Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Sunday, February 15, 2009

Once it's gone . . .

. . . it's really hard to get back (a university's "Catholic character", that is).  Or so this quote, from Prof. Maxim Shrayer, the chairman of the department of Slavic and Eastern languages and literatures at Boston College would suggest:

"I believe that the display of religious signs and symbols, such as the crucifix, in the classroom is contrary to the letter and spirt of open intellectual discourse that makes education worthwhile and distinguishes first-rate universities from mediocre and provincial ones," Maxim D. Shrayer, chairman of the department of Slavic and Eastern languages and literatures, said in an interview.

What twaddle.

Friday, February 13, 2009

"Hands Off" Religious Doctrine

In January 2008, the AALS Law and Religion Section's program examined the rule, or claim, that the Constitution requires government to adopt a "hands off" approach to religious doctrine.  The papers -- by Kent Greenawalt, Sam Levine, Andy Koppelman, Chris Eisgruber & Larry Sager, Bernie Meyler, and me -- have been published in the Notre Dame Law Review, and are available here.  Take a look!

Wednesday, February 11, 2009

"Religion and Respect"

Here is a very thorough account of a recent paper, given at the University of Chicago by Simon Blackburn, called "Religion and Respect."  A bit:

This paper explores the nature of respect and its boundaries, particularly when one is confronted with false beliefs or other beliefs that one does not share. Blackburn does not get into the political implications of his theory in this paper, but it should surprise no one that his views on the subject are that religion should not have a special place in the political sphere. . . .

For Blackburn, we can tolerate people who hold false beliefs and we can tolerate the fact that they hold them, in this sense we respect them. However, we cannot respect these false beliefs in any broader sense and if we respect those who hold them, it is despite their beliefs, not in virtue of them. Blackburn asserts both that it is not the case that any belief is as good as any other belief and that those who claim this do not really mean it. . . .

"The Catholic Church and Intellectual Freedom"

This is the title of Sandy Levinson's post, over at Balkinization, reacting to (the New York Times' typically not-exactly-right presentation of) Pope Benedict XVI's recent dealings with several formerly-schismatic Catholic bishops, including one who is clearly a loathesome Holocaust denier.  Sandy writes:

But I also confess to having very mixed views on reading that the "Vatican Secretariat of State said that Bishop Williamson 'must absolutely, unequivocally and publicly distance himself from his positions on the Shoah.'" . . .

"Recantation" or "distancing" would not only raise the most severe questions about Bishop Williamson's own intellectual integrity (assuming one can use such terms with regard to a Holocaust denier); it would also reinforce the view that the Church--especially under the current Pope?--does not intend to be friendly to anyone who fails to toe a given Vatican line.

The "under the current Pope . . . toe a given Vatican line" jab aside (this jab reflects, it seems to me, an understandable misunderstanding of this Pope's views and record), I'm not sure why the Secretariat's demand should necessarily be seen as demanding what Sandy (and I) regard as pretty-near impossible, i.e., willing away one's mistaken beliefs, or as threatening his "intellectual freedom." 

Williamson is a Catholic bishop (albeit, it seems to me, a very bad one).  Part of being a bishop, I would think, is avoiding scandalizing one's flock and refraining from teaching error.  It is, as it happens, entirely orthodox Catholic teaching that one's beliefs are, and can only be, one's own (see, e.g., Dignitatis humanae); but it does not strike me as remotely authoritarian or "[un]friendly" to say -- if one is, well, the Pope -- to a bishop, "given that you are a successor to the Apostles, charged with caring for the spiritual welfare of Christians, do not say and teach things, as bishop, that are grossly wrong and hateful, to say nothing of un-Christian."  The Pope (I would have thought this was obvious) was not telling Williamson to change his beliefs; but to stop teaching error and creating a scandal.

One's role constrains what one is supposed to say, in the context of that role, all the time.  This fact does not strike me as being in tension with "intellectual freedom."  (I assume that Sandy, like me, would not be moved by a public-school science teacher's argument that his "intellectual freedom" required that he be permitted not only to believe, but to teach in class, young-Earth creationism?)

A paper of interest

This, "Attempt by Omission," by Michael Cahill, looks interesting:

In addition to requiring subjective culpability, criminal offenses typically involve two objective features: action and harm. In the paradigmatic case, both features are present, but criminal law also allows for liability where either of them is absent. Rules governing omission liability enable punishment where the offender performs no act, while rules defining inchoate crimes (such as attempt) impose liability where the offender causes no harm. In different ways, these two sets of rules establish the minimum threshold of objective conduct-to use the classic term, the minimum actus reus-required for criminal liability.

The absolute floor for a criminal actus reus, then, would be defined by the intersection of these two sets of rules. The prospect of liability for inchoate omissions, involving no act and no harm, exists at the frontier of the state's authority to criminalize conduct and, whether allowed or rejected, effectively determines the outer boundaries of that authority. Accordingly, inchoate-omission liability raises fundamental issues about the nature and proper scope of criminal law.

This article considers those issues, asking whether criminal punishment for harmless inaction is legally possible, empirically observable, or normatively desirable and, perhaps surprisingly, answering all three of these questions in the affirmative. However unlikely or dubious the legal math may seem, it turns out that zero action plus zero harm can, does, and should sometimes add up to a crime.

"For what I have done, and what I have failed to do . . .." 

Friday, February 6, 2009

Happy Anniversary to us!

This week marks the fifth anniversary of Mirror of Justice.  (Here is the first post.)  Thanks to all readers and bloggers.  On we go!

Rougeau's essay

Thanks to Michael for posting my colleague (and MOJ alum) Vince Rougeau's recent essay in America magazine.  I am, for what it's worth, as confident -- after careful reflection in light of the full range of Catholic teachings -- that a McCain Administration would have been -- all things considered, and on balance -- better for the common good than the Obama Administration will be as Vince is that the opposite is true.  Still, I believe that there is much in Vince's essay for all of us, and particularly for Catholics who made the same choice I did, to take very seriously.  He is absolutely right that a Catholic in America has to appreciate -- and, I should say, I do -- "the political and cultural concerns of African-Americans and Latinos." 

Now, I worry a bit -- perhaps, defensively -- that he paints in places with a bit-too-broad of a brush, seeming to equate statements like mine (above) with blanket refusals to admit that any reflective Catholic (or "real American") could possibly have voted for Obama.  Certainly, I hope, notwithstanding the strong statements in his essay about Republican failings, he believes that reflective Catholics could have made the choice I did.  All that said, I was struck in particular by this:

Let us consider for a moment the reality of abortion in the United States. Abortion rates (which, by the way, have been in a steady decline for some time) are highest in communities that are disproportionately poor. This means African-American and Hispanic communities, which have poverty rates three to four times those of white communities. What does an all-or-nothing strategy toward criminalization of abortion say to women in these communities, women who are also routinely vilified for having too many babies? Rather than being offered hope through support for the creation of a society in which poor mothers could envision futures of solidarity and participation for their children, they are told that more of them need to be prosecuted as criminals.

Barack Obama’s simple presence in the Oval Office will probably do more to reduce abortions than any possible further restriction of the abortion laws that might have occurred during a McCain-Palin administration. For the first time in American history, women of color can look at their children, particularly their sons, and say with conviction that American society sees them as full, dignified members of the community for whom anything might be possible. Why isn’t that something worth voting for?

Starting with Vince's last question:  It seems to me that it *is*, without a doubt, "something worth voting for."  For me, it was not enough, but the fact it was not enough does not prevent me (and other Catholics who voted the way I did) from recognizing this particular good result of Pres. Obama's election. 

The claim that Pres. Obama's "simple presence" will do more to reduce abortions than anything that could have occurred during a McCain administration is, in my view, not persuasive, if one includes in the calculation the effect of increased public funding for abortions.  Yes, the Born Alive Infact Protection Act does not save many unborn children -- though it does, this horrifying story suggests, save some.  But there was every reason to believe, on Election Day (and today) that the election of Pres. Obama, combined with a Pelosi-Reid Congress, would result in substantial increases in public funding for abortion.

But put all that aside.  I hope that Vince is right, and that the number of abortions goes down during the next 4 (or 8) years.  What was (and is) of more concern to me, though, than the number of abortions was the fact that we have (incorrectly) constitutionalized a gravely unjust and anti-democratic rule (i.e., the Roe-Casey regime), a rule whose premise is that some human beings deserve less protection against private violence than do other human beings.  It would have been wonderful -- and more consistent -- if a vote for Obama, one that reflected a commitment to equal justice and the worth of all, had also been a vote that made more likely (rather than much, much less likely) the possibility that our constitutional law might reflect that commitment again. 

And so, what people like me argued was not so much that no reflective Catholic could ever conclude that Obama was, all things considered, the better choice, but instead that it was a mistake to think that (as Doug Kmiec, for example, seemed to), with respect both to the number of abortions and the justice of the legal regime regarding abortion, the election of Obama would result in improvement.

The issue is not (as I see it), in Vince's words, to tell women that "more of them need to be prosecuted as criminals."  This is not a fair representation of the pro-life argument (at least, not of the argument that moved Catholics who voted for Sen. McCain).  The aim of those of us for whom hoping that social-welfare programs will reduce abortion is not enough is not to "villify", or even to "punish" -- it is to bring about a state of affairs in which our Constitution permits us to give expression, in law and elsewhere, to our commitment to the full and equal dignity of all human persons.

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Teens, abstinence, etc.

So, according to this, teenagers are not having sex as much as they used to (or, as much as we were told that they were).  Ann Althouse and others think about why. 

Also relevant, is this essay, by Ryan Anderson, from Public Discourse, about student-led responses to the "hook up" culture on college campuses.

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

"Positive Secularism and the American Model of Religious Freedom"

The folks at Public Discourse were kind enough to publish an edited version of the remarks I gave at a recent conference, in Rome, on the "American Model of Religious Freedom."  Here is the set-up:

Pope Benedict XVI has, in recent months, expressed his admiration for the “American model” of religious liberty and church-state liberty. For example, during his trip last spring to the United States, the Pope noted, and seemed to praise, America’s “positive concept of secularism,” in which government respects both the role of religious arguments and commitments in the public square and the important distinction between religious and political authorities.

Is there, in fact, such a model, and such a concept, at work in America? What are its features? And, is it worthy of the Pope’s apparent endorsement?

Comments welcome!

Monday, February 2, 2009

Douthat on abortion and the "culture wars"

There has been quite a bit of discussion, on this and other Catholic blogs, about the use (and misuse) of "culture war" talk, about the accuracy of such talk, about whether it is possible (absent surrender on moral questions of importance) to leave behind such talk, etc.  Against the backdrop of this conversation, take a few minutes to read this post, by Ross Douthat.

Now, I tend to think that some calls (not all, of course, but some) for "let's put the culture wars" -- childish things? -- "behind us" are, really, calls for "please stop arguing with me on the serious matters about which we disagree, and just agree that I win."  That said, Douthat raises (and quotes others who raise) an interesting possibility -- could reversing Roe (rather than giving up on its reversal) actually be the better path toward less rancorous politics?  He writes:

Overturning Roe, then, would have a double effect on pro-lifers - it would simultaneously remove the alienating impact of a legal regime that tries to read our views out of the political debate entirely, and enable us to put our theories about American public opinion on abortion and what kind of legal restrictions are possible to the test. Whether this would de-escalate the abortion wars in the long run is obviously hard to say. I suspect that the Linker thesis is correct, and that a short-term spasm of abortion politicking would give way to greater calm on the issue; certainly, I imagine that I would personally feel a lot calmer about the issue if it were de-constitutionalized, whether or not doing so led to the kind of legal gains that I think pro-lifers can reasonably hope for. But there's no way to know for sure.

I think he's onto something.  I know that, during the run-up to the last election, I often expressed my view that the (incorrect) constitutionalization of a broad abortion license, which not only rests on a premise about personhood that many people quite reasonably reject, but also (as Douthat says) implicitly expels from the conversation these many people, is what is most objectionable about the current reality; more so, really, than the fact (which, I am sure, will always be with us) that abortion would, even absent Roe, remain, in many places and cases, legal.