Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, April 24, 2015

Walsh on Marius Victorinus (!) at Mirror of Justice

Last but not least . . . Kevin Walsh on "Marius Victorinus at MOJ."  He opens with Judge Noonan's rule for dealing with religious-freedom scholarship and scholars, namely, that they and we are all situated persons with genealogies, histories, commitments, goals, etc.  So . . . Kevin blogs.  How is blogging -- at Mirror of Justice in particular -- relevant to "professing law"?

Kevin then did a close analysis of MOJ's opening post and "mission statement" and emphasized (drawing on, among other things, Ratzinger's Introduction to Christianity) the "Marian strand" of that mission.    And, he asked, why might it be important to a group of Christian law professors that St. Augustine was moved and inspired by the fact (see Confessions) that the philosopher Marius Victorinus became a Christian?  For us, as for Victorinus, the "idea alone" is not enough; he (and we) need the Church, which is not just an organizing principle for ideas.  And, maybe it matters to people -- those who read what we write or learn from us in classes -- that we participate (and are known to participate) in a community and that we "reflect some light into the dark places of this world."

Kevin closed with a nice remembrance of Dan Markel who -- in Will Baude's words -- "made you a little more fearless when he took your ideas seriously."  We can do that for each other (and he used his own area of federal jurisdiction as a possible example of where this can happen).

 

Stabile on "Evangelii Gaudium and Catholic Legal Theory"

Susan's remarks on Evangelii Gaudium fit nicely with Michael Moreland's earlier talk on "Pope Francis and the Project of Catholic Legal Theory."  A crucial starting point:  Our work to develop a Catholic Legal Theory is not and cannot be separate from the Great Commission, from the mission of evangelization to which all Christians, like the Church, are called.

Susan starts with the word "joy" -- which appears more than 100 times in the document -- and reminds us that Pope Francis has insisted that all we do as Christians -- and this would include the development and study of Catholic Legal Theory -- must be animated by joy.  This is relevant to questions, for example, about how we do what we do.  Relatedly, we are called to be "beacons of hope in troubled times."

Also, it's not enough to learn or write about Christ; it is essential to encounter Him.  Another theme in the document is the communal, and not only the solitary, nature of that encounter.  So, do we Catholic legal scholars do all that we can and should to collaborate and cooperate?  Additionally, "who do we speak to, and how?"  We cannot speak only to ourselves, in small circles of friends.  We have to run the risks that come with face-to-face encounters with others, and the risks of suffering that can come as a result of personal attacks, and the risks of the distortion that will sometimes hamstring our efforts.

Another, unifying or overarching, theme:  Mercy, as the greatest of the virtues.  Justice is part of the picture, and must be tempered by mercy.

 

DeGirolami on "Tradition and Catholic Legal Theory"

Marc DeGirolami -- very fittingly -- is talking about the subject of "tradition and Catholic Legal Theory."  He is focusing on a particular challenge, i.e., the fact that Catholic Legal Theory is often regarded, discussed, and presented as part of a "tradition" but . . . fewer and fewer people actually know what that particular tradition is or, indeed, what a(ny) "tradition" is.   "What do we mean by 'tradition' when we invoke it?"  Are we speaking sociologically, historically, normatively . . . ?

Another question:  How much skepticism should we introduce, in our work or to our students, regarding the very idea of tradition and its moral force?  Marc suggests a role for Catholic legal scholars, namely, that they can and should help students to appreciate that "tradition," actually, is not "utter bunk."  We have to create conditions in which the claims and goods of tradition can get a hearing.  We praise innovators -- destroyers! -- and not caretakers and stewards.  (RG:  Interesting that so many who profess to be unattracted to "tradition" are deeply attracted to "sustainability.")

More generally, Marc suggests, our work as law teachers should attend more to tradition in all courses and areas, not just Catholic Legal Theory.  Our law students are entering into a learned profession, after all, and that entering-into goes along with -- at least it should -- an appreciation of and commitment to a certain inheritance.  

 

 

Berg on the "Relevance and Irrelevance of the Reformation . . ."

" . . . to the Catholic Legal Project, that is."  (We know about its relevance to the history and state of England . . . .  Give us back York Minster, Tom!)  Berg opens with a hat-tip to Admiral Stockdale -- "who am I, and why am I here?" -- and lays some groundwork (drawing from Hunter, Noll, and others) on the interesting and increases places of convergence -- especially with respect to moral and ethical questions -- between Catholics and at least some Protestants.  And (drawing from Massa, et al.) he talks some about some worldview-and-framing differences, including those having to do with communities and institutions, and with dialectic and analogy.

Thesis:  Catholicism is characteristically analogical and Protestantism characteristically dialectical, but both are and should be present in both.  (See this paper of Tom's for an earlier elaboration of something like this thesis in the context of a discussion about Murray and Neibuhr.)  Discussing "the market economy," or "unions," or "democracy," Tom provides examples of how these two forms or kinds of arguments can complement each other.

Tom closes with a discussion of his own area of (great) expertise, namely, the law of religious freedom.  Both distinctively Catholic and distinctively Protestant arguments and emphases are needed, he says, to provide strong and sufficient protections for religious freedom.  Catholic arguments are essential to the religious freedom of institutions and communities, Tom contends.  On the other hand, Protestant arguments might be comparatively more important when it comes to justifying exemptions and accommodations (from anti-discrimination laws, for example).

 

 

 

Brennan on "Problematics of Catholic Legal Theory"

Patrick Brennan follows Michael's reflection on Francis with "Problematics of Catholic Legal Theory under the Roman Regime of Novelty (since 1965 or so)."  How does it happen, Patrick asks, that (a) we have a Pope who is enormously popular and that (b) serious observers like Ross Douthat are asking if we are in a crisis, and if "Pope Francis will break the Church"?  Patrick agrees that the Church is in crisis -- "autodemolition of the Church through relentless novelty" -- and understanding this crisis-context is essential to understanding, and doing, the Catholic Legal Theory project.

Many deny, or ignore, this crisis-context, in various ways and with various untenable explanations, rationalizations, or "spurious optimism."  Patrick bracingly presses the group to see, and understand, this context and to confront more clear-eyedly its implications and roots.  Or, quoting Pope Paul VI . . . "Enough!"  The novel "worship of dialogue" is a grave threat, Patrick warns, and can only distract and undermine Catholic Legal Theory (and much else).  The call, instead, is to evangelize and to "make disciples of all nations"; that is, to teach and to do so with authority.

In Patrick's view, the social and other problems that Catholic Legal Theory purports or aims to address can only be addressed constructively if those engaged in the project look back before the Second Vatican Council avoid the distortions of novelty.  The church-state and religious-liberty debates provide, he says, a good example of a context where such looking-back is seriously needed.  The world does need Catholic Legal Theory -- and the Church -- more than ever.

Moreland on "Pope Francis and the Project of Catholic Legal Theory"

Next up, Michael Moreland on "Pope Francis and the Project of Catholic Legal Theory."  What contribution is he making to the Project?  He starts in a "negation" mode and warns about overstating the role and importance of the Pope or popes.  "Catholic Legal Theory" can be, but perhaps should not be, excessively refracted through or framed in terms of, the thought of the current pope.

That said . . . what about Francis?  What about the significance of  his being "Argentine," "Jesuit," "Spiritual Director and Religious Superior," "Francis," and "Post-Vatican II"?  Francis has sounded a theme, Michael suggests, of a "theology of encounter":  "Being a Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty ideal, but the encounter with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon . . . ."  Pope Francis was also heavily influenced his thought by the experience of the Church in Argentina, and with Peronism, and with Argentinian anti-capitalism and by what Michael calls the Church's "historically fraught relationship to the state."  His role as a spiritual director in the Ignatian tradition is another formative influence:  He has written, for example, about the "fundamental realities" that "we recognize and abhor our sins and their roots in the spirit of the world, and we converse about all this with Jesus 'suspended on the Cross.'"

Michael also shows and talks about some particular paintings and works of art -- including his favorite painter, Chagall -- that have, in interesting ways, shaped and marked Pope Francis, in particular his Marian devotion.  For the future . . . (1) less speculative and more pastoral; (2) anti-liberal (economically); (3) reform from "the periphery"; and (4) new "source churches" in global Catholicism.   

 

Scaperlanda on Catholic Legal Theory and "Assumptions Regarding Liberty"

Michael's talk is called "Challenging the Common Assumptions regarding Liberty."  He reflected on his nearly 3 decades of law teaching and talked a bit about the different courses he teaches, how he teaches them, and what Catholicism and/or Catholic Legal Theory contribute to them.  One of his courses is, in fact, "Catholic Legal Theory" and he sketched the structure and aims of that course and emphasized his efforts to get students to think about freedom, restraint, and liberty, and about how -- drawing on the classic movie Groundhog Day -- being the "sovereign chooser" is not really freedom.  One is more free when one chooses to live for others, and as a gift for others.  But, as Michael recounts, many of his students are afraid to "judge," evaluate, or rank different choices -- in part because of fears about the reality of human frailty and the inevitability of human failure.

 

 

 

Schiltz: Who are we talking to, and should they listen?

Next up is Lisa Schiltz, whose paper is called "'You Talkin' to Me?'  Who Are We Talking to?  And Why Should They Listen to Us?"  If Rob was looking at the current landscape, and John was reminding us about the past, Lisa's focus is on the future and, in particular, the future of faculty scholarship in Catholic Legal Theory.

During the past 10 years, three big things have happened:  The collapse of the legal market and its effects on law schools' priorities and budgets; the explosion of the Internet (smartphones, text, social media, etc.) as the primary mode of communication; and a change of the relationship between the Church and the world (one that is marked by, Lisa suggests, a loss of confidence -- and of interest -- in the enterprise of bringing the thought of, say, John Paul II to bear on contemporary issues, questions, and debates).  These three things have caused, or contributed to, something of a retreat from the Catholic Legal Theory project.

However, as Lisa reminds us, one thing that has not changed is the responsibility -- one that the Compendium characterizes as "urgent" -- that Catholic legal scholars and law teachers -- as called lay people in the Church -- have to and in the world.  So, with this responsibility in view . . . what and how should we think about the three changes mentioned earlier?  First, we should be good stewards, and appreciative of those who make possible our scholarly work, and not self-indulgent.  Next, what about blogging, and blogging (etc) as opposed to (and in competition with) traditional legal scholarship?  (She draws from Carr's, The Shallows:  What the Internet Is Doing to Our Minds and talks a bit about the way our means and modes of expression and communication are changing what and how we think.  As she does, I feel sheepish about live-blogging.  And yet . . . .)

 

 

Breen on "Catholic Legal Theory in Catholic Law Schools: Past and Present"

John Breen (along with Lee Strang) has been doing a lot of interesting and important work on the history of Catholic legal education in the United States.  Now, in his talk, he is presenting some of that work to the group, helping explain how Catholic Legal Theory has, in fact, been instantiated in the structures, practices, and curricula of actual Catholic law schools, past and present.  

He emphasizes, among other things, that -- generally speaking -- Catholic law schools in America were not explicitly founded in order to be vehicles or homes for Catholic Legal Theory, but instead to be means of advancement for Catholic immigrants and to enhance the "prestige" of the various then-new Catholic universities.  But, over time, calls came -- at least at some schools -- for a more distinctively Catholic legal education, and these calls tended to emphasize St. Thomas Aquinas and jurisprudence.  For a few decades, many Catholic law schools were requiring Thomistic jurisprudence courses.  But, by the early 1960s, for various reasons, the Neo-Thomistic "proposal" had "failed" and, at most places, there was a "loss of a distinctively Catholic jurisprudence in the curriculum."   (I had not appreciated the fact that, between 1965 and 1975, the number of law students doubled or thought much about the connection between this development, on the one hand, and the distinctively Catholic character, mission, or curriculum of Catholic law schools, on the other.)  John closes with thoughts inspired by and drawn from Philip Gleason's Contending With Modernity and with questions about what it is (if anything) that could replace Neo-Thomism as the organizing "intellectual architecture" for distinctively Catholic law schools.  Could "Catholic Social Thought" do the job?  John is skeptical.

 

Vischer on Catholic Legal Theory and Catholic Legal Education . . . in tough times

Rob's talk is called "How Should Catholic Legal Theory Matter to Catholic Legal Education in a Time of Retrenchment."  He's asking about Catholic Legal Theory's connection to legal education in three ways:  As a distinctive feature of a law school that helps (or not) to attract applicants and students; as a lens or topic for faculty research; and as an aspect of the curriculum.  Drawing on his own experience as the dean of a Catholic law school -- an intentionally Catholic law school -- Rob is not confident that Catholic legal theory, or a school's Catholic mission more generally, does much work in attracting students (especially in the current difficult times) and he also doubts that faculty research in this field does or can do much to boost rankings or appeal to students concerned about skills, practical matters, and graduating "practice ready."  And, in the curriculum, he discusses (drawing on his experience with St. Thomas's required justice course), it's difficult to incorporate Catholic Legal Theory -- at least explicitly.  It's often seen as not practical, not relevant, and not sufficiently determinate (or perhaps too determinate).

So . . . why should Catholic law schools care about Catholic Legal Theory?  Perhaps because, he suggests, we believe it's true.    And also, explains, because it helps give faculty a sense of their work as vocation and as having a pastoral dimension.

Catholic Legal Theory matters, even in an era of retrenchment, in part because Catholic *law schools* matter, to the common good and not only to those schools' immediate stakeholders.