Here is my take, on the Hosannah-Tabor case, in today's USA Today:
[I]t is well established that a “ministerial exception” to job-discrimination laws prevents secular courts from jumping into religious disputes that they lack the authority to address or the competence to solve. The question in the Hosanna-Tabor case is not so much whether the exception exists — it does, and it should — as how it should be understood and applied.
As the court of appeals recognized, this exception is “rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom.” Indeed, a religious-liberty promise that allowed governments to second-guess religious communities’ decisions about what should be their teachings or who should be their teachers would be a hollow one.
To be clear, the ministerial exception is constitutionally required and valuable, but it does not rest on assumption that religious institutions and employers never behave badly. Certainly, they do. Its premise is not that churches are somehow “above the law.” They are not, and should not be. Its point is not “discrimination is fine, if churches do it.” It is, instead, that there are some questions secular courts should not claim the power to answer, some wrongs that a constitutional commitment to church-state separation puts beyond the law’s corrective reach, and some relationships — such as the one between a religious congregation and the ministers to whom it entrusts not only the “secular” education but also the religious formation of its members — that government should not presume to supervise too closely.
To be sure, not every employee of a religious institution is a “ministerial employee,” and religious institutions — like all employers — have many legal obligations to their employees. Although there are difficult questions to be asked, and many fine lines to be drawn, when it comes to interpreting and applying the First Amendment’s religious-freedom guarantees, it cannot be the role of secular government to second-guess the decisions of religious communities and institutions about who should be their ministers, leaders and teachers, any more than they should review their decisions about the content of religious doctrines.
Last October, many enjoyed a laugh at the expense of Christine O’Donnell, then a candidate for one of Delaware’s U.S. Senate seats, when she questioned the constitutional pedigree of the “separation of church and state.” Her critics were a bit too quick to poke fun. In fact, “separation of church and state” does not appear in the Constitution. Still, and even though it is often distorted and misused, the idea is a crucial dimension of religious freedom. We wisely distinguish, or “separate,” the institutions and authorities of religion from those of government. We do this, though, not so much by building a “wall,” but by respecting the genuine autonomy of these different spheres. We do this not to confine religious belief and practice but to curb the ambitions and reach of governments. . . .
Thursday, April 21, 2011
"Spain ends church control over religion teachers' married lives," The Guardian proclaims. (This is probably not quite the way I'd frame the issue, but put that aside.) The key point in the story, as I see it, is that these religion teachers were working in and for the state's schools. Maybe the Guardian would write pretty much the same story, celebrating the Church's loss of "control", if the teacher had been working in a Catholic school, I don't know. But, for purposes of religious freedom generally -- and the "ministerial exception" more specifically -- this distinction seems to matter a lot.
Dahlia Lithwick, who writes about the Supreme Court and law, can turn a phrase, but her analysis sometimes descends into over-partisan fog. As my colleague, Gerry Bradley, shows (here), this is definitely true of her latest, at Slate, on the abortion-related legislation that some states are considering.
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
From Joe Carter, at First Things.
Dear Joe . . . you're welcome. =-)
