It's exam-grading season. And so, I am doing all kinds of interesting things like cleaning out my kids' "art drawer," organizing 10 years' worth of lessons clipped from "Guitar Player" magazine, and . . . going back to my MOJ posts around May 9 of previous years.
Six years ago, I had these thoughts about the lessons contained in my colleague Vince Rougeau's then-recent paper for the then-hot-topic Catholic Charities case:
If one understands "religion" as being about "personal spirituality", comfort, therapy, and an individual's discrete "personal relationship" with the Divine, then a law requiring entities with health-care plans to include contraceptive coverage in those plans would seem to impose little, if any, significant burdens on the freedom of "religion," so understood. After all, California is not requiring individuals to believe anything in particular, it is not requiring individuals to act in any particular way, and it is not even (directly) requiring individuals to fund conduct that those individuals might, for "personal" religious reasons, find offensive.
Nonetheless, premises grounded in a better, richer understanding of religious freedom push us toward the conclusion that the scope of California's "religious employer" exemption is deeply injurious to the Church's evangelizing and social-justice missions. The exemption decrees to be "secular" activities engaged in by the Church, and by Christians acting together, that represent the Church's efforts to be true to the Great Commission.
Five years ago, Rob. Tom, and I were talking about the Solomon Amendment, state-run law schools, and subsidiarity:
I would regard it as "vital" that we not equate state-run and private institutions, particularly educational institutions. Subsidiarity, as I understand it (and, I'm sure, as Rob does too), is about more than diffusion and mediation. Especially when it comes to education, it is -- as Tom's post suggests -- important that the sources of value and formation not all be governments.
To anticipate an objection: My point is not offered as simply a "government is bad" assertion. Still, the project of "state control over education" is not an ideologically neutral one, and is not one that we who endorse subsidiarity for reasons rooted in Catholic Social Thought should too quickly embrace. So, we should, I think, worry more about preserving the independence and distinctiveness of private law schools, even as we also worry, too, about federally imposed homogeneity among government-run schools.
On May 10, 2006 I raised my eyebrows at reports from the United Kingdom that some were questioning the ability of Labour MP Ruth Kelly, a "committed Catholic and member of the Opus Dei group," to enforce that nation's anti-discrimination laws.
Then, in May of 2007, I . . . [Ed.: For God's sake, Garnett, get back to your exam-reading!]
Saturday, May 8, 2010
My sense is that most of us here at MOJ are (at least) uneasy about Arizona's new immigration law. During a conversation with a friend (a Catholic who is a bit to the left of me politically), we spent some time thinking about this challenging question: For those of us who think that this is not the way to proceed, but who also think (as I do) that it is entirely reasonable for (a) a political community to care about securing its borders and regularizing immigration and (b) border states like Arizona to be upset that they are being asked to bear a disproportionate share of the costs and burdens (the many benefits that come with immigration are spread more diffusely, I think) associated with illegal immigration . . . what should be done? How can the costs and burdens be reduced and spread? How can the benefits still be obtained (and justice done) while also respecting (a), above?
Christopher Tollefsen has this interesting piece, "Immigration and Self-Governance", up over at Pubilc Discourse. He contends that "three issues—the right to secure borders, the moral costs of illegal immigration, and the virtues of generous neighborliness and forgiveness—must be clarified in order to address the problems of immigration reform." With respect to the "virtue of generous forgiveness," he concludes:
We are . . . a prosperous and peaceful country; we make few demands of our citizens for personal sacrifice, and few of us know true want or desperation. Our form of self-governance—the way in which we determine what kind of a people we are to be—can take the shape of a willingness to forgive, as a society, the actions of our neighbors which were taken under duress and for generally noble motives, such as the desire to care for a family. This virtue prompts support for a general amnesty policy and perhaps a fast track to citizenship for some—not as an isolated act, to be repeated serially every ten or twenty years, but in conjunction with the meeting of our obligations as regards illegal immigration. . . .
Thoughts?
Friday, May 7, 2010
I came across this site, "Headline Bistro," a "service of the Knights of Columbus dedicated to bringing readers the top, daily headlines that Catholics need to know." One of the (many) pieces currently up describes a recent poll conducted by CBS and The New York Times, regarding the effects of the recent coverage of some bishops' mishandling of clergy-abuse cases on practicing Catholics' relationship with the Church. The poll (seems to me to) point in a number of different directions on a number of matters. The story's lede, though, is worth re-printing here:
A new poll conducted by CBS News and The New York Times has found that 77% of Catholics who attend Mass weekly say that “the Vatican’s handling of recent child sex abuse reports” has had no effect on how they “feel about the Catholic Church.” An additional 12% of practicing Catholics say that they have a more positive feeling about the Church as a result of the Vatican’s handling of the scandals. . . .
88% of Catholics-- practicing and non-practicing-- report that the scandal has had no effect on their dealings with priests. 82% say it will not affect their Mass attendance, 79% say it will have no effect on donations, and 87% say that it will have no effect on their children’s involvement in Church activities. . . .
It is interesting (to me) that, at a time when (we're told that) Catholics, as a group, think about contested questions of public policy and morality no differently than do non-Catholics, there is, despite the latest round of coverage -- which has, in my view, at times been unfair and misleading -- a signfiicant gap between the views of Catholics and those of non-Catholics (e.g., "only 17% of practicing Catholics, and 33% of Americans overall, believe that the Vatican is currently engaging in a cover-up"). Interesting . . . but also worrisome.
UPDATE: The America blog links to a news story which contains this:
There is a distinctly different level of anger from the public directed toward the Catholic Church over the sexual abuse of minors than toward other organizations whose leaders commit similar crimes, noted two psychologists who work in the field. . . .
Plante told Catholic News Service in a phone interview that there's a strain of anger at the institutional church that doesn't directly relate to sexual abuse itself and has no parallel in how the public has reacted to other institutions where abuse has occurred. "There are a lot of people who are very angry at the Catholic Church about all sorts of things, from the Crusades to how Galileo was treated, to the church's positions on sexual ethics, divorce and women priests," Plante said. "It's like a fire hose, all that gets funneled into the clergy abuse thing." . . .
Congrats, Robby! (Story here.)
Princeton legal philosopher and constitutional scholar Robert George has been awarded the Honorific Medal for the Defense of Human Rights of the Republic of Poland, which recognizes outstanding achievement in the field of human rights.
Marek Zubik, deputy ombudsman of the Office of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection and a law professor at the University of Warsaw, bestowed the medal in a ceremony May 4 at the University of Warsaw, after which George delivered the 2010 Petrazycki Lecture in legal philosophy on "Natural Law, God and Human Dignity." . . .
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
Like Bob, I read closely the news article to which I linked about new Planned Parenthood clinics in Michigan (and linked to it in the hope that others would also read it closely). I agree with him that there is more in the article than (in Bob's words) "simply a 'health insurance reform legislation funds and increases the incidence of evil deeds - abortions - by evil entity - Planned Parenthood' story." But, as my initial link-post suggested, that story is, it seems to me, in the article.
I also agree with him that those of us who are pro-life should "light [such] candle[s]" as we can to reduce the possibility that we are, through our actions, subsidizing abortions in the ways that the federal government is (and is not merely accused of) doing, and to address compassionately and wisely the realities of poverty. We should also, though, always keep lit the candle (I do not suggest or believe that Bob disagrees with me here!) that is our unyielding insistence that it is a grave injustice and an insult to human dignity to exclude unborn children from the law's protection.
Rob's post and Charles Murray make an important point -- the reason why school choice is not only justifiable, but also just, is not because school choice (if correctly implemented) can cause higher test scores. Two quick points: First, the "take away" from Milwaukee should not be "voucher-using kids at religious schools get pretty much the same test scores that they would get in the public school," but "isn't it telling, about the public schools, that voucher-using kids at religious schools get the same test scores that they would have at a public school, given that these religious schools achieve their results with much, much less money and far fewer resources!" Second, there are studies of other choice programs that do show test-score gains for school-choice beneficiaries, especially among African-American children.
That said, and again, Rob is right: the reason(s) to support choice sound more in religious freedom, educational pluralism, parental empowerment, and basic fairness (i.e., the public should be willing to help pay for the public, "secular" good that religious schools provide). Joseph Viteritti, Jack Coons, and others have been emphasizing this for years. I tried to flesh out this point too, a few years ago, in this essay, "The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good." Here's a bit, from that essay:
That the Constitution permits us to experiment with such programs . . . does not mean that we should. We should ask, then, what reasons there are for enhancing parents’ ability to direct and control their children’s education? This question invites, I think, not only numbers-crunching and data-grinding on the nuts-and-bolts of education reform—though such crunching and grinding is needed, too—but also deeper reflections about the purpose of education, the authority of the state, the integrity of the family, the demands of pluralism, political liberalism, and religious freedom, and the dignity of the human person.
[W]ho should decide where, what, and from whom children will learn? Is the education of young people the prerogative of the contemporary liberal state, and its purpose the inculcation of government-approved dispositions, attitudes, and beliefs? Or is education an obligation, vocation, and right of parents, one that is inextricably linked to religious liberty and political pluralism? Is the point of choice-based reform simply to spur improvements in government schools through competition? Is it merely to more effectively and efficiently deliver data and transmit “skill sets”? Or is it to make good on the obligation of public authority to promote the authentic common good?
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Here's Fish, in the Times, writing about the recent decision in Salazar:
It has become a formula: if you want to secure a role for religious symbols in the public sphere, you must de-religionize them, either by claiming for them a non-religious meaning as Kennedy does here, or, in the case of multiple symbols in a park or in front of a courthouse, by declaring that the fact of many of them means that no one of them is to be taken seriously; they don’t stand for anything sectarian; they stand for diversity. So you save the symbols by leeching the life out of them. The operation is successful, but the patient is dead.
The game being played here by Kennedy (and many justices before him) is “let’s pretend.” . . .
My distaste for Kennedy’s opinion has nothing to do with its result. In general, and for the record, I have no problem with the state accommodating religious symbols and I am not bothered by the thought of a cross standing in a remote part of the Mojave desert even if the land it stands on is owned by the government. I do have a problem with reasoning that is patently dishonest and protests too much about its own motives and the motives of those it defends. But that is what the religion clause drives you to when in one of its clauses — the free exercise clause — it singles out religion for special positive treatment, and in the other clause — the Establishment Clause — it places a warning label (watch out for this stuff; it’s trouble) on religion. It’s no wonder that the justices who try to deal with this schizophrenia tie themselves in knots and produce opinions that are as unedifying as they are disingenuous.
I think there's a lot to this. (I think Fish is probably too quick to insist that Congress's motive in preserving the cross is to preserve it as a religious symbol, but put that aside.) In my view, if it is constitutionally permissible for the government to display religious symbols it is not because the symbols are not religious. It is, instead, because the display of a religious symbol is not an "establishment" of religion.
