Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, January 14, 2008

The Church in Argentina

In reponse to Rick's question about the Church's activity during Argentina's "dirty war," my friend Andy Connolly, a diocesan priest in New York, writes: "As so often happens in Latin America and elsewhere, The Church (hierarchy & some laity) and the Church (some priests, religious and laity) are split.  There were some real Christian martyrs who died defending the defenseless.  Then there were members of the hierarchy who were fundamentally supportive of the military dictatorship from the outset and did nothing to stop the murders, torture, disappearances, etc."  (I gather from him that although there is not a lot of information accessible on the web in English on this subject, there is quite a bit available in Spanish.)

Romney and JFK, Revisited

The New York Review of Books

January 17, 2008

   

Romney and JFK: The Difference

   

By Garry Wills

The situations are superficially the same—presidential candidates trying to remove an obstacle to their election arising from their church membership. But the obstacles are quite different. The objections some have to Mitt Romney's religion are twofold, theological and cultural. Those against John F. Kennedy when he gave his 1960 speech in Houston about his Catholicism were more solidly political. The theological problems with Romney come from evangelicals, who know that his Jesus is not a member of the divine Trinity. Romney has assured them in his speech on religious liberty, also given in Texas, in early December, "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the Savior of mankind." That may not be enough for those insisting on their own orthodoxy, since Brigham Young wrote that "intelligent beings are organized to become Gods, even the Sons of God," and that these divinized believers may be the saviors of the worlds they dispose of. But Romney is right in claiming that such points of theology are irrelevant to the practical morality involved in politics. "Sons of God" is not a political slogan.
    ...
The only objection to Mormons on political grounds would be their record of polygamy and racism, both of which have been officially abjured. But Kennedy's problem was precisely political. Catholics were familiar enough to Americans—there was no weirdo factor. (People wearing white hoods over their heads had little right to call others weird.) And Kennedy's opponents were not interested in theological questions like transubstantiation. But there were solid grounds for political doubts about Catholics. The Vatican had not, in 1960, formally renounced its condemnation of American pluralism and democracy. In fact, one of Kennedy's advisers on his Houston speech, the Jesuit John Courtney Murray, had recently been silenced by the Vatican for defending religious pluralism.

There was a cogently argued case against papal politics. Paul Blanshard had maintained, in the best-selling American Freedom and Catholic Power (1948), that Catholics were just pretending to be democrats till they could get into power and imitate such Vatican-approved regimes as that of Francisco Franco in Spain. A strong lobby, Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, had continued to argue the Blanshard position. It had successfully blocked the sending of a full ambassador to the Vatican. The Protestant ministers who organized against Kennedy's campaign, under Norman Vincent Peale, feared the Pope's power more than his doctrines—just as they had when Al Smith ran for president in 1928.

Kennedy could not openly do what the Catholic historian Lord Acton did when Pius IX attacked democracy. Acton told Gladstone that he did not know half the papal atrocities, but these did not matter, since British Catholics paid no attention to them. But Kennedy sidled up to such a statement. Not only had he, too, opposed the Vatican ambassador and financial aid to Catholic schools; he also declared that "I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute." This went beyond what Father Murray was advocating. It was as open an attack on Spanish "integralism" as anyone could wish. Kennedy said he would follow his own conscience, not allowing any church interferences with what his conscience dictated: "I believe in a President whose religious views are his own private affair." In his speech, he faced squarely points on which the Vatican might like to interfere:

Whatever issue may come before me as President, if I should be elected—on birth control, divorce, censorship, gambling or any other subject—I will make my decision...in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be the national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressures or dictates. And no power or threat of punishment could cause me to decide otherwise.

If his conscience and his public duty were ever in conflict—which he thought impossible—he said, "I would resign the office."

    ...

Kennedy said that the democratic values of America are "the kind I fought for in the South Pacific, and the kind my brother died for in Europe." Romney and his strapping sons never wore the uniform—they think running for president is their way of waging a war they support in Iraq. But Romney invoked the war service of George H.W. Bush, who introduced him in Texas. It was heroism by proxy.

Has Romney been able to "do a Kennedy," as his speech was billed in the press? Far from it. Kennedy was on the side of the future. He defied the Vatican's ban on American-style democracy, which was rescinded in the Second Vatican Council, convened after his election. Romney—looking to the past, and specifically to the current Bush administration's position—kowtowed to the religious right. Saying that he opposes religious tests, he passed that one.

[To read the whole essay--which, like all of Wills's work, is provocative--click here.]

Upcoming APA Task Force Report on the Effects of Abortion

There is continuing reason to worry that the upcoming report of a panel of the American Psychological Association will be biased against the growing evidence that abortion harms women. Despite requests by Consistent Life and others to persuade the APA to appoint a balanced panel, that has not happened. Anyone with any influence on the APA should seek now to avert a biased report. The members of the Consostent Life Board, of which I am one, put the matter this way last year:

The Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion has six members. Three of them have a clear and publicly stated ideological stand on what the outcome of its work ought to be. Two of them have a web-site the very purpose of which is to correct information on this matter so as to reflect a pro-choice view, with authors asserting such explicit values do not interfere with the scientific nature of their work (see http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr03/letters.html). The remaining three members are two experts in domestic abuse and one in methodology.

While there are excellent members on this Task Force, it remains unbalanced – and its lack of balance will hurt both sides of the abortion debate, as any bias can be expected to do. This is the second such task force; the previous one, with some of the same members, found there were no detrimental after-effects of abortion.

Both the pro-life and pro-choice movements have a clear interest in a credible decision by the Task Force. To the ideological pro-life movement, women who believe they were traumatized by their abortions are a major constituency group. To have their voice entirely blocked from such a task force will seriously detract from the credibility of its conclusion in their eyes. There are already suspicions that the outcome is rigged.

To the ideological pro-choice movement, who most commonly don't believe pregnancy termination is a form of violence at all, the interest in having a credible outcome is also strong. If the what the original task force found is accurate (no or minimal psychological effects), then having this put forth by a task force that is so easily accused of bias could end up doing more harm than good.

The report of this Task Force is due out in 2008 – an election year, a point which increases suspicion that it is a political enterprise rather than a scientific one.

We have been told that only the science will drive the result, no matter what the personal opinions of the task force members might be, and that there will be a thorough review process after the report before it is disseminated. We hope this is true. But the decision against establishing balance in the personal opinions of the task force members is puzzling if a credible report is truly desired.

More on Liturgy and Life

Tom -- Thanks very much for reminding me to cast a wider empirical net before reaching any conclusions on whether the seeming relationship between the sacred in liturgy (e.g. the Host) and and the sacred in morality (e.g. unborn life) is intrinsic or simply accidental in some Catholic circles. You rightly point to liturgically traditionalist Protestants (e.g. many Episcopalians) who are untraditional in morality, and to liturgically innovative Protestants (e.g. charismatics? Baptists?) who tend to be traditionalist in morality.

But I think that the categories of the great and the holy (as in the Orthodox name for Great and Holy Week) are not coterminous with the traditional or the grand or even the mysterious. Liturgy can be very "high" but merely aesthetic rather than holy. For example, I view choirs as potentially desanctifying, because one can just enjoy them as entertainment, precisely because of their beauty. By contrast, it's harder not to enter into words of adoration that one is oneself singing. By the same token, a seemingly "low" liturgy can be filled with a very reverential spirit. I'm thinking of hymns such as "How Great Thou Art" or "Our God is an Awesome God". Even if, in the lower traditions, God's great holiness is not transferred to any concrete element in church (e.g. host or altar), i would think such hymns to be excellent preperation for reverence toward the image and likeness of that great and awesome God that we find in human beings, including the unborn.

By the way, Jody Bottum and Robert Miller pick up on this discussion on the First Things blog for Jan. 11 & 12. See 

RE: Liturgy & Politics

Posted by Robert T. Miller on January 12, 2008, 1:46 PM

I agree, Jody, that there is an interesting and important connection between the division in the Church over liturgy and the division in the Church over moral issues, and that it’s no accident that those who support traditional morality also support the traditional liturgy while those who support moral innovations also support liturgical innovations....

The Church and the Dirty War

Michael asks, "[w]ill someone please tell us what the Argentine bishops of the Catholic Church--my Church, our Church--were doing during [the "Dirty War" in Argentina]?   And, what does it say that this 'Christian' nation was capable--and that these 'Christians' were capable- of such horror?" 

Answering the second sentence seems (to me) easier than the first.  I suppose it says -- or, it confirms -- what Christianity teaches:  We -- Christians -- sin.  Badly.  Often.  With respect to the first question, the Times ran a story, a few months ago, that might be of interest.  Here is the link.  And, a bit:

Argentina is finally confronting the church’s dark past during the dirty war, when it sometimes gave its support to the military as it went after leftist opponents.

That past stands in stark contrast to the role the church played during the dictatorships in Chile and Brazil, where priests and bishops publicly condemned the governments and worked to save those being persecuted from torture and death. . . .

Are there MOJ readers who know more?  I'd want to know, specifically, from those with relevant expertise whether (what seems to me to be) the widely accepted view -- one that, I should say, my own understanding reflects -- that clergy and Church leaders were culpably complicit in the Dirty War rests on a firm, factual foundation (unlike, say, the "Hitler's Pope" attack on Pope Pius XII.)

How some view religion

In the latest NY Times Book Review, discussing a book by John Allen Paulos called "Irreligion:  A Mathematician Explains Why the Arguments for God Just Don't Add Up," Jim Holt comments that mathematicians believe in God at a higher rate than academics of certain other disciplines.  He then goes on to say:

So you might say that mathematicians are no strangers to belief in the unseen.  (Of course, mathematicians don't drag their beliefs into the public square, let alone fly planes into buildings.)

Wow.  What a view of "religion."  I'll put aside the question -- I don't know the answer, but I suspect it does not begin with "of course" -- whether religious mathematicians are more scrupulous than others are about leaving behind their "beliefs" on those occasions when they enter the "public square."  Let's even roll our eyes and move past the use of the word "drag" -- a word that suggests a strange understanding of both belief and of normal human beings.  After all, one might think that it is perfectly natural for "our" beliefs to accompany "us" -- without any need of "dragging" -- wherever we go.  What really strikes me is this move from "drag[ing] . . . beliefs into the public square" to "fly[ing] planes into buildings."  What on earth would make Mr. Holt write -- after a few sentences about Platonism -- that two features of religious believers, which mathematicians "of course" do not share, are (a) a propensity to "drag" beliefs where (presumably) they don't belong and (b) a propensity to fly planes into buildings.

Sunday, January 13, 2008

Pinker on Moral Instincts

For those who missed it, there's an interesting essay by Steven Pinker in today's NY Times Magazine on human beings' moral instincts.  Here's a taste:

The findings of trolleyology — complex, instinctive and worldwide moral intuitions — led Hauser and John Mikhail (a legal scholar) to revive an analogy from the philosopher John Rawls between the moral sense and language. According to Noam Chomsky, we are born with a “universal grammar” that forces us to analyze speech in terms of its grammatical structure, with no conscious awareness of the rules in play. By analogy, we are born with a universal moral grammar that forces us to analyze human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness.

The idea that the moral sense is an innate part of human nature is not far-fetched. A list of human universals collected by the anthropologist Donald E. Brown includes many moral concepts and emotions, including a distinction between right and wrong; empathy; fairness; admiration of generosity; rights and obligations; proscription of murder, rape and other forms of violence; redress of wrongs; sanctions for wrongs against the community; shame; and taboos.

The stirrings of morality emerge early in childhood. Toddlers spontaneously offer toys and help to others and try to comfort people they see in distress. And according to the psychologists Elliot Turiel and Judith Smetana, preschoolers have an inkling of the difference between societal conventions and moral principles. Four-year-olds say that it is not O.K. to wear pajamas to school (a convention) and also not O.K. to hit a little girl for no reason (a moral principle). But when asked whether these actions would be O.K. if the teacher allowed them, most of the children said that wearing pajamas would now be fine but that hitting a little girl would still not be....

The moral sense, then, may be rooted in the design of the normal human brain. Yet for all the awe that may fill our minds when we reflect on an innate moral law within, the idea is at best incomplete. Consider this moral dilemma: A runaway trolley is about to kill a schoolteacher. You can divert the trolley onto a sidetrack, but the trolley would trip a switch sending a signal to a class of 6-year-olds, giving them permission to name a teddy bear Muhammad. Is it permissible to pull the lever?

This is no joke. Last month a British woman teaching in a private school in Sudan allowed her class to name a teddy bear after the most popular boy in the class, who bore the name of the founder of Islam. She was jailed for blasphemy and threatened with a public flogging, while a mob outside the prison demanded her death. To the protesters, the woman’s life clearly had less value than maximizing the dignity of their religion, and their judgment on whether it is right to divert the hypothetical trolley would have differed from ours. Whatever grammar guides people’s moral judgments can’t be all that universal. Anyone who stayed awake through Anthropology 101 can offer many other examples.

Of course, languages vary, too. In Chomsky’s theory, languages conform to an abstract blueprint, like having phrases built out of verbs and objects, while the details vary, like whether the verb or the object comes first. Could we be wired with an abstract spec sheet that embraces all the strange ideas that people in different cultures moralize?

Unimaginable (Until Now) Depravity

Read this--and weep.  Will someone please tell us what the Argentine bishops of the Catholic Church--my Church, our Church--were doing during this nightmare?   And, what does it say that this "Christian" nation was capable--and that these "Christians" were capable- of such horror?

New York Times
January 13, 2008

Lost Children, Lost Truths
By Roger Cohen

BUENOS AIRES

As journalists, we like to think we do some good from time to time. For 20 years, I’ve believed I helped two Argentine children emerge from the savagery of dictatorship, find their true family and secure better lives. Now I wonder. Here’s a story of truth and justice — or neither.

When the military junta that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983 seized pregnant women, it made a practice of waiting to kill them until their babies were born. The infants were then taken by childless military or police couples while the mothers were “disappeared.”

I was incensed in the aftermath of the dictatorship, finding myself often in rooms filled with the animal sobbing of the bereaved. But there was something about having a young woman give birth, only to slaughter her and steal her child, that took the Argentine state’s depravity — and my anger — to a new level.

It was too early back in the mid-1980s to know the extent of the generals’ crimes: the 30,000 disappeared and corpse-dumping flights out to sea. But new details were emerging. One, a suggestion that twin boys had been abducted from a murdered woman by an Argentine police officer named Samuel Miara, sent me in 1987 to the Paraguayan capital, Asunción.

Miara and his wife, Beatriz, had fled to Gen. Alfredo Stroessner’s little dominion after the Argentine junta fell. Tips questioning the twins’ parenthood had reached the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo human-rights group.

I was in touch with the family of Liliana Ross, a medical student abducted on Dec. 12, 1976, never to be seen again. Liliana had been pregnant and, through an appalled midwife (later murdered), word had reached her husband, Adalberto Rossetti, that twin boys named Gustavo and Martin were born to her on April 22, 1977, in Los Olmos prison, before being taken by the Miaras.

The scene in Asunción is still vivid to me: two blond boys playing soccer, the smell of mowed grass, a big German shepherd barking. And there was Miara, a swarthy man, smoking. Why would he talk to me, for my questions to him were in essence these:

“Are you the guy who’s stolen a couple of children after their mother was killed by the Argentine Army? Are these boys, whom you call Gonzalo and Matías Miara, really Gustavo and Martin Rossetti?”

Yet he invited me in. A troubled conscience can be a journalist’s friend. Miara railed against “leftists” and showed me photographs of his wife in early pregnancy. (But none in late.)

The Wall Street Journal published my story — and things started to move. The Miaras were extradited in 1989. DNA tests proved the children were not theirs. Argentine justice moves slowly, but Samuel Miara was convicted of the boys’ kidnapping in 1991 and again, on appeal, in 1995. He went to jail.

I heard echoes of this. But I’d moved on. Justice delivered, I thought, a good deed done. Until I returned here this week, seeking the 30-year-old twins, and found more acrimony than reconciliation.

The boys were not the children of Rossetti and Ross. DNA tests proved they were born to another “disappeared” student, María Tolosa. She was grabbed with her husband, Juan Reggiardo, in February 1977, and gave birth to twins at Los Olmos prison on May 16, 1977. She and her husband were later murdered.

Rosa Roisinblit, whose own pregnant daughter was abducted in 1978 and killed after giving birth, told me the twins — now called Gonzalo and Matías Reggiardo Tolosa — had sought in vain for a stable home in the 1990s. They clung to Beatriz Miara. A spell with an uncle, Eduardo Tolosa, proved disastrous. They were placed with a “substitute family.”

“These children were booty of war and, somehow, the kidnappers abetted the parents’ murder,” Roisinblit, the vice president of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, told me. “Yet the boys clung to the monsters.”

I couldn’t find the twins. One is said to carry a photo of his biological mother, the other to be inseparable from the “mother” who raised him. By all accounts, they never talk to the press. The justice I’d helped deliver had consisted, for them, of one broken home after another.

But they had the truth, or something closer to it than a peaceful Paraguayan yard reeking of repressed crime. We journalists are intruders who move on. Was this intrusion worth it? For the dead, and for Argentina, I say yes. For the twins, I don’t know.

Truth or justice? Every society emerging from terror must choose. But truth is messier, and justice less adequate than we acknowledge. Life resides in half-tones newspapers render with difficulty, rather than in absolutes.

Miara is facing new charges of crimes against humanity in various prison camps. His trial is expected this year. As for the other twins, those born to Liliana Ross, they, like hundreds of other children of the disappeared, have never been found.

Saturday, January 12, 2008

Interesting Church-State Case Emerging

An MOJ reader sent this along, thinking--rightly--that other MOJ readers would be interested.

State Files to Join Episcopal Case

Attorney General Says Constitutional Issues Are at Stake

By Michelle Boorstein
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, January 12, 2008

The attorney general of Virginia has filed a motion to intervene in the court battle between the Episcopal Church and 11 breakaway congregations, arguing that he is obliged to defend the constitutionality of a state statute at the center of the trial.

The case in Fairfax County Circuit Court is over whether the conservative congregations, which left the national church over disputes related to the interpretation of Scripture and the acceptance of homosexuality, can keep the land and buildings. After voting to leave in 2006 and 2007, the congregations filed court papers saying they had -- under a Civil War-era Virginia law -- legally "divided" from the national church and thus were keeping the property.

But the Episcopal Church and the Virginia Diocese, its local branch, argue that there has been no legal "division" -- rather that a minority of dissidents opted to leave, and therefore have no rights to the land or buildings. Church lawyers also say it would be unconstitutional for the state to determine when a hierarchical church -- such as the Episcopal Church -- has had a fundamental division, that such a judgment is a religious matter. Meddling would be a violation of church-state separation, diocesan lawyers say.

On Thursday, Attorney General Robert F. McDonnell (R) filed a motion to intervene in the case, which was heard in November. A decision is pending.

"The Constitution permits multiple methods of resolving church property disputes," McDonnell argues, and does not require the state to defer to denominational leaders.

Civil lawyers had mixed reaction to that, with some saying it was highly unusual for the state to get involved in a civil case when it was still at the circuit court level rather than waiting for a judge to rule.

McDonnell spokesman J. Tucker Martin cited several federal appeals-court-level cases -- also involving challenges to the constitutionality of Virginia statutes -- and said the attorney general was not taking sides in how the case should ultimately be decided.

"Certainly there is nothing improper about the attorney general weighing in, but it does strike me as a little out of the ordinary for them to get involved in a circuit-court-level case," said N. Thomas Connally, a McLean lawyer who specializes in real estate.

Patrick Getlein, spokesman for the Virginia Diocese, declined to comment, noting that Judge Randy Bellows asked both sides to reply next week on the state's request to become a party in the case.

Jim Oakes, a leader of the cluster of breakaway Virginia churches, said yesterday in a statement that the attorney general's brief "validates the position of our parishes and directly refutes arguments that were made by the Episcopal Church and the Diocese of Virginia."

McDonnell's office has another connection to this issue -- his deputy, former state senator William C. Mims (R), who has been a member of another Episcopal church that broke away from the national church over the same issues of how to understand Scripture as it pertains to homosexuality. Mims prompted controversy and much debate in 2005 when he -- as a senator -- proposed a bill that would have explicitly allowed congregants who leave their denominations to keep their land. The measure failed, and opponents said it was an inappropriate insertion of government into church affairs.

Mims did not return a message, and Martin said he was unavailable for comment.

Protestants and Traditionalism in Liturgy and Other Things

Thanks, Michael, for the interesting questions about Protestants.  I'll leave the spiritual-discipline question for now.  In response to Richard's post about the article on liturgy and life/moral issues, and Michael's question whether "Protestants (or subsets of Protestants) have similar fault lines to those described in Richard's post":

First, I'm not sure exactly what the article is claiming about the connection between traditional Catholic morality and liturgical devotion.  Is the correlation only with the particular wish to receive Communion kneeling and on the tongue?  Or is the correlation with a broader desire for mystery and grandeur in the liturgy -- which would implicate a bunch of features, like the often very un-mysterious "praise music," that the article doesn't mention?

Beyond that, and assuming that the article correctly describes a Catholic fault line, I think that Protestantism is more complicated and has one big dynamic cutting the opposite way that means -- in contrast to Richard's observation -- pro-life attitudes don't correlate with a deep sense of mystery and "sacredness" in liturgy.

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