Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, May 1, 2020

Judge Walker's decision about the Lion's Den Adult Superstore billboard on I-65

Judge Justin Walker of the Western District of Kentucky was fairly criticized a few weeks ago for a lengthy and possibly unnecessary judicial disquisition on the law of religious freedom. Walker currently has a high profile because of a combination of his age, his apparent jurisprudential outlook, and his pending nomination to the D.C. Circuit. With a big target on his back, it's unsurprising that not all of the criticisms of him have been fair. But perhaps some are getting through.

Last week, Judge Walker held the Kentucky Billboard Act unconstitutional. Walker's opinion in L.D. Management Company v. Thomas (W.D. Ky. April 24, 2020) cannot be accused of running too long. It takes just six double-spaced pages for Walker to dispatch Kentucky's billboard law. 

The opinion is a bit too quick and too confident at points, at least for my taste. Near the end, for example, Judge Walker suggests in passing that Kentucky Transportation officials "may have selectively policed the particular billboard in this case." The opinion states: 

Lion's Den told Kentucky about other offending billboards on mobile structures and even provided photos of them. This evidence – which Kentucky filed in support of its summary judgment motion–raises a suspicion that Kentucky specifically targeted Lion's Den and ignored other billboards that broke its rules. If so, this selective enforcement is viewpoint discrimination, an even more 'egregious' violation of the First Amendment. 

This seemed a bit gratuitous, especially for an opinion that otherwise moved with such economy of expression. So I pulled the evidence Walker seemed to be referring to. It was with Kentucky's summary judgment motion, but it was the _plaintiff's_ answers to interrogatories from the administrative enforcement action. And the relevant interrogatory answer included information that undercuts plaintiff's viewpoint discrimination claim. The answer states that counsel shared the photographs with the Transportation Cabinet, and then states, "It was only after that information was provided that the other signs began to be removed." (21-3, p. 142, Answer to Interrogatory 24) (emphasis added). This is pretty weak sauce, and reads a bit like piling on the defense.

On the merits, Judge Walker's decision very well may be correct. As he explains in his opinion, the Sixth Circuit last September held unconstitutional a Tennessee billboard law that the appellate court described as "identical" to Kentucky's. See Thomas v. Bright, 937 F.3d. 721, 732 (6th Cir. 2019). As a judge on a federal district court hierarchically inferior to the Sixth Circuit, Judge Walker is bound by the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Thomas. That decision was issued a couple of months before the defense filed for summary judgment. That filing did not mention Thomas, but instead relied heavily an a prior Sixth Circuit decision that theThomas panel held to have been overruled by the Supreme Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015). That was a big omission.

If Kentucky appeals Judge Walker's decision, though, the appeal will not necessarily be DOA notwithstanding. The crux of Judge Walker's reasoning was that the Kentucky Billboard Act's distinction between signs advertising on-premises activities and those advertising off-premises activity rendered the law "content-based" and therefore subject to a strict First Amendment test. That determination tracked the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Thomas. But Judge Walker also included a discussion of severability, concluding that Kentucky's on-premises/off-premises distinction was not severable from the other provisions of the Act and implementing regulations that the billboard at issue violated. The severability of a state law is a question of state law. The Sixth Circuit's severability discussion in Thomas is therefore not determinative of the severability even of an identically worded Kentucky law. For complicated reasons that don't belong in this already lengthy blog post, the inclusion of severability might not have been necessary either to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Thomas or Judge Walker's decision in this case. But there's more than enough to argue about that an appeal by Kentucky would not be futile.

Finally, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Thomas v. Bright might itself be wrong. That's not something Judge Walker could decide for himself, but the freedom that he took in deciding what issues to discuss might have been better channeled toward considering the nature and limits of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Thomas and the facts of the case before him rather than on other aspects of the opinion that he did include. 

Thoughts about equality and the church-closure issue

Over in this post at my other perch, I have some observations about what I perceive (anecdotally) as rising tensions in response to the Coronavirus-related shutdown orders and other government policies. It's not every day that a municipal Italian government threatens to shut down Mass, disperse the congregants, and force a mask on a priest (see the video). The words are in Italian, but I translate enough of the exchange to give a sense of the tension. There are tensions here in the US, too, and I talk about some of those as I've observed them, from a distance, in New York.

One of the things these conflicts has me thinking about is the psychologically powerful, but (in my view) highly problematic, pull or draw of equality as equal treatment. I'm not saying anything that hasn't been said by others, but I find it interesting to observe that something of what they have said is working itself out in especially high relief and in real time.

In the very beginning of the virus crisis, the fear of the unknown and the comparatively broad coverage of the shutdown orders combined to overwhelm considerations of equal treatment. Food stores were open, yes, and churches were closed, but the emergency seemed to be understood to require drastic and rough measures, and people were prepared for a time to accept unequal treatment for, as it were, the common good.

But as the crisis reaches a second stage--an emergency of a different kind, now a more chronic or enduring condition--and as discretionary government decisions are made both as respects relaxing the closures and prosecuting violations of rules, the powerful psychological draw of equality as equal treatment starts to assert itself. Discretionary decisions require discrimination, and it's at this point that considerations of unfairness become stronger in people's psyche.

The trouble is that resentments about unequal treatment depend upon other, deeper judgments about the nature and value of various kinds of human activities. These judgments are signaled by the use of terms like "essential" but they aren't really resolved by them. Partisans of one or another sort of human activity or way of life then develop arguments for distinguishing the truly essential from the less essential, but these are invariably thought to be spurious or worse by partisans of another sort of human activity or way of life. The arguments about equality really are only cover for other sorts of arguments that it would not be possible to resolve without the rhetorical appeal to equality. The real disagreements go not only to different ways of life, but to different conceptions of the good or goods of any particular human activity. Consider religious observance. If one's view is that all of the true goods of religious observance can be obtained individually, at home, in solitary prayer in front of a screen, then one will think that distinguishing between churches and liquor stores--treating the goods of the human activities that these places foster unequally--is perfectly justified. But if one's view of the true goods of religious observance is very different, then one will not accept these arguments.

All of this to say something that has been said before, I suppose (see, e.g., Westen in part), but that seems especially striking to me right now. Both the psychological power of equality and its problematic, often unspoken, dependence on much deeper and more fundamental assumptions about the differential value of human activity, will become more acute as the crisis enters its subsequent and more attenuated phases.