Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, September 15, 2016

Saint John Paul II . . . patron of alpinists?

I love this . . . 

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Bruce Frohnen on "Constitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law"

I invited Prof. Bruce Frohnen to write up a few words about his and George Carey's new bookConstitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law, which I think might be of interest to MOJ readers:

For decades I argued with my late friend and colleague, Georgetown political scientist George Carey, over whether the American Constitution is a dead letter. George thought it was dead. I still believe it is not quite dead. This limited disagreement rests on a more fundamental shared understanding that is at the heart of our recently released book: American political actors no longer respect their Constitution or the institutions, beliefs, and practices that until recently supported it and were supported by it in turn.

The theme of our book is that America’s unwritten constitution—that combination of traditions, legal structures, and political customs that shape a people’s public life—no longer fits the Constitution as written. This will come as no surprise to most students of constitutional government, but its implications have long been minimized or ignored. Our Constitution was designed for a free and virtuous people leading their lives within largely self-governing families, churches, and various local associations. Our national government now is run by and for elites committed to transforming society through mechanisms intrinsically hostile to the limited government dictated by the Constitution’s plain language.

Defenders of the current regime habitually dismiss defenders of our constitutional republic as retrograde yokels pining for a bygone era of horses, buggies, and institutionalized oppression. It is time to look beyond such self-serving obfuscations to the source and effects of the hostility toward constitutional, procedural, and legal restraints on which our current regime is based.

From Woodrow Wilson, through Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and to this day, Progressives have demanded that the “deadlock of democracy” be broken. They have sought to undermine constitutional restraints on centralized power in the name of “doing the people’s business.” That “business” has been establishing a new order under which administrative experts will protect individuals from want, prejudice, and disapproved hierarchies.

The Framers’ Constitution aims to provide specific, limited public goods, most especially the mediation of disputes among more fundamental associations and political units—those associations and units within which people may pursue good lives in common as self-governing, free people. That Constitution maintained the rule of law and ordered liberty through formal structures and procedures requiring development of supermajority support for most significant policy changes. As the Framers knew, the Constitution’s formal structures cannot function without a supporting constitutional morality emphasizing restraint and acceptance of formal limitations on power. Checks and balances limited arbitrary power only to the extent they were applied moderately and for limited, moderate goals.

Progressivism delegitimized this constitutional morality by presenting the people’s will as the sole source of political legitimacy and by propagating the myth of a “living constitution.” Living constitutionalists claim to seek the best in our Constitution by deriving abstract principles (equality and popular sovereignty) from it, then re-defining constitutional, legal, and governmental practice accordingly. Missing in this rosy picture is the rule of law essential for popular self-government. Progressives’ hostility toward constitutional restraint has produced a system in which Congress no longer makes laws, instead “enabling” executive agencies to do so. Their judges no longer adjudicate under law, instead approving or nullifying laws, institutions, and entire traditions according to their own ideological prejudices. Progressive and even putatively conservative Presidents no longer execute laws, instead ruling by decrees including executive orders suspending immigration laws and legislative signing statements establishing new federal agencies.

The result is a regime of quasi-law. Ignoring the essential nature of a constitution as rules for the making of rules, dispensing with the separation of powers as inconvenient, and rejecting their duty to restrain both their institutional rivals and themselves from overreaching, political actors today issue directives, from whatever branch of government, that have the form and effect of law, but lack essential legal characteristics. We examine these directives in terms of Lon Fuller’s elements necessary for law’s internal morality. They lack generality, being crafted for individuals or interest groups. They fail to provide notice to the ruled because they may come from any (or all) sources of political power. They lack clarity because they allow administrators largely unlimited discretion. They are inconsistent with one another and change radically over time. And they are administered in a manner that differs wildly from that in which they are declared. Consequently, we or our associations must “plea bargain” if charged with violations; we must seek waivers from unworkable regulatory schemes; and we must appeal to the political prejudices of particular judges to defend rights (including that to self-government) guaranteed by the Constitution. From citizens we quickly are becoming subjects of a lawless regime.

This electoral season gives scant reason to hope for re-establishing a genuine rule of law. But it is important to note that we have slid this far into a regime ruled by decree through decades of misunderstanding and constitutional corruption. At root the problem is that we demand too much from our central government and too little from ourselves, as individual persons and as members of more local, fundamental associations. Lawyers and political scientists bear particular responsibility for our dilemma because they have cast aside the model of constitutionalism on which our political tradition was built in favor of one that flatters their view of themselves as experts capable of designing a more fair and just society. But just order cannot be commanded from the political center; it must grow from people’s more natural associations. The character of a people is rooted in its culture, not its politics. And if politics is made the master of culture, our political leaders will become our masters, and our freedom will disappear. Specific reforms are simple to find, for they entail use of the tools (especially the powers of veto, impeachment, and removal from office) already provided by our Constitution as written. But any possibility of improvement requires acceptance of the fact that free governments can only exist within constitutional orders that limit, separate, and aim political power in the interests of associations more natural and fundamental than the central government.

Thanks, and congrats, Bruce!

Wednesday, September 14, 2016

McGurn responds to the (really bad) USCCR report

Here.  A taste:

The commission report is called “Peaceful Coexistence: Reconciling nondiscrimination principles with civil liberties.” Its top finding is this: “Civil rights protections ensuring nondiscrimination, as embodied in the Constitution, laws, and policies, are of pre-eminent importance in American jurisprudence.”

Translation: Nuisances including the First Amendment’s “free exercise” of religion guarantee take a back seat to the rapidly multiplying non-discrimination causes such as the “right” to coerce any baker you want into baking the cake you want for your same-sex wedding.

In her own submission to the report, the commission’s Gail Heriot pinpoints the flaw in the finding. A University of San Diego law professor, Ms. Heriot says she could easily imagine a case for Mr. Castro’s position. But instead of an argument, she says, the commission offers a decree.

“By starting with an assertion that antidiscrimination laws are ‘pre-eminent,’ she writes, “the Commission’s analysis essentially begins with its conclusion. Why should anyone accept it? The Commission said so.”

I recommend readers take a look at the excellent dissenting statements from Commissioners Kirsanow and Heriot, and also the expert statements that were submitted by, among others, Prof. Michael Helfand and Prof. John Inazu.

Tuesday, September 13, 2016

My take on the election: "Neither"

Here's something I wrote for Commonweal on the upcoming presidential election.  

Shorter version:  Trump and Clinton are awful (yes, she is) and we should be ashamed of ourselves for nominating them.  That said, she's going to win.  I'm voting for neither.  In any event, turn out and vote for divided government to reduce the damage to religious freedom and other important causes.

 

Monday, September 12, 2016

"Freedom Of, From, For, and Within Religion: Dimensions of a Common Right?"

This past weekend, I attended a fascinating, rich conference at St. Hughes College, Oxford, that was organized by the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies (ICLARS).  The theme was "Freedom Of/For/From/In Religion:  Differing Dimensions of a Common Right?" (more info here).  Here's the blurb:

Freedom of religion or belief (FoRB), once considered to be the “first” freedom, has become a controversial right. In particular, the practical possibility of implementing FoRB in impartial ways are increasingly questioned. Critics argue that FoRB cannot deliver what it promises: an equal share of freedom for people of different or no religion. Further, it is claimed that the right of FoRB, as it is regulated in international and constitutional law, is intrinsically biased because it reflects its Western and Christian origins.

Part of the problem is due to the fact that FoRB is a complex notion, including different dimensions that require careful consideration. Freedom of religion or belief, as a right recognized for every human being, is the first dimension, but not the only one. Freedom from religion, that is the right to live one’s life without being compelled to perform religious acts, is another and freedom for religion, which concerns the institutional side of this right (what was once called “libertas ecclesiae”) is a third dimension that demands consideration. Finally, freedom in religion concerns the rights that the faithful (and sometimes not so faithful) are entitled to enjoy within their religious communities.

My own paper was called "Freedom For Religion:  (Yet) Another View of the Cathedral," and in the paper I mulled over (as I have in some other places) the passages in Dignitatis Humanae that refer to the duty of the public authority to take care of the "conditions" for religious freedom and to proactively support the "religious life" of people (in ways consistent with the religious freedom of all).  

What was particularly rewarding was the fact that scholars came from around the world, not only North America and Europe, and so we were able to get some perspective on the variety of challenges that religious freedom faces in different contexts.  (And, it was nice to grab a pint with fellow MOJ-er, Tom Berg!) 

Wednesday, September 7, 2016

"To Whom Do Children Belong" by Prof. Melissa Moschella

I've just ordered Prof. Melissa Moschella's (CUA, Philosophy) new bookTo Whom Do Children Belong?  Parental Rights, Civic Education, and Children's Autonomy.  (It's good timing, since I will be talking this afternoon about Justice Douglas's troubling opinion in the Yoder case!).  

The book is reviewed by Prof. Chris Tollefsen here, at Public Discourse.  Here are the opening paragraphs of that review:

Melissa Moschella begins her new book on parents’ rights and children’s education with a quotation from Melissa Harris-Perry that might be familiar toPublic Discourse readers: “we have to break through our kind of private idea that kids belong to their parents or kids belong to their families and recognize that kids belong to whole communities.”

The implications of such a claim are breathtaking. If Harris-Perry is right, where the rearing and educating of children are concerned, the community—and in particular, the political community—should determine both the ends of such care and education and the means to be pursued. The community, in other words, possesses primary authority. Even if that authority is not complete—if, for example, parents also have some authority over their children—such familial authority is at best only partial, derived from an implicit grant from the state.

Such claims strike traditionally-minded persons as outrageous. They seem to be precisely backwards—the reverse of what is true. Families, we think, are prior to the state, which exists to protect families. Within families, parents have primary authority over their children, and even if that authority is partially shared with the state, the primary role of the state is to help parents, not to take over tasks that are properly parental.

Moschella’s book is a vigorous defense of this traditional view.

For other discussions of these issues, check out this book review, by our own Michael Scaperlanda, or this short article of mine (from 2000!  Time flies!).

Tuesday, September 6, 2016

Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools

The conference of the Religiously Affiliated Law Schools is coming up at the end of September, and the line-up (which features our own Rob Vischer, among others) looks great.  Be there if you can!

Saturday, September 3, 2016

More on David Gushee, discrimination, and middle ground

A follow-up to this post:   David Gushee insists, in this (strikingly defensive and sarcastic) "response to his critics," that he was only describing the "collapse of middle ground" on LGBT issues and religious freedom, and predicting various developments, in this post.  Decide for yourself, of course, but I think his original post pretty clearly reads like he's welcoming and endorsing what he's describing.  In any event, this response, by George Guthrie (Gushee's former colleague at Union University) is worth a read.  Guthrie asks, in a John-Inazu-esque vein, "[i]s it possible to embrace appropriate distinctions between social equality and uniformity of beliefs?"  I hope so.

Thursday, September 1, 2016

Save the Date: The Annual Nootbaar Conference at Pepperdine

As always, the Nootbaar Conference at Pepperdine, hosted by Bob Cochran, Michael Helfand, and their colleagues, looks to be a wonderful gathering.  The info is here.

"Trigger Warnings" and Religious Students

This essay, at The Atlantic, is worth a read.

A challenge, for a Catholic university, it seems to me, is to encourage policies and pedagogical practices that do not uncritically mimic the AAUP's understanding of academic freedom or John Stuart Mill's idea of free speech, that are consistent with and conducive to civility, charity, respect, and humility, and that protect the expression of ideas, views, claims, and arguments that, while they might run counter to the orthodoxy of the moment are nevertheless in keeping with both the Truth that has been revealed and the Truth that we are called and made to pursue.