Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, September 21, 2006

More on McGreevy

Thanks to Michael for linking to John McGreevy's fascinating Commonweal piece, "Catholics, Democrats, and the GOP."  McGreevy's engaging and fair-minded presentation of "how we got here" -- that is, of Catholics' shifting place in the American political scene -- is very helpful to thinking through the "what do we do now?" question that Eduardo' piece (and my own post) address. 

Wednesday, September 20, 2006

Response to Eduardo

Thanks to Michael for linking to Eduardo’s piece in Commonweal.  At the risk of being thought by my friend Eduardo to be a “Republican partisan within the Church” or a “Republican Party apologist” – and making clear my view that faithful Catholics can, in good conscience and without being mere “apologist[s]” or “partisans,” disagree about how or for whom to vote – I have to say that I think Eduardo’s arguments are, in places, flawed.

Eduardo writes, “Republican partisans within the church have typically zeroed in on four controversial issues: gay marriage, euthanasia, stem-cell research, and abortion.”  This is, I suppose, “typically” true.  That said, a faithful Catholic might also believe that the Republican positions are strongly to be preferred on, for example, religious-freedom and education-reform questions.  (Indeed, the Church’s social teaching would seem to speak quite clearly on the question of school choice.)  Such a Catholic could easily conclude that an Executive Branch staffed by a Republican president, or a Congress in which Republicans hold the majority, is more likely to be friendly to religion in the public square and to, for example, conscience-based exemptions from general laws for religious believers and institutions.  Certainly, such a Catholic can (and should) regard the Democratic Party's position on school choice as inappropriately attentive to the narrow interests of teacher unions, and insufficiently attentive to social-justice concerns and low-income children's well-being.

Eduardo contends, “[o]n gay marriage, the parties don’t differ all that much; the Democratic Party’s most recent platform, for example, stops well short of endorsing homosexual nuptials.  On stem-cell research, Republicans generally oppose federal funding while Democrats typically support it, but there are dissenters in both parties, neither of which has called for its outright prohibition. Finally, physician-assisted suicide has been legalized in only one state and is more of a cultural bogeyman than a live political issue. That leaves abortion to do the heavy lifting for Republican activists who are trying to capture the Catholic vote.”  It seems clear to me, though, that morally questionable research is far more likely to be supported, and celebrated, if the Executive Branch is staffed by a Democratic President or if Democrats hold a majority in the Congress.  It is true that (thankfully) the euthanasia movement appears to have stalled but – as the recent dust-up involving the Attorney General’s effort to ban the lethal drug used in

Oregon

for euthanasia shows – this does not mean that there are not live end-of-life issues on which the two parties differ.

I do not believe it is the case that the “logic” of a Catholic who, given all the givens, supports Republicans – or, as Eduardo calls this person, a “Republican Party apologists” – is that “the issues where traditionally Democratic policy positions have tended to reflect church teaching-economic justice, the death penalty, war, environmental protection, and others-are issues for which the church’s positions are flexible, making policy disagreements permissible even among those who accept Catholic principles.”  That is, while such a Catholic probably does think that, on these matters (unlike abortion), the Church’s teaching calls for the exercise of prudential judgments, I doubt that he or she needs to concede that the Democratic policy positions on all these issues actually do reflect Catholic teaching more faithfully than do Republican policy positions.  (I am happy to concede, though, that they sometimes do, and sometimes have.)

Eduardo says that “certain aspects of the church’s just-war doctrine as well as what we are taught about the evil of poverty are . . . just as unambiguous as the condemnation of abortion” and that the “George/Bradley argument [for the priority of the abortion issue] would render irrelevant the entire breadth of the church’s social teaching.”  But, that the Church teaches poverty and unjust wars are evil does not, it seems to me, yield definitive answers on particular questions of policy (e.g., is this armed-conflict just?  Is this measure a good way of operationalizing our obligations to the poor?) in the way that the Church’s teaching on abortion does.  And, as we have discussed before, one might want to factor in the extent to which the Democratic Party, at present, tends to regard abortion as not only tolerable, but as necessarily connected to moral claims about autonomy, while the Republican Party, one might conclude, at least purports to endorse the idea that, say, armed conflicts must be morally justified.

With respect to President Bush’s alleged “failure to take extraordinary steps during his six years in office to put an immediate end to the slaughter” and the claim that his failure “makes him nearly as culpable as prochoice politicians,” I think I have, in other posts, explained as well as I can why the claim, in my view, is not very powerful.

Regarding judges:  Eduardo writes, “since abortion is a fundamental constitutional right protected by the courts, the election of antiabortion politicians is not likely to have a tremendous effect on the number of abortions performed. Even more tenuous is the argument that Catholics should vote Republican because Republicans will appoint antiabortion justices to the Supreme Court.”  This latter argument is, in my view, hardly tenuous.  The five Justices who will, we can expect, vote to uphold the ban on partial-birth abortion were appointed by Reagan or post-Reagan Justices (Republican presidents before Reagan never purported to be pro-life.)  Judges appointed to the federal courts (who are able, notwithstanding Roe and Casey, to improve the law by upholding reasonable regulations even under the undue-burden rule) by Republicans are far more likely to believe that abortion may be reasonably regulated.  More generally, I cannot accept the idea that, because the Democratic Party has made it an unmovable, foundational commitment that the Roe / Casey regime, which insulates abortion from democracy, must be preserved, pro-life Catholics should therefore vote for the Democratic Party, rather than for the Party that (Souter notwithstanding) is willing to take steps to ameliorate that regime.

With respect to Eduardo’s statement that “the Bush administration and Republicans in Congress have time and again made decisions that run directly counter to that teaching.”  Insofar as Eduardo is talking about the war in

Iraq

, it seems relevant that the Democratic Party did not oppose at the time, and even now does not oppose with one voice, that war.

On the treatment of detainees, I share Eduardo’s view that it is categorically immoral and unjustifiable to torture detained terror suspects.

I appreciate Eduardo’s recognition that, on questions of economic justice, “Catholic social teaching does not prescribe any one economic system or policy. Still, it does provide unambiguous guidance concerning the values by which economic decisions must be made, offering clear instructions as to which factors must be given the greatest weight.”  We agree that “intentions matter.”  That said, I believe that Eduardo is insufficiently open to the possibility that faithful Catholics, who are as informed about economics as he is and who endorse with no less sincerity than he does the preferential option for the poor, who are neither “incredibly naïve” nor “willfully blind”, to believe   really do believe that, on balance and all things considered, most “Republican” policies are better for the common good than most “Democratic ones.”  (That said, it seems to me that one would have to be “incredibly naïve” to think that the economic policies of the Clinton Administration were crafted – or that the policies of the Warner or H. Clinton Administration would be crafted -- always with an intention of operationalizing the preferential option for the poor.)   

Eduardo and I agree that “most Republicans are not racists” (neither are “most” Democratis).  This is one reason, of course, by the treatment by so many on the left of Justice Clarence Thomas is so offensive.  It is wrong to pander, as Republicans have done (and as Democrats have done in, for example, the

Newark

mayoral race or the

Louisiana

governor’s race, against Bobby Jindal), to voters’ racism.  It is not racist, though, to express doubts about, say, race-based affirmative action and it is, perhaps, quite cynical for Democrats to cast some Republicans’ doubts about affirmative action as reflecting racism.

With respect to environmental stewardship, I would note only that environmental policies involve cost-benefit analyses and trade-offs, and require us – no less than labor policy – to think about the impact of proposed regulations and taxes on the poor. 

Finally, we all agree that our votes ought not to reflect a “narrow fixation on abortion," or on anything else.  That said, and as the bishops have said clearly, we ought not to regard abortion as merely one issue among many, either.

Thanks to Eduardo for the provocative piece, which I regard as reflecting the decisionmaking of a faithful Catholic, and not merely the advocacy of a Democratic "partisan" or "apologist."

Monday, September 18, 2006

God's Politics

Beliefnet has set up a group blog, "God's Politics," named after Jim Wallis's recent book.  (Thanks to Commonweal for the tip.)  Here is Pope Benedict XVI, on a similar subject, in Deus caritas est:

The just ordering of society and the State is a central responsibility of politics. As Augustine once said, a State which is not governed according to justice would be just a bunch of thieves: “Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?”.[18] Fundamental to Christianity is the distinction between what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God (cf. Mt 22:21), in other words, the distinction between Church and State, or, as the Second Vatican Council puts it, the autonomy of the temporal sphere.[19] The State may not impose religion, yet it must guarantee religious freedom and harmony between the followers of different religions. For her part, the Church, as the social expression of Christian faith, has a proper independence and is structured on the basis of her faith as a community which the State must recognize. The two spheres are distinct, yet always interrelated.

Justice is both the aim and the intrinsic criterion of all politics. Politics is more than a mere mechanism for defining the rules of public life: its origin and its goal are found in justice, which by its very nature has to do with ethics. The State must inevitably face the question of how justice can be achieved here and now. But this presupposes an even more radical question: what is justice? The problem is one of practical reason; but if reason is to be exercised properly, it must undergo constant purification, since it can never be completely free of the danger of a certain ethical blindness caused by the dazzling effect of power and special interests.

Here politics and faith meet. Faith by its specific nature is an encounter with the living God—an encounter opening up new horizons extending beyond the sphere of reason. But it is also a purifying force for reason itself. From God's standpoint, faith liberates reason from its blind spots and therefore helps it to be ever more fully itself. Faith enables reason to do its work more effectively and to see its proper object more clearly. This is where Catholic social doctrine has its place: it has no intention of giving the Church power over the State. Even less is it an attempt to impose on those who do not share the faith ways of thinking and modes of conduct proper to faith. Its aim is simply to help purify reason and to contribute, here and now, to the acknowledgment and attainment of what is just.

The Church's social teaching argues on the basis of reason and natural law, namely, on the basis of what is in accord with the nature of every human being. It recognizes that it is not the Church's responsibility to make this teaching prevail in political life. Rather, the Church wishes to help form consciences in political life and to stimulate greater insight into the authentic requirements of justice as well as greater readiness to act accordingly, even when this might involve conflict with situations of personal interest. Building a just social and civil order, wherein each person receives what is his or her due, is an essential task which every generation must take up anew. As a political task, this cannot be the Church's immediate responsibility. Yet, since it is also a most important human responsibility, the Church is duty-bound to offer, through the purification of reason and through ethical formation, her own specific contribution towards understanding the requirements of justice and achieving them politically.

The Church cannot and must not take upon herself the political battle to bring about the most just society possible. She cannot and must not replace the State. Yet at the same time she cannot and must not remain on the sidelines in the fight for justice. She has to play her part through rational argument and she has to reawaken the spiritual energy without which justice, which always demands sacrifice, cannot prevail and prosper. A just society must be the achievement of politics, not of the Church. Yet the promotion of justice through efforts to bring about openness of mind and will to the demands of the common good is something which concerns the Church deeply.

A creative solution to church closings?

A few months ago, I had an op-ed in USA Today in which I discussed the civil-society and urban-health effects of closing Catholic schools, hospitals, and parishes.  This piece, from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, describes one pastor's solution: 

Between Saturday night and Sunday evening, the former St. Elizabeth Church in the Strip District transforms like a theater set between acts -- from The Altar Bar nightclub to the Steel City Church. It's the mission of a 31-year-old pastor who offers a new take on what the Christian life, and nightlife, can be.

The Steel City Church held its first service Sunday for about 250 people. Earlier in the day, the pastor, Damian Williams, and his wife, Anne Williams, carried sofas and chairs from the wings and configured them around an empty dance floor for the 6 p.m. service. It was a cross between coffee house and talk show, with a rolling video presentation and food.

Law & Economics in utopias

Law prof Nate Oman has a very interesting post up over at "Times & Seasons" (which is an LDS group blog), about property rights and idealistic communities, called "Law & Economics in Zion."

Perry in Mississippi

Our own Michael Perry will be presenting a paper, "May Religion Serve as a Basis of Political Decision-Making in the United States?," at the Mississippi College of Law on September 22, at 11:30 a.m.  Click here for more information.  Joining Michael, and presenting a paper called "Taking Religion Seriously in Law and Religion," is Professor Mark Modak-Truran.  After the talks, fill up a plate at Sonny's.

Sunday, September 17, 2006

Brady on Religious Group Autonomy (again)

As has been noted before on this blog, Kathleen Brady has a new paper, "Religious Group Autonomy:  Further Reflections about What is at Stake", on SSRN.  I re-read it, flying back from Villanova, and was struck again by how much it "moves the ball" on the relevant questions.  She contends that freedom for religious organizations is "appropriate [not simply] because . . . [the] social benefits outweigh the costs."

Rather, freedom is important because we do not now and, indeed, never will have a complete understanding of what is socially beneficial and what is harmful (at least this side of the eschaton). Our understanding of which ideas and forms of life are truly progressive is always imperfect and in the process of development. Autonomy for religious groups is essential because these groups are an important source of alternative ideas that make development and improvement possible.

I agree.  It strikes me that Kathy's last sentence is true not only because these groups are a "source" of alternative ideas, but also because, by virtue of their freedom, they play a structural, pluralism-guarding role, and enhance the ability of other entities and persons to develop and propose such ideas.

Amy's paper at Villanova

Patrick blogs, below, about the recent conference at Villanova on Pope Benedict and the re-evangelization of law, politics, and culture.  Congratulations to Patrick, and to his Villanova colleagues, for arranging what was, for me, an inspiring and instructive conference. 

Patrick notes that our fellow blogger, Amy Uelmen, presented a paper, "Reconciling Evangelization and Dialogue Through Love of Neighbor in Law, Politics, and Culture," which -- as Patrick reports -- "offered a searching account of how Benedict's call to social charity consists with the true message of Dominus Iesus about the unicity of salvation through Christ."  Like everything Amy writes, the paper was generous, thoughtful, charitable (as in, full of "charity"), inspiring, and challenging.  And, it now appears, it could not have been more timely. 

I've been thinking a lot about what she said, about love, dialogue, and witness, as I sort through all the news and comment about the Pope's recent speech and the reactions to it.  I hope she'll post it somewhere soon!

Cole on Benedict on Islam

At Michael's suggestion, I read Juan Cole's "Pope Gets it Wrong" essay.  Of course, I am not a historian.  Still, for what it's worth, it does not seem to me that Cole really engages, let alone refutes, the Pope's speech.  Assuming that, as Cole reports, Benedict was mistaken about the timing of "Surah 2" with respect to Muhammad's time in power, I still do not see how the Pope's speech itself -- which struck me, again, as learned, charitable, sincere, and important -- warrants an apology, or "better advisors."  And, I still think that it is the overreaction to the speech -- and the reactions to the overreaction to the speech -- that are troubling, not the speech.

By the way, I do not think this matter takes us off our blog's "Catholic legal theory" focus.  I take it that prominent in any Catholic legal theory will have to be a confidence in reason and its capacity to apprehend truths -- truths about who we are, what we are for, and even who God is.  It seems to me that the point of the Pope's speech was to re-assert this confidence, and call others to it. 

Checking back on Cole's blog, after thinking about his post on Benedict's speech, I came across this post, in which Cole contends that the "sensitivities" which, apparently, the Pope has ruffled by using a half-millennium-old quote in an academic speech, are "a feature of postcolonialism."

Muslims were colonized by Western powers, often for centuries, and all that period they were told that their religion was inferior and barbaric. They are independent now, though often they have gained independence only a couple of generations (less if you consider neocolonialism). As independent, they are finally liberated to protest when Westerners put them down.

An interesting take.  How, I wonder, does the Siege of Vienna, or the Battle of Lepanto fit in?  Or, the murder of Sr. Leonella Sgorbati, in front of a children's hospital in Somalia?

Cole also advises the Pope, saying ""[a]ll he has to do is quote Vatican II on Islam, which is still Catholic doctrine last I knew, and the whole issue would blow over."  Not likely, I'm afraid.  But, we can hope.

Saturday, September 16, 2006

The Pope's speech

A number of us have noted the Pope's (rich, learned, and very important) speech at Regensburg, and the angry reactions of some -- or, it appears, quite a few -- Muslims to it. 

It seems to me, for what it's worth, that what is far more striking (and depressing) about the situation is not the Pope's possible "insensitivity" in using the 14th century quotation that he did but the terrifyingly infantile reaction by -- apparently -- so many to that quotation, and (as Rob notes) the numbingly obtuse reporting on the situation by our leading media outlets. 

People are, I understand, burning the Pope in effigy and, yet again, threatening violence, because they cannot be bothered to read his speech with even marginal attentiveness and maturity, and, somehow, it's (yet again) the Pope who is the bad guy and expected to apologize?  This is, I fear, a very bad situation.