Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, May 17, 2005

"State Meets Religious Fervor"

Rick has pointed out some problems with the interesting article by Mark Lilla in Sunday's N.Y. Times Magazine called "Church Meets State."  A couple of other criticisms occurred to me.  The first is that Professor Lilla, like so many others, sees the American founding as a process by which the Enlightenment thinkers managed the unruly anti-liberal religious sects.  (The framers bet, he writes, "that entering the public square would liberalize [religious sects]  doctrinally, that they would become less credulous and dogmatic, more sober and rational.")  The next step, of course, is to assume that controlling or managing those sects is also the major task for today.  But this overlooks another side to the founding, one in which the sects themselves played a leading role.  On the very issue of religious liberty that is of such concern to Lilla, there is now a strong historical record (assembled by Michael McConnell, William McLoughlin, and others) that it was the fervent and "narrow" evangelical sects that provided the biggest push for religious liberty and disestablishment in the years 1776-1833; meanwhile, a lot of more "enlightened" thinkers supported retaining established churches of a mild, rationalistic variety.  If "enlightened" thought often sought to retain established churches, then just maybe it should not be the sole guide to the meaning of the American "liberal democratic order" that swept those churches away.  Maybe the fervent believers also have something central to tell us about the meaning of the American experiment.

Second, although Professor Lilla points out incisively how and why liberal religion has declined and given way to fervent evangelical religion, he seems ultimately to regard this as a wholly dangerous thing.  (That's why, he says, citizens need to be "more viligant about policing the public square" these days.)  But the fervent evangelical spirit that has given us anti-evolution crusades has also given us movements such as abolitionism -- which was, indeed, a direct outgrowth of one of the Great Awakenings whose "ecstatic" and "credulous" spirit Professor Lilla warns about.  Take also the civil rights movement, the touchstone for all modern social-justice efforts.  It owed most of its energy to the fervor of an "ecstatic" and pretty "literalistic" African-American church; and much of Martin Luther King's religious depth and perseverance came from his embrace of some very un-rationalistic, un-Enlightenment Christian concepts like the pervasiveness of human sin and the high costs that must be paid for redemption.  (These elements in the civil rights movement are documented in a great recent book by David Chappell called Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow.)

My former law faculty colleague, David Smolin, has written:

It is very nice for academics to talk about the dangers of making absolutist, divisive, sectarian religious statements in the political arena, but in fact those sorts of statements are necessary if people are going to be motivated to pay the cost of doing what is right, whether the subject is race, the poor, the environment, or abortion. The problem is not merely determining or debating the "right" course of action, but more broadly one of fighting the constant temptation to avoid paying the costs associated with doing what is right.

I think that the political Religious Right has many faults, including overlooking many issues of common good, such as the environment and social concern for the poor, that should be priorities in a Christian social ethic.  But maybe some of the fervor that the Religious Right brings to an issue like abortion is, as in the other cases above, quite valuable in countering the inertia that keeps us from addressing that moral problem.

Tom B.

Federal District Court Decision for Same-Sex Unions

Last week a federal district court in Nebraska, in an opinion here, struck down the state constitution's ban on recognition of same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships.  The ban had been added to the state constitution by voter initiative in 2000.  Eugene Volokh has a comprehensive critique of the decision here.  Whatever one's perspective on recognition of same-sex unions or marriage as a policy matter -- and Eugene in no way belongs to the anti-gay-rights movement -- his post demonstrates why the court's decision is at best a big overreach as a matter of constitutional interpretation, and on some of its rationales is simply frivolous.

Tom B.

Thursday, May 12, 2005

How Specific Should Catholic Social Thought Teaching Be?

On the Legal Scholarship Network, Michele Pistone of Villanova Law School posts "The Devil in the Details: How Specific Should Catholic Social Thought Teaching Be?," also published recently in the Journal of Catholic Social Thought.  The abstract:

The article explores Catholic social teaching's tradition of generality, and assesses the wisdom of, and potential for, change to a more specific orientation. The article enlightens the reader as to reasons for the traditional approach to Catholic social teaching, what might be gained by the articulation of a more concrete social teaching, the assertion that a more specific social teaching will require greater lay input, a suggestion for a possible mechanism for accomplishing this, and the benefits of greater lay input, particularly via the aforementioned mechanism. The article also makes some recommendations as to when, how, and to what degree the Church should aspire to a more detailed formation of its social teaching.

UPDATE:  Professor Pistone tells me that because of a glitch at LSN, an earlier version of her article got posted on the website to which I linked.  The up-to-date version will be posted in the near future; stay tuned and I'll mention it.

Monday, May 9, 2005

"Catholic" and "Inclusive"

As a non-Catholic, I speak with some trepidation  here, but ... I very much agree with Richard's comments about Catholic legal education.  Of direct relevance to recent discussions here are his comments that "the community [at a Catholic law school] must contain many Catholics, particularly on its faculty.  These Catholics ought to be people who embrace their identity as faithful sons and daughters of the Church, and in particular who embrace the Catholic intellectual tradition. It is certainly not enough that the school have a few Catholics like this, or Harvard would be a Catholic law school because Mary Ann Glendon is on the faculty there."  Also Richard's comment that "[n]on-Catholics would be welcome of course, but as Ex Corde states they would be expected to understand and respect the Catholic identity of the school."

I endorse what Richard says.  (My dispute with Jason Adkins at The Seventh Age has been over his implications that the University of St. Thomas School of Law doesn't have many such Catholics and doesn't make the Catholic intellectual tradition central, which are suggestions that I assert are demonstrably false.)  There can be debates over what precisely constitutes "many," and the precise line for defining "faithful," but everyone should agree with Richard that a small percentage of faithful Catholics will find it hard to set the course for the institution.  (That's in no way meant to denigrate the fine efforts of Mark Sargent and others to bolster Catholic identity at their institutions incrementally, which is the only possible way under many circumstances.)

To turn to another issue that may be of general interest.  In continuing to criticize St. Thomas Law for speaking of its "inclusiveness," Jason asks:

Doesn't Catholic mean integrated and universal, that is, inclusive? Contrary to Tom Berg's comments, if the school wasn't worried about how people perceive labels or believe people perceive buzzwords in characteristic ways (as I suggested), then it wouldn't need those qualifying phrases in the first place.

Yes, "catholic" surely means universal, but that does not necessarily translate over to the big-C "Catholic" institution(s), and certainly not necessarily over to societal understanding of those institutions.  There are plainly widespread perceptions in society about the Church's non-inclusivity and "narrowness."  Many people with those perceptions are simply not open to the Church's insights in any good-faith way, but many others may be otherwise open to many aspects of Catholic intellectual and social thought.  Some of the perceptions about "narrowness" are accurate, and of course in many cases "narrowness" is good because that term is just a pejorative label for clear truth-telling (note also the good deal of discussion these days about whether the Church in fact needs to be more "sectarian" and "pure").

But other perceptions about Catholic "narrowness" are unfounded.  When I tell people I teach at a seriously Catholic law school, I frequently am asked:  "Do you allow non-Catholics there?"  This is the sorry state of understanding in the culture.  There is nothing weak-kneed or dishonorable about correcting such misimpressions:  nothing weak-kneed or dishonorable in being concerned about "how people perceive labels," if those perceptions and labels are inaccurate.  Such misperceptions, if left unaddressed, may seriously and unfairly impede the ability of the institution to reach the culture with its true Catholic-based mission.

Tom B.

State Institutions and Mediating Structures

Rick nicely answered Rob's question to me about seeing state law schools as mediating structures.  My concern is to avoid adopting a construction of "academic freedom" or "associational rights" for state universities that undercuts the well established constitutional prohibitions on a state university discriminating by viewpoint against student groups (Widmar v. Vincent) and perhaps other entities (which might include recruiters; that's a separate question).  Again, while state institutions have a number of features of mediating institutions, they are different from private mediating institutions in that they are preferentially funded by compulsory taxes, giving them a state-enforced competitive position in the marketplace.  Thus, state institutions shouldn't simply be (and usually aren't) equated with private institutions, which is what the Third Circuit did.

Tom

Sunday, May 8, 2005

More on Military-Recruiting Case and Subsidiarity

I haven't read much of the blogosphere commentary on the military-recruiting case in which the Third Circuit held that Congress could not withdraw funds from law schools that refused to give equal treatment to military recruiters.  But my initial take is different from both Rob (who argued that the decison properly bolsters subsidiarity by protecting institutions against top-down congressional policy) and Rick (who argued, among other things, that the government should be able to fund largely as it wishes).

My initial take rests on a distinction between private law schools and public law schools:  the plaintiff group included both, but the Third Circuit (so far as I have seen) made no distinction between them.  If we care about subsidiarity and the practical ability of intermediate communities to choose with whom to associate, then I think that private institutions do need protection from rules that threaten them with loss of important funding unless they agree to give up their power to decide with whom to associate.  I have seen many cases in which religious schools and social services face a Hobson's choice concerning funding:  accept the government's objectionable and institution-altering conditions in order to get funding, or refuse the funding and suffer significant marketplace losses to their competitors who benefit from government support.  I've argued here that institutions should not have to face such a choice, if we really care about preserving a pluralistic set of institutional voices in education, social services, and so forth.

But as to public law schools, the calculus seems quite different.  Private higher education institutions, as private actors, have associational and academic-freedom rights against the government.  Public institutions, by contrast, are themselves government actors and are primarily limited by, rather than protected by, constitutional rights of expression, association, and academic freedom.  This is so not only because public higher education entities are formally arms of the state, but also because they are subsidized by the state and thus reflect the exercise of state taxing and spending power in the market for higher education -- an exercise that can threaten rather than promote subsidiarity and a pluralism of voices.

There are a few Supreme Court decisions recognizing certain academic-freedom interests of public universities (e.g., Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing (1986); Board of Curators v. Horowitz (1978)), but these have been largely limited to core matters of academic discretion such as the academic evaluation of faculty and students.  Recognizing a broad academic-freedom-type right of association for public universities might suggest, for example, that such a university could express its academic values by excluding certain student groups whose viewpoints it dislikes from meeting on campus -- an exclusion that would violate numerous decisions such as Widmar v. Vincent (1981) and Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia (1995).  I am doubtful that the core right of academic discretion and evaluation -- which I think (tentatively) is the only constitutional right that a public university should be able to assert -- should extend to decisions about excluding certain recruiters from a wide-ranging general recruiting program.  At the very least, the Supreme Court ought to ask quite different questions about the public law school plaintiffs than the private law school plaintiffs.

Tom Berg

Inclusiveness and Accommodation (and Incidentally St. Thomas)

Jason Adkins at The Seventh Age continues the debate about the University of St. Thomas School of Law and the "conservative" label.  Some of his latest post consists of characterizations -- well, mischaracterizations -- of St. Thomas.  That particular debate probably is not of much general interest to readers of MOJ.  I have, however, posted comments on the Seventh Age blog (at the bottom of the link above) in which I offer lots of evidence that -- contrary to Mr. Adkins' suggestions -- St. Thomas does have a very strong "critical mass of [faculty showing] fidelity [to] the Magisterium"; that it does offer "an encounter with the Catholic intellectual tradition"; and that politically conservative students should not feel out of place but will find plenty of faculty and fellow students supporting (as well as others challenging) their views.

Of more general interest to MOJ readers may be Mr. Adkins' claim that "tag[ging] the usual disclaimer about how inclusive [St. Thomas] is" to our Dean's statement communicates the message that "yes, the Church and its teachings can be offensive and intolerant, but we soften the edges around here to accomodate."  I don't see the equation between inclusiveness and softening the teachings.  Inclusiveness, at a Catholic law school, means that non-Catholic voices of good will are welcomed as partners in the dialogue and debate with Catholic thought.  That is quite different from changing (softening) the Catholic teachings.  As applied to a law school, this means that one can hire non-Catholic and non-Christian faculty who are engaged productively with the Catholic tradition (including productive debate) -- while simultaneously making it a priority to have a critical mass of faculty who are strong, explicit proponents of the Catholic tradition.  And analogous points about student admissons.  Of course, "critical mass" really has to mean something (that's a subject for another post).

Mr. Adkins doesn't actually claim that being inclusive is the same as softening the teachings; he backs off to saying that "that is the message folks are going to take away from the [St. Thomas] disclaimer."  Sorry, folks, but that reminds me of CNN smuggling a scandalous story onto the air in the guise of reporting about how other media are reporting the story.  If people interpret a law school's statement that it does not "ascrib[e] to any political agenda"  as being "anti-conservative," this will likely be in part because they read commentators who describe the school that way (inaccurately in this case, as I've said in my comments on the Seventh Age blog).

Tom Berg

Friday, May 6, 2005

More on "Catholic, not Conservative"

Greg S. has just posted our Dean's statement criticizing NPR's simplistic identification of St. Thomas as a "conservative" law school.  In response to  objections from our faculty -- including politically conservative faculty -- NPR has admitted that they mischaracterized us, has removed St. Thomas from the list on the web page that Michael P. referenced, and will read the Dean's short statement on the air in the next couple of days. 

This episode has impressed upon me, and others here, the point that Greg and Chuck Reid make about how difficult it is to avoid being pigeonholed into familiar and simple categories.  When NPR was researching this story, I exchanged e-mails with their researcher, emphasizing in my e-mail that "St. Thomas is not a 'conservative Christian' school as such.  It is a law school with a serious Catholic Christian identity" -- and I then explained how that led to some stereotypically "liberal" positions being strong here, like opposition to the death penalty and an emphasis on fighting poverty, as well as some stereotypically "conservative" positions like opposition to abortion and euthanasia.  I also emphasized diversity of viewpoint on our faculty on these and other issues.  NPR totally ignored all the nuances that I described for them when it ran the story.  The idea that any seriously religious law school must be turning out nothing but Republican lawyers was too good, and too easy, for NPR to pass up.  Discussion in the media of questions about religion and law remains at a depressingly low level.

The objection of so many of us at St. Thomas (from across the political spectrum) to being labeled a "conservative" law school does not arise, for most of us, from any discomfort with those "conservative" ideas that are in harmony with the Christian vision of human dignity.  Our objection is that the Christian vision, and the faithful exploration of it at a Catholic law school, is much broader than any such political label and will inevitably cut across such labels.  We have also consciously pursued the goal of having differing points of view on many political issues, while also ensuring a strong core committed to the most bedrock affirmations of the Church on matters of human dignity and social relations.

Here is a lengthier statement from our Dean, Tom Mengler, which may appear on the NPR website (they have indicated that they are considering this, but if they don't post it you'll have it here).

Tom Berg

            A report on “Morning Edition” was incorrect in implying that the

University

of

St. Thomas School of Law

is a “religiously conservative law school.”

            

St. Thomas

is a Catholic law school, and we take our religious identity seriously.  For us, that does not mean pursuing political causes, but instead helping our students to integrate their religious and personal values — whatever those values may be — into their professional identities.  We hope that this will lead our students to practice law ethically and use their legal training to serve their fellow human beings — particularly the most needy among us.

            There is nothing politically “conservative” about our mission, and the people we have attracted prove this.  The vast majority of our faculty and student body are left-of-center politically.  Our faculty includes individuals who are openly gay, who support abortion rights, who oppose the death penalty, and who have worked on behalf of other “liberal” causes.  We have chapters of the National Lawyers Guild and Out!law on campus, but we do not have a chapter of the

American

Center

for Law & Justice.  We are one of the few law schools in the country to require all of our students to do public service as a condition of graduation, and the American Bar Association recently singled out for praise the high number of our graduates who have taken Legal Aid and other public service jobs.

            Far from being “politically conservative,”

St. Thomas

is striving to prove that a law school can take religion seriously without ascribing to any political agenda.

                                                                                                Dean Thomas M. Mengler

                                                                                                Dean and Ryan Chair in Law

 

Friday, April 29, 2005

Ritual Tea and Religious Freedom

The freedom of religion case in which the Supreme Court just granted review -- Gonzalez v. O Centra Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal [UDV] -- is an extremely important one for the freedom of all faiths in America.  The case concerns the interpretation of the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), in which Congress required that before a law can be applied to "substantially burden" sincere religious conduct, that application must be justified by a "compelling" governmental interest and be the "least restrictive means" of achieving that interest.  RFRA was a response to Supreme Court precedent stating that a law that is "neutral and generally applicable" can be applied to suppress religious conduct no matter how serious the burden on religion and how minimal the need for regulation.  Under the principle that RFRA reversed, a dry county in Oklahoma could prohibit the mass, no questions asked, and generally applicable sex-discrimination laws could be applied to force the Catholic Church to ordain women as priests.  Although RFRA was struck down in 1997 as applied to state and local laws, it remains valid as a limit on federal laws and regulations that restrict religious freedom.

In UDV, the government sought to prohibit the consumption and importation of a tea used in the central ritual act of UDV worship services, on the ground that the tea contained a hallucinogenic substance listed under federal drug laws.  The UDV, the tiny American offshoot of an established Brazilian religion, obtained an injunction against the government's actions, based on evidence that the use of the tea would not create dangers of health hazards or drug trafficking, because (among other things) the church insisted that members limit their use to the worship service and because the unpleasant taste of the drug made it unattractive to recreational users.  These very same features are true of sacramental use of peyote by Native Americans, which has led numerous states and the federal government to exempt such peyote use from their drug laws.  The role of the RFRA statute is to ensure that when a similar claim, such as UDV's, cannot get a legislative hearing because the group is less familar or less adept at lobbying, the courts will declare an equal right to free exercise for that faith.  (In sharp contrast is the uncircumscribed use of marijuana, a widely trafficked drug, by other groups claiming religious freedom; these claims always lose, even under the higher standard of RFRA.)

The federal government does not challenge the validity of the RFRA statute; the Bush administration wants to be able to defend religious freedom when it is more popular.  Instead, the government offers an interpretation of the statute that would gut its effectiveness.  The government argues that the mere listing of a drug on the schedule of controlled substances proves that there is a "compelling" reason to prohibit it in any and all circumstances -- without regard to the kind of evidence described above concerning the limited risks from the UDV's use.  Essentially, the government says that the mere existence of a law is proof that it serves a compelling interest in all cases.  Although the government tries to limit this argument to drug cases, its implications go much further.  As Judge Michael McConnell -- a Bush appointee, and no wild-eyed radical -- argued in the court of appeals decision ruling for UDV:

Congress’s general conclusion that DMT is dangerous in the abstract does not establish that the government has a compelling interest in prohibiting the consumption of

hoasca under the conditions presented in this case. . . .

RFRA requires

the government

to "demonstrate[]" that application of a challenged federal law to religious exercise satisfies strict scrutiny under RFRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). The term "demonstrates" is defined as "meet[ing] the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion." Id., § 2000bb-2(3). Obviously, Congress contemplated the introduction of "evidence" pertaining to the justification of "application" of the law in the particular instance. If such a burden of proof could be satisfied by citing congressional finding in the preambles to statutes, without additional evidence, RFRA challenges would rarely succeed; congressional findings invariably tout the importance of the laws to which they are appended.

If the government's position prevails in UDV, then potentially almost any claim of religious freedom as against a generally applicable law would fail.  Amish parents were allowed to remove their teenagers from high school in lieu of informal vocational education (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)) because, even though education in general is an important state interest, a couple extra years of formal education was not shown to be crucial to the development of Amish children.  Formal teacher credentials are generally important for the public-school and private-school teachers handling significant numbers of students, but that does not mean they have to be applied rigidly to home-schooling parents who have close relationships with a small number of students, their children.  These and numerous other successful religious-freedom claims would fail under the standard that the federal government advocates in UDV.  (For input from several Christian organizations that are theologically light years from the UDV but support its right to practice its faith, see this amicus brief.)

This case concerns far more than just a tiny group practicing an unfamilar faith and consuming a hallucinogenic substance.  It concerns far more than drugs and the war on them.  It will affect the freedom of religions across the spectrum when they come in conflict with the huge range of federal laws and regulations. 

Tom Berg

Thursday, April 28, 2005

More on Benedict XVI and Economic Life

What is Pope Benedict XVI's attitude toward economic life, and is he "to the left of" his predecessor on such matters?  An early search of some statements by then-Cardinal Ratzinger:

From a 2004 interview:

Rome, May. 07, 2004 (CWNews.com) - "The world economy is totally dominated by materialist principles," according to Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (bio - news).

The prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in an interview with the Italian Catholic agency SIR, said that world economic affairs are driven by a form of economic liberalism which "specifically excludes the heart." More important, he continued, this outlook also excludes "the highest faculty of human intelligence," which is "the possibility of seeing God, of introducing the light of moral responsibility, love, and justice into the worlds of work, of commerce, and of politics."

Much attention has been given to the 1984 Instruction on Certain Aspects of "Liberation Theology" (available in full here), in which the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, under Ratzinger, criticized many features of liberation theology.  A few key passages:

The present Instruction has [as its purpose] to draw the attention of pastors, theologians, and all the faithful to the deviations, and risks of deviation, damaging to the faith and to Christian living, that are brought about by certain forms of liberation theology which use, in an insufficiently critical manner, concepts borrowed from various currents of Marxist thought.

This warning should in no way be interpreted as a disavowal of all those who want to respond generously and with an authentic evangelical spirit to the "preferential option for the poor." It should not at all serve as an excuse for those who maintain the attitude of neutrality and indifference in the face of the tragic and pressing problems of human misery and injustice. It is, on the contrary, dictated by the certitude that the serious ideological deviations which it points out tends inevitably to betray the cause of the poor. More than ever, it is important that numerous Christians, whose faith is clear and who are committed to live the Christian life in its fullness, become involved in the struggle for justice, freedom, and human dignity because of their love for their disinherited, oppressed, and persecuted brothers and sisters. More than ever, the Church intends to condemn abuses, injustices, and attacks against freedom, wherever they occur and whoever commits them. She intends to struggle, by her own means, for the defense and advancement of the rights of mankind, especially of the poor. . . .

The acute need for radical reforms of the structures which conceal poverty and which are themselves forms of violence, should not let us lose sight of the fact that the source of injustice is in the hearts of men. Therefore it is only by making an appeal to the 'moral potential' of the person and to the constant need for interior conversion, that social change will be brought about which will be truly in the service of man. [33] For it will only be in the measure that they collaborate freely in these necessary changes through their own initiative and in solidarity, that people, awakened to a sense of their responsibility, will grow in humanity. The inversion of morality and structures is steeped in a materialist anthropology which is incompatible with the dignity of mankind. . . .

The class struggle as a road toward a classless society is a myth which slows reform and aggravates poverty and injustice. Those who allow themselves to be caught up in fascination with this myth should reflect on the bitter examples history has to offer about where it leads. They would then understand that we are not talking here about abandoning an effective means of struggle on behalf of the poor for an ideal which has no practical effects. On the contrary, we are talking about freeing oneself from a delusion in order to base oneself squarely on the Gospel and its power of realization.

But in addition to this substantially critical letter, the CDF under Ratzinger issued a second document in 1986, the Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation, which sets forth a positive vision on, among other things, economic matters.  To keep this post from reaching unacceptable length, I'll post passages from that document separately.

Tom Berg