Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, October 31, 2006

ectopic pregnancy: two references

Here are two good sources on the issue of management of ectopic pregnancies: first, Bill May discusses this issue at some length in his book "Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life" beginning at page 182; second, Kelly Bowring published an article on this in the annual volume of University Faculty for Life. Both conclude, quoting May, that "the use of the drug methotrexate and the surgical procedure of salpingostomy [are immoral because they are judged] to be acts of abortion understood as the intentional killing of the innocent unborn." The reasoning supporting this conclusion, as Rob noted earlier, is that the principle of double effect doesn't apply because the act involved is viewed as a direct abortion that cannot be defended by resort to a good motive (protecting the mothers' future fertility). Rob views this as hair-splitting but I think it is quite reasonable to rely on the view that one shouldn't do evil to achieve some good end. We see this in the assisted suicide debate all the time. We don't allow Jack Kevorkian to intentionally kill just because he claims to have a good motive (relieving pain).

Richard M. 

Thursday, October 26, 2006

drinan chairs: a comment

I guess I'll offer a comment about the Georgetown and BC chairs honoring Father Drinan. My first reaction is that these decsions are not a huge surprise but that the decisions are open to serious question. I am sure that Father Drinan has done a lot of good things in his long career. (One of my younger sisters was his research assistant a couple of decades ago and she had good things to say about his personal qualities.) But his public profile involves a long record of support for abortion rights. That record includes his scandalous New York Times op-ed in support of President Clinton's veto of a ban on partial-birth abortions. I understand that he recanted that op-ed but I don't think that recantation received much attention. Father Drinan also serves on the Boards of the ACLU and PFAW, groups that are not known for their strong support of Catholic social teaching. Given this record (and perhaps he has reformed on the issue of abortion), I don't think that a Catholic law school ought to have a chair in his honor. Maybe the theory is that his other work cancels out these lapses, but the message that is being sent is that the areas where he departs from the teachings of the Church must not be terribly important.

When we discussed the Rice honorary degree, I noted that a school defines itself in part by the people the school chooses to honor and to hold up as role models. These actions do not signal a whole-hearted embrace of Ex Corde.   

Richard M.   

Wednesday, October 25, 2006

Drinan Chair?

Because the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling is 90 pages long, I thought I'd ask about a less controversial issue. What do folks think about Georgetown Law School's recent announcement of a Drinan Chair in Human Rights? Do you think that we will witness a protest like the one we saw at Boston College this spring over the controversial award of an honorary degree?

Richard M.

      

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

conscience and democracy, again

Thanks to Steve for his recent post on conscience and democracy. I think a useful way to think about this is to ask whether one's conscience is infallible. In some versions of conscience, it seems that one's conscience can never be mistaken--that it is a capacity to decide about the content of good and evil. (As Pope Benedict has recently stated, this view destroys the categories of good and evil.) The understanding of conscience set forth in the Catechism (sections 1776-1802) and Veritatis Splendor (which, I take it, Steve rejects) is different. In that view, conscience (freedom) is linked to truth. Under this view, one has a duty to follow one's conscience, but that determination can be wrong. The Catechism discusses this at some length under the heading "erroneous judgment." Under Steve's view, is this category an empty set?

I admit to being perplexed by Steve's view that the Catechism's view of conscience is inconsistent with American democracy. Does he mean to say that one could not follow the Magisterium on a disputed moral question without somehow breaking faith with American democracy? Or just that one could not support a law that was consistent with a moral view held by the Magisterium because that would violate the Establishment Clause? There are, of course, many who might react negatively to someone who held the view expressed by the Catechism but I understood Steve to be suggesting something far more sweeping.

Richard M.

   

Tuesday, September 12, 2006

Pope Benedict on faith, reason, and the university

Courtesy of Sandro Magister (and my colleague Ed Lyons who directed my attention to this), here is Pope Benedict's address on faith and reason and the university. I haven't had a chance for a careful read yet, but a quick glance suggests that it is well worth a careful read.

Richard M.

Reminder about Ave Maria conference on John Paul the Great

After reading Patrick Brennan's recent post about the upcoming Scarpa conference at Villanova, I started thinking--what a great conference, but why do these conferences fall when the baseball pennant races are swinging into high gear, when important college football games (ND-Michigan) are being played, and when many of us are trying to figure out the offsides rule while watching youth soccer games. I then realized that I won't be attending to any of these important matters this weekend either because there is another important conference that will be occupying the time of contributors and friends to MOJ.

On Septemeber 15-16, 2006, Ave Maria School of Law will be hosting a conference on "Pope John Paul II and the Law." This conference is being supported by a generous grant from Our Sunday Visitor Institute. Information about the conference is available here.

Here is the list of speakers, in order of appearance--Kevin Lee, Gerry Bradley, Howard Bromberg, Father Kevin Flannery S. J., Ed Peters, Jane Adolphe, Father Robert Araujo S. J., Jason Eyster, and Richard Myers. I hate to single out any particular speaker but I think the highlights will be Ed Peters's talk on canon law (a much-neglected topic) and the different perspectives on capital punishment that will be offered by Father Flannery (from the Gregorian who this year is the Remick Fellow at Notre Dame's Center for Ethics and Culture) and my colleague Howard Bromberg.

The papers from the conference will be published by the Ave Maria Law Review in the spring of 2007

Richard M.         

Thursday, August 17, 2006

another conference on Pope John Paul II and the Law

On September 15-16, 2006, Ave Maria School of Law will be hosting a conference on Pope John Paul II and the Law. The conference is supported by a generous grant from Our Sunday Visitor Institute.  Jane Adolphe, Father Robert Araujo S. J., Gerry Bradley, Howard Bromberg, Jason Eyster, Father Kevin Flannery S. J., Kevin Lee, Richard Myers, and Ed Peters will be speaking at the conference. The papers from the conference will be published in the Ave Maria Law Review. Conference information (schedule, registration form) is available here

Richard M.

Tuesday, August 15, 2006

St. Antoninus and abortion

The book to consult on this issue is John Connery S. J.'s book "Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Perspective" (Loyola University Press 1977). Father Connery explains that Antoninus relied on the distinction between the animated and unanimated fetus that was prevalent before the process of fetal development was understood. Antoninus condemned abortion of the animated fetus in all cases. For the unanimated fetus, Antoninus allowed abortion to save the life of the mother. According to Father Connery, this was completely dependent on the distinction between the animated and unanimated fetus and so I don't think it is fair to cite Antoninus as supporting a pro-choice position. Later commentators who defend "abortion" to save the life of the mother (removal of a cancerous uterus) do so not because they defend the direct, intentional killing of a human life but because they regard the death of the fetus in such circumstances as incidental.

It is true that there have been individual Catholics who defend a "pro-choice" position (I suppose Daniel MaGuire, who has used the example of St. Antoninus, is one example). I don't think this supports the view that the Magisterium has taken conflicting views on the moral permissibility of abortion. And, I don't think it fair to use St. Antoninus's views on abortion to support the view that the Church has taken different views on this question. From Father Connery's account, St. Antoninus sounds more like Pope John Paul in Evangelium Vitae than Daniel MaGuire.

Richard M. 

    

Monday, July 31, 2006

university faculty for life annual volume

The most recent volume published by University Faculty for Life is hot off the presses. The volume is the proceedings of UFL's fifteenth annual conference. That conference, which was held at Ave Maria School of Law, was supported by a generous grant from Our Sunday Visitor Institute.

The volume includes essays by Richard Wilkins, John Keown, Richard Stith, and Mark Latkovic. I'd be happy to send a copy of the volume to anyone who is interested (while supplies last). Just send me an email.

Richard M.

Thursday, July 27, 2006

leiter on religious reasons

I think Rob is correct that Leiter is off on the wrong track in his contribution to this discussion. Leiter certainly has a conception of reasons that he thinks are an appropriate basis for governmental action. He says that only "public reasons" count. That "sectarian, religious beliefs" don't. How do we tell which category we are in. He says, unhelpfuly, that this is on the basis of a "head count." Previously he said that the only reasons that count are "public reasons acceptable to all reasonable people." So, apparently, the only people whose "heads" are being counted are  "reasonable" people. As lots of people have discussed, "reasonable" in this context means those who accept a narrow form of secular rationality that is confined to a very tiny segment of the population. Leiter tells us that Bush's view is religious becasue he says that it depends on ensoulment. I don't think that is true. (I don't believe that the Catholic Church has ever taken a position on the precise time that ensoulment occurs and the Church's respect for human life at all stages of development doesn't depend on ensoulment. See Donum Vitae on this point.)

I think one of the best things written on this is a piece published by Michael McConnell entitled "Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation," and published at 1999 Utah L. Rev. 639. There, McConnell concluded: "One false view of separation is the view that religious ideas must not serve as rationales for public policy. This view, called the 'principle of secular rationale,' is put forward as a means of protecting the public sphere from divisive, absolutist, intolerant impulses and from arguments that cannot be supported on the basis of accessible public reasons. But in fact, it rests on inaccurate stereotypes and questionable epistemological premises, and it would disenfranchise religious persons as full participating members of the political community. The United States has never adhered to the principle of secular rationale. Indeed, our political history is rife with religious political activists and religious political arguments....There is no good democratic argument for excluding them. But more than this: to exclude them would be inconsistent with the very ideals of democratic equality that the principle of secular rationale ostensibly seeks to protect. It is time to stop challenging our fellow citizen's right to be part of democratic dialogue, and time to engage their arguments on the merits."   

Richard M.