Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, September 4, 2007

Take a listen to this ...

Listen to what MOJ-reader and legal philosopher Steve Smith has to say about law's quandary, contemporary jurisprudence, and his book Law's Quandary.

Click here.

Human-Animal Hybrids

Reuters reports that "British regulators will decide on Wednesday whether to permit the creation of hybrid human-animal embryos for research into illnesses such as Parkinson's, Motor Neurone Disease and Alzheimer's."  For the full article, click here.

The Human Subject and the Foundation of Human Rights

A few days ago, Michael Perry posted the following quote from philosopher Charles Taylor:

"[M]odern culture, in breaking with the structures and beliefs of Christendom, also carried certain facets of Christian life further than they ever were taken or could have been taken within Christendom.  In relation to the earlier forms of Christian culture, we have to face the humbling realization that the breakout was a necessary condition of the development."

I don’t know whether the “breakout was a necessary condition of the development” (I need to study the argument and evidence further to make an informed judgment), but I have no doubt that, in the development of human rights, modernity has made some positive contributions and that those contributions ought to be humbly recognized by all, including those within the Church.  My focus in this thread does not contradict Taylor’s thesis.  Instead, I have suggested, here and here, that the beginnings of modern human rights thinking occur within Christian Europe pre-Enlightenment.

I have also suggested that for whatever its contributions, modern secular culture has too thin of a conception of the human person to sustain and support the human rights project in the long term. On that score, I ran across this passage this morning:

“The problem of the subjectivity of the human being is a problem of paramount philosophical importance today. … The philosophy of consciousness [a product of modern culture, no?] would have us believe that it first discovered the human subject.  The philosophy of being [rooted in an older pre-Enlightenment tradition, no?] is prepared to demonstrate that quite the opposite is true, that in fact an analysis of pure consciousness leads inevitably to an annihilation of the subject.”

Karol Wojtyla, The Person:  Subject and Community, in Catholic Thought from Lublin:  Person and Community 219-220 (1993).

More on the Foundation of Human Rights

Jonathon Watson responds to our continuing discussion here and here on the foundation of human rights with this:

"[A]ll base desires we have as Created beings are good,and as Christians, we believe that those desires are placed there by a Creator to lead to certain ends. The desire for justice is very powerful - indeed, so much so that Christ warned against allowing this desire to shade into vengeance. But following Christ carries with it even greater demands. Not only must we not exact vengeance, but we must work always to avoid even the desire for vengeance. Thinking about desires rightly ordered, it seems to me, is one of the developments of Christian legal theory - what the law must do is warn not only what act might not be taken externally, but to show that such an act is always and everywhere evil, and that to contemplate such an act shows in and of itself a disordered desire.

    Christianity seeks nothing less than the perfection of the person in Christ. The Christian is aware that he / she cannot achieve such a thing on his or her own volition, but must always resort to Grace, in the end, to attempt such a feat - in other words, to rightly order every desire to it's proper end in God. And this, in the end, is the debate not only of Christian legal theory, but of any Christian discussion - how shall the desire I feel for x or y be rightly ordered - what is the end it serves? Is it God, or mammon? To paraphrase C.S. Lewis, every choice we make to order these desires is in one direction or another - to something which if we saw it now, we would strongly be tempted to worship, or a horror which we would never have seen, even in our darkest nightmare. We do indeed argue about the contents of such rights, but we have before us the examples of Christ's words, and the development of Tradition of the Church (as again noted by Prof. Reid), and almost always agree that there are certain boundaries which may not be crossed. (We have the example of early Christians, and Romans who encountered them, noting that the practice of infanticide was nearly nil among them.)
    And this, then, is the trouble the athiest faces. Not only must the athiest define desires and why we have them, but must also place them in a heirarchy, the framework mentioned, and show the end to which they lead. There must be an end - a reason for the desire - for human rights is a project, a series of laws ever changing, and if the athiest denies that there is an end to human rights - a reason for their existence - he or she must also deny that they have a direction, an idea of how the law ought to change and why, if at all to lead to greater human rights."

Excluding Religion

Nelson Tebbe's new article, Excluding Religion, may be of interest to MoJ readers.  Here's the abstract:

This Article considers a pressing issue in the constitutional law of religious freedom: whether government may single out religious actors and entities for exclusion from its support programs. Although the problem of selective exclusion is generating intense interest in lower courts and in informal discussions among scholars, so far the academic literature has not kept pace. Excluding Religion argues that generally government ought to be able to target religious actors and entities for denial of support, although the Article carefully circumscribes that power by delineating a set of principled limits. It concludes by developing a theoretical framework for considering the broader question of whether and when a liberal democracy may influence the decisions of private citizens concerning matters of conscience.

Fordham Center on Religion and Culture

18 September 2007, 6–8 p.m.
Fordham University • Pope Auditorium
113 West 60th Street • New York City

By September, the U.S. "surge" will have had over six months to make its mark. At that point what moral principles regarding war, peace and intervention will be applicable, and what will they dictate about future U.S. policy toward Iraq?

Four distinguished ethicists with different perspectives--Michael Walzer, Sohail Hashmi, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Gerard Powers--will frame the choices the nation faces. Trudy Rubin, veteran foreign affairs columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer, will moderate.

Free and Open to the Public.

This Headline Forum will build on a major 2005 Fordham Center on Religion and Culture conference, "The Ethics of Exit," which examined the conditions for the morality of withdrawal from Iraq.

Read the transcript at: www.fordham.edu/religculture

Cosponsors:
The Fordham Center on Religion and Culture
Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

R.S.V.P. [email protected] (212) 636-7347

Monday, September 3, 2007

Another Labor Day Observation

From The Writer's Almanac.  The numbers speak for themselves:

"Today is Labor Day, first celebrated on Tuesday, September 5, 1882. The holiday was the idea of the Central Labor Union in New York City, which organized a parade and a picnic featuring speeches by union leaders. It was intended to celebrate labor unions, call for the eight-hour workday, and to recognize the achievements of the American worker.

"Many of the labor laws those early activists wanted were passed in the 1930s, including the eight-hour workday and the 40-hour workweek. Most sociologists predicted that in the coming decades Americans would work steadily fewer and fewer hours. But in fact, the opposite has happened. Today, more than 25 million Americans work more than 49 hours each week. And 11 million spend 60 hours or more at work each week. Americans also take fewer vacation days than employees in any other industrialized nation, making Americans the hardest-working (or most overworked) industrialized nation on the planet."

Some More Labor Day Reading

In the new issue of The Tablet (Sept. 1, 2007), there is an interesting discussion of this new collection of essays:  Catholic Social Justice:  Theological and Practical Explorations (Continuum 2007).  Click here to read.

Some Labor Day Reading

Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law: Participatory management--the philosophy of involving employees in corporate decisionmaking--arguably is the most important industrial relations phenomenon of the last three decades. It has been endorsed by such disparate figures as President Bill Clinton and Pope John Paul II. Thousands of U.S. firms have adopted one form of employee involvement or another. Insofar as the academic literature on participatory management is concerned with normative questions, it is dominated by calls for some form or another of government-mandated employee participation in corporate decisionmaking. Normative analyses of participatory management by pro-mandate scholars have developed two justifications for government intervention: One sounds in the language of economics, typically arguing that participatory management is an efficient system of organizing production that is nevertheless being thwarted by various market failures requiring governmental correction. I have explored this argument elsewhere, concluding that government-mandated employee involvement cannot be justified on economic grounds [Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, (1998)].

In this Article, I evaluate the other set of pro-mandate arguments; namely, the claim that employees have a right to participate in corporate governance. On close examination, much of the normative literature on employee participation amounts to little more than "rights talk," i.e., political rhetoric dressed up in legal and/or moral rights terminology. For ideologically motivated proponents of employee participation, this is a useful debating tactic because our culture's fixation with individual rights imbues any rights-based claim with an air of legitimacy and incontrovertibility. Using rights-based terminology to phrase the question, however, often impedes or even precludes meaningful analysis. The task before us is thus two-fold. First, we must subject the claim that employees have a right to participate in corporate governance to a rigorous process of specification and assessment. Second, we must ask whether this right--as so specified--merits codification into positive law. I have two principal foils in this article. The first is Roman Catholic social teaching on work and capitalism, which offers the most fully realized statement of natural law principles applicable to the problem at hand. The second is a body of literature to which I will refer as secular humanist. This literature consists mainly of rights talk drawing on precepts of humanistic psychology. Although scholars approaching the problem from this angle thus are not working within a natural law paradigm, their work deserves examination both because it has certain superficial similarities with Catholic social teaching and because it represents the other dominant theory upon which rights-based claims are made in support of government-mandated participatory management. Although both the relevant Catholic social teachings and secular humanist arguments are complex and nuanced, both fairly can be said to emphasize two basic claims. First, participation is asserted to be an essential mechanism for full development of human personality. Self-realization and self-actualization are the conceptual engines driving this claim. Second, participation is posited to be an essential feature of human dignity. I have identified three basic ways in which participation might be related to human dignity: Participation may promote trust between employers and employees. Participation promotes workplace democracy. Participation rights protect employees from opportunistic conduct by employers. I argue only the latter theory rises to the level of plausibility, and it cannot justify government-mandated employee participation.

Saturday, September 1, 2007

The Big Tent

I must say I was heartened by the recent posts of Father Araujo and Eduardo Penalver. Araujo tells me that I may not be a Catholic if I do not have a certain kind of "allegiance to Peter."  (Like Eduardo (not to mention most American Catholics), I suspect that I do not have the kind of loyalty that Araujo has in mind though it is hard to be sure).

Penalver tells me that I do not leave the Church even if I sign up with the Episcopalians or the United Church of Christ ("at least in some sense" - a sense that Penalver believes Araujo could not subscribe to). My own view is that the Catholic Church has a large tent. How large that tent might be is contested. Some would see a much smaller tent than I. It would be hard to deny  that MOJ has a large tent, however. So I am heartened.