Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, June 16, 2015

Decarbonization and abortion

At the Commonweal website, Anthony Annett has posted links to Margaret Archer's response  to a recent piece by Stefano Gennarini in which the latter (fairly, in my opinion) expressed concerns about Archbishop Sorondo's defense of the decision to include Jeffrey Sachs and Ban Ki-moon at a recent Vatican conference on climate change.  I don't want to weigh in on that dust-up, though (well, maybe a little . . . I think Archbishop Sorondo and Archer were simultaneously more defensive and aggressive than was warranted), and instead wanted to say just a bit about Anthony's statement, here, that:

So let the response to such provocation be: “I oppose abortion, but do you oppose decarbonization”? I would like to hear an answer to that question from Stefano Gennarini, George Weigel, Robbie George, Raymond Arroyo, Bill Donohue and all others who seek to downplay and dismiss these concerns.

I would argue that, from a moral perspective, opposing decarbonization is not that different from supporting legalized abortion—you might not be the acting moral agent, but you are still complicit in the structures of sin. Putting it another way, it might not be formal cooperation with evil, but it is certainly material.

I certainly do not "dismiss" concerns about the dangers posed to human well-being by failures to take care of our natural (as well as moral) ecology.  I do worry, though, about connecting too closely something as amorphous as "decarbonization" with the moral wrong of abortion.  I assume that it makes good sense and is the right thing to do to try -- in a way that makes sense and in which the reasonably foreseen costs are not exceeded by the reasonably foreseen benefits -- to "decarbonize" our local, national, and global economies (by, for example, facilitating the increased reliance on nuclear energy).

But, it also seems to me crucial to recall that, with respect to any particular elective abortion, we can say "those who performed and procured that abortion wronged the unborn child, who had a human right not to be violated, and it is unjust that our positive laws permitted that wrong to be done."  It is harder to say, when we observe our neighbor driving by on her way to drop the kids off at school on the way to work, "that neighbor of mine is committing a wrong and it is unjust that she is allowed to do so."

Now, Anthony talks about "material" cooperation and complicity in "structures of sin," and so he might well not disagree with what I said in the previous paragraph.  But, I guess I still have strong reservations about the suggestion that "opposing decarbonization" is similar to supporting abortion -- in part because I assume that none of thinkers Annett mentions "oppos[e] decarbonization" but instead oppose "the idea that decarbonization is a moral imperative that floats above cost-benefit analysis -- that is, the costs and benefits to the flourishing, health, and development of human persons -- of particular decarbonization proposals and policies." 

Monday, June 15, 2015

Horrifying

Something to keep in mind -- and tell others about -- whenever it is suggested that it is "scare-mongering" or "paranoid" to warn about how quickly and far off-the-rails we are going when it comes to respecting the dignity of disabled human persons:

Spain, like the rest of Western Europe, has made gentle peace with the idea of abortion on demand for any reason, including — or perhaps especially — a diagnosis of Down syndrome. This was on naked display this week in Madrid, where Genoma, a Swiss biotechnology company, debuted a building-sized banner advertisement for its latest “non-invasive” prenatal test for Down syndrome. The name of the test — “Tranquility,” could it get any creepier? — stretches out in broad letters above the soft-focus photo of a young girl with Down syndrome.

Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419736/abortion-friendly-firm-spain-uses-girl-down-syndrome-its-ads-matthew-hennessey

"Towers of Solid Ivory"

When I first read the last lines of Alasdair MacIntyre's book, After Virtue, I was not quite sure what Professor MacIntyre meant by awaiting another St. Benedict. But I suspected that what he intended was somebody who would have the genius to create a new institution in the way Benedict had. That is, I thought that the reference to Benedict was intended to suggest neither withdrawal from the fields of law and politics nor a kind of spiritual focus on the arts or the theater or poetry, but the possibility of the creation of a new institutional power (or of the renewal of an existing institutional power) one of whose primary functions would be wise and temperate resistance to the dominant socio-cultural order. The institution of the Benedictine monastery, more than the figure of Benedict himself, was the point.

Patrick Leigh Fermor's description of life at the Benedictine Abbey of St. Wandrille de Fontanelle, in his short gem, A Time to Keep Silence, captures this institutional feature of monastic life. Two things in particular struck me in these passages: first, the rigor of the Benedictine life--its difficulty. This is not just "focusing on the family," so to speak, or expressing one's religious sensibilities through art rather than politics. It is, instead, a profoundly different way of life than most people lead. Second, the idea that a subsidiary, but still important, feature of Benedictine life was intellectual--the highest, purest, and most impregnable peak of the ivory tower.

After the first postulate of belief, without which the life of a monk would be farcical and intolerable, the dominating fact of monastic existence is a belief in the necessity and the efficacy of prayer; and it is only by attempting to grasp the importance of this principle--a principle so utterly remote from every tendency of modern secular thought--to the monks who practise it, that one can hope to understand the basis of monasticism. This is especially true of the contemplative orders, like the Benedictines, Carthusians, Carmelites, Cistercians, Camaldulese and Sylvestrines; for the others, like the Franciscans, Dominicans or the Jesuits--are brotherhoods organised for action. They travel, teach, preach, convert, organise, plan, heal and nurse; and the material results they achieve make them, if not automatically admirable, at least comprehensible to the Time-Spirit. They get results; they deliver the goods. But what (the Time-Spirit asks) what good do the rest do, immured in monasteries far from contact with the world? The answer is--if the truth of the Christian religion and the efficacy of prayer are both dismissed as baseless--no more than any other human beings who lead a good life, make (for they support themselves) no economic demands on the community, harm no one and respect their neighbours. But, should the two principles be admitted--particularly, for the purposes of this particular theme, the latter--their power for good is incalculable. Belief in this power, and in the necessity of worshipping God daily and hourly, is the mainspring of Benedictine life. It was this belief that, in the sixth century, drove St. Benedict into the solitude of a cave in the Sabine gorges and, after three years of private ascesis, prompted him to found the first Benedictine communities. His book, The Rule of St. Benedict--seventy-three short and sagacious chapters explaining the theory and codifying the practice of the cenobitic life--is aimed simply at securing for his monks protection against the world, so that nothing should interfere with the utmost exploitation of this enormous force. The vows embracing poverty, chastity and obedience were destined to smite from these men all fetters that chained them to the world, to free them for action, for the worship of God and the practice of prayer; for the pursuit, in short, of sanctity....

These values have remained stable while those of the world have passed through kaleidoscopic changes. It is curious to hear, from the outside world in the throes of its yearly metamorphoses, cries of derision leveled at the monastic life. How shallow, whatever views may be held concerning the fundamental truth or fallacy of the Christian religion, are these accusations of hypocrisy, sloth, selfishness and escapism! The life of monks passes in a state of white-hot conviction and striving to which there is never a holiday; and no living man is in a position, after all, to declare their premises true or false. They have foresworn the pleasures and rewards of a world whose values they consider meaningless; and they alone have as a body confronted the terrifying problem of eternity, abandoning everything to help their fellow-man and themselves to meet it.

Worship, then, and prayer are the raison d’être of the Benedictine order; and anything else, even their great achievements as scholars and architects and doctors of the church, is subsidiary. They were, however, for centuries the only guardians of literature, the classics, scholarship and the humanities in a world of which the confusion can best be compared to our own atomic era. For a long period, after the great epoch of Benedictine scholarship at Cluny, the Maurist Benedictine Abbey of St. Germain-des-Prés was the most important residuary of learning and science in Europe. Only a few ivy-clad ruins remain, just visible between zazou suits and existentialist haircuts from the terrace of the Deux Magots. But in scores of abbeys all over Europe, the same liberal traditions survive and prosper. Other by-products of their life were the beautiful buildings in which I was living, and the unparalleled calm that prevailed there. At St. Wandrille I was inhabiting at last a tower of solid ivory, and I, not the monks, was the escapist. For my hosts, the Abbey was a springboard into eternity; for me a retiring place to write a book and spring more effectively back into the maelstrom. Strange that the same habitat should prove favourable to ambitions so glaringly opposed.

Do Pro-lifers have a "logic problem"?

Dana Milbank says "yes," in this WaPo piece.  Commenting on proposed legislation in the Senate that would closely regulate all late-term abortions, Milbank -- following Slate's Will Saletan -- charges Sen. Lindsey Graham and others with illogic (and worse):  "Opposing late-term abortions does next to nothing to reduce abortions, but it works well with Republican presidential primary voters. Broadening the use of contraceptives would seriously reduce abortions, but it would be poisonous to the GOP primary electorate."  He adds:

Yet pro-life groups refuse to take up the cause of birth control, because so many of their supporters have problems with that, too. “They’ve betrayed the one thing they stand for, which is reducing abortions,” Saletan said.

Put aside, for now, what strikes me as the very implausible claim that the declining numbers of abortions has little to do with the increased regulation of abortion facilities and providers.  (Put aside also the intriguing possibility that baby pictures on Facebook and higher-tech sonograms are contributing.)  And, let's concede for the sake of argument that increased access to contraception does not only correlate with, but also contribute to, a reduction in the number of abortions.

It is not "illogical," it seems to me, for someone to say (a) "X is unjust and harmful -- in fact, X involves a seriously immoral act of violence on an innocent person.   Accordingly, the public authority should prohibit, to the extent possible, X, just as it would prohibit other seriously unjust and harmful acts" while at the same time not saying (b) "we will pursue and enact all regulatory and policy measures that might contribute, through incentives, etc., to a reduction in X."  Some some measures will and should be enacted, for sure.  But some might have downsides, some might be too expensive, some might themselves be unjust.  In such cases, a decision to not pursue and enact such measures does not mean that the claim in (a) about the immorality of X is hypocritical or undermined.

The Inklings

I'm certainly not alone, but C.S. Lewis significantly affected and shaped how I think -- and how I want to think -- about the world.  It's not only the Narnia books and the Space Trilogy (though I still think they're wonderful) and it's also not the more famous apologetics works, like Mere Christianity.  For me, a little book (his last) called The Discarded Image, along with a short essay called "The Weight of Glory," were key.  I've cited often, both in published work and in talks, the following passage from the latter:

“There are no ordinary people.  You have never talked to a mere mortal.  Nations, cultures, arts, civilizations—these are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat.  But it is immortals whom we joke with, work with, marry, snub, and exploit—immortal horrors or everlasting splendours.”

(In fact, "Everlasting Splendours" is the title of this chapter I did in a really nice volume on Catholic legal thought edited by our own Michael Scaperlanda and Teresa Collett.) 

Anyway . . . the Chronicle has this review of this new book, by Carol and Philip Zaleski on "The Inklings."  Check it out.

Joseph Vining on the thought of John Noonan

Joseph Vining has posted (here) a short paper called "Reading John Noonan," which is forthcoming in the Villanova Law Review.  The abstract is short-and-sweet:

John Noonan is a giant in American law and legal practice -- a distinguished legal historian and a true judge. His reflections on the nature of law have a special importance. This essay is a comment on basic elements in his thought.

And, check out the keywords:

jurisprudence, slavery, universality of value, development and change, morality, history, person, legal person, individual, equity practice, human rights, utilitarianism, positivism, humanism

!

The 800th

 

Today, June 15, 2015, marks the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta. It is as relevant today as it was 800 years ago. Elements have found their way into longstanding Anglo-American and other law. I find, in particular, the Magna Carta’s discussion of the libertas ecclesiae pertinent. In the first substantive discussion, the Carta states:

 

In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present charter confirmed for us and our heirs forever that the English Church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her liberties inviolate; and we will that it be thus observed; which is apparent from this that the freedom of elections, which is reckoned most important and very essential to the English Church, we, of our pure and unconstrained will, did grant, and did by our charter confirm and did obtain the ratification of the same from our lord, Pope Innocent III, before the quarrel arose between us and our barons: and this we will observe, and our will is that it be observed in good faith by our heirs forever.

 

Of course there are components of this text that raise certain questions about whether the temporal sovereign himself had the authority which he was granting to others, including God. In a later context, Thomas More reminded the civil authorities of his time, particularly King Henry VIII, of the legal significance of these words from the Magna Carta. The king chose to ignore More’s counsel and the words themselves when he substituted as the law of the realm his own will-based legislation that was flawed. In the 21st century, these words of the Magna Carta have, I think, a bearing on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. After all, the Constitution came from the same bolt of legal fabric as did the Magna Carta.

I am presently working on an essay about religious freedom and the bearing that the Declaration of Religious Freedom of the Second Vatican Council has on the important legal and civil right of religious liberty. With God’s grace, I shall have something completed by the end of the summer. The words of the Magna Carta have a bearing on how I understand religious freedom in the present age.

 

RJA sj

Thursday, June 11, 2015

Applying Subsidiarity in Business

My colleagues at the John Ryan Institute for Catholic Social Thought, Michael J. Naughton, Jeanne G. Buckeye, Kenneth E. Goodpaster and T. Dean Maines, have written a book applying the principle of subsidiarity in a concrete context.  This might be a good resource for those teaching or working with Catholic social teachings.  Their description:

Respect in Action: Applying Subsidiarity in Business is a book addressed to business leaders committed to implementing sustainable organizational changes consistent with the key principles of Catholic Social Thought.  It is directed to managers whose decisions and purposes influence not only the economy, but the lives of men and women around the world who work for them. Subsidiarity invites organizations to pursue the common good through practices that take the integral development of the human person at least as seriously as economic prosperity. We believe this book has something important to say to practitioners as well as to business faculty and students.

You can download it (for free) as a PDF or e-book here.

Understanding the Francis Papacy

Portsmouth Abbey, a monastery and boarding school on the coast of scenic Rhode Island, is hosting the conference, "Like a Shepherd He Will Tend His Flock:  Understanding the Francis Papacy," on June 19-21st.  

The all-star line up of presenters include: 

Cardinal Seán Patrick O’Malley
Ross Douthat
R.R. Reno
Kathryn Jean Lopez
Fr. Dwight Longenecker
Elizabeth Stoker Bruenig
Fr. Roger Landry
John Carr
Christoper White
Anna Bonta Moreland
Kenneth Colston

The conference organizes say they seek to "foster an authentic understanding of Pope Francis and will explore the major themes of his papacy." Here are the guiding questions: 

–Who is Pope Francis? How does his background — as an Argentinian, a Jesuit, a pastor — motivate his own faith and mission?

–How should the Holy Father’s teachings on economics and the “throwaway culture” influence American social and economic policy?

–What are the main challenges confronting the Church at this point in history, and how is Pope Francis confronting them?

–How does Pope Francis encourage us to live out the fundamental doctrines of the Church?

–How should we understand Pope Francis’s reformational zeal within the context of Church history?

More here

Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Judicial rulings change our law through addition, not subtraction

Randy Barnett continues his debate with Ed Whelan on judicial supremacy (about which I have previously commented here and here). Barnett poses some questions to clarify their joint inquiry and presents his answers to advance it.

Here are some of my own answers to Barnett's questions (which I think are similar to answers that Paulsen and Whelan would give as well): 

Continue reading