Last night I was reading MOJ and enjoyed Prof. Julian Velasco’s comments about the discussion some of us have been having regarding ecclesial issues. While I am in large agreement with many of his fine points, I did not say, imply, or in anyway suggest in any of my postings that would support the statement: “at some point, rejection of Vatican teachings separates one from the Church. Have most American Catholics already done so according to Father Araujo?” I have written to Prof. Velasco to inform him of this misattribution. In reading earlier postings, I noticed that Prof. Steve Shiffrin introduced this point in his posting entitled “What Does It Mean to Be Catholic? I” upon which Prof. Velasco relied. To clarify this confusion, I state for the record that I have not said, implied, or suggested that most American Catholics have rejected “Vatican teachings.” Indeed, people can and do separate themselves from the Church by the actions they take and the views they convey, but I have not quantified this by expressing the view that most American Catholics have separated themselves from the Church. If someone thinks that this is my thinking, then their thinking is mistaken. RJA sj
Friday, September 7, 2007
A point of clarification
Thursday, September 6, 2007
More on Governance and Unity
I would like to thank Eduardo for his patience in following up on his August 31st posting. I just returned from a short business trip to Italy, but I have had some time to reflect on what he said regarding Church governance and unity while I was traveling.
First of all, I would like to identify what I think Eduardo and I hold in common on the points he raised. First of all, these issues that we MOJ members have been discussing dealing with ecclesial governance and unity will likely be debated for some time. While waiting for my plane back to the US at Fiumicino Airport, I had a prolonged discussion with an Episcopalian priest who was returning from a pilgrimage to Rom and Ephesus. We discussed at some length the evolving and growing divide that the Episcopalian Church is presently experiencing. In this discussion, we both acknowledged that this division is deepening and that the debate about it will not disappear any time soon.
I think another position he and I likely share is the fact that each member of the Church is a sinner. Clearly, we are tempted to exercise our free will in ways that we know contravene what God asks of us; moreover, we sometimes take action on these temptations and commit sin. No person is immune from this. Holders of ecclesiastical office, future saints, and we ordinary folk—lay, religious, and clerical—are not immune.
He and I also agree that we disagree or likely disagree on particular issues. But it is not my position within the medium of MOJ to delve into his soul, or he into mine on particular matters. The appropriate forum for this probing is between a person and one’s pastor, confessor, or bishop. Having made this point, I think MOJ is an appropriate medium to present and defend our respective positions in more general terms. And I now take the occasion to do so.
The matters of human sinfulness, reconciliation with God and the neighbor, the forgiveness of sin, and salvation are issues affecting every person (whether he or she acknowledges this or not is another matter) with which ecclesial governance is concerned. Interestingly, the law—both God’s law and, in some contexts, human law—exercises roles regarding these issues. As St. Augustine concluded in one of his sermons, the Church—the Body of Christ, the People of God, and the communion of saints—is the place (he used the image of the sailing ship) where the faithful acknowledge the essence of their being, their unity with one another and God, and the means by which salvation occurs.
Eduardo posits that one can still be a Catholic “in some sense” even if he or she were to completely sever ties with the Church. I assume from what he says that such a person has been baptized but subsequently removes himself or herself from the People of God, etc. through the exercise of free will. However, in accordance with the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, Lumen Gentium, such a person, while remaining “in the bosom of the Church” in a bodily sense, does not remain in its heart. The same Dogmatic Constitution further indicates that those who refuse to remain in the Church cannot be saved without returning to the heart. Implicit in this is the possibility that one can return through recognition of past error and reconcile with God and the Church established by the Son.
So, “in some sense” Eduardo is on track. But his point is on track only if it takes into account what the Second Council, relying on the Creed, stated regarding membership in the Church: one is fully incorporated into it by accepting
“her entire system and all the means of salvation given to her, and through union with her visible structure are joined to Christ, who rules her through the Supreme Pontiff and the bishops. This joining is effected by the bonds of professed faith, of the sacraments, of ecclesiastical government, and of communion.”
A person may detour from this and still return home up to the last moment of his or her life in this world. But, should he or she consciously remain on this self-chosen diversion, as I think Eduardo suggests, then the membership of such an individual in the Church can legitimately be called into question. RJA sj
Friday, August 31, 2007
Human Rights: Natural Rights versus Positive Rights
I would like to begin by thanking other MOJ contributors who have continued our discussion about human rights and their foundation. Clearly, this discussion is of vital interest to most people. I have little doubt that non-theist promoters of human rights maintain sincerely held convictions about the importance of human rights. But I should like to expand briefly upon my August 17th posting in which I discussed the authorship of these rights.
A major difficulty with the atheistic outlook is the positivism on which it relies. While the atheist may acknowledge the existence of natural rights to which any human can claim, the issue remains one of authorship. For the atheist, it is solely the human intellect; however, for the theist, as I stated in my posting of August 17, it is God.
The principal disagreement between these two perspectives on natural rights involves authorship and the subsequent identity of essential rights. In both perspectives (i.e., atheistic and theistic), human reason plays a role. In the case of the atheistic perspective, human reason possesses a monopoly on identifying and defining the rights that belong to human nature. In the case of the theistic perspective, human reason has a non-exclusive role that must be complemented by God’s position as author of human rights.
This distinction becomes palpable in the contrast between the subjective and objective outlooks I mentioned in my August 17th posting. An illustration of this difference follows: let us say two atheist advocates of human rights debate one another regarding what is constitutive of human rights. They rely solely on what their own intellect reveals to them (this does not preclude their intellect relying on that of another person or group of people, but it is ultimately their personal reason that determines the question). What happens when their respective views collide? They have no objective source upon which to rely to resolve the conflict. With the theist, on the other hand, there is the vital role of the objective source of human rights, i.e., God.
Perhaps this brief posting will prompt more discussion on this crucial topic having a key bearing on the work of MOJ. RJA sj
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Governance in the Catholic Church
Prof. Steve Bainbridge has raised some interesting and important points about ecclesial governance within the Episcopal Church and the future meeting with the Episcopal bishops and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Steve presents a most important question about whether the polity of the Catholic Church would insulate it from the fragmentation that appears to threaten the Episcopal Church..
First of all, the Episcopal Church is a product of division. A layman, specifically Henry the eighth of that name, decided that he would not owe allegiance to the successor of Peter nor would he be obedient to the Petrine Office. Once Henry disavowed obedience and allegiance, he had to control the structure that his schism produced. It appears that neither he nor his successors nor clerical partners could do this.
But, the Catholic Church remained separate, distinct, and foundationally undisturbed. With Peter, we are Catholic. Without him, we become something else.
I am mindful that there are those who consider themselves members of the Catholic Church but still challenge Peter while at the same time proclaiming their individual fidelity to the Church. But this perspective is not without its problems. The fact of the matter is that Christ Himself appointed Peter to be the Rock of the Church that He founded. Whether anyone elects to bear allegiance to Peter is up to himself or herself. Should this person decide to depart from this loyalty, he or she leaves the Church notwithstanding personal protestations to the contrary.
The governance of the Catholic Church is quite straightforward. For contemporary skeptics of my posting, I would recommend that they consult Lumen Gentium, the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church. As mentioned previously, Steve has raised an exceptional point, and I suggest that our discussion on his critical posting about why the Catholic Church is substantively different from the Episcopal communion must concentrate on the ecclesial structure of the Catholic Church as defined by Lumen Gentium. RJA sj
Friday, August 17, 2007
Human Rights and Sources
I begin by thanking Michael P., Rob, Eduardo, and Michael S. for their stimulating posts on the question of religion (God’s existence and belief in Him) and human rights. My take on the matter is somewhat different from what has been discussed so far.
The subject of human rights is one of vital interest to the law. While many students of the law might focus on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its drafting negotiations as a defining moment, their recognition is much earlier origin. While the language they chose may differ from ours in the twenty first century, the Schoolmen Suárez and de Vitoria acknowledged in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the existence of human rights. Their recognition, however, does not make them the authors of human rights anymore than the drafters of the Universal Declaration.
It is precisely a question of authorship that brings the discussion which has taken place on this website over the past several days to a head. For the atheist who denies God’s being, there can be only one other source, origin, or author of human rights: the human being—or more precisely, the mind of the human being. The idea of human rights for the nonbeliever begins and ends in the human mind. This makes the human being the source of human rights and what is constitutive of them. But, what the human mind can fashion, the human mind can undo. What is constitutive of human rights begins and ends with what the brain can devise. The atheist’s view, his theory, her approach to human rights is seasoned by the subjectivity of the human person, individually and collectively. What is recognized as a human right one day can be abandoned the next day. Why? The answer to this question resides in the fact that there is nothing beyond human nature that defines human rights.
But, if there is an acceptance of God’s existence, there is a different understanding of human nature and, therefore, a very different conception of human rights and what is constitutive of them. The human mind no longer is their author, their source, or their origin. The basis for human rights is the author of human life itself. The subjectivity that flaws the atheist’s conception of human rights is substituted with the objectivity that surrounds God’s existence. The human mind cannot modify, amend, or revoke that which it has not created.
On a related point, the atheist’s morality and moral code of which Rob spoke may be sincere and have a carefully thought theory and intellectual basis, but it is still subject to the caprice of human subjectivity. RJA sj
Wednesday, August 8, 2007
Catholic Legal Theory—an anniversary reflection
Rick has mentioned the milestone of the Mirror of Justice’s anniversary and the suggestion that contributors offer some focused reflection on Catholic Legal Theory and the objectives of the MOJ project. During my three year’s of participation, I have expressed my thoughts on a number of occasions. Given the context of commemorative postings, I would like to present a few more thoughts.
Catholic Legal Theory has actually been around for quite some time. The corpus of writings by many Catholic authors—lay and clerical—spanning the centuries has often examined questions dealing with common life or, if you will, the common good and the ordered regulation of human activity.
Perhaps imperfectly but with genius sprinkled through the mixture, many of these writings by Catholic authors have provided an objective counterpoint to subjective legal theories. From Augustine to Aquinas to More to Suárez and de Vitoria to Acton to Rommen to Maritain to the many gifted writers of the present day (including George, Glendon, Finnis, Hittinger, and several MOJ contributors!), we can identify Catholic Legal Theory as a lens through which the human person, the family, society, the state, the nation, and the international community can be viewed individually and together simultaneously. The common denominator to these many Catholic perspectives (even from Catholic authors who do not necessarily define themselves as Catholic authors) is recognition that sound legal theory must simultaneously incorporate the moral, the objective, and the transcendent in the legal order. It is through this order (as opposed to one that is subjectively derived or defined) that the human person, the family, society, the state, the nation, and the international community can better understand not only independence from one another but their vital interdependence with one another. In short, I think Catholic Legal Theory is disposed to ensuring that each of these components of the exercise of human nature exists in right relationship with one another and in right relationship with the Author who made us all. Other legal theories, while interesting and even fascinating, tend to be oriented more to the posited viewpoint that cannot as easily, if at all, recognize and insist on these critical connections.
In addition, I think the Catholic Legal Theorist is not satisfied with his or her participation in this project solely as an intellectual enterprise. I will suggest that the Catholic Legal Theorist is energized by the zeal of the disciple and the call to holiness to propose—not impose—to fellow citizens and to all members of the human family the practical implementation of Catholic Legal Theory through argument based on not just reason but on right reason.
I think I’ll stop at this point and await the reflections of my fellow MOJ contributors. RJA sj
Friday, July 27, 2007
Catholics and Their Electoral Responsibilities
I am so very grateful for Rob’s, Tom’s, Rick’s, Amy’s, and Greg’s recent and multiple postings on several fundamental questions regarding the role of Catholics involved with public life and the direction of our political system. Like them, I have expressed thoughts about these matters in the past [HERE], [HERE], [HERE], [HERE], [HERE] and [HERE].
But with the ongoing process of candidate debates that has begun very early and has been taking place very often, our five mentioned colleagues and friends in the Lord have focused attention on the significance of these debates in the context of the duties of the electorate who assert that they Christian and Catholic. At this point, I would like to make the following observations about the Catholic voter.
Since my return to the US, I have been able to follow more closely (and even watch) several of these debates among same-party candidates that commenced in the spring of this year. I think one thing that all Americans need to keep in mind is that, regardless of the political party to which any of these candidates belongs, each seeker of office is trying to secure the largest popular approval that he or she can attain. This means that their fellow candidates from the own parties are not above criticism, oftentimes strong. While we may object to these machinations, this is politics pure and simple in a democratic state. Once each of the parties has narrowed the competition, the strong candidates from both groups will most likely extend their criticism to the survivors of the contest of the other party. The electorate, in general, and Catholic voters, in particular, need to take stock of this: what candidates and parties promise and what they deliver are not necessarily synonymous.
Promises will be made, and all voters will have to assess their reality. In addition, the faithful Catholic must also decide how he or she will exercise the franchise not only as a citizen but as a Catholic knowing that some of what is promised by candidates will be implemented. This is no easy task since none of us can accurately predict how any candidate will conduct himself or herself once elected. As voters (and as Catholics), we should not be surprised that most strong pro-abortion candidates will remain confirmed in this view should they be elected. But one thing is certain: whatever may be promised by any candidate may not be delivered because of the necessity of political compromise.
Thus, the Catholic voter—like any voter—can be confounded by the promises of the candidate versus the record of the office holder. So what guidance does the Church offer Her faithful regarding their duties pertaining to the exercise of the franchise knowing that the outcome escapes the exactitude of the campaign promise? This question raises the need to be particularly conscious of the distinction the Church makes in Her teachings between formal cooperation and material cooperation.
John Paul II in his encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae, N. 74 had this to say about the duty of a Christian pertaining to formal cooperation:
Christians, like all people of good will, are called upon under grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally in practices which, even if permitted by civil legislation, are contrary to God’s law. Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is never licit to cooperate formally in evil. Such cooperation occurs when an action, either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct participation in an act against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral intention of the person committing it. This cooperation can never be justified either by invoking respect for the freedom of others or by appealing to the fact that civil law permits it or requires it. Each individual in fact has moral responsibility for the acts which he personally performs; no one can be exempted from this responsibility, and on the basis of it everyone will be judged by God himself.
This instruction applies not just to some issues, such as abortion or euthanasia, but to all. However, the Catholic might consider how material cooperation is different. On this point, then Cardinal Ratzinger had something to say in his July 2004 letter to Cardinal McCarrick:
A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy to present himself for Holy Communion, if he were to deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate’s permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share a candidate’s stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons.
I will not be surprised if this statement from Cardinal Ratzinger is exploited by some involved with the ongoing campaigns and the 2008 election. But there are several points to keep in mind about the Cardinal’s statement.
First of all, we need to take stock of whether the candidates themselves are bound by the teachings of the Church regarding formal and material cooperation. A few of the candidates for the Presidency assert that they are Catholics, and, surely, the responsibilities imposed by Catholic teachings apply to them. Indeed, both John Paul II and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith have addressed the duties of officeholders, particularly legislators, in recent years; therefore, the obligations imposed by the Church’s teachings, including those quoted from Evangelium Vitae, cannot be ignored. While those office holders and candidates who are not Catholic may argue that they are not bound by these duties, I would suggest that no one is excused from observing the moral natural law that applies to all. But my discussion today does not focus on office holders or candidates, it concentrates, rather, on the electorate who profess to be Catholic.
In addition, some Catholics voters may consider that the text quoted from the letter of Cardinal Ratzinger would enable them to vote for a pro-abortion candidate (or in favor of a candidate who supports euthanasia/assisted suicide) as long as the voter cast his or her ballot for this candidate for other reasons such as the candidate’s support for laws enhancing care for the sick and elderly, refugee relief, and education or restricting penal laws imposing capital punishment. I, for one, do not think that this is what the former head of the CDF had in mind. If it were otherwise, the Catholic voter could justify voting for any candidate or supporting any party as long as this voter expressed disagreement with the candidate (or the candidate’s party on certain issues) on these particular questions or others that conflicted with specific, fundamental, and clear Catholic teachings. For then, the Catholic would be cooperating in a material but not formal way.
But there comes the time when even material cooperation by any Catholic presents gave problems. It should not be considered either an excuse or a permission to justify whatever the user of the distinction claims.
I tender this view because candidates who are elected (and the parties to which they belong) may be emboldened to fortify their positions on issues that are antithetical to Catholic teaching and the moral natural law knowing that they can still win a good percentage of the Catholic vote that is based on the material cooperation argument. While the voter may think that his vote for such candidates is for “proportionate reasons”, the office holder who legislates for or enforces with vigor these problematic positions will likely not take this into consideration. Thus, the laws and policies that contravene Catholic teachings will assuredly become more entrenched. That is why I have previously argued in my October 8, 2006 posting that the “proportionate reasons” cannot be for any reason as long as it is “proportionate.” To properly be “proportionate”, justifications must take into account the concerns that I have mentioned that will further entrench laws and policies antithetical to the teachings of the Church. If I may borrow from Thomas More, when Catholics forsake their religious beliefs for “proportionate reasons”, they will lead this country on a road, if not to chaos, then surely to a place in which the moral natural law has been relegated to the periphery if not abandoned outright. RJA sj
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
An assist for reading Jesus of Nazareth
I have followed some of the earlier MOJ discussion on the Pope’s recently published book, Jesus of Nazareth. I am reading the same volume now, although in Italian—so my progress is slow. I am not sure I have any answers for the questions that Michael Scaperlanda has posed, but I would like to suggest an insight that can help with how this work of the Pope assists the CLT project. Obviously the Pope is addressing a type of authority: Biblical. But he is putting it in the context of another authority: the Magisterium. As a Catholic, he is much affected by these sources of authority, which he (and I) consider good. But as a German, he was much affected by another authority: that of the totalitarian state. And in this context, he witnessed the dangers of a godless authority that was subjective and based on the whim of the totalitarian state. I have read the Pope’s short autobiography, Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977. From this book, I have been able to make some relevant connections between Joseph Ratzinger the Catholic, the theologian, and the pastor and the proper role of authority in Christian life. As Rick Garnett says, check it out (i.e., Milestones). You may find that having Milestones as a background and point of reference will place Jesus of Nazareth in a more accessible context that has a bearing on applying Pope Benedict’s new book to our CLT efforts. RJA sj
Tuesday, July 10, 2007
Normal and Abnormal Views—the perspective of The New York Times
Today’s The New York Times published and editorial entitled “A Nominee’s Abnormal Views.” [HERE] The subject of this editorial is the nomination of Dr. James Holsinger to be the next Surgeon General of the United States. If confirmed by the Senate, Dr. Holsinger would lead the country’s Public Health Service; moreover, he would have for the foreseeable future a platform from which to offer his views on a wide range of medical issues that would presumably draw on his many years of public service dealing with health issues. As the editorial correctly notes, he would serve as the nation’s “chief health educator” and would have “potentially enormous capacity to shape public opinion.”
Curiously The New York Times does not refer to its own enormous capacity to shape public opinion, but I would disagree with the editorial’s authors that Dr. Holsinger’s views on homosexual sex are abnormal. From what the Times alleges about him, I suspect that Dr. Holsinger and I would disagree on questions regarding cloning and embryonic stem cell research. The fact that he and I might differ on this vital issue would not allow me to reach the same conclusion that the Times is so quick to reach. In my opinion, the Doctor would be wrong if he, in fact, supports human cloning for embryonic stem cell research. I would not, however, characterize his perspective on this matter as “abnormal” since it is held by many influential people whom I also believe are wrong.
Abnormal means: irregular; nonstandard; uncharacteristic; atypical; anomalous; strange; odd; peculiar; deviant; aberrant; or malformed. Ironically, the Times (as it suggests when it states that it is “difficult to pigeonhole [him] ideologically”] and Dr. Holsinger probably share similar views on human cloning that leads to stem cell research and the destruction of the human embryos involved in this research. What is “troubling” to The New York Times about this nominee is that Dr. Holsinger is also an active lay leader in the United Methodist Church who opposes homosexual practice.
I may not have written this posting on this Times editorial if it simply asserted its disagreement with the Doctor’s views on homosexual practices. However, for this influential paper and powerful shaper of public opinion to brand and condemn the Doctor’s view on this important topic as “abnormal” should be of grave concern not only to Americans, in general, but to Catholics, in particular. It will be all the more easy in the future for the Times to oppose and denounce a faithful Catholic nominee to any national, state, or local post whose views differ with theirs. Now, that action, should the Times pursue it, would be abnormal. RJA sj
Catholics in rural, urban, and suburban areas—domestic and international
I have enjoyed the robust exchange amongst MOJ participants regarding the Church and parish life in rural, urban, and suburban areas. I may be one of the few MOJ participants who has had the opportunity to serve as a priest the Church in these diverse communities in the United States, e.g., Manhattan, Long Island, Dighton MA, Bethesda MD, Washington DC, Spokane, Los Gatos CA. In response to a question which Elizabeth raised, I have also had some modest experience abroad in Rome, Jordan (where I served as a Jesuit scholastic prior to my ordination), and England where I have also served the local church. I would not want to suggest that any of these diverse communities is more authentically Catholic than some others, nor would I want to propose that Catholicism is more vibrant in any one of these places than it is in another. In all of them, I have met disciples of Christ—sons and daughters of the Church who are generous, thoughtful, and caring Christians. The challenges to practicing their faith are as diverse as their locales, but first and last they are Christians, they are Catholics who labor hard at implementing what God asks of us all. Two of this week’s Gospels (Sunday and today, Tuesday) have reminded us, through Saints Luke and Matthew, that the harvest is abundant, but the laborers are few—nonetheless, the master of the harvest has sent out laborers for the harvest in all these sundry places. RJA sj
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