Timely (and timeless?) wisdom from Justice Brennan

From his concurring opinion, in McDaniel v. Paty (1978):

That public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may arouse emotion, may incite, may foment religious divisiveness and strife, does not rob it of constitutional protection. . . .   The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife does not place religious discussion, association, or political participation in a status less preferred than rights of discussion, association, and political participation generally.

 

Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including . . . vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course, churches, as much as secular bodies and private citizens, have that right. . . .

 

The State's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and strife may not be accomplished by regulating religious speech and political association. The Establishment Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals, and therefore subject to unique disabilities . . . .  Government may not inquire into the religious beliefs and motivations of officeholders -- it may not remove them from office merely for making public statements regarding religion, or question whether their legislative actions stem from religious conviction . . . ..

 

In short, government may not, as a goal, promote "safe thinking" with respect to religion, and fence out from political participation those, such as ministers, whom it regards as overinvolved in religion. Religionists, no less than members of any other group, enjoy the full measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political activity generally. The Establishment Clause, properly understood, is a shield against any attempt by government to inhibit religion as it has done here . . . .  It may not be used as a sword to justify repression of religion or its adherents from any aspect of public life. . . .

 

Our decisions under the Establishment Clause prevent government from supporting or involving itself in religion, or from becoming drawn into ecclesiastical disputes. [n26] These prohibitions naturally tend, as they were designed to, to avoid channeling political activity along religious lines, and to reduce any tendency toward religious divisiveness in society. Beyond enforcing these prohibitions, however, government may not go. The antidote which the Constitution provides against zealots who would inject sectarianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to refutation in the marketplace of ideas, and their platforms to rejection at the polls. With these safeguards, it is unlikely that they will succeed in inducing government to act along religiously divisive lines, and, with judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause, any measure of success they achieve must be short-lived, at best.