by that provision. The question, of course, is whether Prof. Balkin is right about the "nature" of that right, or indeed whether the Establishment Clause creates and / or protects individual "substantive" rights at all. (Some have suggested, after all, that it is more of a "structural" provision.)
That said, it is not clear to me why or how religion-related spending decisions inflict a dignitary harm on those who object to them. (Which is not to say such decisions are permissible, or wise.) Is it because the government's decision to spend, over my objection, on a religion-related project to which I object insults my dignity? Is the relevant injury the painful experience of having my objection go unheeded? Or, is it because the spending decision (to which I object) expresses a claim about me, and my worth, that insults my dignity? Something else? (Maybe these questions just reflect the fact that I am not convinced by the Memorial and Remonstrance-type argument that such spending decisions burden the conscience of those who object.)
"The Cognitively Illiberal State"
Prof. Dan Kahan has a new paper, "The Cognitively Illiberal State," which should be of interest to MOJ readers. Here is the abstract:
Ought implies can. This paper investigates whether the central moral directives of liberalism are ones citizens can - as matter of human cognition - be expected to honor. Liberalism obliges the state to disclaim a moral orthodoxy and instead premise legal obligation on secular grounds accessible to persons of diverse cultural persuasions. Studies of the phenomenon of cultural cognition, however, suggest that individuals naturally impute socially harmful consequences to behavior that defies their moral norms. As a result, they are impelled to repress morally deviant behavior even when they honestly perceive themselves to be motivated only by the secular good of harm prevention. The paper identifies how this dynamic transforms seemingly instrumental debates over environmental regulation, public health, economic policy, and crime control into polarizing forms of illiberal status competition. It also proposes a counterintuitive remedy: rather than attempt to cleanse the law of culturally partisan meanings--the discourse strategy associated with the liberal norm of public reason--lawmakers should endeavor to infuse it with a surfeit of meanings capable of affirming a wide range of competing worldviews simultaneously.
Kahan's conclusion -- i.e., that we ought not to pretend we can "cleanse the law of culturally partisan meanings" -- seems right to me, as does his descriptive claim that "liberalism" cannot -- "public reason" arguments notwithstanding -- be regarded as a morally neutral project. I wonder, though . . . is the reason why Kahan is right just because "[s]tudies of the phenomenon of cultural cognition . . . suggest that individuals naturally impute socially harmful consequences to behavior that defies their moral norms"? Yes, perhaps we do. But, isn't the reason why there is no point in cleansing law of "culturally partisan meanings" because, in fact, the enterprise of law is inescapably a moral one?
An unconstitutionally Catholic Court?
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