Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, October 18, 2010

Politics, Taxes, and the Pulpit

Nina J. Crimm (St. John's University School of Law) and Laurence H. Winer (Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University) have just published Politics, Taxes, and the Pulpit: Provocative First Amendment Conflicts (OUP 2011).  I'll let some of the blurbs on the back of book speak for themselves, especially because one of them is by me. 

Here's what John Witte Jr. says in his blurb:  "Crimm and Winer on religious tax exemptions will be the standard treatment for many years to come.  This book is the most insightful and incisive analysis we now have of the history, policy, law, and constitutional questions surrounding federal income tax exemptions for religious communities.  Litigators, lobbyists, judges and legislators will find powerful new arguments to rethink whether it makes sense to force churches to pay taxes to play in the game of politics -- especially when virtually everyone else plays for free and the Constitution guarantees the free exercise of religion."

And here's my blurb:  "Politics, Taxes, and the Pulpit is a model of how to translate the First Amendment's exalted values into the workable details of a functioning legal system.  With clarity, cogency, and conviction, Crimm and Winer demonstrate why and how current restrictions on the speech of 501(c)(3) corporations, including many houses of worship, should be reformed to give better effect to our constitutional norms of freedom of religion and free speech.  This strong yet subtle account of pressing social, ethical, and legal issues deserves the careful study of a wide readership."

Thursday, October 14, 2010

Governing in the Church -- one among many reasons for libertas ecclesiae

Fr. Bramwell has an outstanding piece over at The Catholic Thing on that work of the pastors of the Church that is rarely named today, viz., governing.  True governing, as Bramwell observes, is a form of service, the service of leading souls to God.  Such service also takes the forms of teaching and sanctifying, of course, but -- this is Bramwell's point -- it does properly take the form of governing, as Bramwell shows in interpreting some recent and subtle words of Pope Benedict. 

This governing role within the Church is important to our MoJ discussion of the reasons there should be a libertas eccelsiae.  Honestly, if the pastors of the Church cannot  -- or do not! -- govern, this might appear, to some at least, as a reason to bring the Church within the scope of the "sovereignty" of the civil governing authority.  Vigorous and upright exercise of the governing authority by the pastors of the Church should provide a concrete reason, among others, for the state to stand back and let the Church be Church.  No persuasive argument for true libertas ecclesiae, I suspect, can be grounded in the Church as (to borrow a phrase from Chief Justice Roberts in the Free Enterprise case) "cajoler-in-chief."   

Friday, October 8, 2010

Announcing the fifth-annual Scarpa Conference at Villanova Law

I am pleased to announce the fifth-annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture.  The focus of this year's Conference is a monumental new book, published in June by Yale University Press, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution, by William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, who will co-keynote the Conference.  William Eskridge is the John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School (http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/WEskridge.htm) and John Ferejohn is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stanford University (http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/ferejohn.html), Charles Seligson Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, and Professor of Political Science at New York University.
 
Other confirmed speakers include:
 
-Associate Justice David Stras, Minnesota Supreme Court; formerly a member of the University of Minnesota Law faculty (http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=JudgeBio_v2&menu=appellate&ID=30536);
-Martin Shapiro, James W. & Isabel Coffroth Professor, Berkeley Law (Boalt Hall) (http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?facID=105)
-Kristin Hickman, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/hickmanke.html)
-Henry Paul Monaghan, Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School (http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Henry_Monaghan)
-Thomas Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Thomas_Merrill)
-Theodore Ruger, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/truger/)
-Jane Schacter, William Nelson Cromwell Professor and Associate Dean, Stanford Law School (http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/profile/133/Jane%20Schacter/
-Patrick Brennan, John F. Scarpa Chair, Villanova University School of Law
 
Please mark your calendars for Friday, February 11, 2010, and plan to join us at Villanova for what promises to be an extraordinary discussion of law, jurisprudence, and the political process.  I'll post more details as they become available.

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Eternal law, natural law, and human law

I've posted a new chapter  on the practical, including U.S. constitutional, consequences of taking seriously the Thomistic thesis that the natural law is our participation in the eternal law and is, therefore, a real law, one from which no rational person, not even the human lawmaker we sometimes mistakenly call sovereign, is exempt.  This chapter consolidates and continues some of my earlier work aimed at showing that a natural law account of human law does not per se lead to what is commonly referred to as judicial activism.  My account does, though, exalt the role of the human lawmaker in a way that will perhaps be disturbing to those, such as Justice Scalia, who tend in the direction of a kind of democratic fundamentalism: in leading the multitude to the common good, the lawgiver is doing something God-like.  (Was this perhaps the hidden premise of Justice Stevens's justification of the rule of Chevron?  I think we know the answer).

Those who were present at the Law and Religion Roundtable at Brooklyn Law this past June saw an early version of this chapter.  In response to the helpful comments of several at the Roundtable (especially Andy Koppelman, Kent Greenawalt, Nelson Tebbe, and Steve Shiffrin), I have sharpened my account of why and how the eternal law provides the nonnegotiable definition of all law, including human law.  My account still won't satisfy those who wish to call an unjust "law" a law, but I think I've done better now at showing why Thomas was right -- and why even those of us in the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition would do better -- to call such a thing a mere "document."

 

Update: The original link I provided didn't work.  I believe the problem's been corrected.

Monday, September 27, 2010

religion as a game show

In the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, (Dei Verbum), the fathers of the Second Vatican Council taught that "insight grows into what has been handed down" (no. 8) or, as another translation has it, "there is a growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been handed down."  The phenomenon under discussion, when it occurs, is what is sometimes referred to as "doctrinal development."  Whatever we call the phenomenon, it occurs, as the Council continues (no. 8), "through the contemplation and study made by believers, who treasure these things in their heart (cf. Lk. 2:19, 51), through the intimate understanding of spiritual things they experience, and through the preaching of those who have received through episcopal succcession the sure gift of truth." 

I mention this because of this piece of moral theology and church (of England) teaching by Rowan Williams.  Damian Thompson asks the right question:  Would Pope Benedict ever -- think especially about his candor in the press conferences on the airplanes -- reply to a most important question, concerning what some regard as gay rights, with a "pass"?  Williams has an impossibly hard job, a fact that is underscored yet again by this serious man's dodging a serious doctrinal question with a "pass."   

Authority is made of sterner -- and subtler -- stuff, as John Noonan's work on "doctrinal development" has shown. 

Thursday, September 23, 2010

Implications of the affirming the priority of the common good

I've long wanted to understand more deeply what was at issue when Jacques Maritain and Charles De Koninck famously disagreed about the nature of the common good (and the individual person's relation thereto).  The recent translation, by Ralph McInerny, and publication, by the University of Notre Press, of The Writings of Charles De Koninck (2009) have been a great help (to me).  This link, to a blog I recently discovered and like a lot, states the terms of the debate with remarkable economy. 

Thursday, September 16, 2010

Benedict en route to the UK

A transcript of the Holy Father's press conference on the plane earlier today is already available here.  It contains the Pope's most decisive language yet on the failures of Church officials to stop the abuse and on the priority of healing of victims.  There is also very strong language about what must be done with the abusers themselves, language that I suspect will raise some eyebrows on account of its denial of the operation of "free will" in certain relevant situations.  In all, though, this State Visit, which is also a pastoral visit, is off to a very promising start, as this thematic money-quote suggests:  "Where there is anti-Catholicism, I will go forward with great courage and joy."  Can't beat that.

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Narcissism at Mass? Could it be?

Back in early August, I raised some questions (here, here, and here) concerning what bad theology of the Mass and made-up liturgies mean for Catholic thought about the state, civil society, the work of being human, and so forth.  Today I stumbled across a fascinating psychological study, co-authored by the always interesting Paul Vitz (emeritus in psychology at NYU) and his son, that has now shown that part of what accounts for the liturgical "creativity" that seems to be almost everywhere in evidence is -- lo! -- the celebrant's narcissism.  Check out their account!  In a culture in which self-definition by self-assertion is the principal cultural and moral problem, it is not surprising that self-assertion would reorient even the sanctuary during Mass.  In such a culture, it is correlatively even more needful that the liturgy exemplify how self-definition by self-assertion is the problem to be overcome, not the omega point of human history.  This is not about Latin, lace, or the location of the celebrant's seat per se, but rather our respective orientations in the action of the liturgy and who's at the center of the act of worship.   

Monday, September 13, 2010

Where the danger actually lies

Robby George invites us to ask where the danger actually lies when candidates for jobs in the legal academy reveal (or not) what they hold as true.  I'll answer (and I know it's only a partial answer) with a true story.  I've taught at several law schools, and one of them once interviewed someone who was then recently first in his class at one of the top three or so law schools in the US.  He was also then a recent clerk to one of the "conservative" Justices of the Supreme Court.  He also brought to the table heaps of other sterling credentials and an engaging way that portended excellent teaching and great citizenship.   I attended his job talk, and was impressed.  Many other colleagues were impressed.  Other colleagues were opposed, though, and one visited me in my office.  She tried to explain that the job talk was deficient.  I offered my reasons for thinking it was very good, certainly far, far above our "standard."  She countered that the candidate "appeared nervous."  I asked why this mattered; I also said I didn't see any nervousness (though, of course, entry-level candidates *should* be nervous, as this story illustrates).  Emboldened, she went on to aver that the candidate was nervous because of his own insecurity about the "conservative" quality of the thesis of his talk.  I'm not myself sure the views he defended were recognizably (or in any way truly) "conservative" (or liberal or any other category like the one invoked), but they certainly weren't popular locally.  For whatever reason, no offer of employment ever issued to said candidate.  He now teaches at a far better law school than the one at which I then taught.

When the person I have in mind interviewed at my then law school, he was married (to a woman).  Later, he divorced and came out of the closet as a gay man.  When I once mentioned that development to an earlier opponent of the candidate whose trajectory I've just described, the response was that if that change had occurred earlier, an offer of employment would have been much easier to make.  

QED 

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

incitement to religious hatred: the possible case of Peter Tatchell

Damian Thompson in the Telegraph offers some telling data and insights about how incitement to religious hatred sometimes comes to pass.  Could any educated person in good faith reject the corrections Thompson makes to Tatchell's "account"? The further question, then, is the source and motive for the misprepresentations Thompson calls out.  Any number of possible answers comes to mind, though some more than others.