Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, April 25, 2012

Who is the Church?

I appreciated Susan’s posting on the question about who is the Church. There are folks who are puzzled by the fact that they see themselves as the Church but deny others the same opportunities they assert for themselves. In September of this year Susan’s University of St. Thomas is hosting a several day symposium entitled “Vatican II: Teaching and Understanding of the Council after Fifty Years.” I will be presenting a paper that addresses the issue which Susan and several of her commenters discuss in a variety of ways: who is the Church? In addition, I plan on exploring what the Council understood the interlinking roles of the different groups who constitute the Church, namely, the bishops, the clergy, the religious, and the laity. In order to accomplish this task, a careful and objective reading of the documents dealing with these groups along with the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium) and the Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) are in order. As these documents have both normative and juridical dimensions, it is my objective to demonstrate that they must be read together in order to understand in a coherent fashion who is the Church. I do not anticipate that my project will please everyone, but that is not what is important. What is important is that the case is made that the answer to the question “who is the Church” can be answered by any person of good will. I think Susan has made an important step in this undertaking.

RJA sj

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

CDF on the LCWR

Back in the fall of 2009 I had the occasion to offer several postings regarding concerns about the Leadership Conference of Women Religious (LCWR) in the United States. As readers will recall, the issues involved with the LCWR matter were being pursued by two Vatican dicasteries. Today, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued its report. While some may argue that the document will generate further tensions, I see the report as one filled with good faith to work with the LCWR to address and remedy serious concerns. The report is here: Download CDF Report on LCWR .

RJA sj

 

Saturday, April 14, 2012

Religious Liberty is a fact of life--and of citizenship

       

I thank Mike, Marc, and Tom for their postings of earlier this weekend. Whether I have something to add, or not, is up to them and to other contributors and readers of the Mirror of Justice, but here goes:

We, wherever we are—be it in the United States or elsewhere—if we are believers in God and the next life—be we Catholics, Christians, Jews, Muslims, etc., etc., etc.—are citizens of two cities. This does not mean that we have divided loyalties; rather, it means that we must be loyal, faithful, and true in the exercise of our citizenships. The ultimately loyalty for the Catholic is to God and His holy Church.

Now I return, more generally, to the idea of dual citizenship for the believer-American citizen, particularly the Catholic. Recalling Charles Dickens, we in the U.S. of the second decade of the twenty-first century, live in the best of times and the worst of times. Dickens addressed the bloody turmoil of the French Revolution. We address a different time, but it is not without its mammoth challenges and suffering as well as hope and promise.

In the American context, the dual citizenship of which I speak is not a loyalty to two states (one of which is the United States) but to country and God. For, American Catholics are simultaneously asked to be faithful members of the Church and contributing members of the American republican democracy. This is why Pope Benedict XVI earlier this year in one of his ad limina addresses to U.S. bishops noted that there is now, more than ever, a “need for an engaged, articulate and well-informed Catholic laity endowed with a strong critical sense vis-à-vis the dominant culture and with courage to counter a reductive secularism which would delegitimze the Church’s participation in public debate.”

Why is this important?

I, for one, do believe the voice of Catholics, as formed by the Universal Church, her teachings, the exhortations of the Holy Father, and the teachings of the bishops-in-union-with-Peter, are quite correct in their presentation of what’s right and what’s wrong regarding the positions on the issues of the day on the public matters that address the common good. This is not argument, on my part, this is—for the time being—background.

What is argument is this: for the American republican democracy to succeed, it is essential that this voice must not be excluded and silenced. Moreover, as the Framers established a union described in the Constitution’s preamble, it is essential for Catholics, who are simultaneously citizens of two cities, to understand how they are to inform themselves on the public issues of the day through careful and deliberate moral evaluation of what is before them. For this preparation to be effective, we need to hear the voices of the successors of the Apostles when they help form our consciences which will direct our actions as citizens in the City of Man. After all, it is we, as citizens of this country, who cast ballots, who run for office, who accept appointive office, and who lobby causes that are crucial to the success of American republican democracy. But when we pursue these things, we must be mindful of our other citizenship.

That is why religious liberty—something that is essential to this country’s establishment, and something that is essential to its preservation—is decisive. To accept what well-meaning persons (who claim fidelity to Christ but who choose what is not reflective of his Church and what is in conflict with citizenship in the City of God) opts for what is not Christ and for what is detrimental to the perseverance of American republican democracy and the critical role that libertas ecclesiae has to play in this democracy. To think that the good Catholic citizen of the U.S. is also true to the faith in Christ and His Church when he or she is attracted to the will of the dominant secular culture is, to borrow from John Courtney Murray, “moral nonsense.”

Dickens spoke of one time of two cities; we still live in a world where two cities are before us and where Catholics (and other believers who are people of good will) are called to participate in both through their dual citizenship. But we cannot be tempted to rest comfortably forever in the City of Man if we forget that the City of God awaits us.

What the U.S. bishops said in their statement of a few days ago on religious freedom will help us understand who we are and where we are going in the exercise of dual citizenship.

 

RJA sj

 

Sunday, April 8, 2012

As Christ was mocked...

As I was preparing for the Easter Triduum, I happened to come across an article in a Catholic diocesan paper reporting on the “Reason Rally” held in Washington, D.C. on March 24. [More here] A principal speaker was the well-known Oxford don Richard Dawkins. Having read and learned more about the rally, I was intrigued to see that the critique of religion, especially Catholicism, was not really based on reason or fact but on mocking disbelief. Dawkins encouraged his audience to attack Catholics, not by rational argument, but by mocking and ridiculing them—us—in public.

He encouraged atheists to be public in their own identity—I was not aware of them being prevented or prohibited from this—for the sake of a more openly secular society. I wonder, though, if his proposal would encounter opposition from those sectors of society who might claim that he is imposing his belief, and therefore a kind of secular religion. But that is not why I write today.

I do write because of his mockery and ridicule of Catholics, for this is what happened to Christ himself. In Saint John’s Gospel, Pilate and Jesus at the trial discuss truth. Pilate was skeptical in great fashion when he asked: “What is truth?” Ironically, the very university where Professor Dawkins has labored for many years was founded by our predecessors whom he mocks and ridicules. Dawkins does not see that they were in pursuit of the truth he claims to accept; moreover, he does not understand that they were also in pursuit of a truth beyond the one that he accepts.

Perhaps one day, Professor Dawkins and an appropriate representative of the Church might engage one another in a spirited debate about truth. Some years ago in 1948, Betrand Russell and Father Frederick Coppleston did just that over the BBC radio.

What we can take from the Dawkins “Reason Rally” this Easter day is this: rather than taking the bait of Dawkins’s torment and responding with our own, unbecoming scorn, how can we of the Church better explain what it is we believe and why we believe what we do—with reason? Our Lord was able to do that with those who scoffed at him. With his help, might we do the same? It takes something more than any human person has, but this something can be ours with God’s help and the temperament of His Son.

 

RJA sj

Sunday, March 25, 2012

More on JFK and the Issue of Church and State

 

Not quite a month ago I mentioned that I have been pursuing research on the subject of John F. Kennedy’s position regarding the relation, if any, between the Church and State. [Here] At that time, I made several observations about then-Senator Kennedy’s address to the Houston Ministerial Association and the question-and-answer session that followed the address. Since the nucleus of my project is to identify the views of the Senator and President on “the separation of Church and State,” it is essential to understand that some major points of the September 12, 1960 speech were based on the September 8, 1960 Background Memorandum prepared by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) before the Houston speech. This memo stressed Senator Kennedy’s “support of the constitutional [sic] provision of the separation of church and state.” The DNC memorandum referred to and relied on the 1948 Statement of the Catholic Bishops of the United States by indicating that,

“We deny absolutely and without qualification that the Catholic Bishops of the United States are seeking a union of Church and State by any endeavors whatsoever, either proximately or remotely. If tomorrow Catholics constituted a majority in our country, they would not seek a union of Church and State. They would, then as now, uphold the Constitution and all its amendments, recognizing the moral obligation imposed upon all Catholics to observe and defend the Constitution and its amendments.”

This is not quite what the bishops said, but more on what they did say later. These words were likely those of Archbishop John T. McNicholas of Cincinnati who was a member of the board that prepared the text of the bishops, but they did not appear in the 1948 statement of the bishops itself.

During the September 12 Houston speech, Senator Kennedy reiterated his opposition to a U.S. ambassador to the Vatican and “against unconstitutional aid to parochial schools.” This formulation begs the question of whether there might be Constitutional aid to parochial schools. He reminded the Protestant ministers of “the statement of the American Bishops in 1948 which strongly endorsed church-state separation, and which more nearly reflects the views of almost every American Catholic.” Furthermore, during the question-and-answer session that followed the address, the Senator reiterated the significance of the 1948 statement when he stated that there is a “happy relationship which exists between church and state” and that, in Kennedy’s judgment, Cardinal Cushing would approve of Kennedy’s position “in the same way that he approved of the 1948 statement of the Bishops.”

Since Senator Kennedy and the DNC relied on the 1948 Bishops’ Statement (entitled “The Christian in Action”), it is essential to take stock of what the bishops did say and what they did not say.

In their paper, the American bishops discussed four topics: (1) religion in the home; (2) religion in education; (3) religion in economic life; and, (4) religion and citizenship. It was in the fourth topic that the bishops elaborated upon the Church-State question. The bishops began tackling the last topic by recalling that there is an essential nexus between religion and good citizenship in the U.S. that is evidenced by the “American tradition” that “religion and morality are the strong supports of national well-being.” They drew attention to the fact of the importance of religion and morality on the Framers’ support of “national well-being” as was evidenced by early legislation when Congress reenacted the Northwest Ordinance.

The Framers also testified to the inextricable connection between the natural law (which the bishops concluded reflects the moral law of God and is comprehendible by human reason and conscience) and human law. The bishops also noted that the natural law process that relies on objective reasoning is the accepted philosophy of law in the American tradition, not the dictate of the will.

The bishops also spoke at length about the growth of secularism in America and its “corrosive influence” that banned religion in tax-supported education and that was advancing the destruction of “all cooperation between government and organized religion in the training of our future citizens.” In short, the bishops saw the strong emergence of a “legalistic tyranny of the omnipotent state.” Yet they recognized the merits of the First Amendment as the antidote to secularism in the United States. In this acknowledgment, they understood that the religious pluralism of America did not prohibit the cooperation between religious communities and the state. The separation and the ability to cooperate were both consistent with “[a]uthoritative Catholic teaching on the relations between Church and state.”

For the bishops, the clear import of the First Amendment meant that the prohibition of an established church or religion did not preclude the collaboration between God and Caesar. The phrase “a wall of separation between church and state” was but a “loose metaphor” that had to be understood in the American context. Otherwise a false reading of the metaphor “would be an utter distortion of American history and law to make that practical policy involve the indifference to religion and the exclusion of cooperation between religion and government.” This indifference and exclusion were the shibboleths of “doctrinaire secularism.” The bishops also noted that recent Supreme Court decisions relying on the metaphor’s unintended implications, including McCollum, were “entirely novel and ominously extensive” interpretations of the First Amendment. They relied on the understanding of the phrase “separation of church and state” offered by Justice Stanley Reed that “a rule of law cannot be drawn from a figure of speech.”

The bishops also recalled the views of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison regarding the ability for religion and the state to collaborate in the state-sponsored University of Virginia. As individuals who played major roles in the founding of the United States, the thoughts and views of Madison and Jefferson reflected the legislative intent underpinning the First Amendment: it proscribes an established religion but does not preclude the role of religion in public life. Like John Courtney Murray, the bishops saw the First Amendment as articles of peace for a pluralist society rather than articles of faith.

The bishops concluded the 1948 Statement by presenting the case for the “reaffirmation of our original American tradition of free cooperation between government and religious bodies.” The bishops “solemnly” disclaimed any plan or aspiration “to alter this prudent and fair American policy of government in dealing with the delicate problems that have their source in the divided religious allegiance of our citizens.” The bishops pledged their cooperation “in fairness and charity” to all who were concerned about the “establishment of secularism” which, in their estimation, threatened “the religious foundations of our national life” and would prepare “the way for the advent of the omnipotent state.”

Although he did not directly adopt the bishops’ Statement, Senator Kennedy and the DNC relied upon it. Would that not mean that there was a common denominator on the meaning of the separation of Church and State held by the successors of the Apostles, the Senator, and his party in 1960?

 

RJA sj

Sunday, March 11, 2012

The Misunderstanding and, therefore, the Misuse of John Courtney Murray

 

In its March 5 issue, America magazine has a series of essays which fall within the caption “Religious Liberty at Risk?”. The question mark in the cover title suggests in the periodical, which bills itself as “the National Catholic Weekly”, that the issue of religious liberty at risk is a debatable one, at least for Catholics, in the United States today.

Some of the contributions in this issue of America argue that the concerns being raised these days about religious liberty by Roman Catholics, largely but not exclusively within the purview of the HHS mandate, necessitate a “balancing act” between the rights of the Church and “the rights of all.” Who the “all” are is never addressed (people who want birth control, abortion, and sterilization?), and the question surrounding what are the “rights” claimed is ambiguous in large part.

Several of the contributions rely on the thinking of John Courtney Murray, S.J. regarding the subjects of religious freedom, morality, and the law (civil). In this regard, I am sure that most folks who read carefully his work would agree that Murray, the Declaration on Religious Liberty, and international texts such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights share the same view that authentic religious freedom is simultaneously a personal and communal right with both private and public dimensions that must be protected. But I detected from time to time that some of the conclusions in portions of the America articles cannot be supported by the thought of Murray as is suggested by several contributors. To comprehend what are the contentions that misuse of Murray, one must take stock of how Murray is brought into the neuralgic issues of the day (same-sex marriage, abortion, and contraception). Second, it is crucial to comprehend all of Murray rather than just some of Murray.

All of these issues of public policy involve some dimension of law promulgated by the temporal authorities of the United States. In addition, these issues also intersect reasoned moral concerns that are addressed by the Church’s teachings. It is also patent that there is polarization in the country today over what should public policy be regarding these neuralgic issues. But it would be a mistake to suggest that the polarization that exists is solely attributable to tensions and conflicts between Church teachings and public policies. Certainly the Church is not the responsible agent for there being “red” states and “blue” states. Still, there is polarization. What might be the responses of Murray to these disagreements about public life and policy which are manifest today?

First of all, Murray would have to acknowledge that while there is not identical overlap between the moral teachings of the Church and public policy that is codified in law, there is frequent intersection. One need only look at the elements of the Decalogue dealing with right-relation between people to see these precepts duplicated in public law that address theft, killing, perjury, and elder abuse. It is not the coincidence of the Church’s moral teachings (and the moral view of religion more generally) and the civil law that is the issue that is the concern in this posting. Rather, this posting deals with the issue of religious liberty today and how far should the state and its law interfere with the moral beliefs and practices of the religious person and religious communities that include the Catholic Church?

In regard to the controversy of the present moment about religious freedom, the distinction between public and private moralities is not the issue. This is an important topic that Murray was not adverse to addressing, but it has little or no application to the current debate between religious freedom and conflict with public law.

Rather, the concerns about religious freedom involve whether public law must coerce the religious believer and religious community to exercise publicly their moral teachings at their peril. The problem is not that the Church is imposing its beliefs on the temporal world. The problem is that the temporal authorities, which have secured in law morally problematic positions, are mandating that the religious believer and the religious community must be coerced into doing that which is morally unacceptable.  Some thinkers and writers have recently argued that Murray asserted that for the law to be effective, there must be consensus about underlying premises if the law addresses moral issues intersecting people’s conduct. I am sure that most folks would agree that laws prohibiting theft are morally acceptable, but the fact that there exists a minority which does not agree indicates that there is not a consensus on this matter. Murray would did not argue that consensus about a moral issue was crucial to the viability of legislating on or for the moral issue. His concern about consensus took a different path.

He understood that the consensus that was essential to the foundation of the United States and its legal regime was also common to Catholic teaching. But this consensus that was crucial to our nation’s foundation seems to be in short supply today as is evidenced by the absence of appeal to ordered liberty—not just for believers and Catholics but for all Americans. What Murray did say about consensus was this: American institutions of the second half of the twentieth century, including the American academy, have “long since bade a quiet goodbye to the whole notion of an American consensus, as implying that there are truths that we hold in common, and a natural law that makes known to all of us the structures of the moral universe in such wise that all of us are bound by it in a common obedience.”

Obedience and law frequently go hand in hand. In the present context of concerns about religious freedom and conflicts with the liberty to have an abortion, to participate in same-sex marriage, or to use birth control it is not these latter “liberties” that are threatened; rather, it is religious freedom which is. What is emerging more clearly with the passage of time is the fact that good citizens who are also good Catholics are being forced to put aside their moral beliefs and embrace against their religious convictions the amoral, the immoral, and the morally compromised.

Murray was a firm believer in the natural law as the exercise of human intelligence comprehending the intelligible reality that surrounds us. What gave him concerns two generations ago was the rise of “the voluntarist idea of law as will” that could push aside the objective reason of human intelligence comprehending intelligible reality. He foresaw the day when the “noble many-storeyed mansion of democracy” would be dismantled and “levelled to the dimension of a flat majoritarianism, which is no mansion but a barn, perhaps even a tool shed in which the weapons of tyranny may be forged.”

I submit that Murray saw what was beginning to happen to the enterprise of the authentic American consensus and the vital role that religious freedom has to exercise within the forming of this consensus. He issued his warning founded on the inextricable nexus between the moral outlook and the laws that must be made by a society that calls itself democratic. Democracy for him would fail when the moral perspective was forced to embrace the morally problematic in the formation of laws and public policy. This is why the Catholic bishops today are exercising their teaching authority to remind all people of good will about the non-derogable nature of religious freedom. The debate about religious freedom today does not entail the imposition of Catholic moral teachings on the rest of society; rather, it involves the imposition of immoral and amoral views on all, even those who are protected by the right of religious freedom, a right that preceded the state which is now being manipulated to impose views antithetical to religious liberty.

In regards to the future of the American consensus, Murray stated, “it would be for others, not Catholics, to ask themselves whether they still shared the consensus which first fashioned the American people into a body politic and determined the structures of its fundamental law.” I think Murray would be of the view that the U.S. bishops are taking a course that is consistent with his notion of religious freedom.

 

RJA sj

Wednesday, February 29, 2012

Religious Freedom as Confrontation and Inflammatory Rhetoric?

On February 14 of this year, a group of faculty of John Carroll University in Cleveland led by Professor Lauritzen (a professor of religious studies and an individual who has disagreed with Church teachings on marriage, human sexuality, and embryonic stem cell research in the past) wrote a letter to the President of the University calling for a stand against the Church’s authority by John Carroll University and other Catholic and Jesuit universities “in the face of the bishops’ unwillingness to accept the accommodation offered by the Obama administration” regarding the HHS mandate. The faculty letter contends that the stance of the bishops regarding the HHS mandate, which in part addresses free contraception coverage, is confrontational and inflammatory given the Obama administration’s effort to accommodate both religious freedom and the “access to contraception [that] is central to the health and well being of women and children.” Via dotCommonweal, the faculty letter can be found here.

These faculty members at John Carroll claim they are committed to the freedom of conscience and religious freedom, but like many who advocate for human rights, it becomes clear that, in their views, some “rights” trump others. Notwithstanding their recognition that the “bishops have the right to proclaim Catholic teaching vigorously and loudly” (which, incidentally would imply that the clerics, religious, and faithful have the right to believe in Catholic teachings and exercise them in accordance with the law of the Church, the international order, and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution), they contend that anything (including authentic religious freedom and rights of conscience) that conflicts with “access to contraception” that “is central to the health and well being of women and children” is of lesser importance.

In short, their recognition of religious freedom—for individuals, for groups of believers, and for the Church herself—will have to be sacrificed when the issue of the “rights of reproductive health” is on the table.

First of all, there are several matters contained in the letter that necessitate comment. The first is this: why is contraception central to the health and well being of children? Is it because they would be at risk if they did not have access to contraception? But this prompts the anticipated question, why should children have access to contraception? Is sexual encounter the only thing they will do that may endanger their lives? Should we not be more concerned about pre- and post-natal care for them? For essential vaccinations? For basic and good health-care in their formative years? Why should only contraception for children be the only health-care issue which the John Carroll faculty are concerned?  Perhaps the letter’s signatories had in mind something else and that the reason why children’s interests are at stake is because if contraception were not made available to adults, the children who result from the “unprotected” sexual encounters may be threatened by other factors such as a difficult life or abortion. The latter point about facing abortion is presented elsewhere in the letter when its authors state that “unplanned pregnancies harm the health of women and children and lead to more abortions.” So, the reasoning seems to be this: if contraception is not paid for by John Carroll University, children’s health will be compromised because they will be aborted if free contraception is not made available to the employees of this Catholic and Jesuit institution. Thus, why can’t John Carroll University go along with everyone else who believes in “family planning services as a part of preventive health care for women”? One answer quickly comes to mind: it is attempting to preserve its Catholic identity which is guarded by the non-derogable right of religious freedom.

But there is a second group of issues that this letter prompts about the bishops’ “resistance” to the “accommodation” and their playing “politics with women’s health.” In this second category of considerations, a central item deals with the Christian Catholic understanding of the nature of the human person. At the Second Vatican Council, the Fathers asked on occasion the fundamental question: quid est homo (what is man; what is the human person)? Is the human person first and last a corporeal entity primarily concerned with sexual encounters at any time with anyone for any or no reason? Or is the human person something else? The bishops and many Catholic faithful have argued otherwise and continue to assert otherwise. If there is a theology of the body as Blessed John Paul II spoke of so often and eloquently, there is surely a theology of the human person which addresses the person’s raison d’être: to live a good, i.e., virtuous, life in preparation for union with God—each person’s undeniable destiny as understood from the Catholic perspective. Unfortunately, the faculty letter addressed to the head of a Catholic university reveals none of this. Moreover, the text echoes the voice too often heard today in human rights discourse that sexual autonomy will always trump the long-established and non-derogable rights which include religious freedom—the right to believe in the question quid est homo and to exercise the answer that inevitably follows.

A principal hallmark of Catholic education has traditionally been that it is the place where God-given human intelligence comprehends the intelligible reality that surrounds the human person and human society so that what is good (i.e., what enables all human persons to flourish on the path to their destinies) can be pursued and what is not can be avoided. The John Carroll University faculty letter does not reveal this fundamental quality of education that employs the moniker “Catholic.” As it does not, there is reason to recall the series of addresses Archbishop Michael Miller delivered in the United States in 2005 and 2006 when he was the Secretary for the Congregation of Catholic Education and where he suggested that there might be need for a kind of “evangelical pruning” for those educational institutions which have compromised their Catholic identity, an identity that clearly and centrally is concerned with the question of what is the human person. I join the many who do not think that this is the right path for John Carroll University to take. Since the authors of the letter upon which I have been offering some comment have urged other institutions to follow their counsel, I do not think that the fruits of their advocacy constitute the proper path for any Catholic institution to pursue unless it wishes to cede its soul, its identity, by casting off the banner of Christ and accepting whatever accommodation might be offered so that “confrontation” and “inflammatory rhetoric” may be avoided.

 

RJA sj

Monday, February 27, 2012

JFK in Houston

I appreciate Steve posting on the JFK speech to the Houston Ministerial Association, September 1960. Many recall the significance of his speech with either their adulation or critique. However, as we consider the import of what then Senator Kennedy said in his formal remarks, we should also take stock of the answers he gave during the formal question-and-answer session that immediately followed the speech. We also need to consider the fact that this was a political speech geared not to losing votes but, more likely, to gaining them.

One of the first questions he had to contend with was whether, as a public official, he would attend a service in a church other than one that was Catholic. In this regard, Kennedy replied in the affirmative. But then he was pressed on why he cancelled an acceptance to attend the dedication of the Chapel of the Chaplains in Philadelphia in 1947. The Chapel was located in the lower level of a Protestant church and was designed as an interfaith place of prayer that commemorated the four brave chaplains (Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) aboard the USS Dorchester who gave their life vests to other service members as the ship was sinking. Kennedy’s answer was that if he were invited as a public official or simple citizen who had served in the Navy, he would have still gone to the dedication. But it appeared that he had been invited as the “Catholic spokesman,” and in this context he “did not feel [he] had very good credentials to attend” in this capacity. In the later analysis, it appears that Kennedy understood he was not in a position to speak for or bind the Catholic Church in whatever he said or did at the dedication. Moreover, as a fledgling office-holder, he indicated that his expertise was not theology and related matters.

That was a simple question—even though he was contentiously pushed with a hard follow-up question—with a relatively straightforward answer given again by Kennedy. But some of the ministers pressed on with more difficult questions. Several, seemingly encouraged by Kennedy’s position that he would not take instruction on public matters from his religious authorities, asked the senator if he would “appeal” to Catholic authorities in the US and in Rome with the plea “relative to the separation of church and state in the United States and religious freedom as separated in the Constitution of the United States, in order that the Vatican may officially authorize such a belief for all Roman Catholics in the United States.” Kennedy’s response demonstrated that he understood that the “separation of Church and State” was to benefit the Church as much as it was to benefit civil society, including the government. In his reply to this “appeal,” the senator said this:

“May I just say that as I do not accept the right of any, as I said, ecclesiastical official, to tell me what I shall do in the sphere of my public responsibility as an elected official, I do not propose also to ask Cardinal Cushing to ask the Vatican to take some action. I do not propose to interfere with their free right to do exactly what they want.”

When he was asked another question about the ability of the Catholic Church “to direct its members in various areas of life, including the political realm,” Kennedy provided a careful, prudential, and nuanced answer that indicated he understood a distinction between an “improper” influence and one that may well be proper. In this context, he may well have anticipated what Pope Paul VI was to say to the temporal leaders of the world five years later at the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council when he honored and respected their authority and sovereignty:

“What does the Church ask of you today? She tells you in one of the major documents of this council. She asks of you only liberty, the liberty to believe and to preach her faith, the freedom to love her God and serve Him, the freedom to live and to bring to men her message of life. Do not fear her.”

By Kennedy reminding the audience of the facts that the United States had previously had two Catholic Chief Justices of the Supreme Court, that Canada had previously had two Catholic Prime Ministers, that France had the Catholic De Gaulle, and that Germany had the Catholic Adenauer, it might be said that the words of Paul VI had already been in place during the Presidential campaign. If there was no reason to fear the Church in these instances cited by Kennedy (two of which included the United States), there should be no reason to fear John Kennedy now in 1960 solely on the basis that he was a Catholic.

One other minister kept peppering the senator with long, partial quotations from different Catholic sources (some of which were mistakenly attributed to Leo XIII when they were probably from Pius IX, i.e., The Syllabus of Errors) and asked Kennedy if he agreed with them. Before Kennedy had much opportunity to say anything, another member of the audience shouted out, “I object to this. Time is running out!” However, the minister with the peppering questions managed to get in one question to which Kennedy responded. The question involved a statement attributed to John XXIII that “Catholics must unite their strength toward the common aid and the Catholic hierarchy has the right and duty of guiding them.” The concern of this questioner focused on the Catholic hierarchy’s “right and duty of guiding” the faithful. Kennedy gave the response of a good politician by reminding the minister that any Baptist or other minister “has the right and duty to guide his flock” in matters of morals and the faith, so why should the pope or any Catholic bishop or priest be different?

As I am currently undertaking a research project to discern the views of John Kennedy throughout his public life (1947-1963) on “the separation of Church and State,” I hope to be able to raise from time to time some of the results of this work with my friends here at the Mirror of Justice. I think it safe to say at this stage that what I discover may help us consider this issue and related matters as they apply to the current Presidential campaign and general election that we shall all face in a few months.

 

RJA sj

 

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

What is freedom?

 

The Mirror of Justice and many other forums discussing the important issues of the day have been addressing freedom. A great deal of the recent focus has been on the claim made by many devout religious believers, including Catholics, that the HHS mandates for health insurance coverage of morally and legally problematic “services”. Of course there are some libertarians who view their perspective as the only one or the best one or the accurate one who disagree with this thought.

Virtually all speakers, sooner or later, rely on some form of the freedom argument. I think they are correct in this pursuit, especially when notions about the rule of law come into play. But what is freedom? Is it as the plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey argued: “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” If so, the collision course which I and others have predicted before is happening once again. In the context of the HHS mandate, we have the folks relying on “religious freedom” in direct conflict with those arguing “reproductive rights freedoms.”

But, one distinction between these two positions quickly emerges: the first group comprising advocates for religious freedom is not asking the second group to pay for their freedom; however, the second group is asking the first to pay for their freedom claim for “reproductive health services.” Should this distinction matter? Indeed, it should. But that is not why I write today. Rather, there is another, far more basic reason which rides on the meaning of freedom. What is it?

In previous postings I have drawn the distinction between the freedom “from” something and the freedom “for” something. Oftentimes the “something” is an authority. But that is not the only something. After a lot of pondering, I think the “something” is fundamentally that which permeates all human existence. The elemental reason for the distinction between the “from” and the “for” is this: there are things that are right, good, and proper for the human person to pursue because they affect many and sometimes all other members of the human family. There are also some things which the human person wants to do because they fulfill or satiate the individual will, i.e., the desires of this person, but these personal objectives do not take stock of the important interests of others. Another explanation for the distinction involves the reality of the Casey dicta: the desirable is what the individual person wants, and that’s it; there is no need to consider anybody else. This approach is a problem.

So is there some way of satisfactorily addressing this predicament?

A thought of Lord Acton offers relevant help. He once explained that authentic freedom is not that which the person wants or desires; rather, it is that which the person must do.

Note how the first element—doing what the individual wants—replicates the Casey formulation. This formulation coincides with the HHS mandate: the “freedom” of persons who want artificial birth control, abortion-inducing chemicals, sterilization, and other desires. This “freedom” is not something that ought to be done for the sake of all including the unborn and those persons with well-formed moral consciences that take stock of the “ought.”

Religious liberty is in the cross-hairs these days. I wish it were otherwise, but since it is not, let me suggest something for this web log community to consider: which of these two fundamental camps that I have identified in the HHS mandate matter is pursuing the self-serving and which is pursuing the other-serving? I submit that the distinction is clear.

 

RJA sj

 

Sunday, February 12, 2012

Suits agains the Holy See, the Pope, and the Secretary of State Withdrawn

Within the last day, the suits against the Holy See, the Pope, and Cardinals Sodano and Bertone (past and current Secretaries of State) have been withdrawn by Jeffrey Anderson and Marci Hamilton, attorneys for the Plaintiffs in the sex abuse cases involving children at the Milwaukee-area school for the deaf during the period 1950 to 1974.

The Vatican Radio announcement about the withdrawals is here.

Plaintiffs' counsel had relied on the so-called "smoking gun" of the 1922 document Crimen Sollicitantionis; however, reliance on this document involving the seal of the confessional was unfounded. It was also problematic for plaintiffs' counsel to argue incessantly that those allegedly responsible for the torts and crimes against the children were "employees of the Vatican."

I am certain that more will be said about these withdrawals and their impact on Mr. Anderson's and Professor Hamilton's efforts to implicate the universal Church. But, for the time being, fact and reason appear to be focusing these cases where they should be.

RJA sj