Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, September 21, 2005

Millennium Development and the UN

I would like to echo most of Susan's post from earlier in the day, and I would like to call attention to Cardinal Sodano's intervention made on the same day as the Murray Symposium at Villanova, last Friday, September 16. Most of the Cardinal's address stressed the importance of the global community, through the UN, to pull together and provide relief to the hundreds of millions of people in the world who wonder what having a dollar a day to buy necessities of life would be like. Mosquito netting, clean water, and basic health care would be a wise investment in ensuring their survival and promoting the common good without upsetting the principle of subsidarity. You will note, however, that the Cardinal ended his intervention with a passing comment about "reproductive health", and he asked the rhetorical question why this term has become the consuming effort of of many delegates when the real issue of basic health is ignored. Under the guise of "human rights," the harsh reality of population control and the campaign for denying basic necessities of human life are hard at work. It strikes me that a core of Catholic Legal Theory on these points would sooner or later take into account the exhortation of St. Matthew's Gospel, Chapter 25: whatsoever you do to the least of my family, you do to me.   RJA sj

Monday, September 19, 2005

MOM, or More on Murray

I would like to add my thanks to those made previously by other members of MOJ for the wonderful John Courtney Murray conference sponsored by Villanova. Mark Sargent and company, notwithstanding any Augustinian prejudices, provided a most hospitable environment to those of Jesuit but not necessarily Jesuitical inclinations. Whilst the presentations and views varied on the different topics that were discussed, it was clear that the atmosphere was collegial. More importantly, speakers, commentators, and those who asked questions did so in a respectful manner even though there might not have been unanimity of opinion on the particular views being advanced. A healthy exchange of views took place. This is the Catholic academy at its best; moreover, there was the ability of participants to stake out a claim, advocate reasons for the view, and hold on to positions after comments were made. The proceedings reminded me of a group of individuals who saw something beyond themselves—that is, searching for God’s truth, the truth that sets us free of the limitations of the exclusively human perspective. I often wonder if this is true of the academy in general today? That is why I made the comment that the ability to present views that did not coincide with a particular stream of thought would not only not be welcome in some academic and legal environments but would not be tolerated. This is something that those of us interested in Catholic legal theory might want to consider as being constitutive of our method of proceeding. For those who might be interested, I include [Download the_role_of_international_law_in_us_constitutional_law.doc ] my most recent draft of the full paper that reflects some of the comments and observations made at the conference. Again, I offer my sincere gratitude to all who made the conference a wonderful and important event.   RJA sj

Tuesday, September 13, 2005

A bit more on academic credentials

I would like to thank Rick and Michael for their recenting postings about the Ph.D. factor in considering credentials for teaching law. Ph.D.'s are nice things to have, and I am certain that they can and do contribute to some faculty members credentials. But are they a sine qua non? I am inclined to join Rick and Michael in their views. Law teachers, when all is said, are asked to teach law. And to teach law well, the teacher must desire to grow personally in wisdom about the world, human nature, and beyond. The roles of philosophy, history, economics, political theory, etc., etc., etc. are helpful in this regard. Of course, those who teach in the field of patent and intellectual property law might also benefit from academic work in technical disciplines or performing arts or literature. This is not an exhaustive list, but I think the point is clear: law teachers can enhance their views and perspectives by being exposed to other academic fields. But there is nothing to stop them from this in their work even with a humble J.D.-- or B.Phil., or LL.M., or J.S.D., or B.C.L., or M.Div., or S.T.L....

What is needed is the law professor's desire for wisdom so that he or she can learn more and understand better. A Ph.D. can help, but is it essential to the task? I do not believe that it is.

A wise person may or may not have a Ph.D. But there have been many wise people who have not had the opportunity to pursue a Ph.D. That did not stop them from seeking wisdom and knowledge and understanding. A wise person probably knows that he or she needs to learn something more, and this individual does not let the absence of three letters of the alphabet stop them from this pursuit. Michael mentioned one illustration. I would like to mention one other: Fredrick Copleston.

Fr. Copleston was an English Jesuit who died a few years ago. He is well known in the academy as the author of the multi-volume History of Philosophy. He took a BA/MA from Oxford, and his honors level was of the second class (I do not recall if it was an upper or lower second). He was quite capable of meeting and debating in diverse academic settings. One of his more famous debates was with Bertrand Russell. He was also one of the wisest people I had ever met. He showed me that even though he was considered famous by many in the academic community, he still had a lot to learn. Fr. Copleston would regularly come to Campion Hall, the Jesuit Hall at Oxford University. He was always interested in hearing what the young priests and scholastics were doing and thinking. He absorbed what he heard, and he learned from what he absorbed. One day, one of the other English Jesuits, who happened to take a first class honors degree, mentioned in the dining room: "Oh, look, there's poor old Freddy. Only took a second, you know!" It was clear to us gathered within hearing range that this other Jesuit was reminding us in his peculiar fashion that he considered himself more intelligent than Fr. Copleston. Well, this did not stop one of my English confreres from reminding the priest who took a first: "Yes, Father, that is true. But look at what Fr. Copleston did with his Second! While we are at, could I ask you what you did with your First?" End of conversation.

A law teacher who wishes to be good at the craft can be like Fr. Copleston. The absence of a particular degree or level of honors need not arrest the search for wisdom and the desire to convey in lucid fashion what has been learned so that others may also learn and grow wise.

Now, if I can only find out from where Thomas More, Benjamin Cardozo, Thomas Jefferson, and John Marshall, just to mention a few other names, received their Ph.D's...

RJA sj

Monday, September 5, 2005

Judges and Consent Cases

Thanks to Susan for her posting yesterday about the NYT article on the Tennessee judges who are recusing themselves in cases where the minor elects not to ask a parent for permission to obtain an abortion. It appears that the minor for one reason or another chooses not to seek parental permission. Her option is to ask a judge. What if the judge accepts the case but denies permission? Will the twelve experts who wrote to the State Supreme Court complaining about Judge McCarroll’s “lawless” actions be satisfied? Will Mr. Chase, the president of Memphis Regional Planned Parenthood then have a motive to evaluate judicial activities? Recalling Prof. Silverstein’s research on how parental consent laws operate, is the judge who decides the case in accordance with the law but denies permission still lawless? I wonder if those who advocate abortion “rights” for minor children will be satisfied with laws under which judges, acting under the State law, withhold permission for abortions? Is the only “lawful” result the type of decision that Judge Bailey renders? These are interesting and important issues that warrant careful and continuing study.  RJA sj

Thursday, September 1, 2005

Avarice

I am sorry that I have been away from MOJ for two weeks; however, I have just caught up with the most recent postings. What do I say to the many eloquent and insightful commentaries to issues ranging from the enormous tragedy in our Gulf Coast, to the questions emerging from the Spokane diocese bankruptcy, to those dealing yet again with interest groups challenging Judge Roberts? And, of course, what do we as lawyers and law teachers say and do regarding these and other pressing matters of the day?

I return from an unexpected trip to Washington, DC. The wife of one of my best friends of almost forty years asked me to do the funeral of her husband who was also my college roommate for three years. He died unexpectedly whilst he and his family were on vacation. He and he son were swimming when he suffered a fatal heart attack that took his life instantaneously. His son brought him back into shore. I mention this because I think my dear friend’s life has something for us in the legal community, especially teachers, to ponder regarding the subjects I have mentioned.

My friend who was in reality another brother was a good man, a devoted father, a faithful husband, and a great public servant. He was a career civil servant in the Federal Government who rose to be the Deputy Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade and Affairs. He was one of the most intelligent people I ever met. He was also a man of outstanding virtue. That is probably why Republican and Democrat political appointees, including current and former Cabinet secretaries, and many others, came to pay their respects. He had many opportunities to leave government service to make a fortune, but he chose not to do this. Because he was a person of great virtue, he understood the common good and how it intersected not only his life but the life of everyone else. He had over 2,500 people who worked for him in all sorts of capacities. Most of them attended either the wakes or the funeral. In life and death he taught me something of great value, and that is this: greed corrupts the human soul. That is what he taught so many people who came to honor him.

I think those of us who are or who have been law teachers, and those of us who are practicing attorneys could learn from his example. Yesterday, I read about the closing of that well established law firm Coudert Brothers. Whilst the newspapers kept mentioning money and profit motivation, I saw something in the New York Times article that may have suggested there were many people of virtue in the firm. It seemed that many of their lawyers were most interested in doing the best job they could for their clients; billing for the services came after the fact. While this may have been their Achilles’ heel in today’s world of competitiveness, I just wonder if the souls of many were saved from the “success” of this world because greed was not what drove them and their firm. The article mentions that many top drawers of the firm could have made more money elsewhere, but they stayed and continued to labor for those whom they represented.

So, now I come to the aftermath of Katrina, the news about Spokane, etc. What is driving people in these contexts to plunder in the aftermath of a natural disaster, a bankruptcy, and a judicial nomination, just to mention a few issues of the day

Avarice.

There are many great souls I am certain who are struggling to bring aid to the people in the Gulf, to protect the Church and its good works, and to enable a decent man to be a Supreme Court Justice. But, there are those driven by avarice: they loot on different fronts to serve themselves and their interests, but they forget something else: the common good. I bring up a personal point about Spokane that reinforces one made by Prof. Steve Bainbridge. Last year when I was still in
Spokane and heard lawyers claiming they would attach all assets of the diocese including the cemeteries, I wondered if they would first exhume the bodies or if they would simply develop over them?

And, that is where we who are Christian come into the play. How do we practice the profession of law? How do we teach it? I know there are many extraordinary and edifying responses to these two inquiries. But, perhaps we can learn the lesson taught to me by the friend I buried last week: avarice does not ennoble the human soul and person; rather, it corrupts. And now we find corruption at the heart of too many problems some of which are on the verge of overwhelming many good people and the national spirit.

So, what can we do in response? We can live a life of example to demonstrate to the world and to our students that avarice does not profit anyone in the long term. If we can do this, I believe that God will be ready to step in and take care of the rest. RJA sj

PS  I have been having extraordinary problems with the spacing of the text of this posting. I apologize. I tried to fix it more than a dozen times, but something is wrong with TypePad tonight, at least over on my side of the Great Pond. Thanks for your understanding.

Wednesday, August 10, 2005

Old England and New England

Thanks to Rick for his posting on the Roberts and Religion issue addressed by Christopher Morris’s essay in yesterday’s Boston Globe.

Today’s Globe carries another interesting Editorial HERE about State Senator Marian Walsh’s proposed legislation that would subject religious organizations to financial disclosure requirements. This editorial replicates an earlier one published by the Globe in October of 2004 on the same subject. Today’s editorial also follows an article in the Globe by Frank Phillip entitled "Bill Would Force Church to Disclose Its Finances—Attitude Shifts on Beacon Hill." This article is a rich source of commentary on a variety of other issues involving the Boston Archdiocese, but these go beyond the scope of the Senator’s bill. However, I did find the use of the singular (Church) in the title to be intriguing.

Since I have limited computer time this month whilst I am away from Rome, I have not yet been able to find the text of Senator Walsh’s bill online. Consequently, my remarks may be incomplete. However, I would like to offer a few preliminary comments until such time as I can review the text of the Walsh proposal.

It should be clear that no one is insulated from liability for financial wrongdoings. Clerics, religious, and laity have misappropriated funds belonging to the religious institutions, and they have been held accountable for these misdeeds. In the case of the Catholic Church, there is access to two systems of accountability—one canonical, the other secular—for reviewing these misdeeds. But it is unclear to me why the civil legislation proposed by Senator Walsh and endorsed by the Globe is required to address the legitimate concerns that any other Catholic might have about the Church’s finances and property. Senator Walsh or any other member of the faithful could go to the parish financial council or appropriate diocesan office to get the information that the bill seemingly would require churches to file with civil authorities. Has she done this? This the Globe does not say.

Mr. Phillips reports that Senator "Walsh’s leadership on the issue is rooted in strong anger." The source of her anger is not identified in the article. I might share the Senator’s concerns if she asked appropriate church officials, clerical and lay, for information on revenues and expenditures and property but was rebuffed. But I wonder if the inquiry were made? The Globe does not say. If this avenue were not pursued, then I would suggest that the anger is premature and unwarranted.

The Globe editorial also comments on the many privileges churches seem to have including exemptions from property and sales taxes and the special mailing rates that are available to many institutions including political organizations. In a display of what appears to be an argument from "reasonableness," the Globe posits that being subjected to the disclosure requirements is "a small price" to pay in return for these "privileges."

But is it a small price? And is it reasonable?

It may be that this legislation is really directed at something else. Again, since I have not read the proposal, I must be careful in what I say. But at this stage I happen to recall certain precedents from Old England in the early Sixteenth Century that could have some bearing on the New England of today. There was a civil ruler in Old England who did not care for the Church’s position regarding a certain divorce. The civil leader put pressure on religious leaders and religious houses in order to obtain a more agreeable response. When they consented, the pressure was released; when they did not, the pressure was increased. One might recall the scene from the film adaptation of Bolt’s play presenting the conversation between Wolsey (Orson Welles) and More (Paul Scofield) on this topic.

Pressure was then used by the civil authorities on the Church and its officials and members for questionable objectives. Is what is going on in Boston today a repetition? In Old England it was the matter of a divorce. But today the matter generating tension between the Church and civil officials may be about abortion, embryonic stem cell research, or the meaning of family, just to mention a few areas of disagreement on contemporary issues between the Church and some civil authorities. Is the situation in New England of today like that of the Old England of Thomas More, Cardinal Wolsey, and King Henry? And is the use of pressure by civil authorities once again being contemplated for questionable purposes? Religious liberty was in harms way five hundred years ago. Is there reason to suspect that history may be repeating itself? It may well if its lessons have been forgotten. RJA sj

Sunday, August 7, 2005

A short response to Rick

My gratitude is extended to Rick for his thoughtful reflection on my earlier post regarding judges. It is my impression that most folks realize that all American Catholics are addressed in the CDF’s note. Of course, the nature of the particular Catholic citizen’s role in public life depends on the individual’s role as citizen, legislator, lawyer, or judge. And all are citizens. I do not think it is possible to chart specific courses for each person in these groups; however, we are all guided by the same first principles of faith and our Church’s teachings. At this point, I think it productive to recall some of the earlier discussions that raised the role of virtue in the American Catholic’s public life. I, for one, believe that virtues are essential to how a Catholic lives his or her life in right relation with God and the neighbor. Reliance on them helps each of us deliberate issues and make decisions. As I have suggested in some of my earlier work, I believe that reliance on virtues is vital to the work of judges and members of the legal profession in general.

Allow me to make a few remarks about Rick’s questions regarding the role of the Catholic judge in capital cases. Like the legislator or any other citizen who is confronted with an existing legal structure, the Catholic judge ought to be mindful of what the note and Evangelium Vitae instruct. Some consideration should also be given about whether the judge is a trial judge or an appellate judge, for each has different responsibilities in assessing the legality and propriety of capital punishment. Indeed, in some jurisdictions for particular crimes, capital punishment is the law. All of us are cognizant of this. So, what does the Church teach? Its position contains nuance, but I think it is evident that as of this moment the Church would prefer life imprisonment to execution even though the latter is not condemned outright.

And what does the judge do in light of this? Well, most of us were on the face of this planet when the Supreme Court stopped capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia. Judges could certainly undo what they undid in the past. I have already suggested this in the context of Roe. Not being a man who wagers, I shall forego discussion about the probability of this happening.

Given the current context of capital punishment and Church teachings, the Catholic judge does not contravene the teachings of the Church by permitting the state to execute the convicted. Neither does the judge flaunt the law by exercising what judicial discretion is at his or her disposal. But the matter does not stop there. As there are different theories about punishment (retribution, rehabilitation, etc.), so there are different approaches for the Catholic judge to consider. One sensible approach might be akin to a Catholic version of the secular rehabilitation perspective. Is there some chance that the convicted who could be executed might some day sincerely seek forgiveness for the heinous crime that could be punished by execution? Both the judge who is operating from a foundation of Catholic teaching and the judge who is not are dealing with different versions of the same issue when the rehabilitation perspective is at work. In the meantime, the convicted person continues to be punished by being deprived of liberty etc. in prison, which is usually not a particularly nice place to spend the rest of one’s earthly life. But the convicted still retains an extended opportunity to seek forgiveness.

I have not addressed many of the issues that Rick has raised, but I hope I have contributed a thought or two that can help us see that Catholic judges and non-Catholic judges just might have some appropriately shared options in capital cases based on issues of faith and points from secular legal theory. I would like to make one final point that I think Catholics and believers from other faiths would agree: there is still one more tribunal to go after the Supreme Court of the United States, and that is a tribunal which each of us must face some day. Might we ponder an exhortation that applies to us all: the Lord is kind and merciful, slow to anger and rich in compassion.   RJA sj

Saturday, August 6, 2005

Judges once more

I am sorry that my being away from Rome whilst I attend language instruction has prevented me from contributing to the ongoing discussion about Catholic judges in a more expeditious manner. I would like to take this opportunity to address some views that may have suggested that the role of judges may have been omitted from recent Church texts regarding the judicial role in democracy and public life. I believe that the CDF’s Doctrinal Note on the Participation of Catholics in Political Life does provide insight on the role of all Catholic citizens regardless of their role in political processes.

While the note does not specifically mention judges by name, it does address all members of a democratic society and their respective roles in civil affairs. This inclusive statement would apply to judges in their dual capacity of citizens and government officials. The text of the CDF does not restrict its concerns to legislators only. Without mentioning particulars, the note states that there are "other ways" besides being a legislator in which the members of society contribute to the development of political solutions and legislative choices that will benefit the common good. The note makes reference to Christifideles Laici and its exhortation that the life of a democratic society cannot be productive without the active and responsible involvement of all its members "albeit in a diversity and complementarity of forms, levels, tasks, and responsibilities." Judges surely have a role in bringing their particular competence and expertise when they embrace this charge. In accordance with the Pastoral Constitution of the Second Vatican Council, the faithful which includes Catholic judges have a duty not to relinquish their important role in promoting the common good. The CDF note specified that the common good includes addressing public order and peace, freedom and equality, respect for human life and the environment, justice and solidarity. Again, judges, including those who are Catholic, have a definite role in this enterprise.

While the note discusses democratic societies, it does not mention any particular political system. But as Americans, we must not forget the role that judges have on the work of the law making process at the national, state, and local levels. A judge can declare a statute or ordinance unconstitutional. A judge can provide a juridical definition or interpretation to a public legal text promulgated by the legislature or other body that serves legislative functions. There is no doubt that the role of the American and Catholic judge is addressed in this text. When the note speaks of "cultural relativism" that sanctions "the decadence and disintegration of reason and the principles of the natural moral law," judges cannot be considered excused from this instruction. In our American legal system, judges do have a role in the making of law through their role in judicial review and legal interpretation. If these obligations mentioned in the note belong to the legislator and the executive, they are also those of the judge.

If a Catholic judge, legislator, or executive cannot rely on his or her understanding of this natural moral law and what constitutes the human good, then whose understanding is being relied upon when public officials make decisions that are or appear to be within their competence? This is the concern I have with the claims for "tolerance" and "pluralism" today about how laws are to be made and interpreted. Our American society and its legal institutions have been gravely affected by these claims that camouflage decision making (be it legislative, executive, or judicial) with some particular interest group’s perspective but in the name of "pluralism" or "tolerance." When a legislature enacts a law regulating abortion that is challenged in the courts by NARAL, the ACLU, or the Center for Reproductive Rights, whose view prevails? Is it the view that protects the interests of all (the common good) or is the view that reflects only the interests of some (and therefore not the common good)? Advocates of pluralism and tolerance often make claims that the views of some cannot be imposed on the views of all, but this is precisely what happens when these special interests defeat the legislature that has regulated abortion as one example. More often than not in recent times it is the view of special interests that is given deference and the views of the rest are subject to forfeit.

As citizens and as officials, Catholic judges like their fellow citizens and disciples need to assess their role in public life "so as to be sure that it is marked by a coherent responsibility for temporal reality." Crucial to this vocation is a proper understanding of the nature of the human person and the dignity that is inalienably due to each member of the human family. After all, that is what authentic human rights is about. And again, judges, including those who are Catholic, have a role and obligations in this pursuit. To do otherwise negates the person’s genuine freedom to both country and Church.

To provide grounding for what all citizens who consider themselves Catholic should do in public life, the note provides instruction:

When political activity comes up against moral principles that do not admit of exception, compromise or derogation, the Catholic commitment becomes more evident and laden with responsibility. In the face of fundamental and inalienable ethical demands, Christians must recognize that what is at stake is the essence of the moral law, which concerns the integral good of the human person. This is the case with laws concerning abortion and euthanasia (not to be confused with the decision to forgo extraordinary treatments, which is morally legitimate). Such laws must defend the basic right to life from conception to natural death. In the same way, it is necessary to recall the duty to respect and protect the rights of the human embryo. Analogously, the family needs to be safeguarded and promoted, based on monogamous marriage between a man and a woman, and protected in its unity and stability in the face of modern laws on divorce: in no way can other forms of cohabitation be placed on the same level as marriage, nor can they receive legal recognition as such. The same is true for the freedom of parents regarding the education of their children; it is an inalienable right recognized also by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In the same way, one must consider society’s protection of minors and freedom from modern forms of slavery (drug abuse and prostitution, for example). In addition, there is the right to religious freedom and the development of an economy that is at the service of the human person and of the common good, with respect for social justice, the principles of human solidarity and subsidiarity, according to which "the rights of all individuals, families, and organizations and their practical implementation must be acknowledged." Finally, the question of peace must be mentioned. Certain pacifistic and ideological visions tend at times to secularize the value of peace, while, in other cases, there is the problem of summary ethical judgments which forget the complexity of the issues involved. Peace is always "the work of justice and the effect of charity." It demands the absolute and radical rejection of violence and terrorism and requires a constant and vigilant commitment on the part of all political leaders.

Finally, for those who might argue or suggest that there may be a conflict with the Establishment Clause, the note is sympathetic. The note acknowledges the difference between the spheres of politics and civil affairs and that of religion and the Church. But the note also hastens to add correctly that morality infuses both spheres. But for those who might argue otherwise, they ought to reflect on the civil laws that protect members of society from those who commit or attempt crimes, for example. Why do we have these laws? We have them because they are proper instruments of civil governance. While they provide moral direction, they also promote a society in which morality is at the root of how we ought to conduct our affairs with one another.

All Catholics have the right and duty to seek the truth about human existence and to promote and to defend this truth by using the appropriate political and legal mechanisms that we have developed. This is at the core of justice which the law presumably exists to protect and maintain. Otherwise, there will always be someone weaker who is controlled or oppressed by someone who is stronger, and this the Church teaches is wrong even though some advocates for pluralism, diversity, and tolerance make different but erroneous claims.

No one who claims to be a Catholic is excused. To argue that judges fall through a crack in the Church’s teachings would be a flawed position to take and to maintain. The CDF’s note and what the Church teaches it members do not command particular outcomes. They do indicate how a Catholic is to be well informed and exercise sound and right reason as he or she engages his or her proper role in political life. These are teachings compatible with American democracy, and they apply to the role of the Catholic judge and every other Catholic citizen. RJA sj

Friday, July 29, 2005

What can a judge do?

Thanks to those who have been adding their insights to the questions about judges, especially Catholic ones, and their judicial responsibilities to uphold the rule of law in the exercise of their duties. I am not suggesting that Judge Gee of the old Fifth Circuit provides answers to this problem, but he does offer some words worth taking into consideration. As a member of the Fifth Circuit, he upheld a District Court Decision critiquing an affirmative program that worked its way to the Supreme Court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. When the Supreme Court reversed the District and Circuit Courts and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit, the latter court issued its decision Download judge_gee_weber.doc . Judge Gee had these words to offer regarding what could be done with a decision that he found “profoundly wrong”:

Obedient to the mandate of the Supreme Court, we vacate the trial court’s judgment, as well as ours affirming it, and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion above.

Then, speaking for himself, he offered these thoughts:

For myself only, and with all respect and deference, I here note my personal conviction that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case is profoundly wrong.

That it is wrong as a matter of statutory construction seems to me sufficiently demonstrated by the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and of Mr. Justice Rehnquist.  To these I can add nothing.  They make plain beyond peradventure that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed the Congress on the express representation of its sponsors that it would not and could not be construed as the Court has now construed it.  What could be plainer than the words of the late Senator Humphrey defending the bill against the charge that it adumbrated quotas and preferential treatment that “the title would Prohibit preferential treatment for any particular group . . . .”? The Court now tells us that this is not so.  That it feels it may properly do so seems to me a grievous thing.

But sadder still tragic, in my own view is the Court’s departure from the long road that we have travelled from Plessy v. Ferguson, toward making good Mr. Justice Harlan’s anguished cry in dissent that “(o)ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  I voice my profound belief that this present action, like Plessy, is a wrong and dangerous turning, and my confident hope that we will soon return to the high, bright road on which we disdain to classify a citizen, Any citizen, to any degree or for any purpose by the color of his skin.

Though for the above reasons I think it gravely mistaken, I do not say that the Court’s decision is immoral or unjust indeed, in some basic sense it may well represent true justice.  But there are many actions roughly just that our laws do not authorize and our Constitution forbids, actions such as preventing a Nazi Party march through a town where reside former inmates of concentration camps or inflicting summary punishment on one caught redhanded in a crime.

Subordinate magistrates such as I must either obey the orders of higher authority or yield up their posts to those who will.  I obey, since in my view the action required of me by the Court’s mandate is only to follow a mistaken course and not an evil one.

One of the difficulties judges and the rest of us face is how to make the distinction between the “mistaken course” and an “evil one.” This brings up the point about material and formal cooperation on which Ed Hartnett is working. Judge Gee does not mention recusal as an option, but he does mention resignation. That is an extreme measure that may lead to a good and virtuous person leaving an office in which he or she should remain. But, I think what Judge Gee did by putting into the public record his concerns and his justifications for them reveals that there are alternatives, besides recusal and resignation, to what a judge can do in a case where he or she concludes that some higher human authority, be it a legislature or another judge, is “profoundly wrong.” RJA sj

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

Recusal and the Rule of Law

Once again, thanks to those participants who have contributed to the discussion about judicial recusal. I would like to respond briefly to this topic and related matters involving “personal convictions about what the law ought to be.” Let me begin with recusal. I have mentioned before that recusal is a method for insuring that a judge who has a personal stake in a case does not participate in its deliberations. I think this means that if the judge has a direct financial interest in the conclusion, is related to one of the parties, or, as a lawyer, previously directed some aspect of the case for one of the current litigants, he or she should seriously consider recusal.

But let us take another situation. What if a judge has not only been a “member” of the ACLU but was a principal for a number of years. Should this person, if appointed to the bench, recuse himself or herself if the ACLU is a party in a case before this judge? This is the situation in the Kentucky Ten Commandments case in which the ACLU (of Kentucky) was a principal. Justice Ginsburg, who had a long professional association with the ACLU, participated in the case. I do not recall if there was any substantive discussion about whether she should have recused herself, but she did not. And, I do not think that she should have recused herself on the grounds of her membership and former role in the ACLU. So, we come to Judge Roberts. Why should he recuse himself in a case that might involve an issue raising the legal status of abortion? I do not believe that the reason that his “personal convictions about what the law ought to be” is a real issue in determining the matter.

Quite frankly, how do we explain a court overruling itself otherwise? The law that was settled in Plessy was unsettled by Brown. The law that was settled in Bowers was unsettled in Lawrence. The law that was settled in National League of Cities was unsettled in Garcia. The law that was settled in Union Gas was unsettled in Seminole Tribe. Were the personal convictions about what the law ought to be involved in these cases? Perhaps another way of looking at these changes in the law might be this: did the new case provide an opportunity for enough justices to say that the Court was “wrong” in the past, and today in this new case we can rectify the “error of the past” notwithstanding the question of something being previously settled. If Plessy, Bowers, National League of Cities, and Union Gas were “wrong,” what principle in the rule of law insists that Roe was, is, and must always be right?

It may well be that in the eyes and minds of some honest intellectual debate is dismissed as “personal convictions about what the law ought to be.” But, when some reason and logic are permitted to overrule precedent but other reason and logic are viewed as “personal convictions about what the law ought to be,” we have a problem in the rule of law. I understand as well as the next person the political consequences of overruling precedent, but I hasten to add that what is it in Roe that makes this precedent and its progeny immune from the scrutiny of reason and logic, key components of the rule of law? The reason and logic that Judge Roberts may have to bring to the reexamination of any precedent, including Roe, are not grounds for his recusal if the reason and logic of the other members of the Court are not subject to the same examination. If Judge Roberts is a virtuous man, and I think he is, what counts is the quality of his reason and his logic. The related pastoral issues which may sooner or later be involved are for Judge Roberts, his priest, and his bishop to address.  RJA sj