Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Sunday, April 11, 2010

Penalver on Justice Stevens and religion

Here is a paper that Eduardo wrote, a few years ago, on the religious-freedom-related work and thinking of Justice Stevens:

Justice Stevens has sometimes been caricatured as the Supreme Court Justice who hates religion, but an exploration of the cases in which Justice Stevens has voted in favor of religious claimants reveals that, rather than being moved by a reflexive hostility toward religion, Justice Stevens appears to respect religion as a powerful motivator of human action, though one that is largely able to look out for its own interests in the political process. Notwithstanding my rejection of the common view of Justice Stevens as hostile to religion, I argue in this paper that there are substantial problems with his actual approach. First, Justice Stevens has a tendency to treat religion as no more valuable than other valuable categories of expressive activity, a tendency that brings him into agreement with a great deal of recent scholarly commentary on the Religion Clauses. The protection he would afford religious practice is therefore largely coextensive with the protection afforded to expressive conduct more generally under the First Amendment, thereby rendering the Free Exercise Clause superfluous. Second, I argue that Justice Stevens places too much faith in the ability of legislatures to look out for the interests of minority religious groups, ignoring the important role that courts play in highlighting for legislatures the situations in which minority religions appear to be suffering disproportionately under generally applicable regulations. Accordingly, I propose a different approach, one that builds on Justice Stevens's views but that adequately acknowledges the unique value of religion in the lives of believers.

I tend to think that Justice Stevens -- who always struck me as unfailingly amiable and decent -- has been wrong in most of his religious-liberty and Establishment Clause votes and opinions.  As Eduardo notes, he sees "religion as a powerful motivator of human action[.]"  It seems to me, though, that it is a motivator about which he tends to be concerned, or suspicious.  (I'm thinking here of his Dale dissent, or his suggestions that regulations of abortion present Establishment Clause problems because they are motivated by or reflect religious commitment.)  Eduardo, do you think this impression of mine is unwarranted?  Other thoughts?  Comments are open.

Saturday, April 10, 2010

Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, and the Structure of Freedom

Here's a link to a book chapter I've done, for a forthcoming volume (edited by John Witte and Frank Alexander) on "Christianity and Human Rights."

What is the “right to freedom of religion,” a right which our leading human-rights instruments commit us to protecting, and what are the legal and other mechanisms that will sustain and vindicate our commitment? Some mechanisms might be better (or less well) designed for the purpose and so might work better (or less well) than others; some actors and authorities might be more (or less) reliable and effective protectors than others. In other words, the project of protecting human rights – including the right to religious freedom – involves not only reflecting on human goods and goals, but also wrestling with questions about institutional design and competence.

This chapter considers both the content of religious freedom and the ways it is protected and promoted. It proposes, first, that the “right to freedom of religion” belongs not only to individuals, but also to institutions, associations, communities, and congregations. Just as every person has the right to seek religious truth and to cling to it when it is found, religious communities have the right to hold and teach their own doctrines; just as every person ought to be free from official coercion when it comes to religious practices or professions, religious institutions are entitled to govern themselves, and to exercise appropriate authority, free from official interference; just as every person has the right to select the religious teachings he will embrace, churches have the right to select the ministers they will ordain.

Next, it is suggested that the right to church autonomy is a structural mechanism for protecting both the freedom of religion and human rights more generally. The relationship between the enterprise of protecting human rights and religious communities’ right to self-determination is a dynamic, mutually reinforcing one. Human rights law, in other words, protects church autonomy – it protects the freedom of religious communities to govern and organize themselves, to decide religious matters without government interference, to establish their own criteria for membership, leadership, and orthodoxy, etc. – and, in turn, church autonomy promotes the enjoyment and exercise of human rights. This mechanism is, John Courtney Murray thought, “Christianity’s basic contribution to freedom in the political order.” If we understand and appreciate this contribution, we will better understand and appreciate that often misunderstood idea, “the separation of church and state.”

Friday, April 9, 2010

Notre Dame "statement in support of life"

The University of Notre Dame's Task Force on Supporting the Choice for Life has "issued an institutional statement affirming its commitment to the defense of human life in all its stages. It also has adopted new principles for the institution’s charitable activity." More here.  Here is the official statement:

Consistent with the teaching of the Catholic Church on such issues as abortion, research involving human embryos, euthanasia, the death penalty, and other related life issues, the University of Notre Dame recognizes and upholds the sanctity of human life from conception to natural death.

In my view -- and I know that some disagree -- it is appropriate for a university to issue and embrace such a statement, and it is particularly appropriate for a Catholic university to issue one like this.

Great news from Notre Dame!

No, they have not hired Brad Stevens away from Butler.  It's even better:

CONGREGATION OF HOLY CROSS TO ORDAIN TWO PRIESTS

Notre Dame, Ind. –

With joy and thanksgiving, the Indiana Province of the Congregation of Holy

Cross announces the ordination of two new priests on Saturday, April 10, 2010, at 2:00 p.m. (EDT)

at the Basilica of the Sacred Heart, located on the campus of the University of Notre Dame. The

Most Reverend Daniel R. Jenky, C.S.C., Bishop of Peoria in Illinois, will confer the Sacrament of

Holy Orders on Rev. Mr. Kevin G. Grove, C.S.C. and Rev. Mr. Gerard J. Olinger, Jr., C.S.C.

“The international Holy Cross community is blessed to welcome these men who will bring

hope and joy to many people through our ministries,” says Rev. David T. Tyson, C.S.C., Provincial

Superior for the Congregation of Holy Cross, Indiana Province. “These ordinations are a time of

gratitude and celebration for us.”

What is the MOJ connection?  Gerry is a graduate of Notre Dame Law School, and my friend and former student.  God is good!

Thursday, April 8, 2010

Smith, Conscience, and Catholic Legal Theory: Five years later

Here's a post, from April 2005, that I thought was worth re-visiting (in light of, among other things, our own Rob Vischer's new book on conscience):

More Thoughts on Americans, Catholics, and Conscience

For starters, Professor Steven Smith has written several interesting papers -- available at SSRN -- on the problem of conscience.  In "The Tenuous Case for Conscience", he writes:

If there is any single theme that has provided the foundation of modern liberalism and has infused our more specific constitutional commitments to freedom of religion and freedom of speech, that theme is probably "freedom of conscience." But some observers also perceive a progressive cheapening of conscience - even a sort of degradation. Such criticisms suggest the need for a contemporary rethinking of conscience. When we reverently invoke "conscience," do we have any idea what we are talking about? Or are we just exploiting a venerable theme for rhetorical purposes without any clear sense of what "conscience" is or why it matters?

This essay addresses two questions. The first is discussed briefly: what is "conscience"? What do we have in mind when we say that someone acted from "conscience"? A second question receives more extended discussion: granted its importance to the individuals who assert it, still, why should "conscience" deserve special respect or accommodation from society, or from the state? That question forces us to consider the metaethical presuppositions of claims of conscience. The discussion suggests that claims to conscience may be defensible only on certain somewhat rarified moral and metaethical assumptions. The discussion further suggests that shifts in such assumptions have transformed the meaning of claims to "freedom of conscience," so that such claims typically now mean almost the opposite of what they meant when asserted by early champions of conscience such as Thomas More, Roger Williams, and John Locke.

In "Interrogating Thomas More:  The Conundrums of Conscience," he writes:

The martyrdom of Thomas More for refusing to take an oath affirming Henry VIII's marriage to Anne Boleyn and his supremacy over the church has fascinated historians, playwrights, and their readers. Why did More refuse, at such sacrifice to take an oath that nearly everyone in the realm (including More's family and friends) had taken - and that they regarded him as obstinate and absurd for not taking? Why did More refuse to explain the reasons for his refusal, even to close family and friends, beyond saying that they were reasons of "conscience"? And how can More's eloquent affirmation that he would "leave every man to own conscience" and that "every man should leave me to mine" be reconciled with his active persecution and execution of Protestants whose consciences impelled them to embrace what More regarded as heresy? This essay investigates these questions and reflects on their significance for modern commitments to (and difficulties with) the idea of "freedom of conscience."

In another vein, but also on the question of conscience, I'm very grateful to Steve Shiffrin, for his note, and also to Rob Vischer for his response.  I'd offer just three, minor thoughts about their exchange.

Steve writes to Rob:  "You seem to suggest that Catholic legal theory can help to lead American Catholics away from their disagreements with the Vatican.  What I like about the Mirror of Justice site is that it brings together people who bring quite different Catholic perspectives to the site.  Your comment seems to suggest that Catholic legal theory is committed to the view that American Catholics are wrong."  To which Rob replies:  "I think it's important that we help elucidate connections between the Gospel and our real-world environment, particularly connections that run along our legal and political cultures, challenging each other to reflect more deeply on what it means to follow Christ in the modern world.  More often than not, this effort will be directed toward encouraging Catholics to recognize the wisdom of Church teaching on a range of issues that are given short shrift in the current climate (notably war, materialism, and poverty, not just sexuality).  At other times, though, Catholic legal theorists may challenge the Church to recognize overlooked or potentially misconstrued implications of the Gospel."

I think it is worth remembering -- because, in the last few weeks, the press covering the death of Pope John Paul II and the election of Pope Benedict XVI rairly has -- that not all "American Catholics" disagree with "the Vatican."  (I'm putting aside the additional point that many American Catholics who profess disagreement with "the Vatican" -- I'm certainly not talking about Professor Shiffrin or any of my MOJ colleagues here -- have, I think, been misinformed by the press about what "the Vatican" claims and teaches.  The coverage of Pope Benedict's pre-election theological work -- on, for example, "Truth and Tolerance" -- has, in my judgment, been egregiously bad in this respect). 

Maybe I'm being pollyannish, trying to paper over differences, but -- as one would hope, I suppose -- most Catholics believe and assent to most of what the Magisterium holds out as the crucial content of the Catholic faith:  We have been redeemed through the saving work of Jesus Christ, who is Lord, who has gifted us with the Church and its sacraments.  And, in many cases, I imagine that American Catholics' failure to embrace that content has more to do with lax instruction than specific rejection.  (For example, I cannot help thinking that polls revealing that a non-trivial number of Catholics do not accept the divinity of Christ probably means that 10% didn't understand the question, or has never been given even rudimentary catechesis -- not that there is a big schism between the United States and Rome on the matter).  The press loves to talk about -- and, not surprisingly, we MOJ-types often talk about -- the hot-button areas of serious, often conscientious and principled, disagreement, but I like to think that, again, the vast majority of us agree about the vast majority of the Church's teachings.

Also, it seems worth emphasizing that there is nothing uniquely "American" about contemporary rejection of -- or failure to embrace -- certain teachings regarding the Usual Suspects issues.  That is, do American Catholics tend not to embrace the Magisterium's teaching regarding contraception because they are "American," or for some other reason?  I'm not sure.

Finally, I think that there are a number of questions where (a) Catholic teaching, properly understood, poses a real challenge to "American" premises and practices; but (b) most of us would agree, despite our various differences, that part of our job here at MOJ might well be -- in Steve's words -- to "help to lead American Catholics away from their disagreements with the [Magisterium]."  To the extent that American Catholics, qua Americans, believe that (say) utilitarian reasoning can and should supply the answers to moral questions about human life and the common good, then these Americans -- however well-meaning -- are mistaken, and in need of "Catholic legal theory's" help.

Wesley Smith on the upcoming puff-pic about (the loathesome) Jack Kevorkian

Here.

 . . .Jack Kevorkian is a dangerous nut who should be shunned, not celebrated. But you won’t see any of this in the movie, because HBO, the producers, and Pacino don’t know Jack. And the worst part is that they—and the popular media generally—don’t want to know Jack. They have a story they want to tell and facts would just get in the way. . . .

Why are great artists (e.g., Pacino) so often so stupid?

Update:  another First Thoughts post makes me wonder if, in fact, Pacino is so clever that he is exploiting the fact that he does, in fact, look like a "killer", to subtly communicate to people what they should, in fact, "know" about "Jack".  Maybe?  No, that's just The Godfather fan talking. 

Berkowitz on Sarkozy and the veil

Peter Berkowitz discusses, in the Wall Street Journal, the recent announcement by French President Nicolas Sarkozy that he intends to secure a ban on the full Muslim veil. 

Mr. Sarkozy's ban on the full veil represents a draconian measure for a free society. Arguably, it is necessary and proper. But it won't prevail without a fight. A few days after Mr. Sarkozy's speech, the Council of State, France's highest administrative body, declared that an outright ban would be hard to enforce, might be unconstitutional, and should be rejected. Meanwhile, a similar ban was unanimously approved by Belgium's home affairs committee last week and will be voted on by the lower house of parliament later this month.

Restrictions on liberty in a free society are always suspect and in need of justification. The best justification is the protection and promotion of freedom. . . .

Given the importance that the French Constitution attaches to liberty and the seriousness of the threat to peace and public order posed by the large, restive and nonassimilating portion of its Muslim population, the veil represents a legitimate concern. Banning it would be justified to the extent that Muslim communities in France use the veil to deprive girls of basic educational opportunities and to prevent women from fulfilling their obligations as citizens, or that terrorists create a security threat by disguising themselves in the veil.

Circumstances, not just principles, are decisive. . . .

Thoughts?

Update:  Jody Bottum, at First Thoughts, has some.

Tuesday, April 6, 2010

"Life is Good" (Take 2)

I am re-posting this, because I forgot to open comments on the original.  And, I would welcome comments . . .

Here is a short essay I did, for Notre Dame Magazine, which tries to connect "Jake" (the stick-figure guy with the smile who's on all the t-shirts), Nick Wolterstorff, and human dignity.  The bumper of my Jeep makes an appearance.  (Sorry for the long excerpt.)  Comments welcome!

I cannot help it — I love “Jake,” the distilled-to-his-essence stick-figure with a wide, winning grin, never-off shades and a disarming, simple message: “Life is good.”

Yes, he’s probably, to put it mildly, a bit overexposed. In fact, he’s everywhere. In airport gift shops and upscale shopping malls, on bumper stickers and backpacks, on doggie Frisbees, gold balls and baby bibs, there’s Jake — deftly managing a sizzling grill, cruising on a mountain bike, relaxing in a hammock, strolling through the woods, strumming a guitar. “Life is good,” he reports through the medium of carefully distressed “vintage” T-shirts. His sure seems to be.

It would be easy, but mistaken, to dismiss Jake as a knock-off of Harvey Ball’s “Have a Nice Day” smiley-face. The latter’s expression is vacant and phony — stoned, maybe — but Jake’s is genuinely happy. The smiley-face is a logo, with no story, plans or dreams, but Jake is the buddy who calls to cajole you into skipping work for a powder-day. “Have a nice day” is a limp, tepid, vague suggestion. “Life is good” is a bold blend of laid-back vibe and affirmation of the cosmos.

Jake is not just a stylized Crocodile Dundee (“No worries!”) or Bobby McFerrin (“Don’t worry, be happy!”), who is relieved to report that things aren’t too bad. He’s no slacker-nihilist, shrugging off what comes with a “Whatever, dude.” No, for Jake, life is Whitmanesque — it is large, it contains multitudes, and he likes it. It is good.

No doubt, Jake’s success is a tribute to lifestyle marketing, but his is more than a “lifestyle” claim. It is, I think, also a theological one, and I like to imagine that he knows it. When God made the world — the “dome in the middle of the waters,” the “two great lights,” the “great sea monsters” and “all kinds of creeping things” — we are told that “He saw how good it was.” Jake invites us to suppose that God’s verdict on bike rides through the backcountry and sausages cooked over fire would be — indeed, that it is — the same. No Manichean darkness here: Jake’s spirituality is joyfully incarnational. His world, like Gerard Manley Hopkins’, is “charged with the grandeur” — the goodness — “of God.”

As a general matter, I am leery of bumper stickers, even ones that tout candidates I support or causes to which I am committed. I would hate to undermine them with a sloppy lane-change, an ill-timed nose-scratch or a long-delayed car wash. My “Life is good” decal, though, seems perfect. It says it all — or, at least, it says a lot — and, really, who could object?

Secret message

To be honest, however, my sticker has a double meaning. As I see it, I’m not only safely throwing in my lot with Jake, and reminding my fellow drivers of the joys to be found in and through guitars, barbeques and hiking boots. I like to think that I am also proposing sneakily what I suppose I am too nervous to proclaim more straightforwardly (on my car, anyway): Every human person is precious and inviolable, every human person has dignity and worth, and every human person — old and young, strong and frail, vulnerable and independent, loved and lonely, innocent and guilty — ought to be welcomed in life and protected by law.

But am I really saying all that? Maybe I’m kidding myself. Sure, I want to think that Jake and his motto make it easier to invite my fellow drivers-citizens to consider and embrace what others’ bumpers say more explicitly, but is it just wishful, self-justifying thinking to imagine that hearts and minds are moved, pervasively and comprehensively, in the pro-life direction by even a contagiously good-natured cartoon-guy’s pro-“life” catch-phrase? And does Jake’s message really capture, or even map onto, what I and so many others mean by “pro-life”?

In his 1995 encyclical, The Gospel of Life, Pope John Paul II challenged all people of good will to take on the “responsibility of choosing to be unconditionally pro-life.” Does my display of Jake’s good-natured profession cut it?

Maybe not. The pro-life message, after all, is not — that is, it is not only — that there’s a lot of fun to be had in “life,” that we should hope, look and reach for many pleasant experiences. It’s a call to communion, love and relationship, not just to hedonism. The good news that is the Gospel of Life is not just that not all of the stuff in the universe is inanimate but is instead teeming with metabolism, reproduction, growth and adaptation. It’s amazing and wonderful, certainly, that so much in the world is alive, and only a crank would refuse to marvel at, even revel in, its dynamism.

Still, “to be unconditionally pro-life” would seem to involve more than standing duly impressed before the workings of DNA and photosynthesis. No, the pro-life claim is about us, and not only about the arenas in which we struggle, the contexts through which we move and the stories we construct. It is about the amazing mystery and gift that is the person who lives — and laughs and cries and prays and plays — and not only about the no-doubt impressive facts that cells multiply and neurons fire.

The pro-life proposal, what it is that I want Jake to be saying when he revels in the goodness of life, is that the individual human person — every one — matters. Each person — every one — carries, in C.S. Lewis’ words, the “Weight of Glory.”

“There are no ordinary people,” Lewis insisted; “You have never talked to a mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civilisations — these are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat. But it is immortals whom we joke with, work with, marry, snub and exploit — immortal horrors or everlasting splendours.”

The claim that every person matters and has worth might seem unremarkable. Perhaps it is one of those “duh” observations that is not even worthy of a bumper sticker, let alone a pop-culture phenomenon like Jake. It is, certainly, the purported premise of the law and morality of human rights and of our American civil religion (“with liberty and justice for all”). But can this claim, this premise, bear the weight we ask it to carry? Is there anything to it? What’s so special about us, actually?

My Notre Dame colleague Tom Shaffer has said that every human person is “infinitely valuable, relentlessly unique, endlessly interesting.” This is true, I’m sure. But what is it, exactly, that makes it true, and not just wishful thinking or a delusion of grandeur?

The great worth

We profess — Jake and I, and the rest of our pro-life friends — that the dying and elderly deserve more, and better, than a chemically hastened, hospital-bed-vacating death, but what makes this true, as opposed to merely squeamish or sentimental?

We affirm that even the commission of the most grave, most horrible crime should not be enough to push the criminal beyond all hope for reconciliation, repentance and relationship, but what saves this affirmation from being so much soft-hearted, excessively expensive fluff?

We insist, flying in the face of a culture that holds out ability and achievement as the criteria for a worthy life, that a severely disabled unborn child is no less welcome, and no less inviolable, than the most gifted protégé, but why isn’t this insistence mere preening or self-indulgence?

“What is man,” the Psalmist asked God, “that thou are mindful of him?” What indeed. After all, he noted, human beings “are but a breath” and “their days are like a passing shadow.” More than a few contemporary philosophers would agree with John Searle, who insists that the world “consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force,” some of which have become organized into “certain higher-level nervous systems.” We are, in other words, electrified sacks of fluid, meat-puppets in particle-clogged space. What is so “good” about that?

It is, to say the least, an unsettling question. We are committed, today, to the morality and language of human rights and human dignity. We believe, in Nicholas Wolterstorff’s words, that “human beings, all of them, are irreducibly precious.” This is true, if a bit wordy for a bumper sticker. But how is it true, and what makes it true?

Many would say that our “reason,” “autonomy” or “capabilities” do the work. We are valuable and inviolable, the arguments go, because of the impressive, inspiring things we do, or at least can do. To be sure, we can do amazing things, we do have characteristics and capacities that set us apart and above so much else that is. But these are not enough. Many of us are broken, disabled, unimpressive; all of us are dependent, vulnerable and incomplete.

The Psalmist, again, gave thanks that he was “fearfully, wonderfully made,” but even a well-designed meat-puppet is, well, just that. Looking through a microscope, one might mistake us for chimps, if not worms. What gives us — what gives life — the great worth that we have and that saves our talk of rights, dignity and the sacred from being so much pretty nonsense?

Remember here the children’s book The Velveteen Rabbit. A little boy’s toy becomes, over the years, “old and shabby, but the Boy loved him just as much. He loved him so hard that he loved all his whiskers off, and the pink lining to his ears turned grey, and his brown spots faded. He even began to lose his shape, and he scarcely looked like a rabbit any more, except to the Boy. To him he was always beautiful, and that was all that the little Rabbit cared about.” Eventually the Rabbit is made “Real” by having been loved by the Boy.

In a similar way, Wolterstorff has argued, God’s love for us is what makes it true that we are precious, sacred and have worth. Our dignity is real; it is not just a convenient, reassuring construct. But, it is not achieved, earned or performed. It is freely bestowed and lovingly given. Our human rights do not attach to our own capacities but instead to the “worth bestowed on human beings by that love.”

This is what John Paul II called the “moral truth about the human person,” that the “greatness of human beings is founded precisely in their being creatures of a loving God” and not self-styled authors of their own destiny. That in which we so justifiably take pride is also, and always, a call to humility. Not one of us, in the ways that really count and matter, is self-made, and thank God for that.

Life is good, then, and it is because we love and are loved.

That almost does sound like it could work on a bumper sticker.

A must-read interview with a worthy and admirable American Catholic

Here.

You know who I'm talking about . . .

There is no doubt that Mike Krzyzewski has enjoyed success in his life. But he also knows that a lot of people had something to do with that success.

“I feel that the success that I’ve had in my life is a result of God-given talents that were helped to be developed by a number of people and that I need to use those talents in a proper way. To me that’s living your faith.”

So at the end of the day, what would Coach K like to be remembered for? Is it the titles and the awards? No. Mike Krzyzewski says he would like people to remember “just the fact that I’m an honest man, a truthful person and somebody who cares about people, not just himself.” Chances are they’ll probably also note that he won a few basketball games along the way.

Monday, April 5, 2010

"Life is Good"

Here is a short essay I did, for Notre Dame Magazine, which tries to connect "Jake" (the stick-figure guy with the smile who's on all the t-shirts), Nick Wolterstorff, and human dignity.  The bumper of my Jeep makes an appearance.  (Sorry for the long excerpt.)  Comments welcome!

I cannot help it — I love “Jake,” the distilled-to-his-essence stick-figure with a wide, winning grin, never-off shades and a disarming, simple message: “Life is good.”

Yes, he’s probably, to put it mildly, a bit overexposed. In fact, he’s everywhere. In airport gift shops and upscale shopping malls, on bumper stickers and backpacks, on doggie Frisbees, gold balls and baby bibs, there’s Jake — deftly managing a sizzling grill, cruising on a mountain bike, relaxing in a hammock, strolling through the woods, strumming a guitar. “Life is good,” he reports through the medium of carefully distressed “vintage” T-shirts. His sure seems to be.

It would be easy, but mistaken, to dismiss Jake as a knock-off of Harvey Ball’s “Have a Nice Day” smiley-face. The latter’s expression is vacant and phony — stoned, maybe — but Jake’s is genuinely happy. The smiley-face is a logo, with no story, plans or dreams, but Jake is the buddy who calls to cajole you into skipping work for a powder-day. “Have a nice day” is a limp, tepid, vague suggestion. “Life is good” is a bold blend of laid-back vibe and affirmation of the cosmos.

Jake is not just a stylized Crocodile Dundee (“No worries!”) or Bobby McFerrin (“Don’t worry, be happy!”), who is relieved to report that things aren’t too bad. He’s no slacker-nihilist, shrugging off what comes with a “Whatever, dude.” No, for Jake, life is Whitmanesque — it is large, it contains multitudes, and he likes it. It is good.

No doubt, Jake’s success is a tribute to lifestyle marketing, but his is more than a “lifestyle” claim. It is, I think, also a theological one, and I like to imagine that he knows it. When God made the world — the “dome in the middle of the waters,” the “two great lights,” the “great sea monsters” and “all kinds of creeping things” — we are told that “He saw how good it was.” Jake invites us to suppose that God’s verdict on bike rides through the backcountry and sausages cooked over fire would be — indeed, that it is — the same. No Manichean darkness here: Jake’s spirituality is joyfully incarnational. His world, like Gerard Manley Hopkins’, is “charged with the grandeur” — the goodness — “of God.”

As a general matter, I am leery of bumper stickers, even ones that tout candidates I support or causes to which I am committed. I would hate to undermine them with a sloppy lane-change, an ill-timed nose-scratch or a long-delayed car wash. My “Life is good” decal, though, seems perfect. It says it all — or, at least, it says a lot — and, really, who could object?

Secret message

To be honest, however, my sticker has a double meaning. As I see it, I’m not only safely throwing in my lot with Jake, and reminding my fellow drivers of the joys to be found in and through guitars, barbeques and hiking boots. I like to think that I am also proposing sneakily what I suppose I am too nervous to proclaim more straightforwardly (on my car, anyway): Every human person is precious and inviolable, every human person has dignity and worth, and every human person — old and young, strong and frail, vulnerable and independent, loved and lonely, innocent and guilty — ought to be welcomed in life and protected by law.

But am I really saying all that? Maybe I’m kidding myself. Sure, I want to think that Jake and his motto make it easier to invite my fellow drivers-citizens to consider and embrace what others’ bumpers say more explicitly, but is it just wishful, self-justifying thinking to imagine that hearts and minds are moved, pervasively and comprehensively, in the pro-life direction by even a contagiously good-natured cartoon-guy’s pro-“life” catch-phrase? And does Jake’s message really capture, or even map onto, what I and so many others mean by “pro-life”?

In his 1995 encyclical, The Gospel of Life, Pope John Paul II challenged all people of good will to take on the “responsibility of choosing to be unconditionally pro-life.” Does my display of Jake’s good-natured profession cut it?

Maybe not. The pro-life message, after all, is not — that is, it is not only — that there’s a lot of fun to be had in “life,” that we should hope, look and reach for many pleasant experiences. It’s a call to communion, love and relationship, not just to hedonism. The good news that is the Gospel of Life is not just that not all of the stuff in the universe is inanimate but is instead teeming with metabolism, reproduction, growth and adaptation. It’s amazing and wonderful, certainly, that so much in the world is alive, and only a crank would refuse to marvel at, even revel in, its dynamism.

Still, “to be unconditionally pro-life” would seem to involve more than standing duly impressed before the workings of DNA and photosynthesis. No, the pro-life claim is about us, and not only about the arenas in which we struggle, the contexts through which we move and the stories we construct. It is about the amazing mystery and gift that is the person who lives — and laughs and cries and prays and plays — and not only about the no-doubt impressive facts that cells multiply and neurons fire.

The pro-life proposal, what it is that I want Jake to be saying when he revels in the goodness of life, is that the individual human person — every one — matters. Each person — every one — carries, in C.S. Lewis’ words, the “Weight of Glory.”

“There are no ordinary people,” Lewis insisted; “You have never talked to a mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civilisations — these are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat. But it is immortals whom we joke with, work with, marry, snub and exploit — immortal horrors or everlasting splendours.”

The claim that every person matters and has worth might seem unremarkable. Perhaps it is one of those “duh” observations that is not even worthy of a bumper sticker, let alone a pop-culture phenomenon like Jake. It is, certainly, the purported premise of the law and morality of human rights and of our American civil religion (“with liberty and justice for all”). But can this claim, this premise, bear the weight we ask it to carry? Is there anything to it? What’s so special about us, actually?

My Notre Dame colleague Tom Shaffer has said that every human person is “infinitely valuable, relentlessly unique, endlessly interesting.” This is true, I’m sure. But what is it, exactly, that makes it true, and not just wishful thinking or a delusion of grandeur?

The great worth

We profess — Jake and I, and the rest of our pro-life friends — that the dying and elderly deserve more, and better, than a chemically hastened, hospital-bed-vacating death, but what makes this true, as opposed to merely squeamish or sentimental?

We affirm that even the commission of the most grave, most horrible crime should not be enough to push the criminal beyond all hope for reconciliation, repentance and relationship, but what saves this affirmation from being so much soft-hearted, excessively expensive fluff?

We insist, flying in the face of a culture that holds out ability and achievement as the criteria for a worthy life, that a severely disabled unborn child is no less welcome, and no less inviolable, than the most gifted protégé, but why isn’t this insistence mere preening or self-indulgence?

“What is man,” the Psalmist asked God, “that thou are mindful of him?” What indeed. After all, he noted, human beings “are but a breath” and “their days are like a passing shadow.” More than a few contemporary philosophers would agree with John Searle, who insists that the world “consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force,” some of which have become organized into “certain higher-level nervous systems.” We are, in other words, electrified sacks of fluid, meat-puppets in particle-clogged space. What is so “good” about that?

It is, to say the least, an unsettling question. We are committed, today, to the morality and language of human rights and human dignity. We believe, in Nicholas Wolterstorff’s words, that “human beings, all of them, are irreducibly precious.” This is true, if a bit wordy for a bumper sticker. But how is it true, and what makes it true?

Many would say that our “reason,” “autonomy” or “capabilities” do the work. We are valuable and inviolable, the arguments go, because of the impressive, inspiring things we do, or at least can do. To be sure, we can do amazing things, we do have characteristics and capacities that set us apart and above so much else that is. But these are not enough. Many of us are broken, disabled, unimpressive; all of us are dependent, vulnerable and incomplete.

The Psalmist, again, gave thanks that he was “fearfully, wonderfully made,” but even a well-designed meat-puppet is, well, just that. Looking through a microscope, one might mistake us for chimps, if not worms. What gives us — what gives life — the great worth that we have and that saves our talk of rights, dignity and the sacred from being so much pretty nonsense?

Remember here the children’s book The Velveteen Rabbit. A little boy’s toy becomes, over the years, “old and shabby, but the Boy loved him just as much. He loved him so hard that he loved all his whiskers off, and the pink lining to his ears turned grey, and his brown spots faded. He even began to lose his shape, and he scarcely looked like a rabbit any more, except to the Boy. To him he was always beautiful, and that was all that the little Rabbit cared about.” Eventually the Rabbit is made “Real” by having been loved by the Boy.

In a similar way, Wolterstorff has argued, God’s love for us is what makes it true that we are precious, sacred and have worth. Our dignity is real; it is not just a convenient, reassuring construct. But, it is not achieved, earned or performed. It is freely bestowed and lovingly given. Our human rights do not attach to our own capacities but instead to the “worth bestowed on human beings by that love.”

This is what John Paul II called the “moral truth about the human person,” that the “greatness of human beings is founded precisely in their being creatures of a loving God” and not self-styled authors of their own destiny. That in which we so justifiably take pride is also, and always, a call to humility. Not one of us, in the ways that really count and matter, is self-made, and thank God for that.

Life is good, then, and it is because we love and are loved.

That almost does sound like it could work on a bumper sticker.