Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, July 9, 2008

More on faith-based programs and "discrimination"

Here is an essay, by Keith Pavlischek, which sets out well (I think) the concerns that one might have -- concerns that, contra E.J. Dionne, do not make one a culture-warrior or narrow ideologue -- about Sen. Obama's proposed changes to the faith-based-initiative.  A taste:

. . .  The hiring issue became a problem only when the cultural warriors of the Left saw Bush's faith-based initiative as a threat to their political strength and sought to deny Bush a political victory. Even John DiIulio, Bush's first head of the Faith-Based initiative gets this wrong. As Joseph Knippenberg shows in a review of DiIulio's Godly Republic: A Centrist Blueprint for America's Faith-Based Future, he mistakenly states that the Charitable Choice legislation signed by President Clinton and the Civil Right Act does not contain such a robust hiring protection.

Regardless, it is still hard to see the objection to maintaining these protections. It is a matter of simple justice. If a nonprofit center provided counseling to drug addicts based on some secular (say, Freudian) theory of counseling, they should not be required to hire, as a condition of government funding, Christian counselors (or anti-Freudian secularists for that matter) who take a different approach. And vice versa. Gay-friendly counseling centers should not be required, as a condition of funding, to hire fundamentalists or Roman Catholics who have profound moral objections to homosexual activity. And vice versa. . . .

A religious-freedom conference of possible interest

I received this notice from a religious-freedom scholar / friend of mine.  Should be of interest to many:

What are the primary legal challenges confronting pre-K to 12 and post-secondary religious schools?  What is the best way for religious institutions to implement codes of conduct for faculty and administrators?  How may religious institutions (except churches) navigate the new Form 990?  What distinguishes faith-based healthcare providers?  How may religious institutions minimize their tax liability?  May religious hospitals enforce beginning-of-life and end-of-life ethical and religious directives?  These are some of the questions that the Religious Institutions Conference sponsored by Holland & Knight LLP and

Palm Beach

Atlantic

University

will address on September 12, 2008 on the beautiful campus of

Palm Beach

Atlantic

University

in

West Palm Beach

,

Florida

.  The morning (beginning at 8:30 a.m.) will focus on religious educational institutions and the afternoon (beginning at 1:15 p.m.) on religious healthcare providers, but there will be plenty on the program of relevance to all Religious Institutions.  The conference including lunch and materials is $15.  You must register to attend.  To RSVP or to request more information, please contact Sheila Stoudt at [email protected] or 850-425-5603.

"An Outdated Muddle"?

The Economist reports, in the current issue's cover story, that "global institutions are an outdated muddle."  What does this observation mean or suggest for the Church -- I suppose the original, and still important, "global institution" -- and, more specifically, for the "Catholic Legal Theory" project?

Tuesday, July 8, 2008

Hitchens, waterboarding, and torture

So, as any consumer -- whatever his or her views -- of social and political commentary knows, Christopher Hitchens can be very frustrating.  He can be (I think) right on, he can be horribly, horribly wrong.  Here, at First Things, Ryan Anderson has posted an excerpt from Hitchens's recent essay waterboarding, specifically, his own experience of being waterboarded.

I've expressed, on this and other blogs, both my unreserved assent to the proposition that "torture" is immoral, and my frustration with what I see as the tendency, in some quarters, to skate too quickly past (what seems to me to be) the hard issue of identifying what, exactly, we are talking about.  That said, Hitchens is confident, anyway, that we *are* talking about waterboarding.  He states fairly the other view:

The team who agreed to give me a hard time in the woods of North Carolina belong to a highly honorable group. This group regards itself as out on the front line in defense of a society that is too spoiled and too ungrateful to appreciate those solid, underpaid volunteers who guard us while we sleep. These heroes stay on the ramparts at all hours and in all weather, and if they make a mistake they may be arraigned in order to scratch some domestic political itch. Faced with appalling enemies who make horror videos of torture and beheadings, they feel that they are the ones who confront denunciation in our press, and possible prosecution. As they have just tried to demonstrate to me, a man who has been waterboarded may well emerge from the experience a bit shaky, but he is in a mood to surrender the relevant information and is unmarked and undamaged and indeed ready for another bout in quite a short time. When contrasted to actual torture, waterboarding is more like foreplay. No thumbscrew, no pincers, no electrodes, no rack. Can one say this of those who have been captured by the tormentors and murderers of (say) Daniel Pearl? On this analysis, any call to indict the United States for torture is therefore a lame and diseased attempt to arrive at a moral equivalence between those who defend civilization and those who exploit its freedoms to hollow it out, and ultimately to bring it down. I myself do not trust anybody who does not clearly understand this viewpoint.

Still, he concludes:

I apply the Abraham Lincoln test for moral casuistry: “If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong.” Well, then, if waterboarding does not constitute torture, then there is no such thing as torture.

Worth a read, I think.  (Even if he is way-wrong when it comes to Mother Teresa, God, and the like.)

Monday, July 7, 2008

More on Obama's proposal . . .

Well, like Cathy says, we disagree.  Because we have the luxury of being able to hash things like this out in real space — i.e., lovely South Bend — I’ll just say that (a) I don’t see the relevance of the Goodling / DOJ-hiring business to the question whether religious freedom is well served by requiring religious social-welfare organizations that receive some public funds to comply with non-discrimination laws (certainly, no one, in any Administration, should break the laws that govern the filling of non-political DOJ jobs), and (b) I don’t see why the fact that, for some religious organizations, the no-discrimination-in-services rule would be burdensome lessens the threat posed to religious freedom by the proposed no-discrimination-in-hiring rule.

From "pro-choice atheist to pro-life Catholic"

An interesting story, in America magazine:

When I would come across Catholic Web sites or books that asserted “Life begins at conception,” I would scoff, as was my habit, yet I found myself increasingly uncomfortable with my defense. I realized that my criteria for determining when human life begins were distressingly vague. I was putting the burden of proof on the fetuses to demonstrate to me that they were human, and I was a tough judge. I found myself looking the other way when I heard about things like the 3-D ultrasounds that showed fetuses touching their faces, smiling and opening their eyes at ages at which I still considered abortion acceptable. As modern technology revealed more and more evidence that fetuses were humans too, I would simply move the bar for what I considered human.

At some point I started to feel I was more determined to remain pro-choice than to analyze honestly who was and was not human.

This post of mine, at Prawfsblawg -- and the comments -- connects pretty well with the America story, by the way.

Friday, July 4, 2008

Question for Michael P.

Michael P. suggested that we read Cathy Kaveny's post, at Commonweal, on the recent speech by Sen. Obama on the faith-based initiative.  It seems to me that, at the end of the day, and despite the "Look!  He's reaching out to evangelicals!" press coverage, all that Sen. Obama has proposed is a roll-back of the more religious-organization-friendly changes that Pres. Bush made to the Clinton Administration's program.

Cathy wrote:

Senator Obama is sensitive to the facts that taxpayer money has to be dedicated to building up the political common good–the good of what St. Augustine would call the Earthly City–rather than to increasing membership of the Heavenly City (which is ultimately a matter for God’s grace) . Building up the political common good is a project in which people of good will can cooperate, no matter what their faith. So the organizational arms of faith-based groups which receive public funds won’t be allowed to discriminate, either in the provision of services or in hiring people to provide those services. Furthermore, they won’t be allowed to use the provision of services as an occasion to proselytize.

I am surprised that my colleague Cathy regards this restriction as justifiable, let alone praise-worthy.  What, exactly, is inconsistent with "building up the political common good" about permitting faith-based groups to actually be faith-based groups?  What is it about "building up the political common good" that should require faith-based groups to give up the right to hire-for-mission in order to enjoy public support for the public goods they provide?  Michael?

Thursday, July 3, 2008

The South Dakota abortion case

Emily Bazelon writes here, at Slate, about South Dakota's "unbelievable" abortion law which, among other things, "requires doctors to give patients who come for an abortion a written statement telling them that 'the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.'"  "If you care about doctors' freedom of speech," she writes, "or their responsibility to give accurate information to patients, the South Dakota statute looks pretty alarming."

I'm not sure what to think about the free-speech objection.  It seems to me that all kinds of reasonable, easily justifiable regulations of the practice of medicine are going to involve requiring doctors to communicate some information to patients and forbid them to say some things to patients.  The free-speech objection, then, appears to piggy-back on the "accurate information" objection.  So, is it, or is it not, the case that an abortion "terminate[s] the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being"?  Well, the statute in question defines "human being" as "an individual living member of the species Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation."  Bazelon thinks this is just cheating; is she right?

Here's the key paragraph of her piece:

But what's more distressing, because the majority's reasoning is so strained, is the assertion that by defining a phrase one way, a state can erase its ambiguity and the variety of perceptions people bring to it. It's one thing to say—as the case law the majority relies on here does—that a statutory definition binds judges and their interpretation of language. It's another entirely to say that when doctors tell women they are carrying a human being, that women will think, Oh, right, that means only the long, convoluted thing that the state says it does. Most patients won't think that, because they won't necessarily define "human being" the way the statute does. As Yale law professor Robert Post says in a 2007 article (PDF) in the University of Illinois Law Review, "If South Dakota were to enact a statute requiring physicians to inform abortion patients that they were destroying the 'soul' of their unborn progeny, and if it were explicitly to provide in the statute that 'soul' is defined as 'human DNA,' the evasion would be obvious." Instead, South Dakota has co-opted human being and attached its own meaning to it.

I was intrigued by the use of the word "co-opted."  Did the legislature really "attach it's own meaning" -- some kind of strange, esoteric, secret-knowledge meaning?  It strikes me that the objections to the statute reflect a worry that, by requiring doctors to remind women contemplating abortions that unborn children are "human beings", the law might make complicate the decision to end these human beings' lives.

"Thou Shalt Not Annoy" at WYD 2008

World Youth Day 2008 is being held this summer in Sydney, Australia.  According to the event's official web site, "[o]rganised by the Catholic Church, WYD brings together young people from around the globe to celebrate and learn about their faith on a more regular basis.  WYD08 will be the largest event Australia has ever hosted. It will attract over 125,000 international visitors - more than the 2000 Olympics.  WYD08 will mark the first visit of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI to Australia."  (During the pontificate of Pope John Paul II, these events were huge, and quite formative, I'm told, for many young Catholics.)

Well, if you put on a big Catholic jamboree, with the Pope in attendance, in a free country, you are going to stir up conversation, debate, disagreement . . . and some protest (some of it, no doubt, malicious and offensive).  And so, local authorities have enacted a new, temporary set of regulations that "will allow police to arrest and fine people for 'causing annoyance' to World Youth Day participants."  In response, as this headline puts it, "Catholics are split on [the] freedom to annoy":

[The] prominent Catholic priest and lawyer Frank Brennan has condemned new police powers for World Youth Day as a "dreadful interference" with civil liberties and contrary to Catholic teaching on human rights.

Any thoughts?  What free-speech rule or principle (if any) should control this situation, and others like it?  I tend to be a free-speech libertarian, even though I'm uncomfortably aware that a lot of libertarian free-speech rhetoric rings hollow.  Would those who object to the "don't annoy" rule object as strongly if the event in question were not World Youth Day but some other, perhaps more "progressive", group?  Readers might want to check out this post, at the Commonweal blog (where I got the story) and also the comments.

Assisted suicide in Germany

The New York Times reports on a recent doctor-assisted suicide in Germany, by an elderly woman who was not ill:

Ms. Schardt, 79, a retired X-ray technician from the Bavarian city of Würzburg, was neither sick nor dying. She simply did not want to move into a nursing home, and rather than face that prospect, she asked Mr. Kusch, a prominent German campaigner for assisted suicide, for a way out.

Her last words, after swallowing a deadly cocktail of the antimalaria drug chloroquine and the sedative diazepam, were “auf Wiedersehen,” Mr. Kusch recounted at a news conference on Monday.

It was hardly the last word on her case, however. Ms. Schardt’s suicide — and Mr. Kusch’s energetic publicizing of it — have set off a national furor over the limits on the right to die, in a country that has struggled with this issue more than most because of the Nazi’s euthanizing of at least 100,000 mentally disabled and incurably ill people.

Not that the Times wants to be judgmental.  After all . . .

While Ms. Schardt was not suffering from a life-threatening disease, or in acute pain, her life was hardly pleasant, Mr. Kusch said. She had trouble moving around her apartment, where she lived alone. Having never married, she had no family. She also had few friends, and rarely ventured out.

In such circumstances, a nursing home seemed likely to be the next stop. And for Ms. Schardt, who Mr. Kusch said feared strangers and had a low tolerance for those less clever than she was, that was an unbearable prospect.

You know, I joke sometimes that some "less clever" people's remarks make me "want to kill myself" . . . but, it's a joke.

Meanwhile, a push for "death with dignity" in Washington.  Don't worry, though . . . Oregon's "safeguards work."