As a brief follow-up to the postings of Michael P. and Richard regarding Georgetown, Boston College Law School has also established a Drinan Chair. Their recent announcement is HERE . RJA sj
Thursday, October 26, 2006
Drinan Chairs
Wednesday, October 25, 2006
“The End of Education” and a new beginning?
Thanks to Rick for posting the essay, The End of Education, authored by Alasdair MacIntyre. I would like to offer several observations in an effort to reply to Rick’s question about whether this essay has anything to say about law schools and legal education. I think that it does, especially in the light of Archbishop Miller’s September 11 presentation at Boston College (in which he also spoke about the “fragmentation of education” and the need for Catholic colleges and universities to lead all universities in the search for knowledge and truth) and comments made by Judge Harry T. Edwards of the DC Circuit about twenty years ago.
Let me begin with Judge Edwards’ concerns. In 1992 in the Michigan Law Review he wrote a challenging essay entitled The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession in which he argued:
“I fear that our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite directions. The schools should be training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. The firms should be ensuring that associates and partners practice law in an ethical manner. But many law schools—especially the so-called ‘elite’ ones—have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy. Many law firms have also abandoned their place, by pursuing profit above all else. While the schools are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle ground—ethical practice—has been deserted by both...This article is my response to...legal academicians who disdain law teaching as an endeavor in pursuit of professional education. My view is that if law schools continue to stray from their principal mission of professional scholarship and training, the disjunction between legal education and the legal profession will grow and society will be the worse for it.” [Italics in the original]
These are words written by a lawyer who attended prestigious universities, practiced law in a large law firm, became a public servant, was a law professor at two “elite” law schools, and was subsequently appointed to the Federal Bench in the late 1970s. Judge Edwards later went on to defend his position against critics and clarify his positions. But his words of concern tie in with those of Professor MacIntyre and Archbishop Miller: is something missing from higher education, including legal education, and is this deficiency evident in Catholic institutions as well? The point I would like to make is this: might law schools, which in some form or another, identify themselves as having a role in ethical professional education have an opportunity to respond to the challenges which Edwards, MacIntrye, and Miller have raised? I believe they do.
But, in order to meet this challenge, they have to overcome a false inferiority complex: the perceived “need” of having to be like other schools. This, of course, assumes that other schools—or, as Judge Edwards says, the “elite” ones—really are elite, really do offer superior education, really provide first-rate education, and really serve as a model for other institutions when it comes to instilling ethical values including those from the Catholic realm.
The challenge for the Catholic law school is, if I may borrow from scripture and Pope John Paul II, not to be afraid of being different from the “elites.” I realize this is hard to do since so much of the evaluation of any school is done in comparison with the “standards” established by the “elites.” Still, the desire to provide sound professional and ethical instruction, and an atmosphere conducive to both that includes public discussion and faculty scholarship, ought to remain strong for the law school which wishes to use the modifier “Catholic.” The manner in which some lawyers practice law today indicates that Judge Edwards was correct in his prediction: the profession and society are the worse for what it does because of the manner in which many lawyers were educated. I am confident that the disjunction can be overcome, but it will take the efforts of those who are not afraid to do so. RJA sj
Sunday, October 22, 2006
Libertas Ecclesiae
A while back, Rick suggested that an emerging question that will become more prominent with the passage of time is the liberty of the Church. At that time, I tended to agree with Rick. It is becoming increasingly clear that evidence is mounting demonstrating that Rick’s assessment and prediction are on solid ground.
I have just read the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio decided this past Thursday. There is little doubt that this 6-0 decision constitutes a threat to the Church’s liberty, in general, and its ability to engage in its good works, in particular. While this decision is being hailed by affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Planned Parenthood Federation, among others, it is not only lamentable, it is foreboding. Although the New York court asserts that the legislation mandating the inclusion of “reproductive health care”, which it validates, is neutral, it becomes necessary for the court to belabor its discussion of “neutrality” on sixteen different occasions in a brief opinion of eighteen typewritten pages. In spite of the court’s conclusion that the legislation and, therefore, its opinion are neutral, they are not. I am sure that Catholic Charities, knowing that the United States Supreme Court has turned down a request to review a similar type case decided by the California Supreme Court, is carefully considering its “options.” Might they include: hiring only Catholics and others who agree with the Church’s teachings about the immorality of artificial contraception and other “reproductive health issues”; terminating all health care benefits for all employees; or, simply closing the doors of Catholic Charities and its corporal works of mercy (or, “social services organizations”, as the court likes to say)?
The New York court on page 8 of its decision relies on the California court’s opinion that quotes from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos (1987). In doing so, I wonder if the New York court considered Justices Brennan and Marshall’s concurrence in Amos where they, Brennan and Marshall, expressed the view that there exists a “substantial potential for chilling religious activity” including “nonprofit activity” to which the law should defer. As these justices stated, “While not every nonprofit activity may be operated for religious purposes, the likelihood that many are makes a categorical rule a suitable means to avoid chilling the exercise of religion.”
The New York court’s decision has provided more than a chilling effect on the good works promoted by Catholic Charities. It has also increased the threat against the Church regarding its proper involvement in a wide variety of public spheres by arming “public interest groups” (such as Planned Parenthood) who are opposed to the Church’s positions with new arguments for their legal arsenal. In spite of the New York court’s view that it has avoided “the inflexible rule of Smith”, its decision has burdened not only the lawful exercise of religion but also a society that has benefited in the past from the many good works done in the name of God by the Catholic Church. The six members of the New York court have now defined what religion is and what it is not. What the members of the religious community have to say about this important matter no longer appears to have a bearing on the meaning of the free exercise of religion. RJA sj
Friday, October 13, 2006
Thanks to Steve—a reply to his posting
I am grateful for Steve’s recent response to my previous posting. I take this opportunity to respond to him, and I will do my best to answer his questions and make a few comments about his perspective on some very important issues.
I begin with his observation that I was silent on the matter of whether the doctrinal perspective (of the Church) is consistent with American democracy. Steve and I are not the first to address this question. As I recently mentioned, Senator John Kennedy’s address to the Protestant ministers frames this issue in one context. Another context was raised by John Courtney Murray in his foreword to “We Hold These Truths—Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition.” [1960, pp. ix-x] I believe that Fr. Murray offered a vital insight when he said this: “The question is sometimes raised, whether Catholicism is compatible with American democracy. The question is invalid as well as impertinent; for the manner of its proposition inverts the order of values. It must, of course, be turned round to read, whether American democracy is compatible with Catholicism.” It might also be worth taking into account which came first: Catholicism or American democracy.
What does this mean in the context of the discussion between Steve and me? I think it means this: there are two facets of the Catholic doctrinal perspective regarding the context of American democracy—the first is the theological perspective; the second is the moral teaching. In regard to the first category, I consider the “theological” as that corpus of doctrine that is constitutive of the Catholic faith, e.g., the doctrine of the Trinity; the doctrine of the resurrection; the teachings on sin and grace; etc. The second facet takes account of the moral teachings of the Church which have a more ecumenical, even universal, application, e.g. Pacem in Terris (John XXIII) and Populorum Progressio (Paul VI), both of which were addressed not only to members of the Church but also to “all men of good will.” As I also mentioned in my previous post, both President Kennedy and the Department of State thought there was something to consider from the encyclical Pacem in Terris.
I agree with Steve that if a Presidential candidate, who is Catholic, were to publicly endorse and (my view) to promote the theological doctrine in seeking office, he or she would likely encounter great difficulty. Moreover, there would, I think, be problems with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in this regard. However, I hasten to add that if the Catholic candidate were to promote not the theological but the moral teaching that is of general application, I do not see a Constitutional impediment, nor do I envisage any prudential problem that would make the Catholic candidate unelectable for exhorting this moral perspective in his or her campaign. By way of illustration, let us consider the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Surely, this important development in our nation’s political life had a strong connection with faith communities that were asserting civil rights on the basis of moral teachings that emerged from faith communities.
Moreover, I would add that there appears to be little if any problem when people in public life, be they office holders or not, promote concerns about the environment, public support for educational initiatives, care for the elderly, and access to medical care, etc., that are also founded on principles from the moral teachings of the Church. Why should moral arguments dealing with abortion, euthanasia, or embryonic stem cell research be any different? Any effort to arrest this discussion would be reflective of the circumstance John Paul II identified as thinly disguised totalitarianism; moreover, it would lead to the crossroads where democratic institutions stand or fall on the basis of the values that they embody and promote. (Evangelium Vitae, NN. 20, 46, and 70) Christopher Dawson made similar observations much earlier in the early twentieth century.
While I do have theological positions on doctrinal matters, I also hold positions on the moral teachings of the Church. The latter are the views upon which I rely in these postings. It appears to me that Steve and I might also be examining in our discussion the idea of the freedom of the citizen, both Catholic and other. Freedom is a vital component of our Nation and a value cherished by its members. But, I promote the view that there are two kinds of freedom involved here. One follows a more Lockean view of “freedom from”; this is an understandable view that I think many Americans, including some Catholics, hold. But it is an incomplete understanding of freedom, for there is also a “freedom for”, which includes a freedom to accept into one’s life the moral teachings that, I think, are crucial to the success of American democracy. “Freedom from” contributes to the notion of citizen as the autonomous and isolated individual; “freedom for”, on the other hand, promotes the idea of citizen as the involved member of society who pursues justice and right relationship not only for the self but for everyone else.
Indeed, all citizens, and for that matter, all members of civil society have rights, but they also have responsibilities to others. This is essential to the success of the American proposition. For, if the American experiment in democracy is based on the notion of “freedom from”, I think it will ultimately fail; however, if it is based on “freedom for”, it will succeed. Pessimism is fueled by “freedom from” but optimism is born from “freedom for.”
I share Steve’s view that “the Church can play a prophetic role; it can be influential; it can speak truth to power.” I also realize that the Church, regardless of whether it has internal division, exists in a pluralistic and often pragmatic country. But, this realization is no excuse that the Church and its members who exercise a public life must be silenced from participating in our national society when they speak from and contribute on the basis of the Church’s rich moral teachings. That would be a capitulation not to a country dominated by a Protestant mentality but to one in which moral relativism has become absolute.
Finally, it strikes me that other contributors to MOJ as well as its readers might like the reference to John Courtney Murray’s discussion of conscience and freedom to which I previously referred. Fr. Murray’s notes appear in “The Documents of Vatican II—with Notes and Comments by Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Authorities” edited by Fr. Water Abbot, S.J. and Monsignor Joseph Gallagher. The specific footnote upon which I relied is footnote 5, which appears on page 679 of the hardback and paperback editions of the Abbot/Gallagher work. However, you may also want to look at footnote 58 on page 694-95, which further develops Murray's thoughts on freedom and conscience.
Once more, I extend to Steve my sincere gratitude for providing the opportunity for this useful exchange. RJA sj
Thursday, October 12, 2006
Responses to Eduardo and Steve
I would like to thank Eduardo Peñalver and Steve Shiffrin for their thoughtful commentaries and to my earlier posting on “Voting for the Common Good”. I am grateful for their respective postings to which I now respond.
With regard to Eduardo’s remarks, I recognize and do not deny that there are, at one level, different questions regarding office holders and voters. But, sooner or later, in spite of the independence of some officeholders from their constituents, the two groups are linked. Legislators, some government executives, and some judges hold office because they receive an electoral mandate from a majority of the voters. Thus, with regard to these officials, there inevitably is a nexus between the voter and the office holder. When the gap increases between the two and the nexus shrinks, the holder of the office may well be without an office to hold.
In short, sooner or later, the connection between the responsibilities of the Catholic office holder and the Catholic voter is established. Catholics, be they in political life or public life as holders of office or as holders of the franchise, share a common responsibility to infuse the temporal order with values that express the moral teachings of the Church if they continue to be members of the Church. The official behavior of Catholic public officials is linked with the electoral behavior of the Catholic voters who have a role in placing these officials into office.
Eduardo states that I assume that “abortion should be the most weighty issue due to the gravity of its evil…” It seems that he agrees with me that it is a most weighty issue. There are also other weighty issues in close proximity—euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. This is so because of the gravity of their evils—the deliberate taking of human life that can be identified as “innocent.” Eduardo properly goes on to identify other important moral issues including the death penalty, unjust war, and the advocacy of torture. Let me compare and contrast the issues of abortion and the death penalty.
First of all, the Church’s teachings on these two grave subjects are different. Second, there is another difference that needs to be considered, and this concerns the numerical distinctions between the annual number of abortions and the number of executions performed. According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, the annual number of legal abortions performed each year beginning in 1980 and running to the present day ranges from 1.3 to 1.6 million per annum. In contrast, according to the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, the number of executions in the United States from 1993 to the present has ranged between 37 and 98 per annum. These may be 37 to 98 executions too many. But it also needs to be remembered that just one abortion is too many. Both of these points regarding different teachings and statistical comparisons are relevant considerations for Catholics, be they office holders or electors. Moreover, for me, both of these points are relevant to ascertaining what is “extraordinary and compelling.”
I would now like to respond to Steve’s commentary of my earlier post. Like him, I recall the nativist spirit that existed and may still exist in the U.S. against the presence of Catholics and their participation in public life. One need only recall the cartoons of Thomas Nast and some contemporary illustrations to realize that this attitude did exist and still does in some parts of the U.S. I am hesitant to agree with him, however, on his two assertions that introduce a statistical or numerical component into his argument. At one point he states in regard to Catholic acceptance of “the absolute power of the Magisterium,” “the overwhelming majority do not.” Later, in the context of the “conception of conscience” that is “fully consistent with American democracy”, he states that “the overwhelming majority of American Catholics” subscribe to the aforementioned “conception of conscience.” I would like to learn more about the source of the data that Steve uses and how he defines this “conception of conscience.”
But I would also like to offer two remarks about the exercise of conscience and the American Catholic. The first involves an illustration from forty-six years ago when Senator John Kennedy was running for the Presidency. When he was running for the Presidency, he had delivered his famous and controversial speech in Houston to an association of Protestant ministers in which he emphasized his strong belief in an “absolute” separation of Church and State “where no public official either requests or accepts instruction on public policy from the Pope, the National Council of Churches or any other ecclesiastical source.” However, after he was elected to the Presidency, and shortly following the encyclical’s promulgation, President Kennedy spoke at the Centennial Celebration at Boston College, and in his address he offered a different perspective from the speech he delivered to the Protestant ministers. He said of Pacem in Terris: “As a Catholic I am proud of it, and as an American I have learned from it.” Clearly the impact of Pope John’s letter had an impact on Kennedy once he became President. In a carefully worded general statement, the U.S. State Department subsequently indicated that the points developed in the encyclical about disarmament, world peace, and development “should be the aspirations of all governments…” It appears that once elected to the Presidency, John Kennedy may have overcome his initial concerns about the effect of the encyclical and began to see its possibilities as an asset for Western diplomacy. Does this not suggest something about the formation of his conscience as well as something about prudential politics?
The second remark is also about conscience as practiced by American Catholics. I am not so sure that I would endorse Steve’s remarks in light of the Second Vatican Council Decree on Religious Liberty—Dignitatis Humanae Personae. While the Decree supports the view that a person should not be forced to act in a manner contrary to one’s conscience, we must also consider what John Courtney Murray, a principal drafter of the text, said about conscience: “[T]he Declaration nowhere lends its authority to the theory for which the phrase frequently stands, namely, that I have a right to do what my conscience tells me to do, simply because my conscience tells me to do it. This is a perilous theory. Its particular peril is subjectivism—the notion that, in the end, it is my conscience, and not the objective truth, which determines what is right or wrong, true or false.”
Finally, I am puzzled by Steve’s reference to “First Things” Catholics, regardless of whether they are right or wrong, whoever they may be. This has me wondering if there are “America” Catholics; “Commonweal” Catholics; “Crisis” Catholics; “NCR” [National Catholic Reporter] Catholics who are not to be confused with “NCR” [National Catholic Register] Catholics. For what it is worth, I usually read all these publications; whether my reading of them identifies me as one type of Catholic versus another type of Catholic is another matter.
Again, my sincere thanks to Eduardo and Steve for their important commentaries of my earlier posting. I am grateful to them both. RJA sj
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
A response to "the liberal bargain"
I would like to offer a short response to Michael’s inquiry Damon Linker’s perspective on “the liberal bargain” and whether, as Michael suggested, it disenfranchises the Catholic citizen.
I begin with the self-admonition that I may need to learn more about the origin of “the liberal bargain.” But, at first blush, it appears to be based on one type of social contract theory in which the participants have actually negotiated and mutually assented to this bargain.
So far so good, but the Linker thesis needs a bit more scrutiny. First of all a significant condition is attached—a condition that Damon Linker provides and requires. This, in my estimation, has an important effect on the nature of the bargain. Moreover, the condition appears to be beyond negotiation to such an extent that it negates the ability to bargain. The condition also is premised on an important assumption: that the believer, in this case the Catholic citizen, has the “ambition to political rule in the name of [one’s] faith.” In Linker’s view that has been expressed in the Linker-Douthat exchange, there seems to be no possibility that the Catholic citizen desires to participate in the work of the polis by proposing rather than imposing views that are based on the Catholic citizen’s beliefs, which are based on reason. Linker insists that the Catholic citizen’s views based on faith are irrelevant because they are inextricably tied to “theological questions and disputes.” Again, Linker makes an assumption that denies the possibility that reason—right and natural—has formed the Catholic citizen’s views.
What Linker has reserved and claimed for his perspective is apparently denied to those who hold particular religious views that differ from or disagree with his own.
I wonder what Linker thinks about the views of the ardent environmentalist or the zealous advocate for “equality”? Surely these individuals consider their political views as articles of a type of faith. So, could one use Linker’s argument to conclude that these views must also be declared “irrelevant”?
If Dr. Linker has made an offer in his version of “the liberal bargain,” it seems to be one that needs to be refused--at least by the Catholic citizen who employs reason to conclude that his or her views have much to contibute to the betterment of society and common life in the polis. RJA sj
Sunday, October 8, 2006
Voting for the Common Good-- yes, but...
During the past several days, I have had an opportunity to reflect on the pamphlet “Voting for the Common Good—A Practical Guide for Conscientious Catholics” prepared by the group Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good (CACG). It is an interesting compilation of reflections that merits the careful study of those of us who are Catholics and who will be exercise the right to vote next month. It is one effort that attempts to bring together two facets of Catholics who are simultaneously citizens of two “cities.” The text of the CACG document is [HERE].
While I have reviewed several other texts prepared by other Catholic groups who offer guidelines or other counsel for Catholics who will soon be voting in local, state, and national elections, I have decided to offer a few comments on the CACG document.
I begin by noting that there are a number of points this pamphlet makes that are shared by most if not all Catholic citizens. For example, it asserts that Catholics have a responsibility to participate in the political process. The text also cautions that voters need to be mindful not only of what candidates promise but also of what they actually deliver once elected to office. Moreover, it offers some sage advice that rarely is there a perfect candidate for Catholic voters, regardless of party affiliation, for each office for which there is an election. The text also states that Catholic citizens must be mindful of the Great Commandment and the interdependence of all people both locally and globally. It seems to also affirm that not all political issues are of equal weight or importance for the Catholic voter.
So far, so good. But then the document makes certain claims that merit careful scrutiny. While it mentions issues that should be of particular importance to Catholic voters (e.g., poverty, war, human rights, abortion, concerns for the environment), it does not mention other pressing issues for Catholic voters like euthanasia, moral concerns about particular biotechnology issues such as embryonic stem cell research, and issues pertaining to marriage and the family. While correctly identifying some sources of the Church’s teachings on important political, economic, and social issues (e.g., Papal texts, council documents, Scripture, and the writings of the early Church fathers), it does not include important, relevant dicastery documents, although they are cited in several notes within the pamphlet. It is at this point that more substantive concerns emerge.
For example, there is an important presentation in the pamphlet about conscience –“listening to one’s conscience is necessary to make any moral decisions.” (p. 4) But the exercise of conscience by Catholics, including when they participate in public life, cannot be based on a subjective understanding of conscience, either in concept or in application. A subjective understanding of conscience is a perilous course to take, as John Courtney Murray, S.J. once counseled. The conscience of the faithful Catholic citizen, in its authentic form, is informed by objective truth as God has revealed and as the Church teaches. These are points made in Nn. 7 and 8 of the 2002 Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life (Doctrinal Note) [HERE].
In this context, the pamphlet comments on the virtue of prudence as the guide that assists in the exercise of conscience. (pp. 5-6) The text then states that “we often must vote for candidates who may hold the ‘wrong’ Catholic positions on some issues in order to maximize the good our vote achieves in other areas.” Once again, we must be mindful that not all political issues are of equal weight or importance. The Doctrinal Note, N. 3, reminds us that “Democracy must be based on the true solid foundation of non-negotiable ethical principles, which are the underpinning of life in society.” The Doctrinal Note continues by stating, in N. 4, that “a well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one to vote for a political program or an individual law which contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and morals.” In this regard, the pamphlet seems to suggest that a voter is limited to exercising his or her franchise to the two (or several) candidates that appear on a ballot. I suggest that in the proper exercise of authentic conscience, as prudentially guided, a Catholic voter should consider other options when they are available. For example, if it is permissible under the local voting law, a faithful Catholic might want to consider voting against both candidates through either abstention on that particular office or providing a write-in candidate.
The CACG text also indicates, p. 6, that “As politically active Catholics, our primary responsibility is to the common good.” While indeed the common good is relevant to the Catholic’s participation in the political process (N. 1, Doctrinal Note; N. 75 Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World), I question that it is the “primary responsibility.” I think that the primary responsibility of the Catholic citizen is to be a faithful disciple who is always mindful of the fact that he or she is a citizen of two cities, not one. As the Doctrinal Note reminds us (N. 9), we must be attentive to “the unity of Christian life: coherence between faith and life, Gospel and culture, as recalled by the Second Vatican Council… to fulfill [our] duties faithfully in the spirit of the Gospel. It is a mistake to think that, because we have here no lasting city, but seek the city which is to come, we are entitled to shirk our earthly responsibilities; this is to forget that by our faith we are bound all the more to fulfill these responsibilities according to the vocation of each… May Christians… be proud of the opportunity to carry out their earthly activity in such a way as to integrate human, domestic, professional, scientific and technical enterprises with religious values, under whose supreme direction all things are ordered to the Glory of God.” (Quoting from N. 43, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World)
There are two final points made by the pamphlet that require comment. The first appears in the section headed “Frequently Asked Questions” (p. 8). The third question presented in this section is this one: “Is it okay to vote for a ‘pro-choice’ candidate?” The pamphlet answers this important question by suggesting that the answer is “yes.” To substantiate its view, it refers to a “note bene” that appears at the end of a six point memorandum, “Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion,” sent to Cardinal McCarrick in June of 2004 by Cardinal Ratzinger, then Prefect for the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. [HERE] The complete text of the “note bene” states: “A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy to present himself for Holy Communion, if he were to deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate’s permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share a candidate’s stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons.” The CACG pamphlet concludes that “it could be acceptable for a Catholic to vote for a ‘pro-choice’ candidate if ‘proportionate reasons’ exist, and if the voter is voting based on those reasons and not the candidate’s ‘pro-choice’ beliefs.”
It should be clear that the licitness of the Catholic voter’s decision to vote for the pro-choice candidate depends on “proportionate reasons.” I suggest that these “proportionate reasons” cannot just be any reason, including those reached by the voter in the exercise of a private, i.e., subjective, conscience. I believe that “proportionate”, as used by Cardinal Ratzinger, implies an understanding of extraordinary or compelling reasons. Why do I say this? The “Note Bene” must be understood in relation to the rest of Cardinal Ratzinger’s memorandum and the resulting June 2004 document “Catholics in Political Life” issued by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops [HERE] as commented on by Cardinal Ratzinger in July of 2004 [HERE].
In his memorandum “Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion,” Cardinal Ratzinger reiterated that the “Church teaches that abortion or euthanasia is a grave sin.” (N. 2) Moreover, he stated that “[n]ot all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia… There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia.”
In their document “Catholics in Political Life” that followed, the bishops of the United States made the following important points:
- The sinfulness of those who cooperate in the evil of abortion
- The obligation to correct morally defective laws that permit abortion
- The duty of Catholics to support and advance the moral principles of Catholic teaching in public life
- Bishops do not have the role of endorsing or opposing candidates for public office, but they do posses the responsibility to form the consciences of Catholics so that the laity, in the exercise of their duties as citizens, can examine the positions of candidates and make choices based on Catholic moral and social teaching
- The Catholic community and Catholic institutions must never honor (by giving awards, honors, or platforms) those who act in defiance of fundamental moral principles as taught by the Church
In his brief July 2004 response to the bishops’ statement, Cardinal Ratzinger said: “The statement is very much in harmony with the general principles ‘Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion.’”
Taking into account these relevant exchanges, it would be dangerous to suggest that the “proportionate reasons” for voting for a pro-choice candidate by a faithful Catholic would be anything other than extraordinary and compelling.
The last point made by the CACG pamphlet meriting comment in this posting concerns the important question, p. 9, “Does voting my conscience mean I can apply my own moral standards?” The initial answer given by the pamphlet is sound: “Our faith teaches that Catholics cannot, in good conscience, disagree with the Church on questions of morality.” However, the pamphlet then backtracks by asserting that “Catholics can disagree in good conscience on the question of how to do the right thing in a practical situation.” (Italics in the original) Not only is there conflict between these two points, but the second one ignores the fact that all decisions, even practical ones, typically involve questions of morality. It seems that the authors of the pamphlet wish to suggest that there is a distinction between the theory of Catholic teaching and its practical application. If this is indeed what the authors suggest, then their reasoning is flawed and the conclusion is false. Doing the “right thing” means making a moral decision in spite of the fact that we live in an imperfect and practical world. The fact that the world is imperfect does not excuse the Catholic from exercising his or her conscience in opposition to the Church’s moral teachings.
RJA sj
Saturday, September 30, 2006
More on the Nirenberg Essay
I would like to thank Michael, the day after his onomastico, for making available the entire text of Professor David Nirenberg’s “Paleologus and Us.”
I cannot disagree with Nirenberg’s statement that Pope Benedict made a declaration of ongoing and universal Catholic teaching, and that this is “exactly what we should expect from the vicar of St. Peter.” Actually, the Pope is the Vicar of Christ, and he is the successor of Peter even though the term “vicar of St. Peter” had been used earlier in the Church’s history. But, to borrow from Thomas More, the title used does not detract from the Pope’s authority. But I digress from my principal remarks.
Nirenberg’s assertion that the Pope’s “lecture was a polemic posing as a dialogue” misses a major point of what I earlier identified as three major themes in the Regensburg address. [See my posting of September 13.] The first concerned freedom, and since he was addressing an academic audience, I chose in my earlier posting to concentrate on academic freedom. But, the Pope’s quotation from the Koran “there is no compulsion in religion” also speaks of religious freedom. This is something that Professor Nirenberg does not address. I think this is an important theme that we will hear about time and again during Benedict’s pontificate.
In this regard, Cardinal Bertone, the new Secretary of State, emphasized the importance of religious freedom and conscience in his address delivered yesterday to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See. The Pope himself previously addressed these matters of liberty of religion and conscience and how they relate to the search for truth—God’s truth—in his January 9, 2006 address to the same diplomatic corps. Unfortunately, Professor Nirenberg did not comment on this vital aspect of the Regensburg address. Instead, he leaves us with the inaccurate and tired depiction of Benedict as the “the Rottweiler” pursuing a “dogged defense of doctrine” that he advanced as a cardinal but now doing so baring “his teeth as pope.” The professor’s canine references do little to explain what Benedict is about and what he said on September 12, and that is a doggone shame. RJA sj
Friday, September 29, 2006
A Preliminary Response to Professor Nirenberg's Remark
I would like to thank Michael Perry for his important and interesting post of Mr. Grant Gallicho’s discussion of Professor David Nirenberg’s New Republic essay on Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg address. Unfortunately, both the MOJ and Commonweal links to the Nirenberg essay require a subscription to the New Republic. Because of this block, I cannot comment properly on all that Professor Nirenberg has argued. However, his statement that was contained in the Gallicho and Perry postings, “What we cannot accept without contradiction or hypocrisy is the pope’s presentation of the speech as an invitation to dialogue,” has provoked me to investigate what, if anything, did the Holy Father say about dialogue with Islam prior to Regensburg? If Benedict XVI did say something, would it provide an essential context in which we can better understand the import of his remarks made on September 12, 2006?
As it turns out, the Pope on at least three prior occasions presented his appeal to the Muslim world for dialogue with the Church and the West. Moreover, his previous invitations also expressed grave concerns about the dangers faced by believers when their religious freedom is challenged or threatened. Such an atmosphere is inconsistent with true religious belief and the desire for sincere dialogue between Christians and Muslims.
For example, in his December 1, 2005 address to the Ambassador of Algeria to the Holy See the Pope Benedict stated in part:
“As I have already had the opportunity to say, the Catholic Church intends to pursue an open and sincere dialogue with believers of other religions in search of the true good of many and of society. I therefore rejoice at knowing the quality of the relations maintained in your Country between the Catholic Community and the Muslim Community. An encounter in truth between the believers of the different religions is a demanding challenge for the future peace in the world and requires great perseverance. To overcome ignorance and reciprocal prejudices, it is important to create bonds of trust between peoples, especially through the sharing of daily life and work done together, so that the free expression of differences in belief are not a cause of mutual exclusion but rather an opportunity to learn to live together with mutual respect for the identity of the other.”
On August 20, 2005 when attending the World Youth Day in Cologne, he addressed a Muslim group with these words:
“Dear friends, I am profoundly convinced that we must not yield to the negative pressures in our midst, but must affirm the values of mutual respect, solidarity and peace. The life of every human being is sacred, both for Christians and for Muslims. There is plenty of scope for us to act together in the service of fundamental moral values. The dignity of the person and the defence of the rights which that dignity confers must represent the goal of every social endeavor and of every effort to bring it to fruition. This message is conveyed to us unmistakably by the quiet but clear voice of conscience. It is a message which must be heeded and communicated to others: should it ever cease to find an echo in people’s hearts, the world would be exposed to the darkness of a new barbarism. Only through recognition of the centrality of the person can a common basis for understanding be found, one which enables us to move beyond cultural conflicts and which neutralizes the disruptive power of ideologies… Past experience teaches us that, unfortunately, relations between Christians and Muslims have not always been marked by mutual respect and understanding. How many pages of history record battles and wars that have been waged, with both sides invoking the Name of God, as if fighting and killing the enemy could be pleasing to Him. The recollection of these sad events should fill us with shame, for we know only too well what atrocities have been committed in the name of religion. The lessons of the past must help us to avoid repeating the same mistakes. We must seek paths of reconciliation and learn to live with respect for each other’s identity. The defence of religious freedom, in this sense, is a permanent imperative, and respect for minorities is a clear sign of true civilization… Teaching is the vehicle through which ideas and convictions are transmitted. Words are highly influential in the education of the mind. You, therefore, have a great responsibility for the formation of the younger generation. I learn with gratitude of the spirit in which you assume your responsibility. Christians and Muslims, we must face together the many challenges of our time. There is no room for apathy and disengagement, and even less for partiality and sectarianism. We must not yield to fear or pessimism. Rather, we must cultivate optimism and hope. Interreligious and intercultural dialogue between Christians and Muslims cannot be reduced to an optional extra. It is in fact a vital necessity, on which in large measure our future depends.”
Finally, on February 20, 2006, in his address to the Ambassador of Morocco to the Holy See, the Pope offered these words:
“[Y]ou stressed your Country’s contribution to the dialogue between civilizations, cultures and religions. For her part, in the present international context with which we are familiar, the Catholic Church remains convinced that to encourage peace and understanding between peoples, it is urgently necessary that religions and their symbols be respected and that believers not be the object of provocations that wound their outlook and religious sentiments. However, intolerance and violence as a response to offences can never be justified, for this type of response is incompatible with the sacred principles of religion; consequently, we cannot but deplore the actions of those who deliberately exploit the offence caused to religious sentiments to stir up acts of violence, especially since such action is contrary to religion. For believers, as for all people of good will, the only path that leads to peace and brotherhood is that of respect for the religious convictions and practices of others, so that the practice of the religion a person has freely chosen may be guaranteed to each one.”
It seems from his earlier statements that the Pope is devoted to authentic dialogue based on mutual respect. Moreover, he does not hesitate to state that there are forces in the world that, in the name of religion, use compulsion rather than debate to make their point and achieve their objectives. And these tactics, in his estimation, are counterproductive to genuine dialogue. This point was reiterated in his Regensburg address when he recited the passage from the Qu’ran: “There is no compulsion in religion.”
I wonder if Professor Nirenberg had read and reflected on these earlier statements of Pope Benedict? If he did, should he have made the assertion that questions the Pope’s sincerity? RJA sj
Saturday, September 23, 2006
It was the best of times. It was the worst of times.
Charles Dickens begins A Tale of Two Cities with these words:
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way—in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”
Dickens opening of his great novel could well provide the context in which Archbishop Michael Miller, the Secretary for the Congregation for Catholic Education, addressed audiences at Boston College and Creighton University in the past several days. Unfortunately, neither of his major addresses delivered at those two institutions has been published yet. Only a few news reports presently offer some of the insights that he presented about Catholic higher education—which I venture to say has some bearing on the project of Mirror of Justice. These two speeches of the archbishop follow his earlier foray into an examination of Catholic higher education in the US late last October at Notre Dame, which some of us discussed at that time. One of the key phrases the archbishop used in his previous Notre Dame address was the possibility that institutions that had wandered from their mission of promoting and fostering the Catholic intellect and culture could be candidates for “evangelical pruning.” I do not think he intended to say that these pruned institutions would be closed or that faculty and staff would be dismissed from their posts. Rather, I think he meant that the pruned institutions would be able to go their own way without the ability to assert that they were still a Catholic—or Benedictine, or Dominican, or Franciscan, or Jesuit—institution.
I shall reserve the opportunity to reexamine the archbishop’s text once it becomes available. But it seems that the several news correspondents that were present and reported his address have provided some initial thoughts and questions for our consideration about Catholic higher education, in general, and where it intersects legal education that takes places on campuses identified with Catholic institutions. One way of beginning to assess the impact that his recent series of addresses may have is to consider words that one reporter attributed to the archbishop as he commenced his Boston College address on September 11. It was the opinion of the reporter that the archbishop critiqued American universities, which call themselves Catholic, because of their loss of religious identity. As the archbishop was reported to have said:
“In the U.S, the vast majority of Catholic universities are non-ecclesiastical. Instead they were founded by religious sects and are now run by a board of trustees… [But] I would like to express my support for the endeavors to secure the ecclesial membership of BC and to encourage the ongoing efforts of Boston College in becoming a truly great Catholic university… Catholic universities in the U.S. should be at the forefront of the church’s dialogue with culture.”
I am intrigued by his statement that this particular institution is making efforts to become a truly great Catholic university. But, does mean that this school is not there yet? It seems that in the estimation of the archbishop, there is still work—perhaps much work—to be undertaken for it to become “a truly great Catholic university.” While complimenting some of its endeavors, it is clear that he argues that there is still work to be done. How much work remains to be seen.
He then continued his presentation by advocating that Catholic educational institutions must present their “uncompromising Catholicity” to society. One, but not the only reason for this is that the health of these institutions matters a great deal to the Holy See. As a former university president in the United States, the archbishop also pointed out that for a university to embrace a Catholic identity it must serve as a counterpoint to other universities which fragment the knowledge of an integral, perhaps even Christian, humanism and divorce the pursuit of learning and investigation from any reference to faith. I begin to wonder when Catholic colleges and universities, including their law schools, display pride in being like the “ivies” and other “topped ranked” schools that have largely divorced themselves from integrated and Christian humanism and the nexus between reason and faith? In some instances, it is clear that these “great” institutions are distrustful of religious faith, including Catholicism, and treat religion as one of many elements in a “pluralistic culture”—but often with an abundance of suspicion or criticism. There is no doubt that in his two recent addresses that Archbishop Miller was challenging his audiences and their respective institutions to begin a renewal of Catholic identity, which includes the pursuit of the complementarity of faith and reason. In short, these American institutions of higher learning must chart this course if they are to continue to rely on the moniker “Catholic.” To fail in this endeavor would be an error that may well lead to their “pruning.”
The archbishop was not hesitant to point out that some dimensions of the problems he investigated emerge from the Catholic community itself when it opposes certain teachings of the Church and fails to examine objectively its content. It would seem from the thrust of his remarks that this sort of enterprise is counter-productive to the endeavor of the Catholic renewal he has in mind. It is clear that those who promote these critiques of the Catholic faith and its teachings have found a home in institutions where the vital relationship between faith and reason may receive lip service but not substantive endorsement and support. The institution which chooses to be Catholic, along with the members of its community, must recall that they are a witness for, not an adversary to, the Church and its intellectual tradition. Relying on the cloak of “academic freedom” does little to conceal the reality of the betrayal of the institution’s raison d’être. To be true to its identity, the Catholic institution must be free to pursue the truth—God’s truth—and not a weak human counterpart riddled with subjectivity or the skepticism that this truth cannot be discovered.
With regard to “Jesuit” institutions, Archbishop Miller made the observation that they and their members must not forget the exhortation of St. Ignatius: the institution that is Jesuit and Catholic must “help make God our creator and lord better known and served.” With fidelity to Ignatius’ insight, an institution that claims to be Catholic and Jesuit would be able to “save its place among the best Catholic universities in America and in the world.” It would follow that without this fidelity, the claim to being Catholic and Jesuit, while vigorously proclaimed, is counterfeit.
During his Creighton address, he commented on the vital relationship between the Catholic institution and the local church. Of the local ordinary, Archbishop Miller stated that he is not “an external agent” but must be a participant in and member of the life of the school. I suppose if secular organizations, some of whose missions conflict with that of Church teachings, are welcome on the campus, it should follow that the local bishop and other church leaders should always consider themselves at home at those institutions of higher learning that rely on the term “Catholic” in their name and mission.
Let me end this posting with my reference to Dickens that appeared at the beginning of this presentation. There is some evidence that we live in the best of times in the context of Catholic higher education. There has been a renewal of the vitality of members of academic communities and the institutions of which they are part to engage in the exciting and satisfying pursuit of bringing together the Catholic faith and reason. Some of the recent symposia that other members of MOJ have recently commented on would be a source of evidence demonstrating this. However, we also live in very challenging times in which the heart, soul, and mind of Catholic institutions of higher education are at grave risk. When I see prospective faculty and students who want to be members of these institutions but are rebuffed, I realize we are also in the worst of times—or at least the worst that has happened so far.
If the problems of which Archbishop Miller spoke are of our making (and I am confident that they are), so are the solutions. I look forward to an ongoing discussion about how other MOJ contributors and friends identify the responses that should emerge to address the concerns addressed by the Secretary of the Congregation for Catholic Education. I like to count myself in the group that realizes that, while there is more than some indication that we are surrounded by the season of Darkness and the winter of despair, we are capable of setting our course on the path to Heaven. We have the capacity to labor for the season of Light and the epoch of belief in the one who came to save us al—who is the greatest wisdom and the greatest truth than anyone of us could pursue.
RJA sj
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