New, "four-dimensional" pictures of unborn children in the womb:
Thursday, January 18, 2007
Wow!
Bigotry and Romney, again
I blogged a few days ago ("Taking Religion Seriously") about Damon Linker's suggestion that Americans may and should be concerned about Gov. Romney's religion when they consider his candidacy for President. I expressed the view that we should not be too quick to respond to argument's like Linker's with the objection that such arguments are out of bounds because religion is "private":
I am sure that, in many quarters, conversations about Romney's religion (or, to go back a few months, then-Judge Roberts's Catholicism) are distorted by inaccurate understandings of Mormonism, or plain prejudice. This is unfortunate. That said, it strikes me that the response of religious believers to questions like Linkers' should not be to insist that religious beliefs are "private," and therefore irrelevant to public life. An appropriate respect for religious freedom and individual conscience does not require us -- those of us who profess religious beliefs and those who do not -- to act as if religious commitments lack content and have no implications for believers’ actions and policies. What exactly these implications are is something that, it seems to me, believers and non-believers alike should think hard -- and fairly and honestly -- about.
Consider, now, this recent op-ed by Hugh Hewitt ("The New New Bigotry"). Certainly, bigotry towards and ignorance about Mormons is widespread, and certainly many past and future objections to Romney's traffic in that bigotry and ignorance. Still, I continue to think it is important to focus on (a) getting religious politicians' beliefs and commitments right, i.e., stating them fairly, and (b) thinking charitably and reasonably about the implications of those beliefs for public service. I continue to think it might be a mistake to jump too quickly from arguments that focus fairly on these matters to (i) accusations of bigotry or (ii) assertions that candidates' religious views are private and therefore irrelevant to the merits of their candidacies.
Marriage and consent to search
Here's an interesting case, United States v. Buckner:
Frank Gary Buckner appeals from an order denying his motion to suppress evidence gathered from password-protected files on the hard drive of a computer police seized from his home. The officers seized and searched the computer, without a warrant, on the basis of oral consent granted by Buckner’s wife, Michelle. On appeal, Buckner contends that although Michelle’s consent sufficed to give the officers permission to search the computer itself, her consent could not extend to his password-protected files. Because Michelle Buckner did have apparent authority to consent to the search of these files, we affirm. Nowhere in the court's analysis of the question whether Michelle Buckner had authority (actual or apparent) to consent does the question arise whether the fact that she is his wife supplies that authority. That is, the court treats the case like any other third-party-consent case. I wonder -- putting aside the in's and out's of Fourth Amendment doctrine -- what we should think of this. What does the court's silence say, or teach, about marriage?
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Happy Religious Freedom Day!
I just made it. Here is a blurb from the President's proclamation:
On Religious Freedom Day, we commemorate the passage of the 1786 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, authored by Thomas Jefferson, and we celebrate the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom.
You know, not to be a crank, but I would much prefer pegging "religious freedom" day to someone other than Thomas Jefferson. How about -- oh, I don't know -- January 28, the day on which it is said that Emperor Henry IV knelt before Pope Gregory VII at Canossa?
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Detainees and Catholic Charities
My friend Paul Horwitz blogged a few days ago about Cully Stimson's now-widely-discussed (and, so far as I can tell, universally rejected) complaints about law firms representing Guantanamo Bay detainees. Paul endorsed (as do I) the view that Stimson is off-base, and agrees with (as do I) Jonathan Adler's statement that "[a]ll individuals, even suspected terrorists, are entitled to a capable legal defense when subjected to legal process, and it is wrong to impugn attorneys on the basis of the clients they represent."
Now, a number of prominent law-school deans have weighed in, with this letter. The deans write:
We teach our students that lawyers have a professional obligation to ensure that even the most despised and unpopular individuals and groups receive zealous and effective legal representation. Our American legal tradition has honored lawyers who, despite their personal beliefs, have zealously represented mass murderers, suspected terrorists, and Nazi marchers. At this moment in time, when our courts have endorsed the right of the Guantanamo detainees to be heard in courts of law, it is critical that qualified lawyers provide effective representation to these individuals. By doing so, these lawyers protect not only the rights of the detainees, but also our shared constitutional principles. In a free and democratic society, government officials should not encourage intimidation of or retaliation against lawyers who are fulfilling their pro bono obligations.
To be clear, I agree entirely with this statement. I wonder, though, if a similar statement was warranted when some students at Harvard Law School protested against Ropes & Gray, during on-campus recruiting (according to this report), for its representation of Catholic Charities, which was at that time seeking an exemption from a non-discrimination law requirement that adoption agencies facilitate adoptions with same-sex couples?
Obviously, statements from government officials like Stimson raise concerns that student protests do not. Still, it strikes me that, "in a free and democratic society," the religious-freedom rights of those with unpopular religious views deserve and require "zealous and effective representation" no less than the rights of detainees. Consider this, from the Boston Globe:
''The words 'boycott-slash-picket' were thrown around," said Peter Renn, a third-year student and Lambda board member who said he had wanted to shame Ropes into ending its work on behalf of Catholic Charities and warn the firm that the issue could hurt recruiting at Harvard.
''Big firms like this are very concerned about public relations, and who in this game is maximally positioned to exert pressure on Ropes & Gray? It's law students," said Renn, who will clerk for a federal district court judge in California after he graduates. ''Attorneys at the firm are in a horrible position, because they don't want to get canned, so they can't say, 'How dare you take that case' and insist the firm withdraw."
In his Stimson post, Paul wrote, "One believes that people are entitled to legal counsel or one does not; one believes that lawyers are entitled to provide that counsel without the taint of association or one does not." Should Dean Kagan (who signed the law-deans' letter regarding Stimson) have made a similar point to Harvard's students?
Monday, January 15, 2007
Thermostat or Thermometer?
Relevant to today's holiday is this, taken from a 1965 interview with Dr. King:
[T]he most pervasive mistake I have made was in believing that because our cause was just, we could be sure that the white ministers of the South, once their Christian consciences were challenged, would rise to our aid.... The projection of a social gospel, in my opinion, is the true witness of a Christian life.... The church once changed society. It was then a thermostat of society. But today I feel that too much of the church is merely a thermometer, which measures rather than molds popular opinion.
(Thanks to Professor Friedman.)
The Problem of Authority
A central problem in jurisprudence -- and, therefore, and important challenge for Catholic Legal Theory -- is that of Authority. That said, here is an interesting post, by Rod Dreher -- inspired by the current situation in Poland -- about the problem of Authority. A bit:
Sunday, January 14, 2007
Prenatal testing
In this op-ed, "What's Lost in Prenatal Testing," Patricia Bauer writes:
What's gone undiscussed in the news coverage of the guidelines seems to be a general assumption that reasonable people would want to screen for Down syndrome. And since nothing can be done to mitigate the effects of an extra 21st chromosome in utero, the further assumption is that people would be reasonable to terminate pregnancies that are so diagnosed.
Certainly, these recommendations will have the effect of accelerating a weeding out of fetuses with Down syndrome that is well underway. There's an estimated 85 to 90 percent termination rate among prenatally diagnosed cases of Down syndrome in this country. With universal screening, the number of terminations will rise. Early screening will allow people to terminate earlier in their pregnancies when it's safer and when their medical status may be unapparent to friends and colleagues.
I understand that some people very much want this, but I have to ask: Why? Among the reasons, I believe, is a fundamental societal misperception that the lives of people with intellectual disabilities have no value -- that less able somehow equates to less worthy. Like the woman in the park, we're assigning one trait more importance than all the others and making critical decisions based on that judgment.
In so doing, we're causing a broad social effect. We're embarking on the elimination of an entire class of people who have a history of oppression, discrimination and exclusion.
Much of what people think they know about intellectual disabilities is inaccurate and remains rooted in stigma and opinions that were formed when institutionalization was routine. In fact, this wave of terminations and recommendations comes as people with Down syndrome and other intellectual disabilities are better educated and leading longer, healthier and more productive lives than ever.
And they'll know we are Christians . . .
. . . by our squabbling about funding sources and non-partisan status. Sigh.
Interesting use of scare quotes
In this piece, reporting that "New Jersey clerics are not required to unite gay couples," the author writes:
Attorney General Stuart Rabner wrote that clergy members could decline to perform civil union ceremonies without violating the law, if performing such ceremonies would go against their “sincerely held religious beliefs.”
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