Readers of the Mirror of Justice will recall that I have previously written [HERE, HERE, and HERE] on the four-institution project sponsored by Fordham University, Fairfield University, Yale Divinity School, and Union Theological Seminary. Although the conveners of this project asserted that they wanted “to change the conversation about sexual diversity and the Catholic Church” by presenting “the variety of viewpoints on issues of sexual diversity among Catholics,” the Archbishop of New York and the Bishop of Bridgeport expressed their concerns to the heads of two of the convening institutions regarding the appearance of the program that dissent from rather than support and defense of Catholic teachings was the nature of the presentations. However, these bishops were assured that “the conferences, while sensitive to the experiences of the participants, will not be a vehicle for dissent.”
As I indicated in a previous posting, I heard most of the presentations delivered at Fordham, Fairfield, and Yale, and it was my initial conclusion that these conferences were, in fact and whether intended or not, a criticism or questioning of the Church’s teachings on critical matters dealing with faith and morals. One of these presentations concentrated on same-sex marriage and was billed as a keynote address, and its content justifies and intensifies my earlier conclusion.
Although the speaker claims to be Roman Catholic, she noted her “wrestling” with the Church’s teachings on homosexual activity (not orientation). Her substantive disagreements with the Church’s teachings in the context of sexual activity and marriage are patent and were presented in three parts.
The first part argues that homosexual activity is moral, and this conclusion directly conflicts with the Church’s fundamental teachings; moreover, the author acknowledges this contradiction. However, she defends her case by arguing that homosexual couples can be and are open to the gift of life from God—just in a different way than heterosexual couples. But if one disregards this crucial difference, then, according to the keynoter, homosexual persons are on the same plane as pregnant and postmenopausal women and infertile men. The biological distinction of male and female enters neither her imagination nor her reasoning. A major point of her argument here is that couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, can be open to the gift of life through adoption—and as we have seen, this constitutes another conflict with Church teachings regarding whether same-sex couples should adopt children.
But the keynoter continues: the sexual relations that can exist between all couples, regardless of their orientation, provide the physical satisfaction that can sustain any “kin-like tie[] and childrearing partnerships.” She takes to task “the bishops” who are not open to “the truth of human sexuality” through “the sexual experience of faithful Catholics of all sexual stripes.” But experience is not the same as truth about the nature and essence of the human person.
Still for her, homosexual activity “can be open to and serve life in precisely the same way that the biologically infertile, heterosexual activity” is because “the biological openness to the possibility of procreation is not essential to good sex” and “love-making need not be inseparably connected to potentially baby-making activity in order for it to be morally good.”
In an effort to buttress her argument, the keynote speaker insists that homosexual activity is complementary—not as it is with opposite-sex couples’ sexual activity without artificial contraception but as it is with opposite-sex couples who do practice artificial contraception. This is a problem in regard to Catholic teaching. But it is not a problem for the keynoter because for her the notion of complementarity must be understood not in the context opposite sex but in the context of apposite sex—that is, sex that is apt for love-making and “forging bonds through the mutual sharing of sexual delight.” This, too, is a problem.
The speaker then combines the “moral” and “complementary” arguments to substantiate her first part claim by concluding that homosexual acts are normative because they are natural—natural if natural means anyone can do anything with anyone else and call it normal, natural, complementary, and moral. It is clear that the objective reasoning that undergirds the Church’s teachings is absent in the keynoter’s position. What is present in her position is nominalism, subjectivism, historicism, and relativism.
The second part of her presentation is that “official Catholic teaching” about same-sex marriage (SSM) is wrong. In large part her perspective relies on that assertion that since SSM is being accepted and adopted by some temporal authorities, the Church’s position must be in error. She further suggests that since the Church has been complicit in allowing same-sex civil unions, it is in no position to oppose SSM. Yet, civil unions are also new and have also been opposed by the civil authorities for a long time as they have by the Church. There is implied but unproven in her argument that the Church looked the other way regarding civil unions, but in fact the Church did not ignore them; it opposed them as well. The keynoter also contends that differential treatment by the Church for “queer folks” did not begin until 1992. Yet she is mistaken because she fails to mention what the Vatican said in 1983 in the Charter on the Rights of the Family regarding marriage and sexual union. Moreover, she fails to acknowledge that the first civil unions (not marriages) for same-sex couples were not available until the year 2000—long after the Church and some civil authorities expressed their concerns about them. Furthermore, up until very recent times within the last dozen years, both the Church’s teachings and the civil norms regarding marriage were comparable, a point she overlooks. Nor does she acknowledge the passage of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act which became the law of the land in 1996.
While the marriage question is a most important issue for the Church in the present age, so are all issues that attack authentic human dignity and the common good; consequently her claim that the “Pope has identified the marriage equality movement as more dangerous to life than hunger, war and tyranny” is a claim that cannot be substantiated.
One further argument she makes which I will tackle today is that “marriage equality will not unduly violate religious liberty.” With the Defense of Marriage Act presently under court challenge and with Judge Vaughan Walker’s unsettling remarks about religion in the context of the Proposition 8 litigation, methinks that the keynoter needs to revisit her insecure claim that the SSM campaign and all its associates, whatever they may be, are not a threat to religious freedom and libertas ecclesiae. If wedding photographers and justices of the peace can be brought to heel on these matters, it is just a matter of time before the members of the Church and the Church herself are also brought into legal and political forums to account for their opposition to SSM. The keynoter would do well to become familiar with the recent discussion presented by Jane Robbins and Emmett McGroarty [HERE] on what is happening to religious liberty today including the SSM context.
The third and final part of the keynote address is that marriage equality is good because it promotes the common good by encouraging love and mutual assistance. This would be accomplished by marriage equality reducing “the social stigma and internalized shame associated with being gay.” But she fails to take stock of the Church’s teachings which make the important distinction between just and unjust discrimination; moreover, she overlooks the positions taken by the Church nationally and universally regarding the sinner who is loved and the sinner who persists in sinning. The key to her third part is that for marriage equality to become “normalized,” the Church’s teachings will have to change. Otherwise “homophobia” and “heterosexism” will remain. So, once opposition to SSM withers, love and the “common good” will prevail. However, this will necessitate that today’s dissent from Church teachings and the heterodoxy that accompanies dissension will have to replace the Church’s views and moral teachings. In essence, what is heterodox must become orthodox, and what is orthodox must become heterodox.
While the organizers of this conference assured two bishops that the Church’s teachings would “be clearly stated and articulately defended” in “More than a Monologue”, something happened in the execution of the plan. Thus, the Church’s teachings were not presented in a convincing way; moreover, the revealed truth upon which they rest was put aside. The promised dialogue did not materialize. What did materialize was a direct challenge to the Church’s teachings.
As Desi Arnaz would sometimes say in his role as Ricky Ricardo, “There’s gonna be some explainin' to do!”
Having just read Rob’s post, I cannot disagree with much of his assessment of Laurie Goodstein’s piece today in The New York Times.
I don’t have much to add either other than to underscore the point that the Goodstein article is not really news reporting but rather is an effort designed to put pressure on faithful Catholics—meaning those who believe in and live the Church’s teachings. “The bishops” (a phrase which Ms. Goodstein over-uses—she utilizes it twelve times; I wonder if I could use in this posting “The Times” twelve times to offer a similar displeasure, but I digress) probably would not have to exercise as much of their teaching authority on the neuralgic issues if “The Times” and other media and cultural outlets didn’t focus on the morally problematic by promoting it as the morally desirable and righteous. The shepherds of the Church are doing their job and they must continue to do so.
As far as the assertion that the successors of the Apostles are speaking “in hushed tones” on the other important issues of the day, this is simply not true. One need only read diocesan newspapers containing pastoral messages or regularly view the USCCB’s webpage for starters to know that the assertion of Faith in Public Life is flawed. Ah, but if “The Times” doesn’t report these matters, then the bishops must be speaking “in hushed tones.”
I fear “The Times” would like to see the shepherds of the Church abandon their important and essential teaching office. But I don’t think they will do this. The pressure on them to do this exists without doubt as it exists on many of the faithful who work in the temporal world to bring the Good News to everyone.
Yet the members of the Church must not lose faith; neither must they be afraid even of “TheTimes.” Right now the pressure on the Church is subtle, but it is also becoming less so.
Hence all the faithful need to recall the dangers posed by the “enlightened culture of the day” highlighted by Christopher Dawson many years ago when he noted that if Christians cannot assert their right to exist, “they will eventually be pushed not only out of modern culture but out of physical existence.” He knew that the totalitarian state of the first half of the twentieth century was capable of doing this. But he also forecast that the western democracies possessed the capacity to do the same.
“The bishops” are doing what they are called to do to see that this does not happen. Clearly this annoys those who would like to see the Church that Christ gave us disappear. But the shepherds are meeting their charge and guarding their flock with grace, prudence, and courage. Nolite timere!
This Thursday, November 10 at 4:00 PM at the Corboy Law Center of Loyola University Chicago, I will be delivering the third annual John Courtney Murray, S.J. lecture. This year's lecture is entitled "The Meaning of Social Justice in Catholic Thought." If you are in the vicinity of Chicago, you are most welcome to attend. A reception, where discussion and debate are welcome, will follow the lecture.
Today The New York Times has a powerful editorial entitled “Edging Toward Equality.” [HERE] The objective of the editorial is to encourage the U.S. Senate to begin measures that would repeal the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) which the Times identifies as “deplorable” because it bars national recognition of same-sex marriage and “denies lawfully married same-sex couples benefits granted other married couples.” Although an editorial in any newspaper cannot get into long justifications presenting detailed reasoned argument, this editorial demonstrates an inherent weakness in its presentation on the idea of equality and the failure of the DOMA to provide equality as the Times editorial board understands the concept.
The Times asserts that the DOMA is both incoherent and unjust. But is it? Might it be just and coherent?
The DOMA defines for Federal purposes marriage as the “legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.” The word spouse is defined as “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.”
The editorial relies, in part, on the argument that if “don’t ask, don’t tell” can be repealed, so should DOMA. The editorial also assumes that contemporary litigation challenges against DOMA will succeed; therefore, the Senate should cave in and begin the repeal of DOMA. The final point of the Times argument is that there is a growing public sentiment to reject “this shameful discrimination.” The thrust of the editorial’s principal argument relies on the equality claim and DOMA’s denial of equality. But something is missing from the editorial’s presentation, and that is a clear and objective understanding of what is equality.
A consideration of the nature of equality might start with Kurt Vonnegut’s story of “Harrison Bergeron” where the tale begins with this anecdote:
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren’t only equal before God and the law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger than anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and 213th Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigilance of agents of the United States Handicapper General.
We might also consider Noah Webster’s commemoration of the Declaration of Independence when he said:
if by equality, writers understand an equal right to distinction, and influence; or if they understand an equal share of talents and bodily powers; in these senses, all men are not equal. Such an equality would be inconsistent with the whole economy of nature. In the animal and vegetable world, however strong the general resemblance in the individuals of a species, each is marked with a distinct character; and this diversity is one of the principal beauties of creation, and probably an important feature in the system. There are, and there must be, distinctions among men . . . they are established by nature, as well as by social relations. Age, talents, virtue, public services, the possession of office and certain natural relations, carry with them just claims to distinction, to influence and authority.
Vonnegut and Webster were onto something about human intelligence and intelligible reality.
It is human intelligence grasping the intelligible reality of the world that surrounds us that leads to the inescapable conclusion that some folks are more adept at debate and discourse; others possess a clear superiority in sports and other physical activities; still others excel in musical talents while others cannot. The self-evident truths about human equality do not deny genuine human equality, but these same truths would acknowledge differences that do exist between and among people. This includes the fundamental distinction between couples of the same-sex and those of opposite-sex.
It is evident that the Times editorial must discuss equality in a legal sense as the proposed repeal of DOMA requires a legal understanding of the matter. After all, the repeal of DOMA sought by the Times concerns a law that is founded on the intelligible reality of human equality and the intelligible reality of human inequality.
This necessitates an understanding of the physical and metaphysical nature of human beings—in short, an understanding of human ontology is in order. For the term equality to have durable meaning in the context of well reasoned human law, equality must be understood within the framework of human nature—its diversity, its restrictions, its capacities, and its imperfections. To ignore these points would facilitate caprice not only in an idea but also in an important legal concept cherished by anyone who treasures the concept of the rule of law.
Genuine equality demands that school-age children (regardless of their race, color, creed, or ethnicity) be protected by laws that permit them to obtain an education that is the equivalent of their peers. Equality demands that men and women (regardless of their race, color, creed, or ethnicity) be entitled to choose their own spouse as the DOMA defines this term. However, the law that is reasonable and protects an ordered liberty can restrict selection of a spouse based on considerations of age and degrees of consanguinity.
For laws to make distinctions—to categorize— divisions must be just and reasoned. What constitutes this justice and this reason?
Well a few requirements quickly come to mind. One is that a just and reasonable law cannot simply reflect the will of the lawmaker, a particular lobby, or a majority. If the law did this, it would be purely positivist. I think this is what the Times has in mind: the law repealing DOMA would be a pure exercise of the will of the law maker, lobbies, or even a majority of the citizenry. The intelligible reality of marriage that is knowable by the intelligent human mind matters little. But this approach does not make good law that can endure. The law, and I suggest DOMA as one example, should state principles that reflect intelligible reality of the nature and essence of the human person, human society, and the posterity of humanity. The law that is just and reasonable needs to correlate facts and objective reason so that the norm can be generally applied.
When the debate, such as the one presented by the Times, concerns just laws dealing with human equality issues, each person should be equal to the other in having aspirations for the future and for the opportunities to fulfill these hopes. There must also be some sense of equality in the ability to make claims to the common stock of the things which are essential to sustaining human existence. But, we are not equal in how we perceive these objectives; moreover, we are not equal in possessing the talents and skills that enable us to pursue the many activities found within human existence, for some of us may have to expend a great effort to attain what it might take another little if any exertion. Moreover, there may well be a sound basis for saying that two people are unequal in certain regards. This is the intelligible and objective reality that underlies licensing schemes related to who gets to be a doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, plumber, electrician, etc.
It is the rational principle—reason tempered by empirical fact and the metaphysical nature of the human person—that demonstrates that there are distinctions between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples. This critical distinction makes these couples unequal when the suggestion is made that for purposes of marriage they are equal. And this inequality is an exercise of justice that is true, not an injustice that is false. The source of the truth about human equality is beyond human definition and control, but it is knowable by the human person. However, this truth can be recognized by citizens and their legislators should they take the time to realize that this truth about marriage is something that transcends their ingenuity and control but can still be known by them as intelligent persons. Let us pray that the Congress of the United States will understand and accept this distinction that is crucial to the rule of law and the enduring validity of the DOMA.
But the truth of the matter is that they are really without something else, for the details of the report further state: “At least 2.3 million people across the Northeast found themselves without electricity after an unusual autumn storm dumped record amounts of snow.”
So, it’s electricity, not power, without which they find themselves. Let us pray for the restoration of their electricity. As for their power, well, that seems to be still within their grasp.
Earlier this semester, I did a second post [HERE] on the joint Fordham-Fairfield-Union Theological-Yale Divinity joint conference entitled “More than a Monologue.” As contributors to and readers of the Mirror of Justice may recall from the postings presented by several MOJ contributors on “More than a Monologue”, the conference was self-billed as “an unprecedented collaboration” designed “to change the conversation about sexual diversity and the Catholic Church.” Several of us wondered if the “change” mentioned was limited to “conversation.” Would it also include altering the attitudes of the public, including the faithful and modifying the teachings of the Church?
The Archbishop of New York (the see in which Fordham University is located) and the Bishop of Bridgeport (the see in which Fairfield University is located) expressed concerns about conference. Moreover, the concerns of these bishops take on further significance considering their ecclesial responsibilities as successors to the Apostles in these venues. On September 22 of this year, both ordinaries issued a joint statement announcing that they had each received “thoughtful expressions of concern from many of the faithful” regarding this four part series. They also stated that they had expressed these concerns as well as their own to the heads of Fordham and Fairfield. A major justification for the unease expressed focused on pre-conference publicity and advanced commentaries about the conference and the billed topics that were to be presented by the speakers. This publicity and these commentaries suggested the possibility of encouraging dissent from both Church teachings and the teaching authority of the Church. The ordinaries also mentioned that the presidents of Fairfield and Fordham indicated that they, the presidents, were aware of the concerns about “More than a Monologue” and brought them to the attention of the conference organizers. In due course, the presidents assured the ordinaries that, “while sensitive to the experience of the participants,” the presentations “will not be a vehicle for dissent.” One of the heads conveyed his confidence “that the Church’s teachings will be clearly stated and articulately defended” within a “spirit of dialogue that is proper to an academic setting.” It was further asserted that, “the strength of these teachings will be quite convincing, based as they are on revealed truth.”
As people of good will, these two bishops stated that with the assurances presented, we “must trust that the conference will turn out as intended: not as a criticism or questioning of the faith and morals of the Church, but as a sincere attempt to listen to those who are trying their best to believe and live it...”
Having participated in academic conferences where these and other neuralgic issues were discussed in the context of the Church’s teachings, I, too, would have hoped for the same outcome—i.e., discussion, learning, and an objective search for the truth of the matter considered within the context of respect for, cogent and reasoned explanation of, and adherence to the teachings of the Church. However, having listened to most of the presentations in archived broadcasts or during live streaming, I must respectfully disagree with the assertions made about the objectives of this conference by its organizers. It may well be that the ordinaries will, in due course, share views parallel to mine.
But the story does not end here.
The truth about this conference continues on several fronts. The first concentrates on the intentions of the conveners of and speakers at the conference. One principal speaker (who interestingly referred to my religious order that has some relationship with the Fairfield and Fordham as “the famously free-thinking Jesuit fathers”) contends that “the Catholic Church appears to be a community dramatically out of synch” with the topic of sexual diversity, and the Church’s work is affected by “a powerful political fear of moral contagion... Are bishops and Vatican officials afraid of moral relativism...?” Elsewhere, one of the organizers stated that the conferences will add “many more voices... to explore the implications of the Church’s teachings on homosexuality. Many people... would like to see the church [sic] change its teachings on homosexuality.” In this context, this organizer cited current surveys on support of same-sex marriage. While contending that surveys themselves do not mean that the Church “will bend to such a statistic,” they point to a “gap” between Church teachings and “the apparent convictions of Catholics.”
Regarding whether the Church will change its teachings, this same person said that one cannot predict this outcome but also stated that, “one should never say never.” Elsewhere, this same individual has displayed his support for same-sex marriage and alteration of Church teachings on marriage. In this context, this person also argues that for Church teachings to “change,” they will do so because of a “theological justification.” But what is a theological justification, you may ask? The organizer provides an answer: “Those who believe such a change can or should occur focus on Catholic understandings of the goodness of creation, which includes the goodness of all human beings as God made them.” I am sure that some of the worst offenders of the Church’s teachings—and those who have dismissed the logic and objectivity of her teachings as well as the soundness general principles of law designed to promote the common good—take comfort in this “theological justification.” After all, it will justify their conduct, too.
For this “theological justification” to take root, the same organizer contends that the Church’s teachings based on “the natural law” remains the “biggest obstacle” to the reform of “Catholic sexual ethics.” As this person further states, “So if the teachings on homosexuality are to change, that will probably have to be part of a larger change in the way the church understands sexuality, which would also have implications for other hot-button issues in Catholic teaching like premarital or extramarital sex, contraception, sterilization and so on. Right now, there is no sign that the church [sic] is ready to make such a momentous move. But that is no reason to delay having an honest, open conversation about sexual diversity and the Catholic Church.”
A second point about this conference involves the support for it. It is clear that four institutions provided space and other resources to host these four gatherings. This is backing indeed. But other resources were needed to host such an elaborate series requiring transportation, housing, and transmission of presentations. In this framework, a large grant of $100,000 was provided by the Arcus Foundation (something which Mr. Thomas Peters brought to public attention [HERE] a while back) to the Fairfield’s organizers “to expand the current discussion on homosexuality within the Roman Catholicism [by including] diverse opinions of progressive Catholic thought leaders and theologians.” Interestingly the grant was not designed to provide for other kinds of “Catholic thought leaders” such as bishops, orthodox theologians, officials of the USCCB, or officials of the Holy See to attend and participate in the conference.
By reviewing the website of the Arcus Foundation [HERE], it is clear that this organization (which advances “pressing social justice and conservation issues...to advance LGBT equality, as well as to conserve and protect the great apes”) has a coherent plan to change Catholic thought and teaching by providing grants to “promote the moral and civil equality of LGBT people”; “to create a cadre of Catholic lesbian, bisexual and transgender women and their allies that would assume a leadership role within the Catholic community on issues related to gender, sexuality, reproductive health, and other justice issues”; to promote “support of a collaborative strategic planning process focused on building a pro-LGBT movement within the Roman Catholic Church in the U.S.”; “to educate Maryland’s Catholic laity and lawmakers about marriage equality”; and, “to work with four leading Catholic LGBT organizations to conduct a messaging campaign and schedule interviews in the broadcast media that promote pro-LGBT messages in connection with Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to Washington, D.C. and New York City in April 2008.”
I now return once again to the statement of Archbishop Dolan and Bishop Lori and the representations given to them about the integrity of the conference. I must respectfully but vigorously disagree with those who contend that the Church’s teachings at these four conferences were “clearly stated and articulately defended.”
They were not.
Instead, these four renowned institutions have demonstrated a rejection of the objective reasoning that underpins not only Catholic thought and teaching but also sound human law on the matters discussed. In place of objective reason, they have in large part relied on the mystery passage of Planned Parenthood v. Casey to justify their interesting views on the nature and essence of human sexuality. I do not think I am alone in contending that this justification is not sound on legal or theological grounds.
Since the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace issued its Note on Financial Reform, Towards Reforming the International Financial and Monetary Systems in the Context of Global Public Policy (the Note), commentators, including members of the Mirror of Justice have expressed views or commented on others’ views about this text.
As the Note relies on the work of Blessed John XXIII in his encyclical Pacem in Terris, it might be instructive to consider side by side the treatment which Pope John and the Note give to supranational authority.
Both documents begin with the recognition that the common good has a key role in the welfare of the peoples of the nations and the world. Moreover, both texts acknowledge that it is the responsibility of any public authority to advance and sustain the common good of everyone. Moreover, both texts emphasize the importance that the public authority being advanced must be developed without compulsion but accepted by reasoned agreement. Imposition by force would suggest that the authority is promoted by the stronger over the weaker nations; thus, the skepticism that the authority would serve the interests of the stronger but not the weaker is understandable. However, there are several distinctions between the two texts that need to be acknowledged.
The first distinction is that Blessed John XXIII saw the public authority as one geared to advancing the common good that is clearly linked with the moral order. The Note does not mention this in the same fashion. Of course the Note could assume this by its reference to Pacem in Terris, but it would have been better to state this clearly so that there would be no ambiguity.
Second, it is clear that Blessed John XXIII spoke about a general kind of public authority having power, organization, and means that would be co-extensive with the problems—presumably any problem—threatening the universal common good. The public authority identified by the Note is more specialized in that it is geared to addressing those situations where free and stable markets promote the existence of efficient and effective monetary and financial systems.
Third, John XXIII was clear about the universality of the agreement that undergirds the establishment of the supranational authority. In short, no authority can exist without the consent of all nations. The Note is less clear on this point because it suggests that universality may not be required in that the consent need to establish the organization “should involve an ever greater number of countries that adhere with conviction, through a sincere dialogue that values the minority opinions rather than marginalizing them.” Monitoring the pulse of countries is important, but it seems that the supranational authority may come into existence without universal endorsement.
Others may have a different take on the existence or significance of these differences. In any case, it is important that both documents be carefully reviewed. A final common denominator they share is that, when promulgated, they caught the attention of many people of good will.
Yesterday, October 18, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared in the case of Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace that the process of removing stem cells from a human embryo, which necessitates death of the embryo, cannot be patented. However, the use of the embryo for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the embryo and are therefore useful can be patented.
This is an important ruling for EU state members and for the rest of the world’s law and legal systems.
Brüstle holds a 1997 patent concerning the isolation of neural precursor cells taken from human embryos. However, Greenpeace challenged the patent in the German Federal Patent Court, and the court ruled that Brüstle’s patent was invalid in so far as it covers processes for obtaining precursor cells from human embryonic stem cells. The German appellate court decided to refer Brüstle’s appeal to the European Court. The question before this court is whether the exclusion from patentability of the human embryo covers all stages of life from fertilization of the ovum or whether other conditions must be met, such as a certain stage of development must first be reached.
The European Court [decision HERE] noted that it would not decide questions of a medical or ethical nature but would address the legal questions in the case. It found that European Law excludes any possibility of patentability where the “respect for human dignity” can be adversely affected. It also found the need to understand the nature of the “human embryo” in a wide sense. The court concluded that as soon as the human egg is fertilized it must be considered a “human embryo” which is the commencement of a new human being. Moreover, in the process of parthenogenesis where the nucleus from a mature human cell is transplanted in a non-fertilized human egg whose further development is stimulated must also be classified as a “human embryo.” In short, new human life has begun.
The court also found that scientific research entailing the use of human embryos cannot access the protection of patent law. However, it noted an exception where the research is done for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes applied to the human embryo and which are useful to it such as correcting a malformation and improving the chances of its life.
The court also concluded that an invention cannot be patented where the implementation of the process requires either the prior destruction of human embryos.
While the debate over this important right-to-life issue may not be over, this is an important and encouraging development.
The “Occupy Wall Street” [OWS] movement has manifested itself across the country. The ability to assemble and to present grievances to the government is a part of American life and the political and legal fabric that form a part of this life. But the OWS is not quite that as the foci of the protests are directed toward private institutions that do have an enormous impact on public life. Nevertheless, the OWS movement is, within reason, protected by the peaceful assembly and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. Should the intent of the protesters incorporate actions designed to interfere with the lives and work of others—many of who are sympathetic—the protections guaranteed by the Constitution become thin to the point of non-application.
Now, Professor Thomas Beaudoin of the Fordham University Graduate School of Religions and Religious Education (GSRRE) has taken the OWS movement into another dimension by suggesting that it could be attempted and should be applied in the Catholic Church. [HERE]
But why does he make this claim? His wonder about the suitability of using OWS methods in parishes and other places where Catholics worship is triggered by his “passion for and grievances with [the] church.”
Taking stock of the Beaudoin suggestion, I suppose that those folks who wonder about what is going on in the American academy of higher education, including that which uses the moniker “Catholic”, could just as easily target these institutions with OWS methods in order to air their grievances against colleges and universities—but I digress.
It does appear that the professor has, if not grievances then, disagreements with the Church that are shared by some of his colleagues from the academy in that he is “a part of the Fordham conference ‘Learning to Listen: Voices of Sexual Diversity and the Catholic Church’.” As the GSRRE website states, he and a colleague are “part of a larger collaboration between Fordham, Union Theological Seminary, Yale Divinity School, and Fairfield University, titled ‘More Than a Monologue: Sexual Diversity and the Catholic Church ’” which I and Robby George have addressed at the Mirror of Justice on earlier occasions. Any disagreements or “grievances” which Beaudoin has regarding “sexual diversity and the Catholic Church” are apparently being voiced and heard by those interested in his views without the need of the OWS model being employed. I am certain that if he chose, he could air his “grievances” on other elements of the Church’s teachings somewhere other than houses of worship, perhaps even in his classroom.
But would it make sense to use the OWS model in parish churches? What goes on there? High level discussions addressing policy, doctrine, and dogma? No. What does go on in these venues is worship and the administration and receipt of the sacraments. Yet, Beaudoin wants to disrupt this in order to “name, protest and change what is intolerable about [the] church today.”
I wonder if he thought about those who are happy with the fact that they have a parish or other place where they can go and pray and receive the sacraments? It appears that he has not, for as he says he has a “vision of a different Catholic Church,” and he is not interested in the one that he wishes to disrupt. He wants a “Catholic version of the Arab Spring, to combat the long Catholic Winter.” But his fiery rhetoric fails to take stock of the fact that programs like “More Than a Monologue” are offering the “vision of a different Catholic Church” that he apparently desires. So, why bother the faithful laity and the presbyterate whose vision of the Catholic Church differs from his? He offers no response to this kind of straight-forward question.
As one progresses through the balance of manifesto, it is clear he is not satisfied with the Church’s teachings on a variety of fronts for he complains of the Church’s “structures, teachings, and practices [that] become steadily more incredible in contemporary society.”
Did it occur to him that the teachings of the Church are not designed to reflect what any society appears to want at any given time? Still, he imaginatively pits the “overwhelming majority (all non-ordained persons)” against “the small minority (the ordained).” I happen to be in the latter category, but I find the reality of being one of the ordained unlike the broad characterization offered by Professor Beaudoin does not pit me against those whom I am called by my particular vocation to serve. Having served on most weekends in local parishes for the last eighteen years since my ordination, I don’t find myself or the other clergy with whom I labor being pitted against the faithful. Rather, what I have found and continue to find in parishes across the country is that the People of God, the Body of Christ, whom I encounter, come together to pray, to celebrate and receive the sacraments, and ask God to help us reinforce our faith so that we may be worthy disciples of His Son. I do not see anyone from either segment of the Church as Professor Beaudoin describes it, “Looking at the world and the church in this moment” and declaring “that now may be some kind of privileged time for [OWS] action.” Beaudoin asks in oratorical fashion: “Will Catholics take it [i.e., OWS action] up?”
Why should they, for most of the faithful, be they clergy or laity, have what they seek in the Church as she has existed, as she continues to exist, and as she will exist: guiding and perfecting their way on the human destiny of union with God. The Church is not a political event; rather, it is a divine institution established to bring salvation to those who, in spite of our sinfulness, chose the standard of Christ.
Professor Beaudoin does not mention anything like this, so I don’t think his OWS-like plan makes much sense for anyone in the Church to pursue, be they of the laity or of the clergy.
Many thanks to Rick for highlighting the Sullivan book, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom. With all that is going on in the world, including the United States, the subject of religious freedom is highlighted by the persecution of and assaults on religious believers.
As Rick points out, the Sullivan thesis points to the role of the state in the protection of religious freedom through the notion of equality. But as Rick points out, there is more to religious freedom than equality.
Of course, religious freedom is protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international juridical instruments. Moreover, by some of these important agreements, religious freedom is a right which the state cannot derogate, even though many states, including our own do infringe do infringe upon it in various contexts.
In the context of Catholic legal theory, the right of religious freedom is important. But it is more than that. This right prompts the question in CLT regarding the role and authority of the state. In the context of the Mirror of Justice project, religious freedom is a right—like the human person, the family, and the non-derogable rights—that precedes the state. For the state to construct a theory of the right as one based on equality is an ultra vires exercise of its proper and limited authority. At most, the state is its protector by obligation, not its definer by right.
I will attempt to tackle some aspects of this issue at the February Nootbaar conference at Pepperdine on the competing claims of law and religion when I present my paper entitled “Render Unto Mao the Things that Are Mao’s...” which addresses the subject of religious freedom (or not) in China.
