Like Michael S., I am grateful to Jim Dwyer for participating in our MOJ discussion about children, education, freedom, poverty, and the state. A few thoughts:
First, I am confident that Jim is right to remind us that "a child is a human being ontologically separate from his or her parents and other family and community members." At the same time, just as there is a danger in "elid[ing] the distinction between child and parent," dangers also attend neglecting the extent to which children -- like all human beings -- are necessarily, inescapably, ontologically social. It seems to me that to be human -- and, to be a human child -- is to be rooted, connected, situated, dependent, and shaped by others, parents in particular. And, there is the fact that, when we are talking about children, we are *always* talking about the relative moral weight of the claims of parents and the state, respectively, to make decisions about children's education, welfare, and upbringing. To say that children are ontologically distinct from their parents -- as they surely are -- is not, it seems to me, to show that parents' moral claims are inferior to those of the state.
Second, I agree with Jim that "liberals" and "conservatives" alike need to take care -- and do not always take care -- that children not "drop out" of our discussions and arguments about social-welfare policy, and that we not permit concerns and claims about the treatment and rights of adults to serve as complete proxy for concerns and claims about the welfare and dignity of children. That said, I (continue to) disagree with Jim's view that conservatives' position in the voucher context (i.e., the pro-parental-choice position) is an example of this mistake. Yes, Jim is right that it is not children, but parents, who are choosing. But it is not, in my view, "oxymoronic" to think that, as between parents and the state, parents have a right to decide where their children should go to school. Someone -- parents or the state -- is going to decide. Jim's view, I know, is that even the parents' presumptive authorization to decide is not -- as I believe -- meaningfully prior to the state's decision to so authorize them. I suppose, this side of Heaven, we are not likely to convince each other on this point.
But, it seems to me that it is entirely consistent with the child-focused approach that Jim supports to conclude that children are better served by an education-policy regime that permits parents to select (and funds low-income parents' decision to select) of private, religious schools. (I have no objection to the regulation of such schools, in the interest of children's welfare, health, and educational success, so long as that regulation is consistent with an appropriate respect for the character, identity, and private-ness of the school.)
Finally, with respect to poverty programs, I think Jim raises an important and -- to me -- compelling point, namely, that our debates about the good and bad effects of poverty programs, and the incentives they create, cannot be limited to the effects on and incentives of adults. Now, this point does not necessarily undermine the "conservative" arguments about, say, the bad social effects of some social-welfare programs, e.g., that they create a culture of dependency, or create disincentives for marriage, and so on. After all, a culture of dependency and the creation of disincentives for marriage are -- conservatives believe -- bad for children, and not just adults. In any event, Jim is right that we all -- liberals and conservatives alike -- need to "apply ourselves to the task of doing everything" -- at least, everything that is plausible and actually helpful, and that does not wrong people who are affected -- "that can be done to help children in poverty have something approximately an equal opportunity in life."
But again, this strong point of Jim's seems to weigh heavily in favor of the "conservative" position regarding the state's effective monopoly on publicly funded education. As Jim knows, in the real world, the anti-voucher argument gets its political heft primarily from (a) the interests of (adult) unionized teachers and (b) (adults') objections to the possibility that public funds might support the educational mission of religious institutions and communities. A child-centered approach to education, it seems to me, would quickly lead us to school-choice and would thereby make progress in helping the vulnerable escape what Jim rightly calls the "hell of urban poverty."
Friday, August 11, 2006
Commenting on Tom Berg's post, a few weeks (?) ago, on CST and income-disparities, blogger Matthew Fish has this post, which includes an interesting chart of the "Gini coefficient," and also a link to a global map of income disparity. (Fish's blog, by the way, is full of thoughtful and interesting stuff.)
In this post, a blogger and college student named Dave Harris reacts to a recent MOJ post, and to the "Catholic Legal Theory" enterprise more generally. He is, to put it mildly, unimpressed. Here is a bit:
CLT definitely seems preferable to the legal theories of the radical evangelical right, but I'm not seeing any brilliant insights, either. Based on my (very limited) research, the key element of CLT seems to be "the dignity of the human person and respect for the common good." I'm all for that, as I've written before. I think it should be fairly uncontroversial that "community [i]s indispensable for human flourishing" and that "authentic freedom" is a good thing. " And I'm an atheist. Thus, I'm not sure what CLT has to add. . . .
Basically, it seems like the good elements of CLT can be found elsewhere, and forcing a distinctively Catholic element onto the ideas I've seen so far has seemed confusing and unproductive at best. That's not to say that they won't have anything interesting or useful to say as a result of their Catholicism. With a few exceptions like the Talmudic tradition and perhaps law itself, there aren't many systems of thought that have struggled more intensely or for a longer period of time with the nature of the law than the Church. In fact, I'd be surprised if Catholicism didn't have something useful to say on the subject, just as I'd be surprised if Buddhism's introspective tradition didn't have anything useful to say about psychology. Still, I'm confident that there are issues on which Catholic teachings are worthless and even dangerous, and people are going to have an extremely difficult time convincing me to adopt a particular position simply because a Catholic theologian or scholar supports it. . . .
And it's a conceit to believe that others--particularly experts and others that believe that they have access to a capital-T Truth that flatly contradicts Catholic teachings--don't understand their own affiars. Like I said earlier, it's quite likely that over the last 1500 years some Catholics have produced tremendously useful ideas that should be given more thought. I'm not going to reject an idea just because it's rooted in Catholic doctrine. But I don't think that people should accept them for that reason, either. And if the posts I looked through are any indication, there's a danger of that with CLT.
I'd be happy if someone can prove me wrong, though. I'm certainly not going to pretend to be an expert on something I hadn't heard of until several hours ago. Am I missing something?
So . . . is Harris missing something? Or, are we ("arrogant[ly]) wasting our time on "confusing and unproductive" repackaging? I'd welcome others' thoughts.
UPDATE: Another sharp critique of the MOJ project -- or, at least -- its execution, is here (scroll down).
UPDATE: Here is a response -- defending the CLT enterprise -- to Harris's post, by David Schraub.
Thursday, August 10, 2006
According to a new study by the Pew Research Center, "[d]espite talk of 'culture wars' and the high visibility of activist groups on both sides of the cultural divide, there has been no polarization of the public into liberal and conservative camps[.]" Hmmm.
UPDATE: Professor Joseph Knippenberg discusses, and critiques, the study here.
The Institute for Peace and Justice, at the University of San Diego (a Catholic university, with an excellent law school), is hosting Renato Raffaele Cardinal Martino later this month, to talk about "the global impact of the Church through its social teachings, especially in the pursuit of peace and justice." USD law professors Gail Heriot and Mike Rappaport, of the "Right Coast" blog, have posted some thoughts, critical of Cardinal Martino's statements in late 2003 to the effect that he felt "pity" and "compassion" for Saddam Hussein, when watching video of Hussein after his arrest. Professor Heriot writes:
At the time, it struck me as an ill-considered outburst. It's fine, even good, for all human beings to feel a visceral sympathy when they see a once-powerful dictator reduced to the level of Saddam Hussein that day. I certainly felt it. But for a Vatican official to make his public statement focus on that visceral reaction shows a lack of moral seriousness. The arrest of man responsible for the murder and torture of thousands is not an ideal occasion to get weepy-eyed over the sight of the once-mighty-turned-pathetic. Above all else, it's an occasion to thank God that he has been brought to justice (and that those who carried out the arrest were not hurt).
Professor Rappaport adds:
I fear that Gail is being too polite . . .. To express pity for Saddam Hussein, except as an afterthought, is to ignore the importance of justice. Whatever one thinks of the need for the Iraqi War, the capturing of Saddam Hussein must be regarded by all men of good will as one of the most important acts of justice in modern times. Sadly, mass killers have too rarely been subjected to punishment, avoiding their just desserts through suicide (Hitler), death under suspicious circumstances (Stalin), or usually natural causes. The humiliation of Saddam Hussein was a morally great thing. Not to recognize and feel it is to ignore the claims of his victims. It is an ugly thing. Perhaps one can feel pity for Cardinal Martino, but not (except as an afterthought) for Saddam.
It is an interesting question, I think, for lawyers interested in "Catholic legal theory": What constraints, if any, should our commitment to "justice" place on the cultivation, or the expression, of "pity" and "compassion" for those who commit great evils and whom we, in accord with the rule of law, prosecute punish? I take it as given -- even if I cannot pretend that I find it easy, or even possible, to really embrace the idea -- that even Saddam Hussein, because he is a human person, possesses the dignity that comes with being loved by, and created in the image of, God. I take it as given that this fact has implications for how he may be treated, notwithstanding the monstrous, depraved nature of his acts and character. That said, I think Professors Heriot and Rappaport are right to regret Cardinal Martino's statements. It is both appropriate, and important, it seems to me, to be pleased -- and for Church leaders to express pleasure -- when justice is done.
In a few days, our law schools will welcome a new first-year class. This essay, "To Beginning Law Students," by our own Patrick Brennan, is a great way for them, and us, to get ready.
