Conjugal Union: What Marriage Is and Why It Matters

In my heart of hearts, I wonder whether there actually is anyone who, in his or her heart of hearts, actually believes that some provision of the Constitution of the United States, independently of any interpreter's personal philosophical or political preferences about marriage law and policy, really does require states to opt for one conception of marriage (say, the idea that marriage is sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership) over a competing conception (say, the idea of marriage as a conjugal or "one-flesh" union).  The only argument I can think of that someone might rely on is the claim that the Constitution forbids irrational legislation and that the idea of marriage as a conjugal union simply lacks any basis in reason--that the only rational understanding of marriage is the idea of marriage as romantic companionship.  But that would be an awfully peculiar thing to say to Plato, Aristotle, Xenophanes, Musonius Rufus, Plutarch, Augustine, Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, Mahatma Gandhi, and Elizabeth Anscombe.  In any event, Patrick Lee and I offer a formal philosphical defense of the conjugal understanding of marriage (and critique of the romantic companionship conception) in our new book, published by Cambridge University Press:  Congual Union:  What Marriage Is and Why It Matters.