Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Notre Dame re-files its religious-freedom challenge to the mandate

I was very pleased to learn that, on Monday morning, the University of Notre Dame re-filed its challenge to the contraception-coverage mandate.  Michael Sean Winters has more details and analysis (with which I largely agree -- especially the discussion of "the freedom of the church") here.  And, the story in our local paper is here.  And, a short piece by me, in Notre Dame Magazine, about the University's challenge is here.

The University's President, Fr. John Jenkins, issued what I thought was an excellent statement regarding the University's decision to re-file, notwithstanding the so-called "accommodation."  (I have not yet been able to find a link to the statement.)  Instead of limiting his discussion to sometimes-technical issues of "material" and "formal" cooperation, he talks in terms of mission, character, integrity, and pluralism:

Our abiding concern in both the original filing of May 21, 2012 and this re-filing has been Notre
Dame’s freedom—and indeed the freedom of many religious organizations in this
country—to live out a religious mission. . . .

As I said regarding our original filing, because at its core this filing is about the freedom of a religious organization to live its mission, its significance goes well beyond any debate about contraceptive services.  For if we concede that the Government can decide which religious organizations are sufficiently religious to be awarded the freedom to follow the principles that define their mission, then we have begun to walk down a path that ultimately will undermine those institutions.  For if one Presidential Administration can override our religious purpose and use religious organizations to advance policies that undercut our values, then surely another Administration will do the same for another very different set of policies, each time invoking some concept of popular will or the public good, with the result that these religious organizations become mere tools for the exercise of government power, morally subservient to the state, and not free from its infringements.  If that happens, it will be the end of genuinely religious organizations in all but name.

This, it seems to me, is really what is at stake -- not only Notre Dame's legal right not to be compelled to do wrong, but its legal right to be Notre Dame. 

Dane on Legislative Prayer

Perry Dane has a very interesting post over at CLR Forum on legislative prayer and Town of Greece v. Galloway. Perry was Justice Brennan's law clerk at the time the Court decided Marsh v. Chambers and Justice Brennan authored a dissent. I see things a little differently than Perry on this issue, but that hardly matters. His analysis is well worth reading, particularly on the question of what ought to happen if the Court follows the majority view in Marsh. Here's a bit:

At that point [if the Court adheres to Marsh], it seems to me, the principle that prayer is serious business would require us to let (most of) the chips fall where they may.  For the reasons Justice Brennan stated, courts should not demand that legislative prayer be “nonsectarian.”  There is, with respect to prayer, no such thing.  Bland prayers, and prayers to an unnamed deity, are — if taken seriously as religious acts — just as “sectarian” as more apparently meaty prayers.  Certainly, judges should not try to monitor or censor individual prayers to strip them of religious particularity.  Nor should they even even try, as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit panel did, to decide whether a whole pattern of prayer over several years is somehow disproportionate by being, for example, too Christian.

I wouldn’t rule out all constitutional limits on the particulars of legislative prayer.  Since legislative prayers are, for better or worse, said in a civic context, the Constitution might at least demand that they be civil, in the sense of not disparaging other faiths.  More to the point, maybe, the Establishment Clause might bar processes for selecting chaplains, guest chaplains, or the like that by their terms manifestly exclude certain faiths, or for that matter even all faiths other than the preferred one.

To be sure, the distinction between exclusion and inclusion is shaky, and applying it in particular cases even more so.  But it might be the closest we can get to a fair rule while still treating prayer as serious business.

Monday, December 2, 2013

"Why the World Doesn't Take Catholicism Seriously"

A bracing challenge -- very much in keeping with Pope Francis's ministry so far, I think -- from Matthew Warner.  I have an uneasy sense that a similar challenge could be issued to "Catholic legal theory" . . .

Cloutier on Douthat, Francis, "conservatives" . . . and the rule of law

A good read, at Catholic Moral Theology, from David Cloutier.  I would quibble with the invocation and ritual-denunciation of supposedly "Randian" talk and thinking among "conservative" Catholics (because I do not believe that, really, any meaningfully Catholic "conservatives" embrace anything like Ayn Rand's objectivism and do believe that we should avoid taking down straw-men).

Anyway, one of the things I liked about Cloutier's piece is his reminder that "secure property rights" -- and, I would extend this to "the rule of law" more generally -- have to be seen as essential aspects of any market-system that has any hope of contributing to authentic human development.  It's not so much that "capitalism" in the abstract helps to lift people and societies out of poverty -- it is that a (reasonably regulated and relatively easily navigable and fairly transparent) market economy that rests on a foundation of rule-of-law commitments, well-designed social-welfare programs, and functioning legal mechanisms does so.

More on "re-enchantment"

A reader sent in the following, which might be of interest:

Regarding Mr. Bottum's recent posts, you may have already read Tel Aviv University Professor Yishai Blank's article - The Re-enchantment of Law, 96 Cornell Law Review 633 (2011), (available at http://cornell.lawreviewnetwork.com/files/2013/02/Blank-final-essay.pdf ). The abstract:
 

The religious revival observed throughout the world since the 1980s is making its mark on legal theory, threatening to shift the jurisprudential battleground from debates over law’s indeterminacy and power to conflicts over law’s grounds, meaning, unity, coherence, and metaphysical underpinnings. Following the immense impact of the legal-realist movement on American jurisprudence, the major jurisprudential conflicts in the United States throughout the twentieth century revolved around the themes of the indeterminacy and power inherent in adjudication (and the resulting delegitimization of it), pitting theories that emphasized these critical themes against schools of thought that tried to reconstruct and reconstitute the determinacy and legitimacy of adjudication. Over the past couple of decades, however, a new jurisprudential dividing line has emerged without attracting much notice or attention. This new divide, which I draw in this Essay, is between thinkers who adhere to a disenchanted, instrumentalist, and secularized view of the law and theoreticians who try to reenchant it by reintroducing a degree of magic, sacredness, and mystery into the law; by reconnecting it to a transcendental or even divine sphere; by finding unity and coherence in the entirety of the legal field; and by bringing metaphysics “back” into the study of law.


Thus a new stage in the evolution of modern legal theory is emerging in which formal legal rationality is no longer the high point of legal disenchantment (as Max Weber saw it) but a model for law’s reenchantment as against the almost universally accepted disenchanting legal theories. And although the question of legal interpretation - and the possibility of objective and legitimate adjudication - is still motivating some of these theories, the reenchanting theories aim to shift the jurisprudential debates from questions of the consequences of legal principles and rules to fundamental questions concerning the grounds of law. This ground shifting might invoke new jurisprudential conflicts between secularism and religiosity, between pragmatism and metaphysics, and between critical and magical thinking. In order to evaluate and demonstrate my claim I analyze four exemplary (though not exhaustive) modes of legal reenchantment that have emerged over the last thirty years: the reenchantment of legal formalism, the reenchantment of virtue, the reenchantment of law as art, and the reenchantment of legal authorities.

 

Ten Thoughts on the Garnett-Bottum Exchange

Here are ten thoughts on the exchange between Rick and Jody Bottum. Thanks to both men for provoking them.

  1. Mr. Bottum is on to something important on the issue of cultural change. Cultural change often is not driven by law or by legal argument, but the other way round. And it also seems to me that this is a desirable state of affairs. We should not want law to be the primary driving force of cultural change, and it would be regrettable, if not dangerous, to live in a society in which law arrogated to itself this function. 
  2. To that extent, Mr. Bottum is right. If one wishes to change the culture, law is not and should not be the exclusive, or even the primary, medium through which one works. He is also right that poetry and storytelling and literature and art, etc., are promising methods, as they have always been.
  3. Still, law has its role to play. Lon Fuller once observed in response to the challenge of legal realism that there is mutual action and reaction between law and culture. Even if law is not and should not be a primary cultural determinant, it is certainly one such determinant. Law's effect on culture is not the less important for being secondary and (generally speaking) reactive. I am thus unsure what Mr. Bottum means when he writes that "you law professors have had the public intellectual part in your hands for forty years." We have had the part that relates to law, and we have taken up that part by our best lights--sometimes well, sometimes poorly. Others have played other parts, also to greater or lesser effect. Mr. Bottum himself has played his own role. There seems to be no shortage of available work, so we needn't niggle over whose turn it is at the bullhorn. 
  4. But perhaps this does not do justice to the sense in which Mr. Bottum may believe that law is actually a problem or an impediment to various larger aims. In fact, it's much worse than he thinks. I fear he may underestimate just how important law has become in our society as a source of value, beauty, and shared meaning. To take one provincial example (what do you expect from a law professor?) this is the reason that Legal Ethics is so hard to teach. People think of it and teach it as a course about rules, but actually, it ought to be taught as a course about law's powerful, usually subterranean cultural and ethical impact. Bar associations and legal education reformers like very much to talk about the importance of ethics and imparting "professional values" to new lawyers, but in fact they usually have very little clear idea what that means. Worse still, it seems vitally important that these ideas remain perpetually vague. To infuse them with content might well disturb what Roger Cramton once described as the ordinary religion of the law school classroom, which is not too far distant from the ordinary religion of the legal profession and the legal culture, which is to say, the culture.
  5. It will be a daunting task indeed to "re-enchant" the culture, if that is what Mr. Bottum has in mind, in part because it will require disenchanting it from law. The terms in which we think about culture are all too often legal terms. That's more or less what remains as a common discursive currency, cheapened by inflation and otherwise devalued as it may be. Another local example: though he did not say so, Mr. Bottum may see the project in which we are engaged at MOJ as problematic inasmuch as it works within a legal framework or world view. The fact that the project has definite limits makes it appealing to me, but those with larger ambitions will want more.
  6. I also sympathize in some ways with the weariness Mr. Bottum has expressed in other contexts and which makes a background appearance here. I am coming to tire more and more of the screeching, scratching, gnawing, biting scuffles about law and religion that one is forced into. But it would be wrong to believe that these fights are increasingly tedious because they don't sufficiently engage cultural issues. In fact, they are tiresome because there is so little law in them. If anything has been true for forty years (at least), it is that law and culture have been too often fused into a kind of cheap alloy, to the detriment and diminution of both, particularly law.  
  7. There is an assumption, one that one hears with some frequency these days, in some of the talk about focusing elsewhere than law, that if we do so the state and those many that stand opposite will be appeased. They will leave us alone. We will be able to go on defending positions we find important, living the way that we think best, and the state will take its ball and go home. I think that assumption is false. First, I had thought the whole point was to stop discussing law and politics and start talking about something else. And second, skepticism about this assumption is one reason that I admire the difficult work of Rick, Tom Berg, Douglas Laycock, and others. But it is also the reason that I am uncomfortable with the strategy of sympathetic reciprocity that I sometimes see in Tom's always deeply thoughtful commentary. Perhaps mine is an overly pessimistic disposition--and I've now been dutifully admonished about the shortcomings of "sourpusses." But the case here is simpler: if Mr. Bottum really believes that singing in the trees and rivers will make abortions less common, I'm afraid I see things differently. The state and those on the other side of the issue will see to that. They will be the only game in town.
  8. Speaking of "hymns to God that are sung in trees and rivers," what is all of this pantheistic, Whitmanesque nonsense? Having read Rick's Notre Dame essay to which Mr. Bottum approvingly linked, I must differ with both of them about Whitman and Whimanesquery respectively. I find Walt Whitman pretty hard to take and think he and Emerson are not the best writers America has produced. As Mark Lilla once put it, in the study of American literature, "just steer clear of anything polluted by Emerson." That goes double for Whitman.
  9. Unfortunately, the last point isn't really about Whitman. Suppose we accept Mr. Bottum's advice and pivot to cultural or metaphysical matters and away from law. We should fully expect to rekindle some of the same sorts of culture war conflagrations that we were so intent on snuffing out. We will fight about whether the cultural turn should in fact be a "song of myself" or a song about someone or something else. I wonder whether many Catholics inclined to the cultural turn will agree with one another about what is enchanting, what is re-enchanting, and what is altogether disenchanting. Some things are worse that Weber's Iron Cage. I suspect there will be considerable disagreement, and that the fire will rage on.
  10. Last, and least. The idea that making the cultural turn will mean "pulling back on politics" (in Patheos's locution) is mistaken. The argument seems to be that if we stick to our tree-chanting, we will have effectively lopped off political and ethical matters. One sees this sort of "non-political" point often, but I confess I am mystified by it (maybe "politics" is being used in a way I don't understand). As I have observed before, all Popes are political (just like the rest of us), and it is intended (and I hope is taken) as a token of respect, not disparagement, to call Pope Francis's recent Exhortation an openly and patently political, social, and ethical document (not only that, of course, but plainly that). To take the cultural turn and to devote one's waking hours to matters other than law and politics will not usher in a new era of abstention from legal, political, and ethical questions. Taking positions on such questions is inevitable, though there are more and less effective ways of doing so. It might be better to be candid about that. Then we could talk substance, rather than form or process, as Mr. Bottum rightly urges.

Sunday, December 1, 2013

What is Marriage? A reply to Charles Reid

A little while back, Michael called attention to Charles Reid's Huffington Post essay criticizing the argument Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson, and I present in What is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense. I promised that Sherif, Ryan and I would soon reply. We do that today at Pubic Discourse:

http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/12/11634/