Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, October 17, 2007

A Reply to Susan’s Invitation

I thank Susan for her post on the Duquesne/Planned Parenthood matter. I realize there may be some intricacies about Duquesne’s license to have a radio station aligned with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting that may need to be addressed, but at this stage in the discussion the question is this: must a public broadcaster accept all donations? I do not think so. Is money, in the context of donations to a broadcaster, a form of speech? It can be and often is viewed as a form of speech when it is used to promote, directly or indirectly, the view of the donor involving matters about public life, i.e., debate about the important issues of the day. Moreover, the relationship between the donor and the institution receiving the benefactor can come into question, particularly when the donor’s identity is or must be disclosed in the programming that the radio station owner intends to broadcast. Can the Duquesne radio station have a program/debate on the abortion issue without raising the problems presented here? I think it can. Must it accept the endorsement of Planned Parenthood (no friend of the Church)? No—it need not, and it should not. 

But this is not the only question Susan has raised. Her inquiry and invitation for response also deals with debate on Catholic campuses; more specifically, she focuses the question by asking what kind of speakers should a Catholic university or college permit. She is in favor of more, not less speech. There is nothing wrong with that. But in the case of the radio station and the university (as owner of the station or of the medium for discussion) it can be and usually becomes a forum for someone else’s speech when it accepts either a donation or a speaker. Must the Catholic university or college as owner of the station or as provider of the podium be required to do either without compromising speech? Again, my answer is no.

The Duquesne situation raised by Susan may remind some MOJ contributors and readers about another controversy taking place on a Catholic campus. This situation involves the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, MA which has leased space for a conference sponsored by the Massachusetts Alliance on Teen Pregnancy (MATP). Interestingly, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Boston has been a member of MATP in the past, but its membership has not been renewed for next year according to MATP’s website. It appears that Holy Cross has leased space to MATP for some of its previous conferences. This year, the Catholic Bishop of Worcester, the Most Rev. Robert J. McManus, has intervened and called upon Holy Cross to disassociate itself from this conference and revoke its agreement to lease the space for the conference. The bishop has properly and correctly raised concerns about two speakers at this conference: Planned Parenthood and NARAL-Pro Choice (another adversary of the Church). Some might argue that Holy Cross has not leased space to Planned Parenthood or NARAL but to MATP, an organization to which Catholic Charities (Boston) was formerly a member. But I must point out that Catholic Charities has terminated its membership; moreover, MATP now endorses as a part of its mission, shared with the “comprehensive sex education programs” of Planned Parenthood and NARAL Pro-Choice, “to increase youth access to comprehensive sexuality education” that includes “support for… healthy choices including abstinence and condom and contraception use” and “access to condoms and other contraception.” These are positions that are diametrically opposed to the Church’s teachings and which are subscribed to and promoted by Planned Parenthood and NARAL-Pro Choice. It is, therefore, not surprising that Bishop McManus has taken the action that he did. Nor is it surprising that Duquesne has returned the PPF donation.

I come back to Susan’s invitation seeking the views of others. In the case of returning donations or denying forums for certain speakers, genuine debates are not affected. What is affected is cooperation—formal or material (or formal masquerading as material). In either case, of returning a donation or denying a podium, discussion of an issue is not prohibited; however, cooperation with an adversary of the Church is stopped.    RJA sj

Tuesday, October 16, 2007

Another reflection on capital punishment

This is not a direct response to Susan’s postings regarding capital punishment, but it is presentation of some views that I believe constitute one Catholic legal theory approach to this important issue. I have been working on this [Download moj_death_penalty.doc ] for some time. My views may help others in their consideration of the status of the death penalty wherever it still exists.   RJA sj

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

A Reply to Rob’s “‘Powerful Lobbies’ and Natural Law”

I would like to begin by thanking Rob for his thoughtful and probing post yesterday critiquing my earlier post on Democracy and the Constitution. Moreover, I am grateful for his expression of consensus with some of the points I raised. However, Rob presented two questions with arguments that challenge claims, which I proposed, about the natural moral law and its role. In the collegial spirit of developing Catholic Legal Theory, I would like to respond to his two points in this posting.

In his first reproach, he argues that the “specter of ‘powerful lobbies’ is too frequently invoked” as a critique of “citizens in association” attempting to persuade their government of the justness of their cause so that the state may “adopt their vision of the good.” Unfortunately, web logs such as Mirror of Justice are not the best vehicle for making the detailed argument necessary to support positions on issues that are not acceptable by all. Therefore, I will do my best to offer additional justification for my critique of the efforts of “powerful lobbies.” I begin with yesterday’s first reading from the Prophet Jonah for the daily Mass. Jonah is charged by God to go and teach to the citizens of Nineveh about their wickedness. This is a task that Jonah is initially reluctant to take up. He knows he must teach and preach to show the citizens of Nineveh the distinction between good and evil, between right and wrong. The task of Jonah is also part of the commission of developing Catholic Legal Theory that can help discipline the authority of human law so that those subject to it embrace the good and avoid evil and understand the difference between what is right and what is wrong. This is easier said than done because it is important, in making these distinctions between good and evil/right and wrong, to have a clear understanding of the standard to be employed in making such determinations. Is it a purely human standard that is relied upon to make these distinctions and employ them in public life once they are identified? If so, that becomes a problem for every person and for the communities in which they exist. Society ends up with competing and conflicting subjective standards used to identify and justify what is desirable and what is not.

An illustration of this problem is found in the dicta of Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning of the universe, and the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.” [Casey at 851] This phrase is indicative of the difficulty that surfaces when a purely subjective standard for determining what is good and what is not regarding issues of concern to public life and the common good is followed. Rob contends that the “citizens in association” (that I termed “powerful lobbies”) are simply trying to persuade their government. I respectfully disagree that this is the objective in many cases because a demand is made that society accept and adopt their subjectively determined standard that is often an exercise of pure positivism. There is little or no objective standard by which these “citizens in association” and the rest of society determine the “concept of existence”, the “meaning of the universe”, or what “the mystery of life” is all about. This problem is intensified when competing visions of the good based on this subjective determination are in conflict and competition with one another.

The natural moral law, on the other hand, offers an important objective standard to determine what is good and what is not; to define what is right and what is not. By encouraging one to consider objectively what is right and what is wrong; what is good and what is evil, citizens and the societies have a far greater understanding of not only rights but also their corresponding duties. This synthesis of rights and responsibilities is crucial not only to developing the law but also to achieving the common good. This synthesis is absent in the subjective standard that Rob appears to be endorsing in his critique of the natural moral law. But, it is the objective standard which minimizes, and quite possibly eliminates, the conflict between competing and conflicting claims which Rob identifies as “their vision of the good.” It may be “their vision,” but it is flawed with the limitations characteristic of subjectively determined goals.

Rob’s second criticism is raised in the context of a practical application of the natural moral law in Lawrence v. Texas, which, by the way, relied, in part, on Justice Kennedy’s earlier quoted dicta from Casey. Rob appears to argue that it is not the duty of the law to determine what consenting adults may or may not do in private. But my actual point about the role of the natural moral law is not that it must declare certain private, consenting activities as crimes (although it may); rather, it must not be expected to endorse certain private, consenting activities (or unconsenting, as is the case in abortion) as lawful. Rob further notes that the natural moral law is indeterminate, at least in part, because it “does not do a whole lot to overcome the disagreement” that exists within society over issues such as abortion, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, etc. While it may not have the authority of the state to impose particular legal requirements, it retains the capacity to instruct citizens and government officials on what the state should do or refrain from doing regarding these subjects over which disagreement exists. The fact that there is disagreement should not prevent anyone, including Catholic Legal Theorists, from making their contribution to the debate over the questions of right versus wrong, good versus evil that permeate these issues. This is true persuasion and not imposition.

In contrast, the proponents of Roe, of Lawrence, of Planned Parenthood have imposed and not persuaded. It is not the natural moral law that is indeterminate; it is, rather, the subjective standard emanating from Casey that is indeterminate and will continue to foster deep divisions within society—and that is what is not “particularly helpful” in guiding our legal framework.   RJA sj

Monday, October 8, 2007

Democracy and the Constitution

I would like to thank Patrick for his posting Friday on Benedict XVI’s October 5th address to the International Theological Commission in which the Pope made the case for natural law as the foundation for democracy. Amongst other important points made during this allocution, the Holy Father noted that “[a] positivist conception of law seems to dominate the thought of many scholars (and, I would add, some lawyers and the litigants they represent).” The Pope elaborated on this crucial point of his speech by indicating that this attitude leads to the tendency to “ethical relativism” that plagues the contemporary world. Patrick’s posting concludes with Benedict’s observation that, “The advance of individuals and of society along the path of true progress depends upon respect for natural moral law, in conformity with right reason, which is participation in the eternal reason of God.”

These thoughts of the Holy Father, as provided by Patrick, frame the context for a few observations on a major essay published in yesterday’s Boston Globe by Christopher Shea entitled “Supreme Downsizing.” [HERE] Mr. Shea makes the argument that

The nine members of the US Supreme Court wield extraordinary power over American Society: Last term alone, they struck down school desegregation plans in two cities, rewrote Congress’s new rules for campaign-finance reform, and modified the free speech rights of high schools students.

Shea’s essay relies on the work of Professor Adrian Vermeule of Harvard Law School (principally Judging Under Uncertainty [Harvard, 2006]), to fortify his case that since the Court “now has two blocs of justices who tend to vote together”… “momentous questions of policy” can be determined by one justice who is the swing vote. [Italics mine] I would like to suggest that this is not a new phenomenon for the Court. The Supreme Court of the United States has often reflected political tensions and divisions that have appeared across American society since the Republic’s founding. But for Shea, the situation that “now” exists provides justification for reexamining the Constitutional authority of the Court which “perhaps… shouldn’t be in such a powerful position.”

According to Shea, Vermeule’s work demonstrates that the Court “should stay out of controversial matters of politics and law almost entirely, deferring—except in painfully obvious cases—to the wisdom of the elected representatives in Congress.” Otherwise, only “perpetual rancor and inconsistency” will result, which are “the bane of good law.” The Globe article presents no insight for determining which cases fall into the “painfully obvious” category requiring the intervention of the Court.

It strikes me that if Shea has correctly identified a serious malady in our republican democracy, dependence and reliance on the “natural moral law” could be an excellent antidote to the woes identified in his Globe article. But it is necessary to return to some other elements of the Shea article which, I believe, undermine his thesis. Relying again on Vermeule’s work, Shea asserts that the nation might be better if it had no “Supreme Court rulings barring anti-abortion laws and anti-sodomy statutes.” I would not disagree with this point. But it is important to ascertain who was responsible for not only the rulings but who brought the cases that led to these decisions. The exercise of right reason suggests that these rulings were not something that the Supreme Court necessarily welcomed. They well could have been unavoidable due to the untiring efforts of powerful lobbies advocating permissive access to abortion and the institutionalization of same sex marriage. If legislatures would not produce the results these interest groups insisted on, the courts, including the Supreme Court, just might.

This is what has happened in the context of legislation addressing abortion and sex. There may well be many members of the Supreme Court who would have preferred not having to decide the merits of the lawsuits filed by these interest groups, but, the Constitution of the United States requires that the judicial department, which includes the Supreme Court, provide interested parties due process of the law.

It may well be, as Shea argues, that there is a need to step back from these issues, but is it purely the responsibility of the Supreme Court? Shea’s appropriation of Vermeule’s advice would appear better directed toward the lobbies that instigate these lawsuits rather than toward the judges who are under an obligation to decide them. With that in mind, “good law” may reign once again.

The Pope’s October 5th exhortation made this point, albeit in more general terms. The instability of the law with which Mr. Shea and Professor Vermuele are properly concerned is not simply a question for judges alone. It is a responsibility for all who are involved with decision-making that involves all members of society—be they judges, legislators, administrators, or citizens. The natural moral law provides a sound, available remedy to many of the concerns identified by Shea and Vermeule, and it is a remedy to be exercised by all, not just by some members of our democratic society. But if the positivist mentality (especially that of the interest groups who are responsible for instigating the litigation of which Shea and Vermeule speak) continues, the sound base of democracy, the moral natural law, will erode and the problems mentioned by Shea and Vermeule will likely continue. Those of us who are concerned about lawyer formation and Catholic Legal Theory would not be the only ones who could profit from the Pope’s wise words. Our students—citizens and future lawyers, legislators, administrators, and judges—would also be the beneficiaries of his counsel.    RJA sj

Thursday, September 27, 2007

A day of reversals

Apropos of the Georgetown Law reversal, here is some news [HERE] about Verizon's reversal of its earlier refusal to allow NARAL instant text messaging. Borrowing from popular culture of the 1960s, second verse same as the first.   RJA sj

Catholic Higher Education’s Future

I largely agree with Patrick’s sentiments in his posting earlier today about the future of Catholic higher education, which, of course, would include legal education. I also share some sympathy with his statement about the Catholic academy being inclusive. After all, our Lord reminded us that it is not the healthy who need the physician.

While the Miscamble, Steinfels, and McGreevy essays offer differing views about particulars and emphases, they appear to agree on the matter regarding mission-fit for hiring. One does not have to be a Catholic to endorse, support, and contribute to the Catholic intellectual tradition where faith and reason and the integration of knowledge that leads to wisdom. But, that is a crucial point essential to the success of Catholic higher education. When there is a proliferation of faculty members who do not subscribe to these elements essential to Catholic education, serious problems begin to emerge. Rick’s posting earlier today about the recent development at Georgetown University Law Center demonstrates this. As the article in The Hoya illustrates, there are, according to the correspondent, faculty who are behind the reversal that will open the door for supporting pro-abortion advocacy (and, I suspect, eventually other things incompatible with Catholic teachings). If you recall, when Georgetown University was involved in litigation regarding its Catholic identity and matters dealing with sexual orientation issues in the mid-1980s, several Georgetown Law faculty were prominently posed against the University in this lawsuit.

Another matter to keep in mind is that, today, the academy often prizes research and the development of theories that are not compatible with or sympathetic to the integration of knowledge. Narrow specialization is favored. Pope Benedict has spoken of this fragmentation of knowledge in the past and the need to counter it with integration of learning, a traditional goal of Catholic higher education. Those faculty members who are not sympathetic to the Pope’s view are often advocates for the specialization that leads to the fragmentation of learning. There is little doubt that folks in favor of increased specialization can be clever about the particulars of certain subjects, but can it be said that they are also wise? While firing-for-mission could be problematic, hiring-for-mission should not. Moreover, it is necessary and essential for the survival and the flourishing of Catholic higher education. RJA sj

Sunday, September 23, 2007

The Commonweal Editorial: “Crisis” Averted

Once again, I’d like to thank Michael P. for his posting the excerpt from the recent Commonweal editorial. Interestingly, I had read and reflected upon the content of the editorial along with Dr. Scott Appleby’s essay on the American Modernists early yesterday morning. For what it is worth, readers of Mirror of Justice may find it useful to know that I read Commonweal, First Things, America, the two NCRs (National Catholic Reporter and National Catholic Register), The Tablet, and Crisis, amongst other periodicals. It might be said that my reading fare is catholic. But I digress.

I found several remarks in the editorial to which Michael referenced arresting. The first is the phrase “faithful Catholics” that was placed in quotation marks by the author(s) of this particular editorial to affirm, I suppose, the fidelity of those who disagree with Church teachings on subjects such as ordination, artificial contraception, and the nature of the papacy. This assertion can lead other members of the faithful to believe that the Church’s teachings on these issues, and perhaps other matters, are flexible or ambiguous. I do not think that the Church’s teachings on these topics are as accommodating or indefinite as the editorial would imply with its juxtaposition of the phrase “faithful Catholics.” While Church teachings may be more flexible or less clear on other matters, they are not on these.

This brings me to the distinction that the editorial makes between “open and respectful disagreement” and “suppression.” There is the circumstance in which the heterodox remove themselves from full communion with the Church, and it would be a mistake to conclude, as the editorial did, that their fidelity to unmistakable Church teachings is not in question. It is, but they can do something about this dilemma as I indicated in a previous posting when Steve and I engaged one another in an earlier discussion dealing with fidelity to the Church’s teachings.

A final point I would like to raise in this posting about the editorial concerns its assertion that “History, especially the history of the Second Vatican Council, tells us that disagreement is often the work of the Holy Spirit.” This is an interesting but, nevertheless, inaccurate proclamation about the Council’s work and the documents it produced. Before drafting this posting, I reviewed the texts that the Council adopted, particularly Lumen Gentium and Dignitatis Humanae, and cannot reach the same conclusion that the editorial does about history, particularly that of the Second Vatican Council, and the work of the Holy Spirit. I acknowledge the existence of a history of dissent that ignores or disagrees with Church teachings that come from the Council, but I cannot agree that this particular history is consistent with the Council’s teachings or the work of the Holy Spirit. In making this appeal, I recall Saint Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians that the faithful must, in fact, agree, avoid dissent, and be united “in the same mind and the same judgment.” Indeed, there are some matters on which we can disagree and remain faith to the Magisterium, but surely there are other items on which we can not.    RJA sj

Friday, September 21, 2007

A followup to the Dutch Dominicans Revisited

Sincere thanks to Michael P. for his re-visitation of the Dutch Dominicans' pamphlet. It appears that their local superior and the Master General of the Dominicans have expressed their own reservations about this work of four members of the Order of Preachers. But they are not the only ones who seem to be interested in the matter.

For example: this past week, Pope Benedict met with some of his former doctoral students in continuation of his annual symposium-seminar that he has been conducting for many years with them. It appears that he reminded his former students, many of whom are now theologians, in the last several days that a theologian should not engage in "theological arrogance." I think when any of us pursue our own course in matters theological that separate us from a rich teaching, we exercise a form of arrogance that separates us from the Body of Christ, Holy Mother the Church.

Again, I ask the question I posed earlier when Michael first raised this topic: what do my Dutch presbyteral brothers responsible for authoring this pamphlet do on their weekends? Maybe they do go out to as many parishes as they can serve by bringing the Eucharist to God's people, but it may be that they do not. If the latter, should they not? I think so, particularly when one considers that they are not only members of the Body of Christ ordained in sacramental ministry as priests, they also belong to the Order of Preachers who have a great gift to bring to the Body of Christ, the People of God.    RJA sj

Wednesday, September 19, 2007

More on the CDF Response on Food and Hydration

Many thanks to Rick for his posting the CDF's Response to the USCCB's inquiry regarding food and hydration and several of the comments the Response has produced. The CDF also issued its own commentary, which is HERE .   RJA sj

Sunday, September 9, 2007

The Dutch Dominicans

Thanks to Michael P. for posting the matter on the Dutch Dominicans. And thanks to Steve B. for his follow-up.

As one MOJ contributor who is ordained in the presbyteral order, I would like to ask my Dutch Dominican colleagues a question about their availability to celebrate the Eucharist in the parishes where there is a need. Perhaps they are doing this, but it is not clear from what Michael said or from The Tablet article that he linked if they have cleared their weekend calendars in order to be available to celebrate Mass in those places where the need is greatest. But maybe this is simply my Jesuit instinct reacting. I am also Jesuit educated (yes, indeed, Georgetown, like Michael), but I am also a Jesuit. While I have no Dominican relatives, I was a chaplain to a convent of Dominican sisters for twelve years.   RJA sj