Bobby Jindal, a Roman Catholic Indian-American, was recently elected Louisiana's governor. This is, I think, a wonderful thing. Here, thanks to America magazine, is a reprint of an article he wrote in 1993 about his conversion to Catholicism.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Bobby Jindal's conversion
Miller on Scalia and "Catholic" judges
Over at the First Things blog, Villanova law prof and MOJ-friend Robert Miller has this post, discussing Justice Scalia's lecture at Villanova and also my own post about that lecture, in which I suggested that Scalia, his protests to the contrary notwithstanding, really is a "Catholic judge." Here's some of what Miller has to say:
. . . Scalia’s conclusion: A person’s moral values are generally irrelevant to the interpretation of legal texts—even when those values are Catholic values.
If he were not a textualist and an originalist, if he thought he ought to rely on substantive moral notions not found in the text, then, Scalia said, his Catholic faith would make a large difference in how he judges cases. Similarly, if he had to judge common-law cases—cases that do not involve texts enacted by a legislature but only judge-made law, cases of the kind that sometimes come before state courts but rarely come before federal courts—things would likewise be different. In making common-law decisions, a judge has to make normative judgments about which laws are best, and so the judge’s values are properly in play. So, too, in the voting booth. Indeed, when the question switches from which laws we actually have to which laws we ought to have, then a person properly relies on moral values, whether they be Catholic or anything else.
Many Catholics, even ones who are fans of Scalia, might find this surprising, even unacceptable. In my view, however, it’s perfectly correct . . .
Responding to my suggestion that Justice Scalia, whether he likes it or not, is a "Catholic judge", Miller writes:
We can take any profession and point out that Catholics who engage in that profession have special reasons, based in Catholic teaching, to do their jobs well in accordance with the standards applicable to all who do such jobs. Nevertheless, we do not speak of “Catholic physicists” and much less of “Catholic third-basemen” or “Catholic real-estate agents” or “Catholic short-order cooks.”
And with good reason. A man may be a Catholic and a physicist, but this doesn’t make him a Catholic physicist. Some adjectives, when put into attributive position (“a heavy drinker”), combine with a substantive to yield a peculiar meaning (“some one who drinks a lot”) different from the mere conjunction of meanings of the adjective and the substantive (“heavy and a drinker”).
So it is, commonly, with the adjective Catholic. A Catholic theologian is not merely a Catholic who is also a theologian but a theologian who studies Catholic theology; and a Catholic writer is not merely a Catholic who is a writer but a writer who writes on Catholic themes. By parity of reasoning, a Catholic judge is not merely a Catholic who is a judge but someone who judges in a way different from other judges precisely because he is Catholic—and this is exactly what Scalia denies he does.
There is no peculiarly Catholic way of judging. And thus Justice Scalia is right when he says, “There is no such thing as a Catholic judge.”
Maybe so. Certainly, like Miller, I do not think that the Catholic faith does, or should, supply a Catholic-who-is-a-judge with the substantive content of her rulings. Still -- and I am entirely open to the possibility that I'm just being stubborn or sloppy -- I do not yet see why I need to agree that "a Catholic judge is not merely a Catholic who is a judge but someone who judges in a way different from other judges precisely because he is Catholic".
Sr. Helen and a "moratorium"
Thanks to Susan for the post about Sr. Helen Prejean's visit to St. Thomas. I read her "Dead Man Walking" when it came out, and also had dinner with her as a first-year law student. Although, over the years, I found myself disagreeing with some of what she said and did, I admire so much the way she managed to challenge us to respect the dignity, and hope for the redemption, even of those who do great evil, and also to remember the dignity of victims, and the pain of their families.
With respect to the "dignity of the human person" and the death penalty, it strikes me that there is this challenge, or tension: On the one hand, Catholic abolitionism has embraced this "dignity" as the basis for the death penalty's immorality. That is, Catholic abolitionists say that it is because of this "dignity" that it is wrong to execute even those who have committed horrible crimes. On the other hand, I believe that this commitment to human dignity also requires Catholics to be skeptical of punishment theories that talk of punishment only in consequentialist or therapeutic terms. If it is true that "human dignity" precludes execution, it is also true, it seems to me, that "human dignity" requires an appropriately retributive (i.e., desert-based) theory of punishment.
With respect to a moratorium, Susan says that if there is not a moratorium in effect, "there should be." I agree, but with the caveat that any such moratorium should be imposed by politically accountable actors.
Monday, October 22, 2007
Is there a death-penalty moratorium in effect?
Luban on legal ethics and human dignity
I'm a little late noticing, but I see, over at "Balkinization", that my legal-ethics teacher, David Luban, has a new book out, "Legal Ethics and Human Dignity." Here is his post, introducing the book. I'm really looking forward to reading it.
David was not only a caring and challenging teacher, he also introduced me, during my second year of law school, to the inspiring legal-ethics work of my current colleague, Tom Shaffer. And, thinking about Tom's work was the occasion for my own effort, a few years ago, to connect legal ethics with Catholic moral anthropology.
Any reviews of the Luban book from MOJ readers or bloggers?
Thursday, October 18, 2007
More from Ryan Anderson on SCHIP
Responding to Tom Berg's recent post, Ryan Anderson sends in the following:
Thanks to Prof. Garnett for posting my Weekly Standard article and this quick note, and [thanks also] to Prof. Berg for his thoughtful response to my article.
Prof. Berg’s comments perfectly illustrate the point I was trying to make; namely that, as I wrote, “there are legitimate arguments on both sides of the debate over this bill.” I outlined some considerations against the bill—and why I thought a faithful Catholic could legitimately oppose it—in my article. Prof. Berg offered some arguments for the bill in his post. I don’t find his case convincing, but we’re not going to settle the American health-care debate here and now. (For a careful reflection on solutions to our health care problems to which I’m generally sympathetic see Eric Cohen and Yuval Levin’s Commentary essay “Health Care in Three Acts.”)
But the point of my article wasn’t the merits of the S-chip debate; I was primarily addressing the parameters of legitimate “Catholic” positions. In particular, I focused on whether a group that purports to “take seriously all our Church’s social and political teachings, and refuses to water down our faith in service of partisan politics” should claim that its favored policy conclusion is the only acceptable one and then run attack ads questioning the pro-life commitments of those who disagree. It seems to me that the Church’s teaching on the legitimate autonomy and liberty of Catholics in the political sphere—within certain moral parameters—is flouted here. I take it that Prof. Berg agrees with me on this point.
Prof. Berg challenged some of my characterizations of the bill. Points similar to mine were made in the New York Times by David Brooks, in the Washington Post by George Will, and in the Weekly Standard by Fred Barnes. Perhaps they have gotten it wrong, and Prof. Berg got it right. Clearly, there is debate—in my opinion, reasonable debate—on this question . Which is, of course, all the more reason for a non-partisan Catholic group not to run the radio ads.
And there is good reason to think that the Democrats’ legislation to expand S-chip is no pro-life bill: When Sen. Wayne Allard motioned to have unborn children covered by S-chip in law (and not by the discretion of administrators, the “unborn child rule”), his motion was defeated 49-50—and you can guess how the vote split.
What I found most curious, though, was Prof. Berg’s calling into question the intentions of those who oppose the proposed legislation to extend and expand S-chip: “I'm not so confident as Mr. Anderson that everyone in the debate is focused on helping the poor.” It is clear in context that he was questioning President Bush’s intentions. This doesn’t quite square with those who know Bush personally and have spent time working with him. Even pro-life, pro-poor Democrat John DiIulio, who has had a rather rocky relationship with the White House, has repeatedly stressed (most recently in his just-released book Godly Republic) that President Bush has very real and serious commitments to the poor. I don’t know if Prof. Berg also questions my intentions, or those of Brooks, Will, and Barnes, or, for that matter, Senator Sam Brownback, who voted against the S-chip expansion and is well known for his big heart for the poor.
It is tiresome—not to mention unhelpful—to insinuate that liberals care for the poor while conservatives do not. This charge also has the vice of being untrue (as Arthur Brooks persuasively argued in his book Who Really Cares?). Rather than assume ill will on the part of those with whom we disagree, we ought to consider that there simply are different ways of being pro-poor. Many conservatives believe and argue that their preferred policy solutions best help the poor. For a taste of this, see Yuval Levin and Peter Wehner’s recent NY Sun op/ed. At the end of the day, we have to realize that there are many competing and conflicting considerations about how to turn our moral and religious convictions into public policy.
To characterize those opposed to S-chip expansion as not really pro-life or not “focused on helping the poor” is simply unhelpful. Some may be. But many are not. (And, if we’re going to take this route, there’s equal room to question the true intentions of those in favor of S-chip expansion.) But the merits and demerits of the bill stand or fall on their own. People acting on equally serious commitments to the poor and with the same basic moral principles can disagree on the technical questions of which policy is most effective. The S-chip debate is not fundamentally a moral or religious one, but a practical one. It falls within the order of being that Aristotle described as techne; it stands in relation to the natural law as what Aquinas termed determinatio. On these questions, reasonable people of good will—including pro-life citizens—can disagree, which is one reason to pause before broadening the pro-life label to include contested legislation of this sort.
Using religion (and charging irreligion) to push through a legitimately disputed piece of legislation truly is partisan in the worst sense of the word—the type of abuse that anyone concerned with religion in the public square should reject. While our faith and moral commitments can tell us that we have real obligations to the poor, they can’t alone tell us how best to meet them.
Wealth, inequality, and human dignity
Zenit has available, here, excerpts from the Pope's remarks on "the World Day to Overcome Extreme Poverty." A bit:
The disparity between rich and poor has become more evident and more disturbing, even within the most economically advanced nations.
"This worrying situation appeals to the conscience of mankind because the conditions being suffered by such a large number of people are such as to offend the dignity of human beings and, as a consequence, to compromise the authentic and harmonious progress of the world community.
"I encourage, then, an increase in efforts to eliminate the causes of poverty and the tragic consequences deriving from it."
So . . . which "efforts" should be "increase[d]"? (I would think, for example, that steps by wealthy and politically stable countries to incentivize developing and poor countries to crack down on corruption, and provide meaningful protection for property and other legal rights, so as to encourage more investment, are essential). And, which have shown themselves to be ineffective? (I would think, for example, that there's no future in celebrating dictator-demagogues who promise massive confiscation and redistribution.) How do we put this into practice, as we should?
More from Fr. Miscamble on Catholic hiring
A few weeks ago, my Notre Dame colleague, Fr. Bill Miscamble, had a piece in America magazine, in which he discussed the importance to Catholic universities -- at least, to those that aspire to be Catholic -- of hiring and retaining Catholic faculty. The piece was widely discussed in the blogosphere (and, I'm sure, in faculty lounges and bars where alumni hang out). In response, another friend and colleague, Prof. John McGreevy, responded in Commonweal, and contended that Fr. Miscamble had both missed the good news that there is and failed to appreciate the nature of the Catholic-hiring challenge.
Fr. Miscamble has now prepared a reply to Prof. McGreevy. Apparently, America magazine is not going to publish it. So, I have reproduced the whole thing, below the jump. In his reply, Fr. Miscamble discusses, among other things, the importance of non-Catholics to the mission of a Catholic university, the caution that is (as Prof. McGreevy had pointed out) appropriate regarding a focus simply on "the numbers", and the question of the "depth of the pool" of possible Catholic hires.
Justice Scalia, a "Catholic" judge . . .
. . . whether he likes it or not. Thanks to Rob for the link to the news account of Justice Scalia's talk at Villanova. As I see it, when Justice Scalia says "there is no such thing as a 'Catholic judge'" and "the Catholic faith seems to me to have little effect on my work as a judge", what he means to say is that his faith does not supply the substantive content of the opinions he writes and the decisions he reaches. He is, I think, pushing back on the idea -- which seemed to be widespread during the Alito and Roberts confirmations -- that a "Catholic" judge would be one who handed down "Catholic" decisions, i.e., decisions that, in their policy dimensions, somehow reflect or map onto Catholic Social Teaching. Understood in this way, I think Justice Scalia is entirely right.
That said, it is unfortunate that he insists on putting the matter this way, because he is way too smart not to know that his statements will be, and are, taken to mean that, as a judge, he "puts aside" his faith (JFK-style). But, I am confident this is not what he means. The point is not that "I am not a 'Catholic' judge because I put aside my faith when I judge, and operate only in slimmed-down-identity mode." To be a Catholic judge -- and Justice Scalia is, whether he likes it or not, a "Catholic judge" in this sense -- is to be a judge in the way a Catholic, like everyone else, should be a judge: To take seriously one's obligation to decide impartially, to submit to the rule of law, rather than one's own preferences, and to have an appropriate humility about the task one is charged to perform. Obviously, this is not a distinctively Catholic way of judging -- I'm not even saying that Catholics are more likely to judge in this way than others are -- but it is, I think, the way a Catholic should judge. It's also the way Justice Scalia thinks he should judge and, I'm confident, he thinks this way (at least in part) because he is a Catholic.
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
"Civilizing Authority"
Run, don't walk, to . . . an internet bookseller and get Patrick Brennan's new edited volume, "Civilizing Authority: Society, State, and Church." It's just great. Or, as I put it in my (first!) back-cover blurb, "An education and a delight, Civilizing Authority is like participating in a rich and provocative conversation, about questions that are both timely and timeless, among learned friends." Contributors include Patrick Brennan, J. Budziszewski, Jack Coons, Avery Cardinal Dulles, Russ Hittinger, Tom Kohler, Steve Smith, Glenn Tinder, Joe Vining, and Michael White. Wow!