Since the issue has come up on the blog, and since it touches on aspects of a Catholic university's identity, readers might be interested in a letter from 18 members of the St. Thomas (Minnesota) law faculty to university president Fr. Dennis Dease and vice-president for academic affairs Thomas Rochon, criticizing the university's recent decision to veto an invitation to Archbishop Desmond Tutu to speak at St. Thomas as part of a youth conference on peacemaking. The signers include the St. Thomas contingent on MOJ.
October 8, 2007
Dear Father Dease and Dr. Rochon,
We are members of the School of Law faculty with a variety of political and religious perspectives. We write in our capacity as faculty of the University of St. Thomas and with respect for the leadership you provide the University. We are concerned by the recent decision to veto an invitation to Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu to speak at St. Thomas. We urge you to reconsider this decision and to join in inviting Abp. Tutu to speak in the Twin Cities.
In general, the appearance at UST of a Nobel-Peace-Prize winner, a major figure in the nonviolent movement against apartheid, would be a magnificent opportunity for the University community. Although the conference at which Abp. Tutu would speak is sponsored by an outside group, without a doubt his appearance here would benefit UST students, faculty, and staff, and enhance the University’s reputation as a place engaged in dialogue with figures of international distinction. We are distressed at the rejection of this opportunity, and especially at the rationale that the administration has publicly asserted: that the University should not host a speaker who, in comments on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has said things that are offensive or “hurtful to members of the Jewish community.”
At the outset, we note that the asserted rationale here is not that Abp. Tutu has been invited to speak directly to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his appearance at UST. Rather, the administration’s rationale, that he has made statements that are hurtful to some on other occasions, reflects a far more restrictive attitude toward hosting speakers who are distinguished but in some way controversial.
To reject a distinguished speaker based on worries that his words may cause hurt or offense to some is entirely at odds with the search for truth that should characterize a Catholic university. Speech taking positions on controversial subjects will often be offensive or hurtful to some people. Nevertheless, a Catholic university should be willing to open itself to such speech – and criticisms of that speech – in order to learn the truth. Only with such an approach can a university carry out its mission of “consecrat[ing] itself without reserve to the cause of truth” (Ex Corde Ecclesiae ¶4 (our emphasis)). To give controlling weight to worries about hurt or offense cannot be reconciled with the University’s charge to pursue “all aspects of truth . . . without fear but rather with enthusiasm, dedicating itself to every path of knowledge” (id.). We could easily cite secular academic norms as well, for in this case they harmonize with Catholic norms.
That an otherwise distinguished speaker should be rejected because he has made statements on disputed political issues that hurt or offend some people is a principle of breathtaking scope. Under this rationale, it appears, the University would refuse to invite former President Jimmy Carter or Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to speak on any matter of human rights or public affairs. Proposals for speakers who have worthwhile ideas but are less well known might fare even worse under this calculus.
We recognize that Abp. Tutu has spoken on a broad range of issues, and that his opinions do not always comport with the views of the Catholic Church. However, Abp. Tutu was to receive no award, honor, or generalized endorsement from the University; and his views on issues other than those he has been invited to address simply are not relevant in this particular case.
We urge that the administration issue Abp. Tutu an invitation in connection with the Peacejam conference, and in the absence of an invitation, that the University issue a statement acknowledging that it was a mistake to reject the invitation on the ground that has been offered.
Respectfully,
Ann Bateson, Thomas Berg, Elizabeth Brown, Teresa Collett, Robert Delahunty, Neil Hamilton, Robert Kahn, Joel Nichols. Julie Oseid, Charles Reid, Elizabeth Schiltz, Gregory Sisk, Susan Stabile, Scott Taylor, Robert Vischer, Fr. Reginald Whitt, Virgil Wiebe, Jennifer Wright
A reader had the following comment on Paul Wojda's question about advance directives about withdrawing food & water in PVS:
Under what circumstances would the burdens of ANH (artificial nutrition & hydration) justify its discontinuation for patients in PVS? [Obviously, if such an intervention were futile, it would not be morally obligatory to pursue (or morally blameworthy to discontinue).] Given the nature of PVS, it wouldn't be right to say that the burdens come in the form of physical or emotional suffering. The Explanatory document issued by the Vatican seemed to suggest that the expense of ANH is not usually prohibitively burdensome. Indeed, the general "exceptions" to the norm of continued ANH sketched out by the document seem quite narrow:
“When stating that the administration of food and water is morally obligatory in principle, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith does not exclude the possibility that, in very remote places or in situations of extreme poverty, the artificial provision of food and water may be physically impossible,”
“Nor is the possibility excluded that, due to emerging complications, a patient may be unable to assimilate food and liquids, so that their provision becomes altogether useless. Finally, the possibility is not absolutely excluded that, in some rare cases, artificial nourishment and hydration may be excessively burdensome for the patient or may cause significant physical discomfort, for example resulting from complications in the use of the means employed.”
“These exceptional cases, however, take nothing away from the general ethical criterion, according to which the provision of water and food, even by artificial means, always represents a natural means for preserving life, and is not a therapeutic treatment. Its use should therefore be considered ordinary and proportionate, even when the “vegetative state” is prolonged.”
So it is difficult (though not impossible) to imagine a case in which discontinuation of ANH would be morally sound. It is doubly difficult to imagine how one could anticipate with certainty (and describe with legal clarity) these cases such that he or she could accordingly formulate his or her advance directive.
While the CDF document and explanatory text do not squarely address the question raised by Paul, they do strongly indicate that the circumstances in which a PVS patient would be burdened by ANH are exceedingly rare.
I appreciate Fr. Araujo's reminder that a just social order requires prudence not only on the part of the judiciary, but also by other government officials and private citizens. I also agree that the courts cannot always be blamed for overreaching or social engineering since they can't simply ignore claims brought by groups who are pursuing their own social agendas. Nevertheless, I have a couple of comments. First, the specter of "powerful lobbies" is too frequently invoked, in my view, as an easy means of condemning instances in which citizens in association seek to persuade the legal/political authorities to adopt their vision of the good. Often, it is true, the proposed vision of the good is grounded more in the self-interest of those doing the proposing, rather than in some more authentic attempt to cultivate the common good. But are the citizens (and their associations) who are behind challenges to laws calling for the arrest of adults for consensual sexual conduct in the privacy of their homes really a "powerful lobby" that needs to be resisted? Can't they just as easily be portrayed as voices for limited government and human dignity, standing up against majorities on behalf of the marginalized? In the early part of the last century, should citizens concerned about state laws closing down Catholic schools have waited until they could convince their neighbors, one by one, that such laws are unjust, or should they have brought a constitutional claim to strike down the laws? Do those parents, teachers, and schools fall into the category of "powerful lobbies," or are they exempt because their action is brought on behalf of the "natural moral law?" And since few litigants believe that they are advocating against the "natural moral law," wouldn't this be the exception that ate the rule?
Second, how would the natural moral law play out in the case of Lawrence v. Texas? It's not obvious to me why the natural moral law would support the state's efforts to criminalize sexual conduct between consenting adults in private. At the very least, it seems highly debatable. And that's why, in my view, invocation of the natural moral law as a guiding framework in our legal system is not particularly helpful: when all reasonable people reach agreement on its content (e.g., slavery, genocide), the natural moral law appears to reflect the conclusions we've already reached. At times when disagreement on an issue is widespread (e.g. abortion and same-sex marriage), then the natural moral law's own indeterminacy does not do a whole lot to overcome the disagreement. Unless we're willing to invest ultimate interpretive authority in an institution (e.g., the Church) that lies beyond the reach of majority opinion, I'm not sure what the natural moral law adds to the conversation.
