Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, December 15, 2023

A Misguided Attack on Educational Choice in Commonweal

A recent issue of Commonweal includes an unfortunate, and unsound, attack on school choice called "The Battle Against School Vouchers", by Luke Mayville.  Let's start with the fact -- and, to be clear, it is a fact -- that Catholic Social Teaching clearly supports policies that not only permit Catholic schools to operate as Catholic schools but also that make it possible for parents to choose such schools.  To put the matter differently, the standard anti-pluralism argument of school-choice opponents that, somehow, school-choice programs "take money away from public education" is unsound:  Public education, correctly understood, is the education of the public; it is not limited to education delivered by government employees in state-owned buildings.

Mayville draws on a variety of tropes in the first paragraph:  "In place of a school system that is publicly funded, democratically governed, and accessible to all, policy entrepreneurs have sought to transform American education into a commodity—something to be bought and sold in a free market."  Let's put aside that systems of state schools in the United States are not, in a meaningful sense, "democratically governed."  Let's also put aside the notion that using market mechanisms, and permitting choice, insidiously transforms education (from what?) into a "commodity." The fact is that the "policy entrepreneurs" in question have sought to expand the range of "publicly funded" educational opportunities and options and thereby to better meet the needs, reflect the values, and empower the decisions of "all".

Mayville also gets the law quite wrong:  "Meanwhile, voucher proponents were energized by landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court, most notably Espinoza v. Montana in 2020 and Carson v. Makin in 2022, both of which appeared to remove constitutional obstacles to the use of public dollars for private religious education."  In fact, as MOJ readers probably know, "the use of public dollars for private religious education" (again, this misstates the issue:  school choice involves using "public" dollars, to which parents who choose religious rather than government schools are no less entitled, for education, provided by non-state schools) has been, in various circumstances, constitutionally permissible for decades.  Espinoza and Carson -- correctly -- affirmed that governments may not single out religious private schools, as opposed to other non-state schools, for discriminations.

The piece continues with various false political-advocacy claims, and recounts efforts to block school-choice (and preserve the interests of those who benefit from the current monopoly), and descends into various teacher-union talking points.  None of this kind of thing is new, but what does seem new, and disappointing, is that the piece -- without any engagement with Catholic Social Teaching -- ran in one the longest running Catholic journals.

Tuesday, December 12, 2023

Coming up on 20 years (!) of Mirror of Justice

This blog launched a gabillion years ago -- well, on February 3, 2004 -- with this post.  My own first (substantive-ish) post was this one, on "Law and Moral Anthropology". A bit:

The Psalmist asked, "Lord, what is man . . . that thou makest account of him?” (Ps. 143:3). This is not only a prayer, but a starting point for jurisprudential reflection. All moral problems are anthropological problems, because moral arguments are built, for the most part, on anthropological presuppositions. That is, as Professor Elshtain has put it, our attempts at moral judgment tend to reflect our “foundational assumptions about what it means to be human." Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Dignity of the Human Person and the Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, 14 JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION 53, 53 (1999-2000). As my colleague John Coughlin has written, the "anthropological question" is both "perennial" and profound: "What does it mean to be a human being?” Rev. John J. Coughlin, Law and Theology: Reflections on What it Means to Be Human, 74 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW 609, 609 (2000).

According to the Robots, we've had going-on 7 million pages views and over 16,000 posts here.  Not all of them have been about New Urbanism, or Christ the King, or the judicial murder of Henry Garnet (even if, from my own blog-work, it might seem that way). 

We all (because of Twitter/X, Facebook, arthritis, etc.) blog less than we used to; some past contributors have moved on; the "issues" have changed . . . heck, we are on our third pope! (And, several of our original bloggers are now presidents of Catholic universities!)  Many of us have changed institutions, and jobs . . . and retired. And, of course, may eternal light shine on our former co-blogger, Fr. Araujo.

For my own part, I continue to obsess over questions having to do with Catholic institutions, and with the way these institutions are shaped, pushed, supported, thwarted, etc. by the law.  I continue to be interested in the ways that law mediates the relationships among "church," "state," and "society." Certainly, in recent years, the renewed interest in "integralism" has . . . affected the conversations about these relationships. 

The "anthropological" question still seems central, to me.  Any "Catholic legal theory" has to include, or incorporate, it seems, an account of what it means to be human, of what a "person" is.  (My friend Carter Snead's recent book on this question, in the context of public bioethics, is outstanding.) Today, even more so than in 2004, it seems as though the Catholic account is contested -- maybe even on the ropes.  Rather than being "everlasting splendours" -- created, loved, and sustained by God -- we are loosely connected, shifting, coagulations of identities, preferences, and performances.  What can law do -- how can law deal -- with such things? I'm not sure. Stay tuned! 

Thursday, November 30, 2023

Panel event TODAY at Notre Dame: "The Rising Tide of Antisemitism on American Campuses and Beyond"

Notre Dame Law School and our Religious Liberty Initiative are hosting TODAY an important, if distressingly timely, event on "the rising tide of antisemitism on American Campuses and Beyond."  (I should note that, unlike far too many University presidents, our own president, Fr. John Jenkins, was a lead signatory on a strong statement condemning the 10/7 terror-murders by Hamas and supporting Israel's right to exist and to defend itself.) (The event will be live-streamed.)

n November 30, Notre Dame Law School Professors Avishalom Tor and Stephanie Barclay will host the event, "The Rising Tide of Antisemitism on American Campuses and Beyond" at the McCartan Courtroom in Eck Hall of Law.

The panel discussion includes a keynote address delivered by Professor Ruth Wisse, Martin Peretz Professor of Yiddish Literature and Comparative Literature Emerita at Harvard University.

The panelists include:

Ken MarcusEsq., Chairman of the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law
Most Reverend Robert J. McClory, Bishop of the Diocese of Gary
Professor Jeffrey VeidlingerJoseph Brodsky Collegiate Professor of History and Judaic Studies at the University of Michigan

The event will begin with an introduction from Professor Avishalom Tor, Professor of Law and Director of the Notre Dame Program on Law and Market Behavior (ND LAMB) at Notre Dame Law School.

The opening remarks will be delivered by Dean G. Marcus Cole, Joseph A. Matson Dean and Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School.

The panel discussion will be moderated by Professor Stephanie Barclay, Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School and Faculty Director of the Notre Dame Religious Liberty Initiative.

Attendees will be asked to present their Notre Dame ID card. Backpacks and bags will not be allowed in the courtroom.

1140 Eck Hall will be reserved as the overflow room where the livestream of the event will be playing.

Tuesday, November 21, 2023

Pushaw on "Defending Dobbs"

Prof. Robert Pushaw (Pepperdine) has a comprehensive and magisterial article, "Defending Dobbs", posted. A perfect gift for your irritating, Casey-loving uncle at Thanksgiving! Here is the abstract:

In short, the Court is on the right track in cases like Dobbs by retreating from eccentric, unreviewable, common law policymaking and instead focusing on the Constitution itself.

Alas, average Americans, politicians, pundits, and even lawyers rarely read Court opinions but instead care only about whether they personally agree with the outcome, as the reaction to Dobbs illustrates. One can hardly blame them, as the Court’s constitutional opinions have often featured legal window dressing for results already reached on political or ideological grounds. Therefore, the current majority of Justices must illuminate the public about the Court’s proper role in interpreting the Constitution as law. The Court tried to do so in Dobbs, without the Chief Justice’s support and without widespread popular approval. Hence, its educational task will be formidable, and perhaps impossible.

The foregoing themes will be detailed in four Parts. Part II examines the Court’s discovery in 1965 of a constitutional right to marital privacy, its awkward common law extension of that right to include abortion in Roe, and attempts by Justices and scholars to bolster Roe’s shaky constitutional footing. Part III describes how the three concurring Justices in Casey concocted an unprecedented version of stare decisis that allowed them to purport to follow Roe while substantially changing its legal framework. Part IV demonstrates that the Justices applied Casey’s malleable “undue burden” approach to reach any results they desired, as illustrated in cases concerning laws that either banned late-term abortions or that mandated certain safety standards for abortion providers. Part V analyzes Dobbs and defends the decision as restoring the idea of the Constitution as law.

Wednesday, November 8, 2023

Disappointing results in Ohio

In Ohio, "Issue 1" -- which adds to Ohio's state constitution an expansive (I would characterize it as radically permissive) right to abortion -- passed by a wide margin yesterday, marking yet another post-Dobbs loss for the pro-life side.  This piece, in National Review, explains well how far-reaching (and deceptive) the Issue is.

The Supreme Court was wrong -- by which I mean, the justices badly misinterpreted the Constitution's text -- in Roe; the Court was wrong to affirm (or, re-make) Roe in Casey; and the Court was right, in Dobbs, to jettison Roe and Casey as "grievously wrong" (as I and some co-authors argued here).

That said, in the wake of the Ohio vote (and of other electoral setbacks), at least two things seem, unfortunately, clear:  First, the media overwhelmingly mischaracterizes / lies about abortion, about its regulation, and about the content and implications of abortion-rights proposals.  This is not going to change, and it would seem to follow that pro-life activists simply must do better in terms of communication and education.  Second, it is, for now, a fact about the United States that -- even in many "red" states -- most voters/citizens want most abortions (i.e., "first trimester" abortions) to be legal. That these voters / citizens are mistaken about the demands of justice is, for present purposes, not relevant.  This could change (but, see the first point) -- we should pray that it does, and do what we can to bring such a change about -- but, until it does, pro-life activists can expect that, in most places, returning abortion-regulation to the democratic process is not going to result in pro-life abortion-regulation regimes (although, we should not forget, in some places it will and has).

In my view, given the two points above, it is both morally permissible and prudent to propose and support incremental measures -- not, to be clear, as principled or permanent resolutions but as the best that can be enacted -- at a particular time, and in a particular place -- until citizens' and voters' consciences are better formed.  As MOJ-er Robby George wrote, a while back, regarding Evangelium vitae,

When it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects (no. 73).

Although there are dedicated pro-life people who continue to believe otherwise, it seems clear to me that the Holy Father is saying that a person who makes manifest his commitment to continue working for the full legal protection of the unborn, may, as a matter of prudence, support and vote for laws that, though not perfectly just, are less unjust than the existing law or any currently politically attainable alternative.

At the same time, as the Pope makes clear, there is never a legitimate excuse for failing to work toward the goal of full equal protection for the unborn and other victims of the culture of death. It is not enough merely to attempt to ameliorate the extent or gravity of unjust laws. The universal and unconditional pro-life imperative demands that we work unceasingly—even if, by necessity, incrementally—toward the ultimate goal of bringing our laws fully into line with the requirements of true justice.

In the words of Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, taken from "the greatest pro-life speech ever given," 

We shall not weary, we shall not rest, until every unborn child is protected in law and welcomed in life. We shall not weary, we shall not rest, until all the elderly who have run life’s course are protected against despair and abandonment, protected by the rule of law and the bonds of love. We shall not weary, we shall not rest, until every young woman is given the help she needs to recognize the problem of pregnancy as the gift of life. We shall not weary, we shall not rest, as we stand guard at the entrance gates and the exit gates of life, and at every step along the way of life, bearing witness in word and deed to the dignity of the human person—of every human person.

 

Monday, November 6, 2023

Misguided Moral Equivalence from the Kroc Institute

A few days ago, Notre Dame's Kroc Institute's published an"Open Letter for Peace" in the student newspaper, The Observer (October 30, 2023), stating that "[w]e are horrified by Hamas’ recent attack on Israel and the taking of hostages. We are appalled by Israel’s bombing of Gaza, which is killing, injuring, and displacing Palestinian civilians[.]" The Letter also noted, correctly, that "[i]nternational law prohibits the targeting of civilians."
 
More clarity and care were needed in the open letter.  No comparison can plausibly be drawn between, on the one hand, the gruesome October 7 terror-murders, rapes, and kidnappings by Hamas and, and on the other, Israel's lawful actions against the leaders and assets of a genocidal terrorist organization. Nothing -- nothing -- can justify or excuse the former. Hamas illegally and immorally targets civilians and uses human shields for propaganda purposes; Israel does not. The responsibility for the suffering of civilians in Gaza, and for the rape and torture of civilians in Israel, lies with Hamas, its sponsors, and its supporters.  It is very troubling to see -- especially on our campuses -- expressions not only of solidarity with Gazan civilians who are victimized by Hamas -- Hamas snipers are shooting civilians who try to evacuate -- but of support for Hamas itself, and its genocidal ambitions.
 
I was pleased, though, that the University's president, Fr. Jenkins, was a "founding supporter" of this strong letter about "moral clarity" in the war against Hamas.
 

Thursday, November 2, 2023

Garnett on 303 Creative and Public Accommodations Laws

I have an essay up -- "Protecting Equality or Correcting Thoughts?" -- at Law & Liberty on the 303 Creative case and some broader questions about the reach and aims of public-accommodations laws.  Here is a bit:

This is not the place for a detailed history of public-accommodations laws (a task which has been ably undertaken by Law & Liberty contributor, Prof. Adam MacLeod). It is worth emphasizing, though, that, over time, the aims and justifications of these rules have also evolved and expanded. At first, these laws’ focus and concern seemed to have been monopoly power, or the obligations that were thought to accompany a publicly conferred license, or business operations that occupied a kind of choke-point in the marketplace. When the availability of a room at the inn could make the difference between life and death, or cold and warmth, the right of the innkeeper to arbitrarily choose his clientele was expected, reasonably, to give way. Later, the Heart of Atlanta Court built on, and above, these earlier foundations, and emphasized that these laws, in addition to ensuring Black citizens’ access to interstate commerce and ability to travel freely throughout the country, “vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.”

Given the pervasive, persistent, and systemic nature of racial prejudice and discrimination, and the demeaning, insistent efforts of so many to resist the equality guarantees of the Civil War amendments, the Heart of Atlanta justices’ invocation of “personal dignity,” as well as market access, was welcome and warranted. In cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop and 303 Creative, though, the public-accommodations-enforcement project seems less about combatting monopoly, ensuring meaningful access to the commercial sphere, or vindicating equal-citizenship rights than about marginalizing, punishing, and re-educating those with at-present disfavored views on a few currently controversial questions.

Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting in Boy Scouts v. Dale, a case where the Court concluded that it would violate the First Amendment to use a public-accommodations law to require the Scouts to take on a “gay rights activist” as a scoutmaster, did not focus on Mr. Dale’s ability to access volunteer opportunities. Instead, he warned of the “atavistic opinions,” “nourished by sectarian doctrine,” that the Scouts’ policy was thought to reflect. He was confident that such opinions, which cause “serious and tangible harm,” could and should be changed through assiduous application of the state’s public-accommodation regulation. The assertedly reformative, rehabilitative effects of vigorous enforcement have also been invoked by Jack Phillips’s current opponents, who have as a stated aim “correct[ing] the errors of his thinking.”

This way of thinking about the ends of and warrant for public-accommodations laws is both deformed and dangerous. It is a dramatic overreach, and an unwelcome departure, for these laws to be used not to facilitate equal access to commerce and civil society but to punitively re-educate those with traditional, or now-disfavored, views about controversial questions.

Saturday, October 7, 2023

Lepanto

 

 

Thursday, October 5, 2023

Some good news in a sacred-sites case

The Becket Fund has the news, here, that the federal government has agreed to settle a sacred-sites case and "make efforts to restore the site by replanting trees, allowing the tribal members to rebuild a centuries-old stone altar, and recognizing historic Native American use of the site." Some church-state law professors filed an amicus brief in support of the tribes' position, which you can read here.

Tuesday, October 3, 2023

Garnett on Baylor, Title IX, institutional pluralism, and religious freedom

Along with Nathan Berkeley, I have a short piece up at National Review, about the ongoing campaign of some members of Congress against Baylor University.  Here, in a nutshell, is what's going on:

In a September 5 letter to the U.S. Department of Education, five members of Congress led by Representative Adam Schiff (along with Representatives Greg Casar, Joaquin Castro, Mark Takano, and Veronica Escobar) objected to “Baylor University’s claim to an exemption from Title IX’s regulations prohibiting sexual harassment . . .” and urged “the Department to clarify the narrow scope of this exemption.” Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in education programs that receive federal financial assistance.

In addition to calling for greater scrutiny of the scope of Baylor’s religious exemption, they also challenged the school’s fundamental eligibility for a Title IX exemption in light of allegations that “[Baylor] is no longer controlled by a religious organization.” The ideology driving this inquiry threatens Baylor’s religious freedom and that of many other religious institutions in America.

And, here is a bit of our take:

While showing genuine respect across differences must be a commitment we all make in our pluralistic society, people should not be able to use their identity to impose moral demands on the religious institutions they voluntarily enter into. And yet, that is precisely what Congressman Schiff and his colleagues are demanding on behalf of dissenting students.

Like so many American elites, these congressional representatives are so preoccupied with ensuring diversity within institutions that they fail to see the immense value in safeguarding diversity among institutions. Policy-makers should promote genuine pluralism within American higher education rather than using heavy-handed regulations to impose uniformity in this vital sector. In numerous ways, as one of us argued recently, our highly diverse society needs a diverse array of colleges and universities.

The mission of Baylor University is “to educate men and women for worldwide leadership and service by integrating academic excellence and Christian commitment within a caring community.” In a world increasingly awash with identity claims, Baylor’s identity matters, too.