Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Is Compassionate Conservatism the Problem?

Senator Tom Coburn (R-Okla.) writes in today's Wall Street Journal that what has ailed the Republican party recently are its "big government" ideas, including not just the lobbyist-oriented "K Street Project" but also "compassionate conservatism":

Compassionate conservatism's starting point had merit. The essential argument that Republicans should orient policy around how our ideas will affect the poor, the widow, the orphan, the forgotten and the "other" is indisputable – particularly for those who claim, as I do, to submit to an authority higher than government. Yet conservatives are conservatives because our policies promote deliverance from poverty rather than dependence on government.

Compassionate conservatism's next step – its implicit claim that charity or compassion translates into a particular style of activist government involving massive spending increases and entitlement expansion – was its undoing. Common sense and the Scriptures show that true giving and compassion require sacrifice by the giver. This is why Jesus told the rich young ruler to sell his possessions, not his neighbor's possessions. Spending other people's money is not compassionate.

I wonder if this means Sen. Coburn wants to eliminate not just earmarks and the Medicare prescription-drug benefit (the big recent social spending increases), but also the Bush initiative for making more assistance available to faith-based and other community organizations helping the needy.  No doubt we all here agree that "policies [should] promote deliverance from poverty rather than dependence on government."  But let's suppose, as I think is true, that many private nonprofits receiving government social-service funds do aim to empower people to escape poverty, often in part through personal transformation, rather than just tide them over with material support.  Sen. Coburn's logic seems to reject assisting even these agencies with tax funds because "true giving and compassion require sacrifice by the giver" and "[s]pending other people's money is not compassionate."  Is that argument well-founded?  Assume that a certain form of help to the needy is truly empowering rather than dependence-inducing, and is properly administered -- then isn't it supported by demands of justice as well as of charity, and therefore proper for government to assist and promote?  Isn't compassion in part an obligation of justice as well as of charity?  Should government assistance in that context be dissed as "spending other people's money"?

Tom

Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Women, Work, and Leadership

Sunday's NY Times magazine contained an article discussing what we and our daughters should learn  from the fact that opposition to Sen. Clinton's candidacy has included some expressions of sexism and misogyny (e.g. the "Life's a Bitch, Don't Vote for One" T-shirts) along with, the author recognizes, legitimate grounds for opposing her.  The author then talks about the obstacles women still face in entering "male" occupations like firefighter and in rising to the top as large-company CEOs, large-firm law partners, etc.  I was struck not by the article's emphasis on obstacles -- it took a pretty middle position recognizing the "possibilities" for young women and the "vitriol" they may face in working to realize them -- but by the fact that all the obstacles described were flat-out sexist expressions or attitudes (facing "the b- and c- words," surveys showing lots of men prefering to have male bosses etc.).  There was no mention of the structural obstacles that exist because women remain the dominant family caregivers while also trying to provide the long work hours and intense work availability that it typically takes to rise high in a workplace.  Again, I don't discount the sexism or misogyny aspect of the problem, and maybe the article focused on sexist expressions because it was trying to draw lessons from the Clinton candidacy (or maybe the author as a contributing (free lance?) writer hasn't experienced the structural workplace-demands problem herself).  But it struck me again how often the structural side of the "glass ceiling" problem is ignored -- that if we value both mothers' caregiving and women's professional leadership, then changes in the competition-driven workplace are needed -- and therefore how important are the ideas discussed in this symposium, at St. Thomas Law last year, to which Lisa, Susan, and Michael S. (see link on symposium page) contributed.

Tom

Thursday, May 8, 2008

Models of Christian Legal Scholarship

Bill Brewbaker (Alabama) posts what looks to be a very interesting paper, Theory, Identity, Vocation: Three Models of Christian Legal Scholarship.  From the abstract:

Recognizably Christian scholarship is becoming more commonplace in the American legal academy, yet little systematic attention has been given to fundamental questions of approach. This article highlights moments of continuity and discontinuity between Christian legal scholarship and its secular counterparts. Contrary to the expectations generated by contemporary political debate, the distinctive contribution of Christian legal scholarship is not primarily to provide ammunition for political programs of the right or the left, but to situate law and human legal practices within a larger story about the world.

The "vocation" model seems particularly interesting:

Finally, a vocation model emphasizes that legal scholarship is one of many human (and not merely Christian) callings, the point of which, as with other such callings, is the glory and enjoyment of God. In order to know what pleases God, the scholar will need to study the Scriptures and theology; he or she will need the church. But the scholar will also need to study God's creation, including not only the world God has made directly, but also those relevant human institutions that, in God's providence, inhabit it. On this view, there is no reason to prescribe a uniform methodology for Christian legal scholars, nor should we necessarily expect widespread agreement among Christians on contestible legal issues.

Tom

More on Obama and Judges

In reaction to Rick and Rob on Obama, I think that we do not want judges (in constitutional and statutory cases) to carry out "their broader vision of what America should be," but that we do want judges who can understand (or try to understand) "what it's like to be gay, poor, or black" (as well as other characteristics; I do think there's a problem with overly selective sympathy).  Sympathy for the real-world conditions of people is a judicial virtue, not because the judge is suppose to enact that sympathy solely or in the face of the law, but because it is often essential to giving meaning to the directives of the law (constitutional or statutory).  Interpretation, even an under an originalist analysis, often requires making an analogy (or disanalogy) between the context of the enactment and the context today.  For example, could a justice have voted to strike down school segregation in Brown without making some judgment that segregation denied equality to people in an analogous way to the black codes of 1868, and that education had become so pervasive a factor in people's opportunities by 1954 that it was analogous to the rights (property, contracts, etc.) as to which the 1868 framers meant to guarantee equality?  Would a justice be able to reach those conclusions, or even address those questions, without trying to imagine "what it [was] like to be black" in segregated societies/schools"?

As another example, I've found that asserting the constitutional right to bring religion into the public square -- a well-grounded right historically, but one whose contours in current situations are not entirely clear -- won't succeed unless judges try to sympathize with the religious believer facing the state: the student who wants to do a religious paper topic in class over a teacher's objection, or the family that wants their religious choice included equally in a school choice program as against the state's teacher's lobby and Blaine Amendment history.  Without thinking "what it's like to be a serious religious believer," judges tend to say "I don't see that you're that burdened; you can still practice your religion at church and home."

Tom

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Divorce Issue re. Wheaton Professor

From Christianity Today online:

After refusing to discuss the details of his divorce, tenured professor Kent Gramm resigned from his English position at [evangelical] Wheaton College.

Wheaton’s faculty handbook states that the college will consider employee retention “when there is reasonable evidence that the circumstances that led to the final dissolution of the marriage related to desertion or adultery on the part of the other partner."

But Gramm declined to discuss details. “None of Your Business” headlined Monday’s Chicago Sun-Times front-page story.

Wheaton apparently followed the rule it had in place.  But the comments section includes interesting thoughts on what the rule should be, for example:

Christians are often accused of being inconsistent in discussing family issues--i.e., how can you be vocal on homosexuality but silent on no-fault divorce? Opposing no-fault divorce is one step toward consistency and one step away from hypocrisy. I think firing Christian professors who do not defend their life choices is one way to make that statement.

Versus:

Yes, they should fire the divorcing person as long as they fire everyone else who commits a sin or makes a mistake.

Tom

Friday, April 25, 2008

John Green (Pew Forum) on Catholics and Obama

Apropos the Sisk/Shiffrin exhange on Obama's problems with Catholic voters, here are thoughts on the subject from religion and voting expert John Green of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.

No St. Thomas Law Public-Service Credit for Work at Planned Parenthood

This week our dean at St. Thomas Law, Tom Mengler, ruled that students seeking to satisfy our 50-hour public-service requirement for graduation cannot get credit for hours volunteered at Planned Parenthood, even if the specific work they do is not abortion or contraception services.  The Cardinal Newman Society (CNS) applauds the decision here.  I'm not trying to curry favor with my dean when say that I (along with lots of others) applaud it too.  Since some of Tom's explanatory email has already been quoted by the CNS, I think it's best just to post the whole email and let it speak for itself.

Tom B.

++++++

Dear friends,

I write to resolve a community dispute regarding a decision made yesterday by our Public Service Board (PSB).  Yesterday, the PSB voted to authorize public service credit to a student who would like to volunteer at Planned Parenthood.  Since then, Dean Organ and I have received a number of emails or visits from students and faculty questioning the PSB’s decision, as well as questioning some of the language and processes under which the PSB functions.

For now, I would like to set aside for another day some of the broader questions that members of this community, including members of the PSB, have raised with respect to modifying the PSB guidelines.  These Guidelines were adopted by the faculty and can be amended, therefore, only by a favorable vote of the faculty.

I do think it is important, however, for me to treat as a formal appeal to the Dean the specific concerns that many from this community have voiced regarding the PSB’s decision to certify volunteer work at Planned Parenthood as “qualifying public service.”  [I'm omitting a short discussion here about the appeal procedures.--TB]

As the PSB Guidelines make clear, they are designed to encourage an ethic of servant-leadership within this community.  The Guidelines also clarify that qualifying public service is restricted to “any type of volunteer work that is consistent with the mission of the School of Law and the University of St. Thomas.”  Not surprisingly, this broad encouragement of public service activity places few restrictions on the types of volunteerism for which our law school community should be congratulated.

One restriction, however, flows directly from the University of St. Thomas as a Catholic University, and of the School of Law as an academic unit that seeks to live its Catholic identity.  At this University, there is helpful precedent.  Nine years ago in 1999, Father Dennis Dease as President of this University decided an issue very similar to the one that presents itself to our law school community.  Father Dease denied externship credit to an undergraduate student who wished to volunteer at Planned Parenthood on grounds that St. Thomas cannot endorse -- with academic credit -- student service at an organization whose mission is fundamentally in conflict with a core value of a Catholic University.   Because Planned Parenthood is a leader in the abortions rights movement and because opposition to abortion is one of the core values of the Catholic faith, Father Dease refused to authorize the extension of academic credit to academic or service work at Planned Parenthood.

I regard Father Dease’s decision in 1999 as controlling -- and for this reason I must reverse the decision of the PSB.  Volunteer service at Planned Parenthood, whatever the nature of that service, advances the mission of Planned Parenthood, an organization whose mission is fundamentally at odds with a core value of the Catholic Church.  Such service does not constitute “qualifying public service” for purposes of satisfying the School of Law’s graduation requirement of 50 hours of public service.

I understand and appreciate that my decision in this matter will be met with mixed reaction.  At the School of Law, we have set a course that attempts to live out our Catholic identity in a way that, on the one hand, is true to this identity and, on the other hand, is welcoming and embracing of those who differ.  I regard this decision as an effort to walk that path.  Because our Catholic identity begins with the value of extending respect and dignity to every individual, rarely should it require us to make decisions that cause unhappiness or discontent.  This is one of those rare circumstances, however, in which living out our Catholic nature as a Catholic law school may cause a difference of opinion and feelings among students, faculty, and staff.

Finally, I would like to make clear that my decision should not be read as critical of the fine work of the PSB.  The student members of the PSB have consistently worked effectively and tirelessly to administer our public service requirement, to make public service opportunities available to this community, and to encourage all of us to become servant leaders.  With regard to this particular issue, the PSB debated deliberately and reflectively on their roles and attempted to reach a decision that was true to our Catholic identity and encouraged each of us to draw on our own faith and values to become professionals of character and integrity.  I commend the PSB on the seriousness with which it undertook to resolve a difficult question.

Sincerely,

Dean Mengler   

Monday, April 21, 2008

Tancredo Blasts the Pope on Immigration

As the New York Times reported, the Pope spoke in favor of immigrants several times during his visit, including in his speech to the American bishops, where he urged them and their communities "to continue to welcome the immigrants who join your ranks today, to share their joys and hopes, to support them in their sorrows and trials, and to help them flourish in their new home. This, indeed, is what your fellow countrymen have done for generations."  He also spoke of the need to prevent the breakup of families in the immigration context, since the separation "'is truly dangerous for the social, and human fabric' of Latin and Central American families."

One of the Pope's comments -- that the U.S. should do "everything possible to fight . . . all forms of violence so that immigrants may lead dignified lives" -- set off anti-illegal-immigration obsessive Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO), who issued a statement saying, "I would like to know what part of our lax immigration policy is violent" and claiming that the Peope had "encourag[ed] Bush to provide blanket amnesty to all illegal immigrants in the United States."  (HT: Kathryn Lopez)  Tancredo went on, as described by the Times:

Accusing the Pope of "faith-based marketing," Mr. Tancredo said Benedict's comments welcoming immigrants "may have less to do with spreading the Gospel than they do about recruiting new members of the Church."  Mr. Tancredo, a former Catholic who now attends an evangelical Christian church, said it was not in the pope's "job description to engage in American politics."

Obviously there are legitimate arguments for strengthening anti-illegal-immigration policy in various ways.  No one could reasonably criticize Benedict for his calls for humaneness in treatment of illegal immigrants -- which has implications for the policy issues like deportations (although I'm quite confident he's never urged "blanket amnesty").  But one can colorably argue that a call, like his, to "welcome immigrants" must always be qualified by recognizing the need for legal-immigration requirements to manage the flow of incomers in an orderly way.

But my preexisting impression that Tancredo carries beyond these arguments to foment prejudice has now been strengthened by his rush to beat off any challenge by invoking, explicitly or implicitly, other prejudices: that the Church is mostly concerned to "recruit" rather than uphold human dignity, and that the Pope should not comment on American moral-political issues (combining allusions to "religion should stay out of politics" and "the Pope is a foreigner").

Tom

Monday, April 14, 2008

Another St. Thomas Speaker Kerfuffle

There is developing blogosphere commentary over the recent decision by a University of St. Thomas administrator to reject an April 21 on-campus speaking event with Star Parker, pro-life activist, who would speak about "the harmful impact of abortion, especially in minority communities."  The speech would have been sponsored by the University's Students for Human Life and the conservative Young America's Foundation.  From everything I can tell, this is another misguided decision by University administration to reject a speaker based on greatly exaggerated fears about disturbances, or about inflammatory speech that might be inconsistent with the University's mission.  (See here, e.g., for a statement last fall criticizing the University's decision, later reversed, to refuse an invitation to Abp. Tutu -- who coincidentally spoke in the Twin Cities last Friday at the event in question, which in the end was not held at St. Thomas.)  Hopefully, criticisms of this decision, as of that one, will lead to a reversal.

Tom

Friday, April 11, 2008

Another Unnecessary Imposition on Conscience

Continuing in the threats to conscience vein ....  Eugene Volokh reports:

Elaine Huguenin co-owns Elane Photography with her husband. The bulk of Elane's work is done by Elaine, though she subcontracts some of the work some of the time. Elane refused to photograph Vanessa Willock's same-sex commitment ceremonies, and just today the New Mexico Human Rights Commission held that this violated state antidiscrimination law. Elane has been ordered to pay over $6600 in attorney's fees and costs.

Eugene goes on to discuss Elane's legal objections to this sanction.  One is the First Amendment's right against compelled speech (Board of Education v. Barnette), based on the argument that the photographer is compelled to use her artistic talent to present positive images of an event she opposes.  Another is the New Mexico state Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which requires that the state justify any substantial burden it imposes on religion as "essential to further a compelling governmental interest" and as the "least restrictive means of furthering" that interest.  Statutes like this, also in force for the federal government and about a dozen other states, provide legal authority for giving weight both to religious conscience and to governmental interests in particular contexts.  In this case it's the photographer's interest in freedom of conscience against government sanctions, versus -- and let's put it in the strongest light -- the couple's interest in carrying out their conscientious decision to make a public commitment to each other with the assistance of various commercial services that one expects to be able to make such events memorable.

It seems very likely than in Albuquerque, the couple can go the next wedding photographer in the phone book or online and secure its services.  To help the couple can avoid this inconvenience, the state proposes to drive out of the wedding-photography business anyone who won't participate in commemorating same-sex marriages or commitment ceremonies.  I would think that the effect on the photographer (who has probably made some investment in that business) is typically much greater than the effect on the couple who can usually obtain another photographer easily.  Thus this seems like one of the many cases in which an exemption preserves the ability of the people on both sides to follow their consciences.

As Eugene notes, though, antidiscrimination plaintiffs and state antidiscrimination agencies argue that each act of discrimination itself violates a compelling interest in nondiscrimination, so the availability of other services (photographers or whatever) is irrelevant.  This argument has basically been accepted in the case of race discrimination, where exemptions are almost always refused even if done by a few isolated entities (think, for example, the Bob Jones University case).  But as Rob and others have  argued, the prohibition on race discrimination in commercial activities came after a long national debate (with just a few battles and protest marches along the way) out of which an overwhelming consensus emerged about the wrongness of racial discrimination.  We are much, much earlier in the process of debating the legitimacy of same-sex marriage.  Giving conscience serious but sensible protection includes leaving room for that debate to happen before the government throws its weight in by sanctioning those who carry their belief (on one side or the other) into their work lives.

It's especially silly, of course, that the state should punish private citizens for doing the very thing that the state itself does: refuse to recognize or participate in a same-sex marriage.  That certainly undercuts any allegedly compelling nature of the state's interest here; and it dramatizes how misguided it is for the state to try to pressure people on the same-sex marriage issue at this stage in the debate (when the state isn't even willing to take the step itself), unless same-sex couples are really unable to get services.  Even if or when the state recognizes same-sex marriage, the photographer's conscience should be protected when other photographers are available; but the state's coercion of conscience at this point in time is even more unwarranted.

Tom