Mark has asked an important question about the relationship between Catholic and Jesuit in the context of The Heights editorial from a couple of days ago. The link is inextricable. As then Father Avery Dulles said in 1999, the second, Jesuit, is an intensification of the first, Catholic. I also believe that a way of understanding this connection is to think and pray about the election between the two standards in the second week of Saint Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises. As the Mullan translation puts it: "The one of Christ, our Commander-in-chief; the other of Lucifer, moral enemy of our human nature." I am not sure if the editors who wrote the piece quoted by Mark are familiar with this part of Jesuit spirituality. It would be a good place to start for any of us interested in the vital relationship. RJA sj
Wednesday, December 7, 2005
A Response to Mark's Invitation
Slavery again
Thanks to Eduardo for his posting. I am not sure where to begin responding to his diverse points, but I shall try my best. Professor McGreevy’s work to which Eduardo refers is “Catholicism and American Freedom.” I think it fair to say that many Catholics, including bishops, were dealing with strong anti-Catholic sentiments in the US in the ante-bellum period. Thomas Nast’s cartoon characterizations of Catholics after the Civil War was over demonstrate that this antipathy did not end with the Civil War. Professor McGreevy mentions that the Northern abolitionists were also public in their distaste for Catholics. Under such conditions, it would be hard to imagine an alliance between Catholics and the abolitionists. During the American Civil War, Catholic loyalties were divided. But I must respectfully disagree with the unnamed British observer who offered the view that Pius IX “could not conceal from me that all his sympathies were with the Southern confederacy.” The diplomatic correspondence between the Holy See and the U.S. minister to Rome and the U.S. Department of State demonstrates that Rome and the Pope supported the Union. As the American Minister reported to the U.S. Secretary of State in 1863, “His Holiness, as well as the Cardinal Secretary of State, are decided friends of The Union and ardently desire that its integrity may be preserved. The latter was strong in the expression of his Hopes that the North would speedily subdue the Rebellion.” Dispatch no. 8, to Washington, April 4, 1863. Earlier, in June of 1862, Pius IX wrote to Mr. Randall the then Minister of the United States to Rome assuring him of the Holy See’s intention of friendly relations with the United States. It was the British who were divided in their support of the Union and the Confederacy as the March 23 parliamentary debates demonstrate. Lord Campbell urged recognition of the Confederacy, but Earl Russell counseled against action that would antagonize the Union. I have attempted to verify the accuracy of 1866 instruction from the Holy Office. At this stage I am not willing to accept the veracity of the sources available on websites that refer to it. With regard to Professor Diana Hayes comments, I must disagree with what appears to be her contentions. If she is asserting that the Church continues to enslave, I again must also disagree. I suggest that a person today freely chooses to follow the Church or not. To be free for its teachings is not enslavement but the greatest exercise of freedom. To seek freedom from something is rather easy, but to be free for something requires considerable effort on the part of the person who claims and practices this kind of freedom. RJA sj
Saturday, December 3, 2005
A bit more on Dissent and Conscience
Thanks to Steve for his post on Conscience and Dissent. The late Richard McCormick of the Society of Jesus was a gifted man whom I did not have the opportunity to meet. But if I did have that opportunity, I would ask him to elaborate his point so that I could understand why dissent within a community is essential in order to avoid its “comfortable stagnation.” I have the article to which Steve referred before me, and I have been going through it. Is it not possible that those who are faithful to the community and take the intellectual life and honesty seriously may regularly subject their positions to exacting scrutiny testing them with logic and objective empirical evidence and the critique of other views which stand in disagreement to their own? If so, and the positions of their community stand and maintain their integrity after being subjected to such rigorous, periodic examination, why is dissent from within the community needed to fend off stagnation, comfortable or otherwise? RJA sj
Slavery and Church Teaching
I would like to respond to Eduardo’s challenging observations about the Church and slavery in the nineteenth century. If Eduardo was making the point that the Church did not speak out against slavery in the nineteenth, I must respectfully disagree. If his point was that some members of the Church did not abide by its teaching, then I would agree that there were Catholics involved in varying degrees of supporting slavery or its trade.
It is important to be mindful of what the Church teaches and has taught. It is also important to know that we, as Catholics (clerical and laity), are sinners who do not always follow the teachings of the Church. This is true when the practice of slavery is examined. With the European exploration and colonization of the globe in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, slavery became a growing business and, therefore, a subject of the Church’s teachings. We might recall the writings of de las Casas, Suàrez, de Vitoria, Molina, Claver, and others during this period. While Councils and Popes condemned various aspects of slavery and the slave trade in the first millennium of the Church, we need to be mindful of the teachings of Eugene IV (1435), Paul III (1537), Pius V (1568), Urban VIII (1639), Benedict XIV (1741), Pius VII (1815), Gregory XVI (1839), Leo XIII (1888), and the Second Vatican Council (1965) condemning, by different methods, slavery and the slave trade. The faithful—clerical and lay—have not always abided by these teachings, as I have mentioned. My own order was suppressed at the insistence of their Catholic majesties of France, Portugal, and Spain in 1773 for several reasons including its work against slave practices in colonial regions of the world. Perhaps they, their Catholic majesties who pressured the Pope to suppress the order, had in mind the words of Henry II: “who will rid me of this meddlesome priest!” It is also true that members of the Jesuit order in the Maryland Province participated in America’s “peculiar institution.” Perhaps those who participated in slavery had in mind, “when in America, do as the Americans.”
My point is this: the Church has held and taught for a long time that slavery and its trade are wrong. Nevertheless, some who considered themselves Catholics did not abide by this teaching. It appears the same is true when other issues of contemporary interests are studied. In these matters where the Church’s teachings are clear, some members do not always observe and practice what the Church teaches. RJA sj
Friday, December 2, 2005
More on Conscience and Authority
I am grateful for Steve’s recent comments on authority and conscience. He raises issues and develops points that cut across a number of current debates within the Church on pressing contemporary topics. MOJ readers and contributors may conclude that I have a different approach which leads to other conclusions. Steve properly refers to the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church (Lumen Gentium) which is a vital text in comprehending the matters he raises. The Second Vatican Council spoke of the Church as the People of God. This includes everyone who is a part of the Church, and each person, each member has one’s proper role in the Body of Christ, the Communion of Saints. While Steve also incorporates the views of several theologians, I will rely on their perspectives. When it comes to authority and conscience and religious liberty, the Council addressed these issues. Lumen Gentium is the roadmap that explains the apposite relationship of the Church’s members to one another; moreover, it also provides the roadmap by which we navigate the relationships that ensue from our participation in the People of God.
We know from Lumen Gentium that there is a distinction that must be kept in mind about the members and how they are to relate to one another. But these distinctions ultimately do not divide, they harmonize in a communion. As the Councils stated: “The distinction which the Lord has made between the sacred ministers and the rest of the People of God involves union, for the pastors and the other faithful are joined together by a close relationship: the pastors of the Church—following the example of the Lord—should minister to each other and to the rest of the faithful; the latter should eagerly collaborate with the pastors and teachers.” With regard to the faithful laity, the Council said, “by reason of their special vocation it belongs to the laity to seek the kingdom of God by engaging in the temporal affairs and directing them according to God’s will.” But as they engage the temporal affairs of the world, including its difficult political issues, the faithful are to rely on the teaching they have received from their pastors, including their bishops and the Pope. The Council was clear in its presentation that the bishops have the duty as authentic teachers of doctrine; moreover, they exercise this responsibility in communion with the Roman Pontiff, and are endowed with the authority of Christ and rulers who ward off errors that threaten their flocks.
And where does conscience come in to all of this? Again, the Council has provided the way to understand what conscience is for each member of the People of God. Each has and can exercise freedom of religion according to the Declaration, Dignitatis Humanae. For those who are members of the People of God, it means that they are not simply free from interference with their faith by those outside the Church which is a “civil right”; they are also free for accepting what the Church teaches and striving to abide by its teachings in daily life. Temptation can lead us astray from these teachings, but we are informed by the Council that we have the freedom to return to them of our own volition. I do not think that the Council discussed “freedom of conscience.” It did discuss conscience and, in doing so, it explained how the conscience is formed. But, in the formation of conscience, the Christian faithful have been taught to attend to the sacred and certain doctrine of the Church. And as the Council also explained, the Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher of the truth. It is the Church’s duty “to give utterance to, and authoritatively to teach, that truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which have their origins in human nature itself.” I have already pointed to how Lumen Gentium addresses where this teaching authority is to be found.
Conscience is therefore not a freedom that exists solely within each person. Rather it is that which binds each person in a harmonious relationship with the People of God. It would be mistaken to conclude that “conscience” authorizes the person to decide for one’s self what his or her conscience dictates. These leads to a subjectivism that takes the person away from one’s union with the Body of Christ and the objectives truths which help us understand what proper and what is not; what is right and what is wrong; what is sinful and what is virtuous; and what is true and what is not. Conscience and the Church rely on proper and authentic relationships.
The proper relationship between the bishops and the laity is therefore also addressed by the Second Vatican Council. It is important to keep in mind that this relationship is built on trust, love, dialog, and respect. Each member of the relationship holds an obligation to the others to respect and implement the duties of the relationship. Nonetheless, there are several important points made by the Council necessitating emphasis which shed light on these relationships. The first is that the faithful laity must exercise respect to the bishops who as teachers represent Christ, as He exercised his fidelity in His obedience to the Father. At the same time, the bishops need to acknowledge and encourage the dignity and responsibility of the laity to contribute to the affairs of the temporal world. Moreover, bishops are to be mindful of their duty to rely on the “prudent advice” of the laity and “confidently assign” them duties which are in service to the Church in the exercise of which they enjoy a proper measure of freedom. But all of these individuals—be they clerical or lay—grow from the vine of Christ on which they are branches. And for so long as we choose to remain branches, we need to direct our energies to producing fruit abundantly in the name of Christ and the Church. For that is what the vine needs and expects if we are to remain in communion with Him and with one another. RJA sj
Wednesday, November 30, 2005
The Congregation for Education's Recent Text
I have read with great interest the recent postings by MOJ members on the Congregation for Education's text, and I would like to offer my own reflections. However, since several provincials (major superiors) of my religious institute have instructed our men not to offer any public comment at this time, I must honor their instruction. For those who continue this discussion, it would be helpful to keep in mind the following Church texts that have addressed elements of the issues associated with the discussion during the past 30 years: (1) the December 29, 1975 "Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics" HERE ; (2) the October 1, 1986 "Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons" HERE ; (3) the July 23, 1992 document "Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative Proposals on Nondiscrimination of Homosexual Persons" HERE ; and, (4) the July 31, 2003 "Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons" HERE. RJA sj
Tuesday, November 22, 2005
The Human Rights Committee and "Human Rights"
Thanks to Rick for his posting on the Human Rights Committee action on the KL v. Peru matter. It is not a case as we understand them. Let me try to address a few of Rick’s important questions. The Committee was created by the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It has a variety of functions that are spelled out in the instrument. One duty it has is to evaluate periodic reports that are filed by countries that are parties to the Covenant under Article 40 of the Covenant. That is pretty straight forward; however, the product of the evaluation is not particularly satisfying in many cases. In recent years, even some progressive countries have disagreed with the Committee’s conclusions about the comments they received on their compliance reports from the Committee.
The more interesting and less clear duty the Committee has is under Articles 41 and 42 of the Covenant. It can receive a “declaration” from one country that is a party to the Covenant that another country that is also a party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. I have tried to ascertain if that is what happened in the matter to which Rick refers, but I have not been successful. The Center for Reproductive Rights website and the UN websites are unhelpful in answering these basic questions. Does that tell me something? Yes. So I think that is what has happened: another country did report the matter of Peru and KL to the Committee. In any event, the Committee (or an ad hoc “Conciliation Commission” that the Committee can appoint under Article 42) investigates the complaint with the right of the “parties” to supply information. The Committee is not supposed to take action unless it has determined that “all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted” and “in conformity with recognized principles of international law.” “Friendly resolution” of the matter is encouraged. The Committee then submits a report to the State parties concerned. I think that is what happened—a report was issued. Not a ruling. Not a decision.
Is this type of report “law”? I don’t think so, but after a while these reports pile up and they get quoted. When things get quoted time after time, they leave an impression. The Center for Reproductive Rights is aware of this phenomenon. After a while, they suggest that these reports reflect customary law.
My written presentation at the Villanova John Courtney Murray Conference this past September will offer some explanation of the process. It also offers an account of some of the methods used by the Center for Reproductive Rights in commandeering international bodies to further its political agenda of “reproductive rights” (including abortion) which the Center has concluded are “human rights.” That is hard to accept when one considers the implications of the “right to life” article in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This brings me to Rick’s second question. I hope I am not dodging it here by saying this, but these folks—the Committee and the Center for Reproductive Rights—have a lot to learn about core principles of international law and authentic human rights. Having said that, they understand well a system, and they are exploiting it. In the meantime, human rights suffer. I fear they will continue to suffer under the irony of promoting “human rights” that exist only through skewed interpretations and clever political manipulations and not through sound legal interpretation and application of the rule of law. RJA sj
Monday, November 14, 2005
Where is international law?
I would like to thank Rob for his important posting on the Ninth Circuit decision in Fields v. Palmdale School District. Judge Reinhardt does not mention international law as a source of support for the position of the parents. I find that interesting since that was a principal justification for Lawrence overturning Bowers. I hasten to add that in another forum (the Villanova John Courtney Murray Symposium), I questioned whether there was international law to rely on in Lawrence. International law was also a source of support for the juvenile death penalty case in Simmons. In neither of those cases was the United States a party to the fundamental principles on which the majorities relied. But for those majorities, that did not seem to matter. Justice Scalia, in blunt words, indicated in his Simmons dissent that to invoke "alien law" when it agrees with one's own thinking and ignore it otherwise is "not reasoned decision-making but sophistry." Following Justice Scalia's argument, can one argue that there might be a problem with the Fields case?
The Ninth Circuit decision in Fields does not refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is arguably customary international law to which the Court could have deferred. Article 26.3 appears to support the contention of the parents about their rights which were downplayed by the Ninth Circuit. But we don't have to argue about the role of the Universal Declaration. There is another component of international law that clearly does apply to the case. The United States is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 18.4 addresses the issue at stake in this case. It would seem, then, that the Ninth Circuit failed to follow applicable international law that is dispositive of the case. Consequently, the concern raised by Justice Scalia in Simmons is boosted to another level. Here international law should apply since the law of the United States, through its being a party to an international instrument, states that the parents do have the right that was denied to them by the Ninth Circuit. However, that law was not relied upon by the Ninth Circuit. It appears that some courts call something international law and use it when they have questionable grounds for doing so. However, when they should apply international law but do not, the problem is intensified. Perhaps Justice Scalia is on to something. RJA sj
Tuesday, November 8, 2005
Catholic Law Schools: Models and Essence
Amy and Richard have been most helpful in developing issues about Catholic law schools. Surely we must look at Ex Corde Ecclesiae, but I also think Fides et Ratio is an important text to consider. I also believe that the CDF’s document on Catholics in Political Life is relevant to our discussion on defining what is essential to Catholic legal education. A number of Conciliar texts including Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes also play an important role in the investigation and discussion. This list is not intended to be exclusive one, simply an identification of some relevant Church documents that have a bearing on the matter. Amy raises the interesting and important point about whether we should consider identifying a variety of models rather than determining the “best” model of Catholic legal education. I am not sure that identifying and discussing models, however, is the right question. I assume that there are different models for Catholic law schools. To aid the discussion, MOJ readers may wish to look at John J. Fitzgerald’s helpful article in the October 2002 issue of Crisis magazine on this point. He examines several schools: Ave Maria, Saint Thomas (Minnesota), Catholic University of America, Notre Dame, Boston College, and Georgetown. [Here] Do these models really help us understand what makes a law school a Catholic law school? There may well be a variety of models to consider, but is there something at the essence of the institution which says: here is a Catholic law school. Surely curriculum, perspectives, the identity of teachers and students, speakers, publications, sponsored or recognized student organizations, and other issues are at play. It could also be that different models contain this essence. But, when all is said, are there essential characteristics at the heart—perhaps the soul—of the institution which determines whether it is a Catholic law school or not? If that is the right question, I look forward to participating in developing a response with MOJ friends. RJA sj
Thursday, November 3, 2005
"Catholic" Law Schools
My thanks to Michael for posting the most interesting article by Patricia Lefevere on Catholic Law Schools.
Catholic Law Schools? Do they exist? This is a suitable topic for MOJ exploration, since CLT is well suited to address the topic and the issue. Father Hesburgh once said that the Catholic university is the place where the Church does its thinking. Can the same be said of the Catholic law school? Ms. Lefevere is quick to bring this question into focus when she raises her own inquiry about whether it is “even desirable to have such an identity?” Her rhetorical point brings up the further question: if an institution were accused of being a Catholic law school, would there be sufficient evidence to convict?
Initially, I was reluctant to write this post, but two immediate points in the article necessitated a response. The first was our introduction to the new dean of Villanova Law School, Mark Sarget. I immediately wondered what happened to our dear friend, Mark Sargent. But my initial concern about Mark Sargent’s fate was quickly relieved when I realized that the spelling of his surname was a typographical error! Following his point about Catholic mission, I would hasten to add that I cannot find any law school that asserts missions for social injustice and academic laziness when Catholic schools are said by some to be distinctive in their demands for social justice and academic rigor. And when it comes to symbols, why is the symbol of the cross deemed offensive by some? Yet, at the same time displays of other symbols which have no connection with Catholicism, e.g. rainbow colored banners, do not seem to raise any questions at all?
The second point was the statement that “Villanova tied with the University of San Diego, a Jesuit law school, for 63rd spot…” The University of San Diego is not a Jesuit institution, so I was perplexed to learn that it has a Jesuit law school. But this would raise another question best left for another time knowing that John Breen and others have looked at the issue: is there such a thing as a Jesuit law school today? Do any exist? Ms. Lefevere states that there are thirteen in the US, but there are fourteen schools which claim to be in this group. In 1994, the University of Puget Sound’s law school was acquired by Seattle University, and it became “Jesuit” law school number fourteen. Once I decided to comment briefly on these two points, I succumbed to the lure of writing more.
I begin with my thanks to Mark, Greg, and Susan for their observations. At the outset, I will let MOJ readers know that I am inclined to agree with Mark’s assessment about the problems and challenges that face Catholic identity in legal education today. I applaud Greg’s and Susan’s work. I know Russ Pearce at Fordham and congratulate him, too, knowing that Amy Uelmen is also responsible for much of the good work that takes place at Fordham Law in the name of Catholic identity and mission.
I also agree with Tom Shaffer that one might expect a uniquely Catholic perspective on the law that could be available in addressing not only property, contracts, securities regulation, or criminal procedure, but Constitutional Law and everything else as well. Admittedly, the task is not always quite the same for each substantive area of law, but if Feminist Theory, Critical Race Theory, and GLBTQ Legal Theory, etc. are acceptable lenses for examining substantive legal disciplines across the board, why not Catholic Legal Theory? The MOJ discussion group was established to pursue this point and to examine the role of the Catholic intellectual tradition’s contribution to the underpinnings of legal theory. I believe that Tom is onto something when he states that Catholicism “has always copied too much in trying to come to terms with the secular university…” I wonder if this is behind Russ saying “Jesuit universities are saying, ‘Catholics can learn from non-Catholics…’” But is the reverse true today: can non-Catholics also learn from Catholics? I should hope so, and I should further hope that this is what the Catholic universities, including Jesuit ones, are all about. Tom indicated in his interview that he scratched his head about one school that has not been able to turn the corner, but I wonder if that is the only one over which one can scratch heads? Some schools have yet to approach the intersection where they can turn a corner; for others, the corner is pretty big, and I wonder if they will come out of the turn if they have ventured into the intersection?
Greg also makes some solid points when he stated that many contemporary academics “shy” away from discussing religion. I think that would be more difficult at secular, state-sponsored institutions, but even many of them have religious studies departments. Why should this be difficult at an educational institution that claims to be Catholic? He perceptively makes two additional points: the first is that by raising discussions about the religion, would some consider themselves excluded when a particular religious view, let’s say Catholicism, predominates? But when measures are taken to make the institution welcoming of others who are not members of this religious community, his second astute observation comes into play: the religious perspective, over time, becomes marginalized. And with that occurrence, is there not the threat of this perspective becoming lost? Greg’s next statement about offending those of other or no religious traditions then comes into play. Several years ago, I visited a “Jesuit” law school, and I was asked in a public forum by one of the faculty members if I always wore “that” as this teacher pointed to my clerical shirt. I was surprised by the individual’s question which generated embarrassment and offense to me. Whether either was intended, I do not know. I wonder how this individual would have reacted if I had raised the same question about the soiled T-shirt this person was wearing. Would such a question have been off limits, and would asking it generate offense? This brings me to another observation about Greg’s statement about those schools which “seek” to be “authentically Jesuit.” Are they not “authentically Jesuit” now? If not, why? What has happened? Why must the Catholic/Jesuit school seek to be Catholic/Jesuit? It is not simply building trust and avoiding suspicion and anxiety about the faith dimension of the school’s social justice dimension as he states; it is about the ability to define the soul of the institution as Catholic or not. If the Catholic soul is no longer present, what has happened to it? I gather that is why there must be seeking today.
Bill Treanor of Fordham is quoted on points about diversity and dialog as virtues. Yes, indeed, his perspective has merit, and it is “something to be cherished.” But do law schools in general, and those which claim to be Catholic in particular, practice “inclusion and dialogue” and avoid “imposition or indoctrination”? I wonder. What would happen in a law school Constitutional law school discussion where someone, be it teacher or student, questioned, from the perspective of the Church’s teachings, the underpinnings of Justice Blackmun’s Roe opinion or Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion, for example? Would such a person “feel” included? Would such a person be welcomed into “dialogue”? Maybe, but then again, perhaps not. It becomes problematic when a religious perspective quickly becomes suspect of “imposition or indoctrination” but other views escape or are immune from such labeling. The problem intensifies when it is the Catholic perspective at the Catholic law school that is the object of suspicion. This raises one side of the coin presented by Susan’s helpful discussion about proselytizing and enabling students and faculty to disagree with particular views they find objectionable. Somehow the Catholic perspective seems to be the one that gets labeled “proselytizing” whereas vigorous advocacy for relativism or the exaggerated autonomy identified and addressed by Mary Ann Glendon in her “Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse” again is immune. But if some have a problem with what appears to be proselytizing, I hope we can agree that a Catholic institution, including a Catholic law school, is called to evangelize. If that is still a problem for some, then the institution's Catholic identity is not simply diluted, it is expunged.
This brings me to one last point I would like to offer about Ms. Lefevere’s article. She raises a discussion about the important questions surrounding who gets to teach at the Catholic law school, and she addresses issues surrounding hiring for mission. Hiring for mission discussions once prompted a colleague of mine to raise the issue if there could be such a practice as “firing for mission,” but I will put that aside for the time being. It appears that faculty members who have been hired, regardless of their views, have little to fear; moreover, tenure brings additional security. But a dimension of this important discussion about faculty hiring was not addressed, and this concerns those who share in the Catholic mission of the institution but face hidden obstacles to being hired. If a person cannot he hired, how can he or she contribute to the school’s Catholic mission? If the faculty candidate who is interested in contributing to the Catholic identity of the school and publicizes this aspiration has his or her application sidelined, this is a further problem. I am aware of hiring practices where some Catholic law school hiring committees have said: we must replace a woman who leaves with a woman; we must replace a racial minority who leaves with a racial minority; we must replace a sexual minority who leaves with a sexual minority. Is the same true about replacing a Catholic who leaves with a Catholic? A Jesuit with a Jesuit? Does simply asking the candidate whether he or she will “respect” the Catholic mission and identity of the school suffice? This makes Mark’s comment about “hiring toward mission” all the more important to the vitality of Catholic legal education.
I have gone on at some length, and I am grateful to MOJ readers for their patience. I would like to conclude on this note. For those who may view my remarks as expressions of dissatisfaction, I must add this counsel form St. Paul, whose wisdom I labor to follow. In his letter to the Romans, he reminds the faithful not to be overcome by evil; rather, the charge is to overcome evil and that which is wrong with good. That is often easier said than done, but when this exhortation becomes the course directing one’s life, that person’s discipleship has a greater claim to authenticity. It is also the direction that the Catholic law school and all associated with such an institution are called to pursue. Any thoughts anyone? RJA sj