Tom asked (and asked again) what people thought of the possibility of justifying the death penalty for non-homicide crimes. A few quick thoughts:
First, it seems likely that the Court will invalidate the Louisiana law under review in the Kennedy case. (See here for more details.) It will be interesting to learn why, though. Will the Court say, "here's a bright-line rule: the death penalty is never constitutional absent a conviction for a homicide crime." If the Court does say this, what's the theory? Certainly, it is possible for someone who intentionally (and wickedly, heinously, evilly, gruesomely, etc., etc.) rapes a child to be more blameworthy -- in terms of subjective culpability -- than someone who causes another person's death in a way and under circumstances that make him death-eligible. I suppose the Court could just cite Tison and Coker and be done with it (ignoring the tone-deafness of that opinion with respect to the harm involved in the crime of rape, and also the fact that Coker talks about the rape of "an adult woman." We'll see.
Second, with respect to Tom's statement that "taking a life by execution cannot be appropriate redress for a crime that does not involve the taking of a life": Why not? I mean, I am inclined to agree, but why? What is meant by the word "redress" here? Tom's statement, it seems, highlights what has long been, for me, a troubling aspect of the Catechism's "protect society" approach. Because the Catechism does not say -- and the Church has not yet taught (has it?) -- that "it is never -- no way, no how -- morally permissible for the public authority to punish an offender by executing him", we are stuck wondering whether it could ever be the case that execution was necessary to "protect society" from someone who has been convicted of child-rape.
So, Tom . . . why not? (See above.)