Damon Linker has an article on Gov. Romney’s religion (“The Big Test: Taking Religion Seriously”), and why we should worry about it, in the Jan. 1-15, 2007 issue of The New
Republic
.
Although I was quite underwhelmed, and put off, by Linker’s overheated and parricidal book, The Theocons, and think that his recent writing about things Catholic and relating to Pope Benedict XVI has missed the mark, I think, with respect to Romney's religion, he has a point. (Though not, perhaps, the point he intends to make.)
Linker's argument, in a nutshell -- which is also spelled out in this on-line debate between him and Richard Lyman Bushman -- is that treating Mormonism and Gov. Romney's embrace of that faith with the seriousness they deserve requires us to take seriously, and worry about, the claim that Mormonism does not have the doctrinal and traditional resources capable of supporting and sustaining (what Linker believes is) the necessary wall between a Mormon political leader’s own "conscience” and “church policy.”
Now, I do not know if Linker is right, i.e., that Mormonism in fact lacks these resources. My take on Linker's writing about Catholicism makes me skeptical about his claims with respect to Mormonism. I note that Richard Lyman Bushman insists, in his online debate with Linker, that, in fact, “Mitt Romney's insistence that he will follow his own conscience rather than church dictates is not only a personal view; it is church policy.”
In any event -- I do think, though, that those of Linker's critics who are objecting to arguments like his on the ground that Romney's religion is "private" are also missing the boat. As David Bell writes, in this post from "The Open University":
The modern notion of religion as a purely private matter demands a literal suspension of belief: the burden is on the believer to reject, or at least ignore, those elements of her faith that might lead her to violate the laws and norms of modern secular society.
In modern society, it is not at all "prejudice" to demand that politicians shoulder this burden.
Or, I would say, it is perfectly appropriate to expect a religious believer to explain that, and why, the claims and commitments entailed in her religious profession are superior, and more worthy, than the "laws and norms of modern secular society." (There is no reason, that is, to rule out of court religiously grounded challenges -- which may or may not convince -- to modern secular society.)
Those, like Linker, who want to raise concerns about Romney's Mormonism have an obligation, of course, to do so fairly, to not traffick in stereotypes, and to get that Mormonism right. (And, unfortunately, there are good reasons to doubt the abilities of the press and commentariat when it comes to "getting religion.") They also, it seems to me, need to concede, and not lash out against, analogous expressions of concern about, say, the political import of other, non-Mormon politicians' professed religions, and even about the political import of a hypothetical candidate's professed commitment to, say, reductionist materialism. Couldn't we worry about whether someone who looks at the world the way, say, Daniel Dennett does, might also be shaped by a tradition or worldview that lacks the real ability (see, e.g., Michael Perry's work) to support and sustain human-rights commitments?
A final, quick gripe about the Linker piece. He writes – distinguishing concerns he thinks are justified with respect to Mormons from those that might be harbored about Jews or Catholics – that “[u]nder modern conditions, some religions [including “post-Vatican II” Catholics] have spawned liberal traditions that treat faith primarily as a repository of moral wisdom instead of as a source of absolute truth.” But, of course, nothing done or said at the Second Vatican Council involved a reduction of the Christian faith to “a repository of moral wisdom,” nor does the view that Christ has revealed – and, indeed, is – “absolute truth” entail the view that the Church or the faith supply “absolute[ly] tru[e]” answers to policy and political questions.
Richard Woodward has a thoughtful piece, at OpinionJournal, about the video of Saddam Hussein's execution. Here is a bit:
[I]n everything from the partisan chants of Shiite bystanders to the grainy, low-lighted jumpiness of the footage and the horror-movie ski masks of the executioners, the video images of the execution contradict the fragile message that a secure and democratic government is in charge, rendering justice to someone who deserves to die.
The intention of the U.S. in putting Saddam in the dock for crimes against humanity was to demonstrate the rule of law, a process he never followed while in power. . . .
In less than three minutes, the video undid that deliberate process. Saddam will now be frozen in time looking like a tested leader--angry but resigned to his fate--while the Iraqi government is seen hurrying to complete its nasty business before the new year.
With respect to the question of executing Hussein: Although I try to oppose capital punishment, I agree with many of the points Steve Bainbridge made recently in this post. Still, Woodward seems to be onto something: The morality of an execution, it seems to me, is not unrelated to the plausibility of the claim that this particular government action is capable of meaningfully serving as an instrument or vehicle for justified retribution. Having read about -- and also watched -- the video of Hussein's execution, I'm not sure this claim is all that plausible in this case.
In answer to Michael's question, and -- I suspect -- agreeing with him, it does not seem possible to me to deny that treatment of the kind alleged by Padilla's lawyers is immoral -- horrifyingly so, in fact.
Monday, January 1, 2007
What is "freedom"? What does it mean for freedom to be "authentic"? What is the relationship between "freedom" and "liberty"? And so on. All questions of interest to those working to understand and expound "Catholic legal theory." So, check out this review, by Gary Rosen, of Charles Fried's new book, "Modern Liberty and the Limits of Government". Here's a bit:
As Fried sees it, the free development of individuals, choosing and judging by their own lights, must “come first” as a social and political priority. Much as we might talk about other public goals — virtue, equality, national glory — they all amount in the end to mere metaphors, especially as compared with the “rock-bottom, indigestible fact” of our “lonely individuality.” To capture this idea of personal liberty, and to give it some normative force, Fried asks us to imagine ourselves surrounded by a protective “bubble” of rights, carefully negotiating the terms of every relationship and attachment. This, he writes, is the “moral space” we inhabit, and no one may “trespass upon it” without wronging us. . . .
. . . Fried tends to press his philosophical claims too far, especially in asserting the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the sovereign individual. His hyperrational Mr. Bubble is a theorist’s fiction. No one’s life really takes shape so antiseptically, without unchosen attachments and the habits of mind imprinted by family, friends and nation.
NRO has gathered some short posts -- including one by me -- by Catholics in response to the characterization, by a spokesman for the Holy See, of Saddam's execution as "tragic." Those of Fr. Williams and Prof. Brugger strike me as particularly worth reading.
