Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Saturday, December 31, 2011

Fr. Robert Barron's "Catholicism"

In the "Great Minds Think Alike . . . and Ours, Too" category:  I gave to my parents, and they gave to me, Fr. Robert Barron's new "Catholicism" series of DVDs.  (Fr. Barron is the very gifted priest behind "Word on Fire."  Check it out.)  I love them.  They are lively, and are set in evocative, beautiful places (Galilee, Chartres, etc.)  They are not just catechesis -- they are about the whole Christian message / claim / vision.  Great stuff. 

Thursday, December 22, 2011

Another lawsuit challenges the coverage mandate

The happy warriors for religious liberty at the Becket Fund have filed a second lawsuit -- this time on behalf of an Evangelical Christian institution, Colorado Christian University, challenging the interim final rule that requires employers to provide coverage for, among other things, contraception and abortion-causing drugs.  The Maureen Dowds of the world want to frame the debate about exemptions from the mandate as a narrowly Catholic concern (and, really, not even a concern for most Catholics), recognizing that framing it this way goes a long way, in many people's minds, toward winning it.  But, the issues is bigger than Catholics-and-contraception. 

Robert Burt, "In the Whirlwind"

My friend and teacher, Prof. Robert Burt (Yale Law School), has published a new book called "In the Whirlwind:  God and Humanity in Conflict."  (For such an irenic guy, Bo's book's have lots of "conflict" in their titles.  See his "The Constitution in Conflict".)  Here is the blurb:

God deserves obedience simply because he’s God—or does he? Inspired by a passion for biblical as well as constitutional scholarship, in this bold exploration Yale Law Professor Robert A. Burt conceptualizes the political theory of the Hebrew and Christian Bibles. God’s authority as expressed in these accounts is not a given. It is no less inherently problematic and in need of justification than the legitimacy of secular government.

In recounting the rich narratives of key biblical figures—from Adam and Eve to Noah, Cain, Abraham, Moses, Job, and Jesus—In the Whirlwind paints a surprising picture of the ambivalent, mutually dependent relationship between God and his peoples. Taking the Hebrew and Christian Bibles as a unified whole, Burt traces God’s relationship with humanity as it evolves from complete harmony at the outset to continual struggle. In almost every case, God insists on unconditional obedience, while humanity withholds submission and holds God accountable for his promises.

Contemporary political theory aims for perfect justice. The Bible, Burt shows, does not make this assumption. Justice in the biblical account is an imperfect process grounded in human—and divine—limitation. Burt suggests that we consider the lessons of this tension as we try to negotiate the power struggles within secular governments, and also the conflicts roiling our public and private lives.

Looks fascinating!

NDLS student wins National Pro-Life Legal Writing Award

Congratulations to my student, Michael Fragoso, who was honored by Massachusetts Citizens for Life with that organization's annual "National Pro-Life Legal Writing Award."  The award-winning paper is Michael's note, published in the Notre Dame Law Review, called "Taking Conscience Seriously or Seriously Taking Conscience?  Obstetricians, Specialty Boards, and the Takings Clause."

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

"Liberty, Conscience & Autonomy"

In the current issue of Touchstone (well worth a subscription, IMHO), Barry Hankins has an interesting piece called "Liberty, Conscience & Autonomy," which is adapted from a chapter in his book Jesus and Gin:  Evangelicalism, the Roaring Twenties, and Today's Culture Wars (2010).  Check it out.

A response to Tuesday's op-ed on Notre Dame, Fr. Jenkins, and the mandate

Tuesday's edition of The Washington Times included an opinion piece by Patrick Reilly ("Unholy abortion compromise"), who charges Fr. Jenkins and the University of Notre Dame (and others) with proposing to "replace what many consider to be an unconstitutional [HHS] mandate with language that, at best, is only marginally better for a select few[,]" thereby "threatening the rights of many religious organizations and insulting our Christian and Jewish brethren. By doing so, these prominent Catholic institutions undermine the interests of the Catholic Church and the defense of religious freedom."

This charge, in my view, is not fair.  (I responded earlier, here, to what I regarded and regard as other misplaced criticisms of Fr. Jenkins's letter.)

First, and in a perhaps-futile effort to head off suggestions in blog-world that I am merely slavishly defending my employer or that I've gone wobbly on the injustice of the mandate:  Yes, Notre Dame has, in my view, made some mistakes with respect to living out its Catholic character and mission, and yes, the mandate is unjust.

That said, I think Mr. Reilly's op-ed proceeds from a too-quick reading of Fr. Jenkins's letter to Secretary Sebelius, while neglecting his other public intervention on the matter.  In Fr. Jenkins's letter, he did not simply call for the replacement of the current (clearly inadequate) religious-employer exemption with Section 414(e) -- which deals with pension plans -- of the Internal Revenue Code.  True, that provision was cited as a guide, but Fr. Jenkins's focus was on the "principles" that he sees underlying that provision.  And, discussing these principles, he emphasized the importance of protecting generously those institutions or organizations that share “common religious bonds and convictions with a church" and "all organizations that work in the ministries of the church.”  In addition, he insisted that "an institution inspired by faith to serve beyond the limits of its religious denomination should not be judged less religious and hence less worthy of an exemption.”

As Mr. Reilly points out, Section 414(e) has been interpreted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a narrow way -- a way that, in my view, would not be consistent with the "principles" mentioned in Fr. Jenkins's letter.  But, the fact that one court has used a particular, and inadequate, three-factor test to operationalize Section 414 hardly does not mean that Fr. Jenkins and Notre Dame are proposing to settle for this particular (and, I agree, inadequate) three-factor test in the contraception-mandate context or that such a test would be authoritatively adopted and employed in the enforcement of a broader religious-employer exemption to that mandate.  (My understanding is that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation has not even been adopted by the I.R.S.)

What's more, even if the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of 414(e) were what Fr. Jenkins is proposing as a substitute for the religious-employer exemption to the HHS mandate, I think Mr. Reilly overstates the "similar[ity]" between that court's third factor -- "whether a denominational requirement exists for any employee or patient/customer of the organization" -- and the current HHS exemption, which applies only to organizations that "hire and serve primarily people of the same faith."  (My emphasis).  The former actually is much broader.

At the end of the op-ed, Mr. Reilly adds to the charge that Fr. Jenkins is proposing a course that is "insulting [to]our Christian and Jewish brethren" with the suggestion that he is "simply working to protect [his] institution[].  But the practical effect of their proposed compromise would be to slam the door on most religious organizations while providing political cover to the Obama administration."  Certainly, I believe that it is not just Notre Dame's religious freedom that matters, and I hope that neither of these "practical effect[s]" comes to pass.  Still, the suggestion is not fair.  Here is the concluding paragraph of Fr. Jenkins's other public intervention on the matter, which appears on the USCCB's web site and which is signed by, among others, Carl Anderson of the Knights of Columbus (hardly a squish when it comes to life issues) and Archbishop Dolan:

The HHS mandate puts many faith-based organizations and individuals in an untenable position. But it also harms society as a whole by undermining a long American tradition of respect for religious liberty and freedom of conscience. In a pluralistic society, our health care system should respect the religious and ethical convictions of all. We ask Congress, the Administration, and our fellow Americans to acknowledge this truth and work with us to reform the law accordingly.

This is not, in my view, a statement that is either self-serving or insulting to non-Catholics or to institutions other than Notre Dame.

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

"Good minus God: The Moral Atheist"

Returning to an earlier-discussed matter, here is Louise Antony, in The New York Times, arguing with "those" who are alleged to argue that "[a] person who denies God . . . must be, if not actively evil, at least indifferent to considerations of right and wrong."  I have never heard anyone (who is in the arguing business) actually argue this, but put that aside.  She writes:

 It is only if morality is independent of God that we can make moral sense out of religious worship.  It is only if morality is independent of God that any person can have a moral basis for adhering to God’s commands.

Let me explain why.  First let’s take a cold hard look at the consequences of pinning morality to the existence of God.  Consider the following moral judgments — judgments that seem to me to be obviously true:

•            It is wrong to drive people from their homes or to kill them because you want their land.

•            It is wrong to enslave people.

•            It is wrong to torture prisoners of war.

•            Anyone who witnesses genocide, or enslavement, or torture, is morally required to try to stop it.

But, the the truth of these "moral judgments" (which are, I agree, true) is not, as I see it, actually "independent of God's existence."  It is only because God exists that the universe is such that we are what we are and that these "moral judgments" are (therefore) true.  The author writes: 

To say that morality depends on the existence of God is to say that none of these specific moral judgments is true unless God exists.  That seems to me to be a remarkable claim.  If God turned out not to exist — then slavery would be O.K.?  There’d be nothing wrong with torture?  The pain of another human being would mean nothing?

Why is this claim "remarkable"?  True, the claim makes some extremely uncomfortable, but that is because those people (i) do know that these moral judgments are true but (ii) don't know that God exists, or do believe that he does not.  But this comfort does not refute the point that, absent the existence of a God who loves and sustains the world and persons, these judgments would not be "true", no matter how strongly they were believed and no matter how conscientiously those who believed them committed themselves to living in accord with them.  The author writes, "Imagine telling a child: 'You are not inherently lovable.  I love you only because I love your father, and it is my duty to love anything he loves.'"  But, I don't think this is what I'm saying; I am saying, though, that my child is inherently lovable (and not merely that the "matter and force that seems to me -- whatever I am -- to constitute (however it does) me -- feels something strong and pleasant toward my child") because that child is loved by God. 

There's a lot in the piece, and most of it is taking issue, I understand, with "Divine Command Theory", which I don't and don't mean to endorse.  Still, and with apologies for being a broken record, I think there is a distinction between the obviously-not-true claim that "people who don't believe in God cannot act morally or come to correct moral judgments" and "the moral judgments which are, really, true would be no-less-true even if the universe were as Searle describes it."

Once again:  Philosophers, set me straight! 

Friday, December 16, 2011

"Tebow and the Mystery of Victory"

My friend and colleague, Jeff Pojanowski, has a nice reflection over at Patheos about the Tim Tebow phenomenon.  He concludes:

Hollywood and sports culture have little patience for losers and less of an eye for ordinary grace. If Tebow's winning streak or career does not end in triumph, any continued dignity, faith, and service on his part—no matter how revolutionary—likely will not be televised. Yet the vast majority of children who order Tebow jerseys will also see their own NFL dreams evaporate. Beyond that, many will grow up to lose jobs, disappoint loved ones, be disappointed by loved ones, and experience dark nights of the soul that persist well past dawn. For those reasons, it may be Tebow's worldly defeat—if handled with grace, humility, and constancy—that could make his jersey truly worth holding on to.

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

"Is God Necessary for Explaining Moral Absolutes?"

Joe Carter links to Matthew O'Brien's Public Discourse essay, which answers this question "yes."  Recognizing that some people who are much smarter and more learned than I am think that the answer is "no," I am inclined to agree with O'Brien.  It's not (as I see it) that claims about what ought or ought not to be done -- or even about what absolutely ought or ought not to be done -- are not rational or reasoned; it's that (as I see it) God's existence and providence, His creating and sustaining of the world, His gift of dignity to and plan for human persons, etc., are what make it the case that it is true -- that it is even possible for it to be true -- that some things really ought or ought not to be done.  It seems to me that, if "the world is made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force," then there are no "moral absolutes"; it makes no sense, really, to talk about what meat puppets really ought or ought not to do.  It's because we are not just meat puppets, but rather creatures of a loving God, that it does make sense to talk about these matters.

Alright, philosophers.  The comments are open.  Set me straight.

UPDATE:  Sam Levine (Touro) kindly suggested to me that these two earlier MOJ posts (from 2008 and 2009) are relevant to this discussion.  Sam wrote:

Some Jewish biblical commentators understand Abraham's statement in Genesis 20:11 as making a similar point about religion and self-control. In the context of the narrative, Abraham seems to imply that notwithstanding the possible virtues of Abimelech and the people of Gerar, the lack of religious belief left them (relatively) vulnerable to temptation and improper

Another update:  Robert Miller, at First Things, contends that "moral absolutes" do not depend on "divine commands."  He concludes:

Some actions are incapable of being ordered to our final end, and these actions are always and everywhere wrong. God absolutely prohibits such actions, but the divine legislation functions not to ground the absolute prohibition but to enforce it.

And here comes the unfrozen caveman lawyer (i.e., me) obstinately wondering whether it would make any sense, really, to talk about "final ends," and about the always-and-everywhere-wrongness of actions that are "incapable of being ordered" to them, if there were no God.  If the universe were as, say, Searle describes it, then there would be no "final end" of persons (indeed, there wouldn't really be "persons") and no "moral absolutes."  To say this, though, is not (at least, I think it is isn't) to embrace "divine command" theory; it is to say, though, that theism is necessary for morality to be real

I know, I know.  A lot of really learned people say I'm wrong about this, and so I guess I am.  But, I suspect that I am invincibly so, because I cannot shake my attachment to what seems to me obvious:  Happen-stance clumps of electrified bits of dirt don't have morally meaningful "final ends"; creatures of a loving God, however, do. 

YET ANOTHER UPDATE:  A friend and reader helpfully sends in this quote, from Peter Atkins (a chemist):  “I adopt the view that the whole of all there is can be accounted for by matter and its interactions.”  As I see it, if Atkins's view were true -- that is, if it really were the case that "the whole of all there is can be accounted for by matter and its interactions", i.e., if there were no God, then it would not make much sense to talk about "moral absolutes" (or morality, for that matter).

Monday, December 12, 2011

Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe

PRAYER OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI 
BEFORE THE IMAGE OF OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE

Wednesday, 11 May 2005

Pope honours Our Lady of Guadalupe, prays for mothers

 

Holy Mary, who under the title of Our Lady of Guadalupe are invoked as Mother by the men and women of Mexico and of Latin America, encouraged by the love that you inspire in us, we once again place our life in your motherly hands.

May you, who are present in these Vatican Gardens, hold sway in the hearts of all the mothers of the world and in our own heart. With great hope, we turn to you and trust in you.

Hail Mary, full of grace, 
the Lord is with thee, 
blessed art thou among women and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, Jesus. 
Holy Mary, Mother of God, 
pray for us sinners, 
now and at the hour of our death. Amen. 
Our Lady of Guadalupe, 
Pray for us.