Thanks to Father Araujo and Amy for their insightful reflections on this topic. I want to make a brief comment prompted by Amy's thoughts.
I have mentioned this before when we have had these discussions. I think the place to start is with Ex Corde Ecclesiae. (I disagree with Tom Shaffer about this. I think Ex Corde and the lengthy debate about its implementation played an enormous role in stimulating discussion about the nature of Catholic universities and law schools. I think that Ex Corde has thus far largely failed to change the direction of most Catholic insitutions.)
The orientation provided by Ex Corde is critical. The first universities were "born from the heart of the Church." Law schools that want to be a part of this great and noble tradition ought to view themselves as Catholic insitutions. They do not inhabit some space between the Church and the world of (secular) legal education. As a Catholic institution, a Catholic law school ought to be an "authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ."
I am increasingly of the view that the presence of a Catholic community is really essential. We tend to focus on the curriculum and this is certainly of great importance. It is important to have a jurispridence class where students can learn about the natural law tradition. It is important, we believe, to make a more systematic attempt to bring the richness of the Church's reflections on law and morality to bear on every course we teach. But, it is not enough that a student has an opportunity to learn something about the Catholic intellectual tradition or that the student has the opportunity to attend Mass. (Princeton is not a Catholic school just because Robby George is on its faculty; the University of Illinois is not a Catholic school because the Newman Center there has Mass several times a day.) The institution itself needs to be Catholic. I think it is really important that the institution has a rich liturgical life. Here at Ave Maria, we have a Mass of the Holy Spirit to begin the academic year. We have a Respect Life Mass in October. We have Mass three times a day and Eucharistic Adoration, etc., etc. These things are not on the periphery of the school, although they are obviously optional. It is important that the students see that faculty participate in these activities. I remember how important it was to me in college to have professors who took their Christian faith seriously. It sends a message that is most likely more powerful than our words when the students see their professors trying to integrate faith and reason in their professional work and trying, certainly imperfectly, to live out their faith in their family life and in everything else they do.
In order to have a Catholic community that sends these messages, the law school must have more than a critical mass of Catholics, if that is meant in the sense described in Grutter and Gratz. There must be a majority of Catholics on the faculty, and most likely in the student body as well. This should not be exclusive. One of the more interesting things to me about our short history here at Ave Maria is that we have attracted a relatively large number of Mormons. They are as enthusiastic about our mission as the Catholics. I think, and they have said this many times, that the Mormon students appreciate the links we try to draw between faith and reason and law and morality, and that they enjoy the community here (even though they don't obviously share fully in the liturgical life) and especially the community's support for family life.
Richard
Tuesday, October 25, 2005
Readers might be interested in a symposium on interjurisdictional recognition of same-sex unions. This symposium was just published in Volume 3, Issue 2 of the Ave Maria Law Review. The papers are from a conference held in November 2004 at Brigham Young University. The conference was co-sponsored by Ave Maria School of Law and the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young.
The symposium issue includes papers by a diverse group of scholars. The ten papers are by William A. Reppy Jr., Dwight G. Duncan, Emily J. Sack, Richard S. Myers, L. Lynn Hogue, Lynn D. Wardle, William C. Duncan, Stanley E. Cox, David M. Wagner, and Sheldon A. Vincenti. The conflicts issues, which are increasingly moving to the forefront of the debate, have also been addressed in recent issues of the Creighton and University of Pennsylvania law reviews.
Richard
Monday, October 24, 2005
A few comments on this case and the point raised by Rick and challenged by Michael. First, I have great doubts about the wisdom of the Kansas law and in particular the lengthy prison sentence. Of course, we might have different reactions about the length of the sentence if the Kansas authorities had pursued the case on the grounds that they are mentioning in press reports--that Limon was a sexual predator. Second, this post doesn't address the constitutional arguments invovled. I think, though, that Rick is correct to be worried about the idea that moral disapproval is not a legitimate state interest. This view--which Justice Scalia railed against in Lawrence--was the basis for the federal district court's ruling in the Extreme Associates case that obscenity laws are unconstitutional after Lawrence. That case was argued before the 3rd Circuit in the last week.
I wanted to comment on Rick's point that there might be a plausible rationale for Kansas treating same-sex sexual activity differently than sexual activity between minors of the opposite sex. The Catholic Church still takes the view that homsexual inclination is an "objective disorder." Obviously, this view is not popular. The American Psychiatric Association changed its view on this issue in 1973, although that was regarded by many as largely a political decision. There are psychologists who adhere to the traditional position on this issue. (See the Catholic Medical Association's website for a statement on homosexuality.) If the view taken in the Catechism is plausible then I could understand why a legislature might be more concerned about same-sex sexual activity than heterosexaul conduct. Even if the latter were immoral (because non-marital), the legislature might think along the lines of Bradley and George that there are more serious reasons to be concerned about minors engaging in conduct that is objectively disordered. Is the Kansas Supreme Court able to say with such confidence that the moral views expressed in the Catechism are so far out of the mainstream that they ought to be treated as insufficient to satisfy even the rational basis test?
Richard
