Benedict XVI: Natural Law Is Base of Democracy
Says Ignoring It Is a Crisis for Human Civilization
VATICAN CITY, OCT. 5, 2007 (Zenit.org).- Benedict XVI says that natural law must be the foundation of democracy, so that those in power are not giving the chance to determine what is good or evil.
The Pope said this today when receiving in audience the members of the International Theological Commission, who had just completed their annual plenary meeting, held in the Vatican this week under the presidency of Cardinal William Levada.
The Holy Father discussed with the theological experts what he considers the antidote to "ethical relativism."
Natural law, the Pontiff explained, is "the norm written by the Creator in man's heart," which permits him to distinguish good from evil.
But, he contended, partly because of "c ultural and ideological factors, today's civil and secular society is in a situation of confusion. The original evidence for the foundations of human beings and of their ethical behavior has been lost, and the doctrine of natural moral law clashes with other concepts that run directly contrary to it.
"All this has enormous consequences on civil and social order. A positivist conception of law seems to dominate the thought of many scholars."
Benedict XVI explained that according to these scholars, "humanity, or society, or in effect, the majority of citizens, become the ultimate source for civil legislation."
Unnecessary relativism
He continued: "The problem that arises is not, then, the search for good but the search for power, or rather the balance of power.
"At the root of this tendency is ethical relativism, which some people even see as one of the principle conditions for democracy because, the y feel, relativism guarantees tolerance and mutual respect.
"But if this were true, the majority at any given moment would become the ultimate source for law, and history shows with great clarity that majorities can make mistakes.
"True rationality is not guaranteed by the consensus of the many, but only by the openness of human reason to the reason of the Creator and by listening together to this Source of our rationality."
Freedom
Benedict XVI affirmed that natural law is actually a guarantee of freedom.
He explained: "When fundamental essentials are at stake: human dignity, human life, the institution of the family and the equity of the social order -- in other words the fundamental rights of man -- no law made by men and women can subvert the norm written by the Creator in man's heart without society itself being dramatically struck ... at its very core.
"Thus natural law is a true guara ntee for everyone to live freely and with respect for their dignity, protected from all ideological manipulation and from all arbitrary abuses of the powerful.
"No one can disregard this appeal. If by reason of a tragic clouding of the collective conscience, skepticism and ethical relativism managed to annul the fundamental principles of natural moral law, the very democratic order itself would be profoundly undermined at its foundations."
The Pope said that men and women of all faiths should combat this possibility.
He said: "Against such clouding -- which is a crisis for human, even more than for Christian, civilization -- the consciences of all men and women of good will must be mobilized, both laypeople and followers of religions other than Christianity, so that together they may make an effective commitment to creating ... the conditions necessary for a full awareness of the inalienable value of natural moral law.
"The advance of individuals and of society along the path of true progress depends upon respect for natural moral law, in conformity with right reason, which is participation in the eternal reason of God."
There's a nice essay (http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=10279 ) in the October 15 America on the importance of recovering the concept of the common good in our contemporary American political discourse and practice. Not moral values, not pluralism, not rights, not dignity -- the "common good" at the center, those other concepts taking their place in service of achieving the common good (and the individual goods that it includes). Hats off to the authors, Kelley and Gehring.
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
The questions that Fr. Miscamble, Peter Steinfels, John McGreevy, and others are working through are hard, and I admire all concerned for their clear acknowledgment that something -- but what? -- needs to be done to reverse the trend according to which formerly "Catholic" universities no longer deserve that predicate.
Approaching the issue from a slightly different angle than any I've seen in the recent discussions, I'll take Villanova, where I am privileged to work, as an example. Villanova University is, as it has been from its founding, an aposolate of the Order of St. Augustine. The Augustinians have chosen to allow lay men and women (along with other religious and clerics) to join with them in that apostolate at Villanova. It would be self-defeating, indeed perverse, for those charged with this apostolate to attract to Villanova those who either don't support or are hostile to the apostolate. Obviously, those doing the hiring at Villanova will and must look for qualities in addition to ones bearing directly on support of and contribution to the apostolate, but it's hard to see how one can justify adding folks who do not in some way further the apostolate as such -- unless by outright denying that the University should be engaged in its declared apostolate (a point to which I return below).
As a matter of fact, however, most "Catholic" colleges and universities, including Villanova, do most of their hiring without regard for apostolate or mission. It would seem to me, therefore, that the first necessary step is to try to get agreement that support of apostolate/mission is as imporant in potential faculty hires as are intelligence, education, collegiality, and the like. With most people in most Catholic places of higher education not even granting the legitimacy of hiring for apostolate/mission (let alone its desirability or exigence), it's no wonder we cannot begin to reach consensus on whether hiring Catholics (with a numerical goal in mind) is the way to go or hiring "for mission" is the preferred path. In each of the several Catholic law schools I know, non-Catholics are among the biggest supporters of mission, but in most Catholic universities, including their law schools, controversy rages over whether or not to hire "for mission."
I think it's virtually beyond serious question that, whatever has been going on over the last generation has delivered a raft of Catholic places of higher learning that are no longer meaningfully Catholic. In my judgment, the sponsors of those institutions with charismatic and canoncial apostolates should either acknowledge as much and stop pretending the contrary or take the necessary action to renew the religiosity of their institutions. What that action would be, I'm not entirely sure, and obviously it would to some extent vary from place to place. It's worth bearing in mind, though, that (as Bernard Lonergan observed) extraordinary action may be required to reverse a cycle of decline. I can understand why some people are uncomfortable, for example, with numerical goals for hiring engaged *Catholics* (rather than hiring "for mission"), but it would seem to me that the burden is on those who oppose such numerical goals to demonstrate an alternative that will likely do better. Personnel are policy, and engaged Catholics are at least prima facie on the side of the sponsoring Catholic religious order's apostolate.
Peter Steinels worries about a "top-down fiat [that will be] disruptive of the university community." In my judgment, such disruption may be exactly what is needed to reverse the unhappy trend that seems to move forward with inexorable force. But, granting Steinfels's concern, what about the "disruption of the university community" that occurs when colleagues deny that hiring for mission is even legitimate, claim that the Catholic quota is filled, or openly mock and actively subvert the religious identity of the institution? What about this disruption that quietly but insatiably eats away at the core season after season, day after day? I don't disagree with Steinfels that "hiring for mission" has promise, but it has to be done. How many pro-mission faculty can one find at such "Catholic" schools as Georgetown, Fordham, Boston College, Santa Clara, and the rest? I suspect that if the incumbents were pro-mission, hiring "for mission" wouldn't be so controversial as to be the exception rather than the rule.
Let me be clear: In my judgment, Catholic places of higher education should be inclusive, both at the faculty level and at the student level. But there is no inconsistency between being authentically Catholic and genuinely inclusive. The arms of the Church are wide.
Monday, September 17, 2007
The Chemerinsky debacle has generated some throughtful blogging on the proper role of (I'll call them) firmly held commitments in faculty hiring ("ideology" is too pejorative). On Ilya Somin's principles (as posted by Volokh, see below), it would be acceptable for a self-describing Catholic law school *openly* to favor Catholics for faculty positions, but wrong for the same law school to discriminate against, say, Democrats for faculty positions.
If, say, the Catholic religion taught (as it does NOT) that non-Catholics are necessarily going to hell, there might be reason to worry whether Catholic faculty members could treat non-Catholic students fairly. But, whatever the religion's teaching, the cognizable issue is indeed whether the potential faculty member is likely to discriminate against students who do not profess that religion. The presumption should be in favor of religious adherents' opportunity to be non-discriminatory in the exercise of the professional duties.
Somin at Volokh:
When Is it Permissible for Universities to Refuse to Hire Professors Based on their Political Views?
The Chemerinsky saga raises a broader question: Is it ever permissible for a university to refuse to hire an academic because of his political views? For reasons that Eugene Volokh elaborates here, schools should be much more hesitant to reject professors on political grounds than high-ranking administrators such as law school deans. I am tempted to say that taking ideology into account in faculty hiring is never defensible. However, there are three situations where it probably is:
I. Institutional Commitments to a Religion or Ideology.
Some schools are explicitly committed to promoting a particular religion or (less often) political ideology. In such cases, it is permissible for the school to give preference to professors who share that commitment. For example, Brigham Young could legitimately prefer Mormon professors over non-Mormons. However, a school that follows this approach should openly announce its commitments and what they entail in terms of faculty hiring. It would be wrong to mislead prospective students and faculty members by secretly pursuing an ideological or religious agenda behind a veneer of supposed neutrality. To my knowledge, most religious universities that give preference to co-religionists in faculty hiring are in fact open about their agenda. By contrast, some secular schools that engage in ideological discrimination are not.
II. Ideological Commitments that Conflict with Professional Competence in One's Field.
Some ideological commitments are at odds with basic professional competence in an academic's own field. For example, a school would be justified in refusing to hire a World War II historian who is a Holocaust denier. Even if his professional credentials were otherwise adequate, the Holocaust denial in and of itself calls his competence into question because the evidence against that position is so overwhelming.
However, it is essential to recognize that this applies only to views on issues that directly relate to the scholar's academic work. Many people have outlandish or poorly supported views on political issues unrelated to their areas of expertise. Views on these unrelated issues should not be held against them in the academic hiring process. For example, Noam Chomsky, in my opinion, has crackpot views on various political issues, such as denying the existence of Pol Pot's mass murders in Cambodia (whose reality is almost as well established as that of the Holocaust). However, his poor judgment on these issues is irrelevant to his academic work as a linguist, in which field he is a leading authority.
Even within job candidates' own fields, there is a danger that hiring committees will tend to define as professionally incompetent any view that diverges too much from their own. That risk is difficult to eliminate entirely, as most people understandably have greater tolerance for views similar to their own than for those that are very different. There is no way to completely cure this bias. All we can do is to try to be vigilant about it, and also to ensure that a wide range of ideologies are represented on faculties. Ideological diversity reduces the danger of political bias in hiring, because it is hard to claim that a job candidate's views are beyond the pale of serious scholarship if some of your current colleagues share them.
III. Ideologies that Prevent Adherents from Treating Students Fairly.
In very rare cases, a job applicant's political ideology might cast serious doubt on his or her ability to treat students fairly. For example, a university could understandably refuse to hire a virulently racist professor for a position where he would be responsible for teaching large numbers of African-American students. After the fact sanctions for discriminatory behavior by the professor may not be sufficient to prevent discrimination, especially given the reluctance of most administrators to sanction academics for all but the most egregious in-class misconduct. Moreover, professors have a great deal of discretionary authority over students, and thus many opportunities to discriminate in ways that are hard for administrators to detect after the fact.
Like the previous one, this exception to the principle of tolerance can easily be abused. For example, political opponents could interpret any opposition to an ethnic or religious group's political agenda as hostility to the group itself. The classic example is the attempt to define all opposition to affirmative action as racist. But there are parallels to this on the right. Thus, it is important to remember that this justification only applies in cases where the job applicant has a prejudice against a group so strong that he is likely to discriminate against students who are members of the group. It is not enough that he opposes some element of the group's political agenda. In the case of religious groups, it is not enough that he opposes the group's theology (e.g. - if he is an evangelical Christian who believes that those who do not accept Christ will go to Hell).
In assessing both the second and third exceptions, faculties should err on the side of tolerance when in doubt. Otherwise, free academic inquiry could be seriously undermined. At the same time, we have to concede that there are extreme cases when schools can legitimately refuse to hire academics based on ideology.
