I thank Michael Scaperlanda, Rick Garnett, and Bob Hockett for their thoughtful contributions on a number of important issues such as school vouchers and abortion, both of which may involve subsidies to citizens through legislative initiatives or judicial decisions. Today, I shall concentrate my remarks on the subject of abortion. In particular, I have been weighing what Bob said in this regard: “Since the state cannot speak in the name of all of us on this very deep question [abortion], any more than it can on the related question of what role a faith should play in an earthly human life, we effectively ‘blind’ the state to this matter for the time being.” More recently in his last posting that I saw while composing this one, Bob concludes Michael S. to be saying that there is “no room for disagreement as to whether unborn human beings from conception onward are legally cognizable persons whom the polity is duty-bound to protect from abortions sought by their mothers” or, for that matter, anyone else. Bob then argues that this claim he attributes to Michael “that there is no room for disagreement... strikes me as simply false.”
Bob elsewhere thoughtfully expresses his concern about the term “abortion subsidies” in the discussion about the current health-care insurance debate before the Congress and then goes on to state that this phrase “is ambiguous as between intended financing of abortion on the one hand, and collateral effects on the disposable income of people who might seek abortion on the other—precisely the distinction that step one of a double effect inquiry aims to keep clear.” His reason for making this point is to ensure that his readers understand that his “question is aimed at what significance ‘intervening choice’ ought to have in the ‘proportionality’ thinking of a legislator who has reached step two of a double effect inquiry—that is, a legislator who already, by hypothesis, does not intend to push funds toward abortion but is now thinking about collateral effects.” He then goes on to say that, in his opinion, “the likely collateral abortion effects of health insurance reform legislation remain at this stage uncertain, particularly because [they are] subject to countervailing tendencies.” One illustration of these tendencies he offers is abortion-seeking on the one hand and poverty on the other.
I think Bob is correct when he argues that the state does not have the authority to assert what role faith has on earthly human life. Such matters are beyond the temporal competence of the state whose role and authority are strong but still limited as Catholic social teaching and other perspectives contend. However, he also opines that “the state cannot speak in the name of all of us on this very deep question” on abortion.
In a way, I tend to agree insofar as the state addresses many issues on which many citizens have diverse views; however, this does not arrest the state from taking action. The fact that it cannot speak in the name of all does not mean that it cannot act on behalf of all even though it must be acknowledged that there often is not unanimous agreement on most temporal issues that the state is addressing. But there is something missing from Bob’s careful reflections, and for me, there remains the vital question of the moral evaluation of what the state does knowing that it has the competence to act on matters where the state does not “speak in the name of all” but nevertheless acts on behalf of all through its making and enforcing of civil law.
Catholic legal theory has something to offer this discussion—both to the citizen and law maker who are Catholic and to the citizen and law maker who are not. Here Bob and I likely part company on some of the points he has made in his several postings over the past couple of days. I first address the Catholic citizen and law maker. Both are “citizens” of two cities—God’s and this earthly dwelling place that we inhabit with the rest of humanity. On matters dealing with abortion, I suggest that, as Catholics, we are asked to be of one view, a view that we freely choose because of our self-identification as Catholics that reflects our being the branches on Christ’s vine.
Bob notes on a several occasions the fact that some in our legal culture agree that the unborn child is not a person; however, I hasten to add, others do. For the Catholic, citizen or law maker, the position should be clear: the unborn is a person whose integrity and dignity are to be protected. Why? As branches of the vine of Christ, this is what we as Catholics freely believe following the instruction that Christ’s vicar, in union with the episcopal college (the ordinary universal Magisterium), has taught and continues to teach. This teaching we freely adopt as the moral compass that guides our evaluation of what is good and what is not in the civil law; what is true and what is not; what is to be done and what is not. If the state permits (through its provision for payment—direct or indirect) for abortion, it is effectuating a grave moral wrong. One may argue double effect, proportionality, or some other rationalization for the state’s action, but the wrong remains clear and obvious. The Catholic citizen and law maker are obliged to oppose this because enabling of the death of an unborn child, who is a person in Catholic teaching, is wrong and violates the dignity of every human being regardless of his or her stage in human development because everyone, in his or her lifetime, was that unborn child. If the taking of one innocent person’s life can be justified by the civil law, the lives of all others may well be compromised under the same legal regime pursuing double effect, proportionality, or some other justification. The task for the Catholic, then, is to begin to reign in both the cultural attitude and the legal regime that allow “collateral issues” to camouflage the reality of what is happening—a grievous offense against God and humanity (a crime) as the Second Vatican Council concluded.
But the citizen and law maker who is not Catholic may hold and offer a different view. It is true that these individuals may not accept the same teachings of our Church on this central issue based on how they exercise their freedom, but this does not mean that they are excused from a careful and critical moral evaluation that centers on the common good or, as our Constitution states, “the general welfare.” The non-Catholic is also obliged, through his or her citizenship or oath of office, to participate in the operation of the state that was founded to “establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promoted the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” The fact that what was once illegal may now be legal (i.e., abortion) does not, in fact, make it right or moral.
While some issues involving private morality may not necessarily be subject of the law, those dealing with public morality are or ought to be the subject of the law. And abortion deals with public, not private morality. That which threatens the common good is a part of the enterprise of our civil law and the state which makes and enforces it. One who is not a Catholic may not concede, as the Catholic must, that the unborn child is a person on the ground that this is a “religious” view which he or she does not share; however, he or she must realize (1) that the threat to any human is a threat to all future generations who one day will be in their earliest stages of development and (2) that abortion terminates the life of another human being—regardless of whether there is consensus that he or she bears the title “person.” Everyone and anyone should be able to identify with the unborn human because, regardless of one’s view on personhood of the unborn, everyone shared the same state in his or her early life. May I suggest, then, that the threat to one is a threat to all. The peril to one is a menace to the common good—the general welfare—because when one is threatened, the rights of the integrity and dignity of all may be called into question and compromised. So, those interested in the “the general welfare” and in “our posterity” may find themselves necessarily drawn to the same conclusion of the Catholic that what threatens the life of one inevitably can threaten the lives of all. We know that not all in our polity believe this—some do not believe it because they view abortion as a right, human or otherwise. But such a view opposes the common good, something which right reason should lead anyone to conclude, regardless of whether he or she is Catholic or not.
My sincere thanks to the other interlocutors who may wish to respond to what I have said.
RJA sj
Saturday, March 6, 2010
Thanks to Rob for posting this important question that emerges from The Washington Post article about the former executive director of the Washington Archdiocese’s Catholic Charities sending a letter to the Archdiocese asking that it revoke its new policy regarding spousal benefits. The Archdiocese has indeed altered its benefits to spouses, but the Post article does not specify what the Archdiocese actually did. As the Archdiocese stated:
Catholic Charities will continue to honor the health coverage current employees have as of March 1, 2010. After that, all new employees, and any existing employees who want to change their health coverage, will be covered under a new benefits package. The new plan will provide the same level coverage for employees and their dependents, with one exception: spouses cannot be covered. This change is the direct result of not receiving an adequate exemption for religious organizations in the same-sex marriage legislation.
Mr. (formerly Fr.) Sawina, the former executive director of Catholic Charities, was quoted in the Post article, and Rob has captured some of what Mr. Sawina said in his complaint about the Archdiocese’s policy quoted above. Although I have tried to track down all of what Sawina stated in his letter to the Archdiocese, I have not been successful to date. But here is the entire statement that the Post published and attributed to him:
“Some, including the archbishop, have argued that by providing health care to a gay or lesbian spouse we are somehow legitimizing gay marriage,” said Sawina, a former priest. “Providing health care to a gay or lesbian partner—a basic human right, according to Church teaching—is an end in itself and no more legitimizes that marriage than giving communion to a divorced person legitimizes divorce, or giving food or shelter to an alcoholic legitimizes alcoholism.”
Rob has asked what should the Archdiocese have said in its letter. Well, before tackling that issue, which I shall not do in this posting, a few questions must be raised about the Post’s quotation of Mr. Sawina. I shall do my best to provide answers to the issues that I raise.
The first point concerns his claim that “providing health care benefits to a gay or lesbian partner—a basic right, according to Church teaching—is an end in itself...” I disagree. First of all, while the Church has a strong stand on ensuring basic health care to all persons, it is quite another thing to insist that this noble teaching mandates the Church to provide health care benefits to the gay or lesbian partners of any of its employees. This claim cannot pass the muster of the Church’s definition of a family that “is based on marriage, that intimate union of life in complementarity between a man and a woman which is constituted in the freely contracted and publicly expressed indissoluble bond of matrimony and is open to the transmission of life.” To do what Mr. Sawina asserts the Church should do would be to coerce her into supporting a relationship that defies her teachings. To borrow from Margaret More Roper’s words, we know what it would mean if the Church were to do what Mr. Sawina asks—it would mean that Catholic Charities has conceded that it is paying benefits to a homosexual partner in contradiction of the Church’s teachings, and this would be an endorsement, perhaps indirect, but an endorsement nonetheless, of “same-sex marriage.”
Mr. Sawina then goes on to argue that payment of the benefits themselves is itself independent of this recognition of same-sex marriage. He argues that it is like other ends which “no more legitimizes that [same-sex] marriage than giving communion to a divorced person legitimizes divorce...” Here Mr. Sawina fails to take stock of what the Church teaches. Assuming that the communion minister is aware of the existence of a particular divorce, the minister can still give communion to the “innocent” party, that is, not the person who sought the divorce or whose actions precipitated the divorce. Surely giving the innocent victim of divorce communion does not legitimize a divorce for which that person is not responsible. But Mr. Sawina’s quotation does not take stock of this important point.
Mr. Sawina then goes on to construct another flawed analogy. He further contends that it is like other ends which “no more legitimizes that [same-sex] marriage [than] giving food or shelter to an alcoholic legitimizes alcoholism.” Well, first of all the Church acknowledges that alcoholism can be a disease if it is not caused by conscious and intentional abuse of alcohol that can be stopped and restarted by the person consciously and voluntarily abusing alcohol. But Mr. Sawina is not talking about this; rather, he is arguing that giving food or shelter to an alcoholic legitimizes alcoholism. It does not. The Church is feeding the hungry and sheltering the homeless. It is not supporting alcoholism. Having worked in the Church’s homeless shelters in the past, I am also aware of the efforts made to assist with treatment alcoholics who come into shelters administered by the Church. And, treatment does not include giving alcohol to alcoholics. But if the Church were to give alcohol to alcoholics, then its actions could be construed as legitimizing alcoholism—but this is not what the Church does.
RJA sj
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Thanks, Michael, for pointing this out. I would suggest that my route is more direct.
RJA sj
Thanks to Michael P. for the postings linking the opinions of Sandro Magister regarding the address given by Archbishop Chaput yesterday in Houston.
I, for one, think it is important to read what the archbishop actually said.
RJA sj
Monday, March 1, 2010
Readers may recall that on February 13, I posted my thoughts on the Albany diocese’s plan to proceed with a needle exchange program. On February 19, I invited one of the interlocutors who commented on my post to provide me with “the peer review scientific literature that attests to his” views which were critical of my position. Although I did not hear back from this commenter, I independently did a search of “peer review scientific literature” on the topic of needle exchange programs. In particular, I consulted documentation available through the National Institute of Health. My study of these reports demonstrated that the authors largely concluded that, “methadone treatment is the modality most directly targeting the injection drug user”; therefore “it has the greatest capacity for reducing HIV risk behaviors.” Interestingly the same documentation of the NIH states that, “the efforts of community-based organizations offering AIDS prevention outreach and needle exchange have resulted in increased demand for treatment services, suggesting the need for drug abuse treatment programs to work collaboratively with these organizations on behalf of a common concern about the health and well-being of their clients.” The emphasis here is not on needle exchange programs per se but on treatment programs that may work in tandem with exchanges.
I hope that readers of my original post understood me to say that the health of drug users and others who may be associated with those addicted are the major concern. While there appears to be some correlation between treatment programs and needle exchange programs if the organizers of both collaborate with one another, nothing is said about the availability of data indicating what happens to the needles given in the exchange since supervision and treatment appear not to cover monitoring of the use of the needle once the new one is given to the addict who may also be under treatment. Giving clean needles does little to assist the health of drug users and their friends, sexual partners, and casual acquaintances.
If treatment is not the principal focus of a program, will programs that only provide clean needles really address the underlying and related problems of drug addiction? The NIH materials that I consulted suggest no. As some research indicated: “making available the implements of drug taking, needle exchange programs” was not considered as a way of “removing, societal sanctions against drug use. The response of those championing the harm reduction strategy was that rehabilitation, although a laudable goal, was impossible in the absence of a client’s survival.” While there is other data from these studies suggesting that those involved in needle exchanges may be more inclined to enter treatment programs, there is virtually no data about “sexual partners” or other persons who may be “recruited” into drug use by those addicts who do exchange needles. There is little if anything known about the effects of needle exchanges on third parties who know and come in contact with the addict who is receiving clean needles.
The peer review material repeatedly emphasizes the important correlation between exchange programs and treatment. But if that correlation does not exist or succeed, what happens then? The answer is obvious: the abuse of drugs continues perhaps with some decrease in risks to the needle exchanger but not for anyone else.
The point of my original post was this: must the Church, through her charitable works, be forced to engage in needle exchange program to combat drug abuse and related health issues? My position was and remains that the Church in her good and well-formed conscience must do what she can to treat those afflicted with drug dependency. There is no reason why a treatment program must also provide needle exchange opportunities. These points that I have made appear to be reflected in the NIH studies which indicated that “the primary barrier to linking needle exchange clients to treatment is the lack of available or effective treatment in many communities.” What prevents any organization, including Catholic Charities, from concentrating its resources on treatment? Apparently none; moreover, peer review scientific data indicate that treatment is the real objective, not providing means for continuing addiction which may reduce blood-borne disease infection of the addict.
Some of the peer review scientific data concede that with the often expected 30% drop out rates from treatment programs, it might be “better” to instruct addicts on “safer drug injection.” In other words, there is a concession that drug addiction rather than treatment and cure may be all that is possible. And if this peer review literature is correct, then what is Catholic Charities to do? In spite of the fact that my interlocutor suggests that needle exchanges do not encourage drug use, it seems from the peer review data suggest otherwise.
I have presented my position that Catholic Charities ought not be involved with needle exchanges or, for that matter, instruction on “safer drug injection.” My argument about what happens to the “new” needles once given but whose use is not supervised is not “irrelevant” as my interlocutor suggested: “Most importantly, the arguments about what people are doing with the needles and whether there is an assurance that they’re not being shared is utterly irrelevent. [sic] These programs are very well demonstrated to reduce the transmission of blood borne diseases. Whether some of the syringes from the program are shared does not matter because those injections would have been with a dirty needle anyways. The bottom line is the one that matters, and the bottom line shows that these programs save lives and are incredibly cost effective at doing so.”
It matters a great deal what becomes of the syringes once they leave the exchange site. The assertion that it does not matter if syringes from the program are shared “because those injections would have been with a dirty needle anyways” is problematic. My interlocutor concedes that there is a problem with dirty needles; well, my point is that the fact that a needle may be new and clean one day does not mean that it will remain so until returned to the exchange site. Indeed, he concedes my point and yet he dismisses it. A needle intended for one injection becomes a used needle that may be used again, and my interlocutor concludes that it is “a dirty needle anyways.” He further maintains that sexual partners and other third parties are protected by the exchange programs. But are they really? There is no data in the peer review materials to indicate that such a conclusion can be tendered and supported because there is no information about what happens to the “new” needle once it leaves the exchange site.
Let us hope and pray that any Catholic organization contemplating needle exchange projects reconsider this; moreover, let us encourage them to help those suffering drug addiction find treatment rather than sustenance of this destructive menace.
RJA sj
Friday, February 19, 2010
It appears that the only way to take up a commenter's offer is to seek his or her further contribution is by another post. There is no way to contact the commenter directly through TypePad.
And so I write to Phil. I should like to take him up on his offer to provide me with "the peer review scientific literature that attests to his" contentions and disagreements with me.
So, before I do respond to what he said, I should like to have the benefit of his offer.
Thank you, Phil.
RJA sj
