While I am still not comfortable holding out as "guidance" to Bob my thinking about (how to think about) the healthcare-insurance-funding proposal, his recent detailed and thoughtful post certainly (more than) deserves a response.
Let me start with Bob's "two final points": The care that Bob takes, and urges us to take, to avoid assuming "too much of an uncharitable character" is commendable and to be embraced. That said -- and conceding, of course, that I do not and cannot know what is in the heart, or motivating the actions, of every legislator and citizen who is supporting the Senate proposal -- it seems to me that the facts (as I, probably imperfectly, understand them) make it hard to avoid the conclusion that for many of the Democrats in Congress -- including the relevant leaders -- and also for many of the leaders and activists in the party's base, it really is important and core (not merely incidental or regrettable) that the healthcare-insurance debate / legislation serve as a vehicle for increasing "access" to abortion. (Not only through funding (direct and indirect); my understanding is that the Senate proposal does not include the "conscience" protection for health-care providers that was included in the House bill.) And, it seems similarly clear that, for these people, the desire to increase "access" travels closely with the view that increasing "access" will also have the desired effect of entrenching the practice legally. Bob says "we owe it to most if not all of [the non-pro-life Democrats] to take them at their word when they say they seek not to increase abortion-funding, but to increase insurance-funding." I don't think this is, in fact, the word of these Democrats.
Back to Bob's first point. He says that he is "genuinely trying to work out a workable mode of ethical assessment, suitable for conscientious Catholic lawyers and indeed citizens more generally, of proposed legislation that bears effects upon the incidence and what might be called 'public meaning' of abortion even while directed at ends that have nothing to do with abortion." This is an important and worthy project. (In this particular case, though, as I suggested above, I'm not sure it should be conceded that this is a case of proposed legislation that is "directed at ends that have nothing to do with abortion.") I am not sure I have, or have professed to have, a "mode of assessment": I noted that the Senate proposal would have certain bad effects in terms of the incidence and public meaning of abortion. It seems clear to me that it would. And, that a piece of legislation is likely to have such effects is, I think, a good reason to withhold support. Would the possibility of such bad effects always compel, for me, the withholding of support? Probably not. (See, e.g., Bob's highway-funding example.) Here, (i) the bad effects strike me as pretty bad; and (ii) there are, in my view, other, garden-variety reasons for withholding support of the proposal, which does not seem likely to me to result in sufficient good effects, at a reasonable cost. So, when I put all that together, I oppose the Senate proposal. I don't know if "all things considered" counts as a "mode of assessment", but I think that's what I'm doing.
As Bob points out, I said in an earlier post, "focusing (for now) only on the question whether or not the proposal facilitates and entrenches the unjustified exclusion of unborn children from the protection and solicitude of the law -- it seems to me that the answer to this question is "yes", and I'm comfortable holding the view that this answer provides a sufficient reason to hope the bill does not pass." For me, this answer does provide a "sufficient reason" in this case; and, I imagine that in the vast majority of cases (even if not in every imaginable case), this answer would provide, for me, a very weighty, even conclusive, reason to oppose proposed legislation. I do not think that, in saying this (jumping ahead to Bob's third set of points), I am saying that "the abortion effect of any proposed piece of legislation might be lexicographically prior to any other effect of that piece of legislation when it comes to assessing it with a view to whether it ought to be supported or opposed." For me, though, a proposal that seems likely not merely to result, indirectly, in a possible increase in the number of abortions, but to entrench more deeply a legal regime in which unborn children are excluded from the law's protections and religious objections to collaborating in abortions are under-protected, and to a cultural situation in which elective abortions are regarded as "health care" to which people have a "right" (at public expense), is almost always going to be a proposal that should, on balance, be opposed.
Bob says that he does not know enough, yet, to know if my "diagnosis" is mistaken. As I see / understand it, the Senate proposal moves the federal government away from a neutral posture towards abortion to, instead, directly subsidizing plans that provide it. (There are also direct-funding measures in the proposal and -- again -- removal of "conscience"-type protections.) It is clear to me that this will increase abortions and entrench in the law the government's approval of *purely elective* abortion as healthcare. If Bob has a reason for thinking that I am wrong about this, then I would certainly want to hear it, so that I could form a more accurate understanding of what, in fact, the proposal would do.
I appreciate, again, Bob's thoughtful post, and also the conversation.
Monday, December 21, 2009
I'm late taking the bait laid out by my pal Michael, not because I've been busily drafting, but because of, well, Christmas-and-kids stuff.
As for the views of "the Princeton economist and Nobel laureate" Paul Krugman . . . I have nothing useful to say. Krugman, in my view, is an entirely predictable partisan. His understanding of the common good is, on many important points, not mine.
With respect to Bob's request for "guidance" . . . I certainly would not presume to provide "guidance" to Bob regarding the Senate's plan. (Oh, all right -- it costs too much, and does too little good, and too much bad).
I'm not sure how to respond to Bob's first query. Does Bob disagree with my view that the Senate proposal moves "dramatically in the wrong direction when it
comes to protecting unborn children in law and even when it comes to
the (different) goal of reducing the number of abortions?" How is my (initial and revisable) diagnosis mistaken?
As for the second query, it seems to me that there are plenty of things about the proposal that could "suffice to underwrite a justifiable hope that the legislation not pass" (see supra). But, focusing (for now) only on the question whether or not the proposal facilitates and entrenches the unjustified exclusion of unborn children from the protection and solicitude of the law -- it seems to me that the answer to this question is "yes", and I'm comfortable holding the view that this answer provides a sufficient reason to hope the bill does not pass.
A question for Bob, and Michael, and Krugman: Why does it seem to matter so much to the Democrats in Congress that abortion-funding increase? Should the importance they seem to attach to abortion-funding (it would be much simpler -- wouldn't it? -- to help the poor get decent healthcare if they were to settle for not-too-shabby prize of current legal regime) call into question the genuine-ness of their professed commitments to human dignity and well-being? Given all that we were told during the recent presidential election, why hasn't the President made clear to Congress, and to the country, his desire that his party put aside its desire for increased abortion funding (and decreased regulation of the practice) in service of the more important goal of providing (at a reasonable cost) decent healthcare to more Americans?
Monday, December 14, 2009
I am delighted to welcome Prof. Kevin Lee, who teaches at Campbell, to our merry band of MOJ-ers. (Kevin's bio, CV, and the like are
here.) Kevin brings to our conversation, among other things, the fruits of his advanced studies in religious studies and political ethics. Welcome aboard!
Friday, December 11, 2009
MOJ readers might remember that, a few years ago, Notre Dame's President, Fr. John Jenkins, commissioned a Task Force to study and respond to some of the challenges facing Catholic schools. That group produced a report called “Making God Known, Loved, and Served”, http://ace.nd.edu/assets/2296/tf_cover.pdf, and a number of interesting, concrete developments have come out of that Task Force’s work.
More recently, Fr. Jenkins asked the Notre Dame Task Force on the Participation of Latino Children and Families in Catholic Schools to study, in a particular way, the participation of Latinos in America’s Catholic schools. In conjunction with the Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe, that Task Force has released a report called “To Nurture the Soul of a Nation: Latino Families, Catholic Schools, and Educational Opportunity.” More information is available here: http://newsinfo.nd.edu/news/14167
This latter report should be available on Notre Dame’s website very soon. I’ve read the hard-copy, though, and I think you’ll find that it’s very exciting and inspiring for all of us who care about Catholic education.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
. . . is David Bentley Hart's "The Beauty of the Infinite."Mathew Milliner makes the case, at
First Things, here.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Here's Australia's Cardinal George Pell, speaking at a recent conference in Sydney. Cardinal Pell is concerned (with good reason, it appears) about an ongoing investigation by that country's Human Rights Commission into the freedom of religion and, more specifically, "the compatibility of religious freedom with human rights[.]" Cardinal Pell writes:
. . . The tone was set when the inquiry was announced in September 2008. The ABC reported the Commission’s Race Discrimination Commissioner, Tom Calma, expressing concern (in the ABC’s words) “at evidence of a growing fundamentalist religious lobby, in areas such as same-sex relationships, stem-cell research and abortion”.[1] I am not a fundamentalist religiously, politically or morally. But I was not aware that being a fundamentalist was against any Australian law; nor am I aware why this should be of any concern to a Race Discrimination Commissioner. This alleged fundamentalism is apparently one of the main reasons for the inquiry, and this attitude — that religious opinion and religious people in the public square are somehow a problem, perhaps even a danger — runs through the discussion paper the Commission issued to commence the inquiry.
In case there was any doubt about the matter, in August Mr Calma and Conrad Gershevitch delivered a conference paper on the inquiry which opened with these words:
"The compatibility of religious freedom with human rights is the subject of the most comprehensive study ever undertaken in Australia in this area. ..." [2] (emphasis added).
Let us spell this out: the clear meaning of these words is that religious freedom is not a human right and may not be compatible with human rights. This is an astonishing claim from a senior officer of the body responsible for the protection and advancement of human rights in Australia. Mr Calma announced the inquiry in a similar vein, comparing religion and human rights to oil and water – substances that do not mix.[3] . . .