The liberal group Protestants for the Common Good has issued a "Statement on the Christian Right," drafted by Chris Gamwell of the University of Chicago Divinity School, a scholar, teacher, and person of great integrity (who I was privileged to have as a teacher). It offers a theological assessment of what distinguishes the Christian Political Right from (roughly) the Christian Political Left. While obviously a critique of the Christian Right, it is written with Gamwell's characteristic care and is worth pondering.
A few excerpts follow, with my comments inserted in bold. I wonder what others think. Does the statement accurately identify some different theological bases of the Christian political right and left? Does it mischaracterize the Right, and if so where? Do its categories apply to Catholics in the political right and left? What about those Christian political approaches (Catholic and other) that cut across political alignments (e.g. the "consistent ethic of life")?
On the Christian Political Right, the larger social setting is seen as a stage for the church, in which salvation is proclaimed and worked out. This view certainly affirms that the whole creation is God’s, and Christians are to serve the needs of all people. But love for those outside the Christian community cares, above all, that they, too, should accept Jesus as their Lord and become members of the community of believers. Typically, salvation is seen to express itself in a pious life that anticipates and prepares for another world, eternal life in heaven. . . . Thus, the center of moral concern for those who take this view is the Christian community itself, and moral exhortation primarily directs Christians to practices through which the integrity and growth of the church and its members are sustained and pursued. . . .
In line with this view, political activities are chiefly concerned to create a proper background for the practice of “true religion.” A pious life exhibits a certain personal character or certain virtues, those that subdue or conquer temptations to find happiness in the things of this world. For those on the Christian Right, our society is hostile to such virtues, being so pervasively corrupted by secularism and its permissive sanction for life aimed at satisfying worldly wants. . . .
This is why political purposes of the Christian Right concentrate almost entirely on so-called traditional values, which include virtues of family commitment and sexual control, taking responsibility for oneself, readiness to work with diligence, obedience to the law and local mores, charity toward the victim of misfortune, and religious piety itself. We, too, wish to affirm the importance of personal virtues. Our basic disagreement comes because, for the Christian Right, these so dominate the things with which politics should be concerned. Guided by this concentration, the political agenda of this movement is centered on issues such as abortion, same-sex relationships, educational curriculum, prayer in the public schools, the discipline of law and order, and governmental accommodation of religion. [But some of the listed agenda items, especially the anti-abortion position, involve matters not only of "personal virtue" but of justice for the broadest human community, the alternative Christian emphasis that Prof. Gamwell commends below. Moreover, one example of "accommodation of religion" is the push for the "faith-based initiative," which likewise seeks to serve others but asserts that they will be best served through programs involving conversion of heart and personal responsibility.] . . .
Protestants for the Common Good presents a different understanding of the New Testament witness: The church has its distinctive importance as a servant to God’s will for the inclusive human community and, therefore, is not itself the center of moral concern. The God whom we experience through Jesus loves all the world, and God’s purpose calls all humans to accept God’s love as their only ultimate assurance. Salvation is this acceptance and expresses itself by loving all others as oneself. This is the fundamental commandment for all humans, encompassing all other moral responsibilities, and every person is the neighbor for each of us. . . . The church, therefore, is commisioned to proclaim the decisive revelation of God's love through Jesus Christ and to pursue among all people a beloved community. . . .
Mutuality, then, is the purpose of the whole human community, stretching from family and friendship to the widest social and political forms. . . . Politics is concerned with the most general context of mutuality. Principles of justice assign to politics its part in the community of love. The Christian vision of justice, therefore, includes laws and policies that provide or promote for all the most general conditions through which people are empowered to enhance their communities. Conditions of safety, health, and self-respect; material provision and opportunity for work; education; cultural richness; beauty and integrity in the environment; a favorable pattern of associations, including freedom of association; and a community of democratic rights, including religious freedom — these are the general sources that empower people to achieve, and they are the business of justice. . . .
Focus by the Christian Political Right on the personal character of individuals as if the communal sources of empowerment do not matter violates the community of love and distorts the gift and demand of God’s love revealed through Jesus Christ. The result is a callous neglect of social and political inequities and the suffering they cause, as well as the loss to our common life when human potential is denied just access to conditions of achievement. [Again, the distinction between "personal character" and communal empowerment may be overdrawn, since the former may be essential to the latter's effectiveness; though I agree that the possibility for emplowerment from the broader society can get ignored too easily.] On the Christian Right, moreover, concern focused on private virtue has too often led to narrow and rigid ideas of morality and thus a call for government to impose parochial standards of behavior that stigmatize
Beyond this, there is a threat to democracy itself. Seeing the world as background for the church, many on the Christian Right believe that political choices should be based on biblical authority and advocate laws and policies solely by appeal to revelation in scripture. [I don't think this is true of thoughtful Christian conservatives -- as opposed to perhaps some loud voices -- any more than thoughtful Christian liberals believe in "anything goes" or "follow whatever is the world's new fad."] But government by the people means government by all the people, so that laws and policies should be decided through full and free discussion and debate. The assertion of religious authority as the sole basis for those decisions is incompatible with both democracy and Christian commitment. [Presumably, this includes appeals to magisterial authority as well to scripture.] . . . [By contrast,] we embrace the democratic discussion and debate and believe that our vision of the beloved human community, derived from our experience of Jesus, can appeal to reasons grounded in common human experience. [Again, on many issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage, the Christian Right can and does appeal to common human experience -- whether or not one thinks the particular arguments are convincing.] . . .
We [a]gree with many on the Christian Right for whom [an] idolatry [of materialism] is hostile to important private virtues. With them, we affirm the need for personal character because mutuality is gravely threatened when dedication to intimate relationships, taking responsibility where one can, and charity for those who suffer are widely missing. But the true ideal is not, as the Christian Political Right believes, a common life in which private morality is sufficient. We are called to maximize the common good because God wills the highest happiness for all through a human community of love and the requisite virtues include a passion for justice.
The vision Prof. Gamwell articulates shares some features with a model that I've argued has characterized recent theories of mission in mainline Protestantism: the ideal of a "Servant Church" serving the broader world. (As he puts it, the broader community, not the church itself, is the focus of moral concern.) I've argued that the "servant church" aspect of that ideal is extremely attractive, but that Christian conservatives (Protestant and Catholic) can be promoting the "servant church" ideal too, and that mainline churches, in providing their service to the broader world, can get way too sanguine about accepting the methods and parameters of that world.
Tom
Friday, March 3, 2006
Marci Hamilton writes concerning my earlier post:
Your pre-assessment of Cardozo's conference on fundamentalism and the rule of law is, well, odd, I guess. You don't bother to mention Esposito's keynote. Are you aware of his work on these issues? Or Khan's? Mark Rozell's? Prof. Dan Crane, who is an evangelical, is moderating one of the panels, so, just maybe, the debate is going to be scholarly and thoughtful, which, of course, is what Cardozo is known for. I guess my question is where are you coming from? I wasn't aware that the boundary line between fundamentalism and the rule of law already had been so politicized that such a conference would generate such a comment. In my view, the discussion has not even started yet, though it is absolutely crucial for the future.
I've spoken (at Marci's invitation) at two Cardozo Law conferences, both of which were indeed scholarly and thoughtful and balanced, so perhaps it's a little churlish of me to criticize an event there. I certainly agree that this a vitally important topic, and I already noted that the presenters for the upcoming conference are all excellent and thoughtful scholars. But excellent and thoughtful scholars still have points of view, and so a conference is still better if it reflects a balance of competing views among thoughtful people on issues as to which there is room for reasonable disagreement. I don't think that Marci challenges my conclusion that those on the program (speakers and commentators) who have a strong normative position about the role of the Christian right in politics appear to be almost all negative -- for example, on issues like inclusion of religious social services in funding programs, which is certainly an issue on which reasonable people can disagree. This is not a matter of "politics," but of the academic benefits that come from contending points of view. That's where I'm coming from (and I personally would defend the Christian right's legal position on some issues and not on others). I also noted that there were some social-science analysts on the program (like Prof. Mark Rozell, whom Marci mentions) whose work is more descriptive then normative. But I see no one on the program who strongly defends things like the faith-based initiative on a normative basis. While Prof. Crane is an evangelical (and I don't know his views on these issues), a moderator is necessarily much more circumscribed in presenting his/her normative positions. As for the references to Professors Esposito and Khan, who are speaking on Islam, I didn't claim anything about the subject of Islam, on which I'm relatively uneducated. My concerns had to do with the range of views toward the legal activism of evangelicals, on which I know a lot more.
The real point is not about any particular conference, but about discussions of these matters in general. When the normatve views on the activism of evangelicals are significantly weighted to the negative in a discussion of "fundamentalism" -- a word that, especially after 9/11, has extremely negative connotations to many (including to me) -- I think there is reason for concern that some important distinctions and countering points of view will be missed. One such issue I mentioned before (but not the only one) is the distinction in Christianity between evangelicals, who drive several of the initiatives that speakers will criticize, and fundamentalists. When the contributors are high-quality, as they are here, then the defenses of evangelical activism may still be brought up and seriously considered. It's just more likely to happen if the discussion includes a strong defender of evangelical activism along with the strong critics.
Tom
Wednesday, March 1, 2006
To the excellent recent exchanges over the relative importance and "categorical" nature of various Catholic social teachings, I'd like to respond for now only by ... plugging our conference of the Murphy Institute at St. Thomas on April 7-8 concerning "Public Policy, Prudential Judgment, and the Catholic Social Tradition." An excerpt from the conference description (full text here; speakers include MOJ's own Rob Vischer, with plenary addresses by John McGreevy (History, Notre Dame) and Christopher Wolfe (Political Science, Marquette)):
In recent years a number of public policy questions, such as the permissibility of the death penalty, the morality of the war in Iraq, and the justice of welfare reforms, have provoked controversy among Catholics. Advocates of very different policies have claimed that their positions follow from the Catholic social tradition and, at times, some have even insisted that their positions alone are faithful to this tradition. These controversies highlight enduring questions about the proper relationship between moral principles and prudential judgment.
In much the same way, controversies have also accompanied some of the formal positions adopted by the American bishops and even the Vatican on questions of public policy. Here again there has been an indistinct line between direct inference from moral principles and sound prudential judgment, where the former invites commitment and the latter tolerates disagreement.
Because of the importance of prudential judgment in public policy matters, the time is ripe for a careful and comprehensive discussion of the topic.
Tom
Tuesday, February 28, 2006
While we're in the mode of fisking upcoming legal conferences, this notice I received about the "Fundamentalism and the Rule of Law" conference at Cardozo Law School on March 14 doesn't inspire huge confidence in its balance. There are some very fine scholars speaking, including several friends of mine, and of course one can't tell precisely how the discussion will go; but a few concerns of note. . . .
First, the premise is that "[r]eligious fundamentalism is on the rise around the world. Its truth claims often directly challenge not only competing social mores but also legal rules. That clash . . . is just beginning to gain the attention of scholars." This sounds like the subject will be the foundational challenge to modern democracy from radical groups, especially in Islam; and indeed there are a couple of addresses or papers on subjects such as "Islam and the Rule of Law." Combined with those, however, are a couple of papers on the "faith-based initiative" and the funding of social services, and another on "the religious right and the politics of abortion." Is it really fair to suggest that either (i) the effort to extend equal funding to religious social services that aid the poor and needy or (ii) the effort to enact restrictions on abortion (in many cases, comparable to restrictions that exist in Western European nations) constitute the same kind of fundamental challenge to Western democracy and the rule of law as we are seeing from truly fundamentalist groups?
Second, the conference conception seems to gloss over the important distinction in American religion between fundamentalism and evangelicalism -- the latter being a less separatist and more acculturated version of conservative Protestantism than the former. The panel with a paper on the faith-based intiative (as well as others on intelligent design and abstinence-only programs), for example, is called "Fundamentalist Initiatives in the U.S." But fundamentalists, with their highly separatist attitude toward society and the state, are generally unlikely to seek government funding for social service activities, and certainly are not as accepting as evangelicals of seeking such funds on simply the same basis as secular social services. Of course there are not hard and fast lines between fundamentalism and evangelicalism, but it is hard not to see the thrust of this conference as lumping the two together (and with negative connotations, as for example in the question about the consistency of these viewpoinrs with "the rule of law").
Finally, the conference appears heavily weighted against the idea of conservative religion playing a role in politics and law. The two papers on the faith-based initiative are by opponents, including Winnifred Fallers Sullivan (U. Chicago Divinity School) and Steve Green, the former general counsel for Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Commenting on Steve's panel, along with a Cardozo professor, is . . . well, Barry Lynn of American United for Separation of Church and State. Don't expect a strong clash of views there. The perspectives of the panelists vary in some ways -- and some are objective social-science analysts -- but the normative views about conservative Christians, so far as I can see, run from very negative over to moderate/mixed. I see no one on the roster who is an overall defender of evangelicals' activism in politics and law, no one really to counter the several panelists who are sharp critics of that activism.
Tom
In the Washington Post, E. J. Dionne calls attention to a forthcoming "Statement of Principles By Fifty-Five Catholic Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives":
"As Catholic Democrats in Congress," the statement begins, "we are proud to be part of the living Catholic tradition -- a tradition that promotes the common good, expresses a consistent moral framework for life and highlights the need to provide a collective safety net to those individuals in society who are most in need. As legislators, in the U.S. House of Representatives, we work every day to advance respect for life and the dignity of every human being. We believe that government has moral purpose."
The statement is only six paragraphs, which gives it clarity and focus. After a paragraph on Catholic social teaching about the obligations to "the poor and disadvantaged," the writers get to the hard issue, insisting that "each of us is committed to reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies and creating an environment with policies that encourage pregnancies to be carried to term."
What's significant is that this is not a statement from pro-choice Catholics trying to "reframe" the abortion question. The signatories include some of the staunchest opponents of abortion in the House, including Reps. Bart Stupak, Dale Kildee, Tim Holden, James Oberstar and James Langevin.
In other words, Democrats on both sides of the abortion question worry that it is crowding out all other concerns. And in very polite language, the Catholic Democrats suggest that their bishops allow them some room to disagree. "In all these issues, we seek the church's guidance and assistance but believe also in the primacy of conscience," they write in an echo of Kennedy. "In recognizing the church's role in providing moral leadership, we acknowledge and accept the tension that comes from being in disagreement with the church in some areas."
It will be interesting to read the full six paragraphs when they are released -- in particular, to see whether the pro-choicers signing the statement have dragged the pro-lifers in their direction, or whether the pro-lifers have influenced the pro-choicers in any significant respect.
Tom
Tuesday, February 21, 2006
Rick is right about the importance and correctness of today's unanimous SCOTUS decision finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) protected a sect's consumption of tea with a hallucinogen in it at their worship services. The opinion, by Roberts, is brisk, clear, and makes all the right points necessary for RFRA to have real meaning in protecting religious freedom. Here's the key passage:
Under the Government’s view, there is no need to assess the particulars of the UDV’s use or weigh the impact of an exemption for that specific use, because the Controlled Substances Act serves a compelling purpose and simply admits of no exceptions. . . .
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more focused than the Government’s categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law "to the person"—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.
That's the fundamental point: the court should look to whether granting an exemption for the particular exercise of religious conscience would create a serious problem (and thus implicate a compelling interest), not whether undermining the law as a whole would do so. That's how RFRA ensures that there will be a balance between religious freedom and government interests: if the government could define its interest as uniform enforcement of the law, it would always win. (For more expanded version of this argument, see this brief I co-wrote in the case.) The Court nails this point dead center.
And its ruling will have a salutary effect, not only on cases involving RFRA itself (which limits the effect of federal laws on religious freedom), but also on cases involving the federal RLUIPA statute (cases involving zoning or landmarking laws burdening churches, as well as prisoner religious exercise claims), state versions of RFRA (in force in about a dozen states), and state constitutional provisions (in several other states) that have been interpreted to apply the "compelling interest" test.
Tom
Thursday, January 26, 2006
The published papers from the "Pro-Life Progressivism" symposium last year at St. Thomas will be out soon, in the new issue of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal -- in a couple weeks, the editors tell me. They'll include Mark's fine piece on "The Coherence and Importance of Pro-Life Progressivism," posted on the right.
To whet your appetite, I've posted my short foreword to the symposium here (with an abstract, and the paper alone to the right). It's not a substantive argument, but a summary of some of the issues and background and of the symposium papers. (If the summary sounds interesting, ask for the book! I can pass on requests to the editors.)
Tom B.
