Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, September 28, 2006

Urban Tragedy

Michael J. Petrilli writes, on National Review Online, about the tragedy of urban Catholic schools closing.  As he suggests, it is not these urban schools that need closing.

The closures have little to do with the quality of education that these schools provide. Two decades of studies have shown them to be effective, especially for poor and minority children. Rather, broader demographic trends are to blame. Simply put, most Catholics have left the urban core for homes in the leafy suburbs, and urban parishes have dried up in their wake. No parishes, no parish subsidies, no parish schools — yet thousands of needy children remain downtown. On top of that, the schools’ pipeline of affordable teachers has run dry. Once upon a time, most Catholic-school instructors were members of religious orders, requiring little or no cash compensation; now there are more nuns over age 90 than under age 50 in the U.S., and only five percent of the schools’ teachers come from religious orders. Lay teachers must be paid a decent wage, pushing Catholic-school tuitions out of reach for many poor families.

Meanwhile, in some of the same poor neighborhoods where effective Catholic schools are getting the axe, failing public schools remain open, seemingly resistant to reform.

Wasn’t the “accountability movement” supposed to change that?

In a similar vein, I wrote, in this USA Today op-ed:

We might well sympathize with those for whom the closing of a parish is painful because of family memories or ethnic traditions, or those who must now find a new school. And maybe we regret the loss of a few older, attractive buildings. In the end, though, why shouldn't the reaction of outsiders simply be, "Oh well, that's life"?

Why should we care?

For starters, urban Catholic schools and their teachers do heroic work in providing education, hope, safety, opportunity and values to vulnerable and marginalized children of all religions, ethnicities and backgrounds. Similarly, Catholic hospitals have long cared for underserved and disadvantaged people in both urban and rural areas, and helped to fill glaring gaps in the availability of health care. It is too easy to take for granted these and similar contributions to the common good. We should remember that, as these institutions fold, the burdens on and challenges to public ones will increase.

We might also care about the closings for slightly more abstract but no less important reasons. In a nutshell: It is important to a free society that non-government institutions thrive. Such institutions enrich and diversify what we call "civil society." They are like bridges and buffers that mediate between the individual and the state. They are the necessary infrastructure for communities and relationships in which loyalties and values are formed and passed on and where persons develop and flourish.

Catholics and non-Catholics alike can appreciate the crucial role that these increasingly vulnerable "mediating associations" play in the lives of our cities. Harvard University Professor Robert Putnam and others have emphasized the importance of "social capital," both to the health of political communities and to the development of engaged citizens. In America's cities, it has long been true that neighborhood churches and schools have provided and nurtured this social capital by serving as places where connections and bonds of trust are formed and strengthened. As Joel Kotkin writes in his recent book, The City: A Global History, healthy cities are and must be "sacred, safe and busy." If he is right, Catholic parishes, schools and hospitals help make America's cities great.

Cities and civilization

A great quote:

[C]ivilization . .  . is achieved because city dwellers . . . have smoothed the edges of private desire so as to fit, or at least work in with all the other city dwellers, without undue abrasion, without sharp edges forever nicking and wounding, each refining an individual capacity for those thousands of daily, instantaneous negotiations that keep crowded city life from being a constant brawl or ceaseless showing match.  When a city dweller has achieved that truly heightened sensitivity to others that allows for easy access, for self and others, through the clogged thoroughfares of urban existence, we call that smoothness urbane. . . . Through the several millennia of our Western culture, to be urbane has been a term of high praise precisely because cities are such difficult environments to make work.

-                     Bart Giamatti

Samuelson on income inequality

Here is Robert Samuelson, on "Our Growing Inequality Problems."  Here's a bit:

[T]he annual numbers are less important in addressing the trickle-up question than long-term trends. Here are three that I think matter.

Living standards aren't stagnating. Over any realistic period -- say a decade -- they've risen for almost everyone. From 1992 to 2002, ownership of microwave ovens by the poorest tenth of Americans went from 39 percent to 77 percent, reports one Census Bureau study. VCRs went from 22 percent to 56 percent, computers from 4 percent to 21 percent. Households, when adjusted for their size, uniformly have higher incomes. From 1995 to 2005, the median income of four-person households rose 10.5 percent to $69,605; for three-person households, the increase was 9.6 percent to $58,917. These are real gains, though modest.

The rich are getting an ever-bigger piece of the economic pie. In 2005, the richest 5 percent of households (average pretax income: $281,155) had 22.2 percent of total income, reports the Census. In 1990, the share was 18.5 percent; in 1980, 16.5 percent. These figures exclude capital gains -- profits on stocks and other assets -- that have most benefited the richest 1 percent. With capital gains, their pretax income averaged about $1 million in 2003. That was about 20 times the average income of households in the middle of the economic distribution. In 1979, the ratio was 10 to 1.

The inflow of poor Hispanic immigrants, along with their (often) American-born children, has increased poverty. From 1995 to 2005, the rise in the number of Hispanics in poverty -- by 794,000 -- more than accounted for the entire increase in the U.S. poverty population. Poverty among blacks, though still high, declined. Among non-Hispanic whites, it held roughly steady. Health-insurance coverage has also been affected. Since 1995, Hispanics account for about 78 percent of the increase in the uninsured.

The bottom line: Productivity gains (improvements in efficiency) are going disproportionately to those at the top. We do not really understand why. Globalization, weaker unions, increasingly skilled jobs, the frozen minimum wage and the "winner-take-all society'' (CEOs, sports stars and movie celebrities getting big payouts) have all been cited as reasons. Costly employer-provided health insurance is also squeezing take-home pay in the middle.

What might government do? The Bush administration's enthusiasm for tax cuts for the rich could be tempered; to reduce the budget deficit, their taxes could be raised without dulling economic incentives. (For the record: I supported the first Bush tax cut and opposed his cuts on capital gains and dividends.) Equally, liberals and others who support lax immigration policies across our Southern border should understand that these policies deepen U.S. inequality.

But many familiar proposals would be mostly symbolic or hurtful. Raising the minimum wage might directly affect only about 5 percent of workers and might destroy some jobs. Protectionism might save a few well-paid jobs but would inflict higher prices on those least able to afford them. Still, no one should be happy with today's growing economic inequality. It threatens America's social compact, which depends on a shared sense of well-being.

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Socrates or Muhammad?

One of the better things I've read, I think, about Pope Benedict's Regensburg speech is this essay, "Socrates or Muhammad?," by Lee Harris.  A taste:

On September 12, Pope Benedict XVI delivered an astonishing speech at the Uni versity of Regensburg. Entitled "Faith, Reason, and the University," it has been widely discussed, but far less widely understood. . . .

Benedict . . . is not issuing a contemporary Syllabus of Errors. Instead, he is asking those in the West who "share the responsi bility for the right use of reason" to return to the kind of self-critical examination of their own beliefs that was the hallmark of ancient Greek thought at its best. The spirit that animates Benedict's address is not the spirit of Pius IX; it is the spirit of Socrates. Benedict is inviting all of us to ask ourselves, Do we really know what we are talking about when we talk about faith, reason, God, and community? . . .

Let us begin by taking seriously Benedict's claim that in his address he is attempting to sketch, in a rough outline, "a critique of modern reason from within." He is not using his authority as the Roman pontiff to attack modern reason from the point of view of the Church. His approach is not dogmatic; it is dialectical. He stands before his learned audience not as the

pope, but simply as Joseph Ratzinger, an intelligent and thoughtful man, who makes no claims to any privileged cognitive authority. He has come, like Socrates, not to preach or sermonize, but to challenge with questions.

Ratzinger is troubled that most educated people today appear to think that they know what they are talking about, even when they are talking about very difficult things, like reason and faith. Reason, they think, is modern reason. But, as Ratzinger notes, modern reason is a far more limited and narrow concept than the Greek notion of reason. The Greeks felt that they could reason about anything and everything--about the immortality of the soul, metempsychosis, the nature of God, the role of reason in the universe, and so on. Modern reason, from the time of Kant, has repudiated this kind of wild speculative reason. For modern reason, there is no point in even asking such questions, because there is no way of answering them scientifically. Modern reason, after Kant, became identified with what modern science does. Modern science uses mathematics and the empirical method to discover truths about which we can all be certain: Such truths are called scientific truths. It is the business of modern reason to severely limit its activity to the discovery of such truths, and to refrain from pure speculation.

Ratzinger, it must be stressed, has no trouble with the truths revealed by modern science. He welcomes them. He has no argument with Darwin or Einstein or Heisenberg. What disturbs him is the assumption that scientific reason is the only form of reason, and that whatever is not scientifically provable lies outside the universe of reason. According to Ratzinger, the results of this "modern self-limitation of reason" are twofold. First, "the human sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology, and philosophy, attempt to conform themselves to this canon of scientificity." Second, "by its very nature [the scientific] method excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question." . . .

Modern reason argues that questions of ethics, of religion, and of God are outside its compass. Because there is no scientific method by which such questions can be answered, modern reason cannot concern itself with them, nor should it try to. From the point of view of modern reason, all religious faiths are equally irrational, all systems of ethics equally unverifiable, all concepts of God equally beyond rational criticism. But if this is the case, then what can modern reason say when it is confronted by a God who commands that his followers should use violence and even the threat of death in order to convert unbelievers?

If modern reason cannot concern itself with the question of God, then it cannot argue that a God who commands jihad is better or worse than a God who commands us not to use violence to impose our religious views on others. To the modern atheist, both Gods are equally figments of the imagination, in which case it would be ludicrous to discuss their relative merits. The proponent of modern reason, therefore, could not possibly think of participating in a dialogue on whether Christianity or Islam is the more reasonable religion, since, for him, the very notion of a "reasonable religion" is a contradiction in terms.

Ratzinger wishes to challenge this notion, not from the point of view of a committed Christian, but from the point of view of modern reason itself. . . .

In his moving and heroic speech, Joseph Ratzinger has chosen to play the part of Socrates, not giving us dogmatic answers, but stinging us with provocative questions. Shall we abandon the lofty and noble conception of reason for which Socrates gave his life? Shall we delude ourselves into thinking that the life of reason can survive without courage and character? Shall we be content with lives we refuse to examine, because such examination requires us to ask questions for which science can give no definite answer? The destiny of reason will be determined by how we in the modern West answer these questions.

Maritain

The Weekly Standard this week includes a nice review by Edward Short of Jean-Luc Barre's book on Jacques and Raissa Maritain, "Beggars for Heaven."  Unfortunately, the full review requires a subscription.  Here's a bit:

Not long ago I met a young woman who is studying philosophy at Stanford, and when I told her I was reading a new biography of Jacques Maritain, she said she had never heard of him.

That the greatest Catholic philosopher of the 20th century should now be unknown on the very campuses where, just a generation ago, he was universally read and admired, is profoundly disheartening. The fact that he has been jettisoned from the curriculum to make room for the nominalism of Michel Foucault speaks volumes about the intellectual defeatism that holds sway over our academic elites. This biography, by the French journalist-historian Jean-Luc Barré, should help revive interest in the work of a man who still rewards study. . . .

After the war, Maritain served as de Gaulle's ambassador to the Vatican. Ronald Knox, the English Catholic convert, once advised that "He who travels in the barque of St. Peter had better not look too closely into the engine room." Maritain saw altogether too much of the engine room and concluded that "Catholics are not Catholicism. The mistakes, the clumsiness, the inefficiencies, the lack of concern of Catholics do not involve Catholicism itself. It is not the responsibility of Catholicism to furnish an alibi for the shortcomings of Catholics."

When Maritain returned to Paris after the Second World War and found that he was practically forgotten, he received a letter from his fellow Thomist, Etienne Gilson, who took the liberty of advising his old friend on what Samuel Johnson once referred to as "the justice of posterity."

"Whether you realize it or not, you are great," Gilson told him, "and this is something for which you will never be forgiven." Gilson continued: "Go on with your work, which is irreplaceable, and don't worry about anything; the rest is of no account." Judging from what Maritain once said about his own mission, it is probable that Gilson's advice did not go unheeded. "I feel like a man walking on a slippery slope," he said, "carrying a very heavy weight in his arms. He must beware of the slightest misstep. What can one do? When it is a question of God's grace, one can only close one's eyes and let it work."

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Fighting the hypothetical?

With respect to Eduardo's recent question:

Let's assume for the sake of argument that the actual numbers of abortions under a system of legal prohibition would not drop significantly but would simply move underground . . . .  Let's also assume that these proposals by the Democrats would cause a substantial drop in the actual number of abortions.  Setting aside questions concerning the morality of contraception . . . , would that be a reason to favor the Democratic position on abortion over the Republican position? 

In my response, I don't think that I -- in Eduardo's words -- decided to fight the hypothetical.  Instead, I think I responded to Eduardo's other question:   "[I]f you favor the Republican position, is it because you think the assumptions are implausible or is it for some other reason?"  As I tried to explain, I do think the assumptions are implausible.

In any event, though, Eduardo invites us, again, to consider a "fairly narrow question about morality and law," namely, whether "abortion must be illegal, irrespective of the consequences of that prohibition."

Now, Eduardo and I (and Murray and St. Thomas!) agree that not all immoral conduct need be, or should be, illegal.  It is immoral, I assume, to relish in one's mind delicious revenge against one's enemies, but only a monstrous legal regime would make such relishing illegal.  It is wrong to engage in cruel and hateful speech, but we do not -- and should not -- outlaw such speech.  It is wrong to cheat on one's spouse, but no one should go to jail for it.  And so on.

Eduardo and I agree that abortion is immoral.  So, should it be illegal?  Or, to refine the question slightly, "how important is it that abortion be illegal, if its incidence can be reduced substantially by means other than regulation"?

For starters, I have to say that Roe and Casey should be opposed, and overruled -- that is, it should be, again, permissible to regulate abortion -- for reasons independent of abortion's immorality.  They are bad constitutional law, and the fact that these mistakes are more likely to be fixed (though, obviously, not certain to be fixed) by judges appointed by Republicans is a strong reason to prefer Republicans.  That said . . .

I tend to think that it is not enough (though it is a very good thing!) to reduce the number of abortions, while maintaining a legal regime that permits -- let alone funds and constitutionalizes -- it.  Conceding that there are real and important limits to legal moralism, it does seem to me that for a political community to fail to protect innocent unborn children from lethal violence -- that is, to single them out for non-protection -- on the ground that to protect them would violate adults' liberty to "define one’s own concept of existence, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life" is to choose, in a fundamental, defacing, and corrupting way, injustice over justice.  So, I'm hesitant to frame the task of choosing between the two parties' approaches solely in terms of the approaches' predicted effects on the number of abortions.  (This is not to say, I think, the consequences of prohibition are irrelevant to the "should we regulate?" question.)

Graham Greene's Catholicism

An interesting read about a great writer.  (Thanks to Amy Welborn for the link).

A letter to a tenured professor

In Books & Culture, Andy Crouch writes back to Edward Wilson.  Crouch has written about evangelicals and environmentalism.  Wilson, as readers probably know, has a new book, which takes the form of a letter, urging greater attention to urgent environmental issues, to a fictional minister.

"Torture Is always Wrong"

Law prof Paul Campos (Colorado) explains:

Torture is wrong. It is always wrong, at all times, in all places, no matter what good one imagines might come from torturing a fellow human being.

It is wrong because to torture a fellow human being destroys the torturer's own soul as surely as it destroys the body and mind of his victim.

Here is a basic truth, understood by all religions and peoples who have not yet sunk into total barbarism: Mortality is only possible if there are certain things we must refuse to do under any circumstances. You do not "balance" the costs and benefits of torturing your fellow men, because it does not profit a man to gain the world if he loses his soul.

UPDATE:  "Five Reasons Torture Is Always Wrong," from Christianity Today.

The Pope, Islam, and reciprocity

Thanks to Michael for linking to the Commonweal interview with Fr. Madigan.  At one point, discussing the issue of "reciprocity," Fr. Madigan says:

There are many calls in Europe to restrict the rights of Muslim citizens and immigrants until full and equal rights are accorded Christians in Muslim majority countries-Saudi Arabia is the case usually cited. Some commentators have interpreted the Holy See’s recent references to reciprocity as a concern and a demand for reciprocal rights as a condition of further dialogue, and an encouragement for Western governments to use Muslim citizens’ rights and freedoms as leverage to achieve reforms.

Such a strategy can be reconciled neither with the gospel nor with explicit Catholic teaching about the basis of religious freedom being rooted in the dignity of each person.

This seems quite right to me.  That is, the fact (and, unfortunately, it is a fact) that few Muslim nations accord anything like religious freedom to their citizens certainly would not justify Western nations violating the human-dignity-grounded religious freedom of Muslims living in those nations.  It is worth making clear, though, that neither the Pope nor the Holy See has ever suggested that such violations would or could be justified.  Instead, the Pope and the Holy See have -- quite rightly, in my view -- challenged Muslim nations, and urged all of us to challenge Muslim nations, to respect the human rights of their citizens (Muslim and non-Muslim alike).  Fr. Madigan is right to note that we should not demand reciprocity as a "condition" for dialogue; that said, we should, I think, continue to make clear our view that this dialogue is less likely to be productive if Muslim nations fail to respect their citizens' religious freedom.